103 Opinion of the Court. does not sell news and does not operate for profit, or that technically the title to the news remains in the petitioner during interstate transmission." Petitioner being so engaged in interstate commerce, the Congress may adopt appropriate regulations of its activities for the protection and advancement, and for the insurance of the safety of, such commerce. The National Labor Relations Act seeks to protect the employees' right of collective bargaining, and prohibits acts of the employer discriminating against employees for union activities and advocacy of such bargaining, by denominating them unfair practices to be abated in accordance with the terms of the act. As is shown in the opinion in Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, the experience under the Railway Labor Act has demonstrated the efficacy of such legislation in preventing industrial strikes and obviating interference with the flow of interstate commerce. The petitioner, however, insists that editorial employees such as Watson are remote from any interstate activity and their employment and tenure can have no direct or intimate relation with the course of interstate commerce. We think, however, it is obvious that strikes or labor disturbances amongst this class of employees would have as direct an effect upon the activities of the petitioner as similar disturbances amongst those who operate the teletype machines or as a strike amongst the employees of telegraph lines over which petitioner's messages travel. In Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 570, we held a statute United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420; United States v. Simpson, 252 U. S. 465. 'Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 560. 146212-37- -9 Opinion of the Court. 301 U.S. protecting the rights of collective bargaining by railway employees was within the competence of Congress under the commerce clause and that its provisions extended to clerks who had no direct contact with the actual facilities of railway transportation. We there said: "Exercising this authority, Congress may facilitate the amicable settlement of disputes which threaten the service of the necessary agencies of interstate transportation. In shaping its legislation to this end, Congress was entitled to take cognizance of actual conditions and to address itself to practicable measures. The legality of collective action on the part of employees in order to safeguard their proper interests is not to be disputed. It has long been recognized that employees are entitled to organize for the purpose of securing the redress of grievances and to promote agreements with employers relating to rates of pay and conditions of work. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209. Congress was not required to ignore this right of the employees but could safeguard it and seek to make their appropriate collective action an instrument of peace rather than of strife.” In Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, supra, we have held an amendment of the Railway Labor Act, in all material respects analogous to the statute here under consideration, applicable to so-called back-shop employees of railroads despite the contention that their employment is remote from interstate transportation. These decisions foreclose the petitioner's contention that Watson's employment had no relation to interstate commerce and could not be subjected to the regulatory provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Second. Does the statute, as applied to the petitioner, abridge the freedom of speech or of the press, safeguarded by the First Amendment? We hold that it does not. It 103 Opinion of the Court. is insisted that the Associated Press is in substance the press itself, that the membership consists solely of persons who own and operate newspapers, that the news is gathered solely for publication in the newspapers of members. Stress is laid upon the facts that this membership consists of persons of every conceivable political, economic, and religious view, that the one thing upon which the members are united is that the Associated Press shall be wholly free from partisan activity or the expression of opinions, that it shall limit its function to reporting events without bias in order that the citizens of our country, if given the facts, may be able to form their own opinions respecting them. The conclusion which the petitioner draws is that whatever may be the case with respect to employees in its mechanical departments it must have absolute and unrestricted freedom to employ and to discharge those who, like Watson, edit the news, that there must not be the slightest opportunity for any bias or prejudice personally entertained by an editorial employee to color or to distort what he writes, and that the Associated Press cannot be free to furnish unbiased and impartial news reports unless it is equally free to determine for itself the partiality or bias of editorial employees. So it is said that any regulation protective of union activities, or the right collectively to bargain on the part of such employees, is necessarily an invalid invasion of the freedom of the press. We think the contention not only has no relevance to the circumstances of the instant case but is an unsound generalization. The ostensible reason for Watson's discharge, as embodied in the records of the petitioner, is "solely on the grounds of his work not being on a basis for which he has shown capability." The petitioner did not assert and does not now claim that he had shown bias in the past. It does not claim that by reason Opinion of the Court. 301 U.S. of his connection with the union he will be likely, as the petitioner honestly believes, to show bias in the future. The actual reason for his discharge, as shown by the unattacked finding of the Board, was his Guild activity and his agitation for collective bargaining. The statute does not preclude a discharge on the ostensible grounds for the petitioner's action; it forbids discharge for what has been found to be the real motive of the petitioner. These considerations answer the suggestion that if the petitioner believed its policy of impartiality was likely to be subverted by Watson's continued service, Congress was without power to interdict his discharge. No such question is here for decision. Neither before the Board, nor in the court below, nor here has the petitioner professed such belief. It seeks to bar all regulation by contending that regulation in a situation not presented would be invalid. Courts deal with cases upon the basis of the facts disclosed, never with nonexistent and assumed circumstances. The act does not compel the petitioner to employ anyone; it does not require that the petitioner retain in its employ an incompetent editor or one who fails faithfully to edit the news to reflect the facts without bias or prejudice. The act permits a discharge for any reason other than union activity or agitation for collective bargaining with employees. The restoration of Watson to his former position in no sense guarantees his continuance in petitioner's employ. The petitioner is at liberty, whenever occasion may arise, to exercise its undoubted right to sever his relationship for any cause that seems to it proper save only as a punishment for, or discouragement of, such activities as the act declares permissible. The business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privi lege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court." He is subject to the anti-trust laws.10 Like others he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business." The regulation here in question has no relation whatever to the impartial distribution of news. The order of the Board in nowise circumscribes the full freedom and liberty of the petitioner to publish the news as it desires it published or to enforce policies of its own choosing with respect to the editing and rewriting of news for publication, and the petitioner is free at any time to discharge Watson or any editorial employee who fails to comply with the policies it may adopt. Third. The contentions that the act deprives the petitioner of property without due process, that the order of the Board deprives petitioner of the right to trial by jury, and that the act is invalid on its face because it seeks to regulate both interstate and intrastate commerce, are sufficiently answered in the opinion in Texas and N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, supra, and in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., ante, p. 1, and need no further discussion here. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, dissenting. Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER, MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS, MR. JUSTICE BUTLER and I think the judgment below should be reversed. One of the points inade in the court below, and assigned as error here is that the statute involved, as applied, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281. "Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402. 10 Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., supra. 11 1Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250. |