familiar to them, as the idea of worlds on worlds in space is to us; that it would not have been in keeping with their time ideas, had the seers of Israel limited their conceptions of the periods of creation to days of twenty-four hours; and he proves from their thoughts and language, when they go back and recall the birth and growth of the world, that they did not so understand the Mosaic record. This discussion of the Time-Thought of the ancients upholds, confirms, and establishes the validity of all his other reasonings. As thus upheld, all the previous investigations in the volume receive decisive force.

CHAPTER II.

BUT what reader ever did glean, or could by any possibility glean, the least idea, intimation, or hint, of any of these things from Professor Dana's criticism on "The Six Days of Creation?" Since that volume was published, Lewis has frankly said, that he had "looked with anxiety to the examination of other biblical scholars in respect to the reasonings about the great time-words, so strangely used in the ancient Shemitic dialects, and the interpretation given them. Here was the foundation of all the other arguments. Here, it was thought, was found that peculiar feature in the ancient thinking, which relieved all the other interpretations from the forced, or the mere possible aspect." Lewis says, this is "the great question, which is the hinge of the whole discussion, What is the fair interpretation of the word Day, as it stands in a very ancient record, dealing in very extraordinary ideas, and expressed in very remarkable language? This inquiry pervades the book; everything is subservient to this issue; all seemingly divergent discussions grow out of it, return to it, and terminate in it." Thus the author. On the other hand, thus the critic: "Between the fourth and fifth days a discussion again comes in on the word Day, and on time, and on the uses of the sun, which it is here unnecessary to consider." On searching through the criticism, it is found the "again" is deceptive, the "here" delusive! This sentence is its only allusion to the soul of the volume it professes to review!1

1 Prof. D.'s first critique was published January 1856. Subsequently he continued his criticisms. In a third article, a year and a half after the first, he alludes, in a note of five lines, to the discussion of the word Day in the volume, as "worthy of attentive consideration."

Another fact is connected with this. Lewis groups together the ideas suggested by the creation of the animal and the vegetable races under the Fifth Day. The critic wonders at this, "in a work exegetical, profound," "offered as a contribution to biblical literature," etc. etc., and even asks "Can we be satisfied that the word of God has been sufficiently studied and apprehended, when not even a mention of the creation of quadrupeds is introduced into the chapter on the Sixth Day?" Lewis, bringing to bear his philological and analytical powers upon the record of the creation of vegetables and animals, discloses in it remarkable truths, bearing on the duration Moses intended by the term Day. The terms in different parts of the record are similar, but are most explicit when the fifth day's work is described. At that time, therefore, he stated what he had to say, "preferring economy of reasoning to any useless affectation of chronological order.” His reader is foretold of this, and reminded of it. His course, and his reasons for it, are set forth in the proper places. The charge, then, which intimates that the author did not know what even children ought to know, could not have been made by one who heeded the statements or the plan of the work.

The critic not only discards the main design, but also a subordinate one, important in itself, and in its relations to the main design. The book opens with three chapters on Phenomenal Language. These give a philosophical exposition of the language of inspiration on natural subjects. Old as the topic forced on the mind of Christendom by the theories of Copernicus is, it was never so well thought out before. These chapters adjust a perplexing subject, never before adjusted and disposed of. This exposition of scriptural language on natural subjects is the finest piece of thinking ever wrought out on that topic, the perfecting of all the previous right thinking upon it. It often happens that the thought, in the main the right thought of former generations, needs to be wrought out, and placed on an immovable base. To do this, there is required a mind capable of giving a brief, clear, and just presentment of compre

hensive and difficult truth. The fact that a truth is partially well apprehended, often hinders it from being fully comprehended; for lesser minds are content to take it as it was given to them, and so to hand it down to others. Thus, a halfwrought shape it stands, waiting the eye, the thought, the touch of Phidias.

For these chapters, the volume is invaluable to every scholar, and especially to every divine; but, whatever their worth, they are indispensable to all that follows in the volume. Lewis points this out. On phenomenal language he "must be allowed to dwell;" his "ideas on it are vital to the whole discussion." Yet the critic gives no hint of these noble chapters, preliminary to all the reasoning of the volume.

At this point, we turn from the substance of this criticism to its style. It is supercilious. A very few words, which, detached from their context, seem otherwise, really form no

1 This is too faint a term. We like not to seem to make more public what the critic has said; but can it be more public? On seeing it, no one can deny a reply to it should be made; and it has met us too often to doubt of this. He is reckless. He opens with twelve pages, which "are trite, and would be out of place," i. e., below the intelligence of his readers, "were it not for lamentable ignorance, of which the book at the head of his article is an example." This style is kept up for two years, and for one hundred and sixty pages. Of the study of nature his author" is ill-prepared to be a self-appointed judge." "He knows nothing of the depths of truth in God's works." "He has a limited comprehension of the Sacred Record"—"a negligent way of following it." His tone is "not at all good-natured” — “arrogant "—"unmannerly." His "unworthy spirit is due to prejudice and ignorance." "His mind is unfit for research." A meaning is put on a clause, such as no one else ever put on it, and then it is said, "This is not in any way or sense true." And things similar to this are done many times. "On almost every page God's works are treated as if the Creator were some illnatured Genius." "His volume is plainly hostile to man's best interests." "He has done a lasting injury to the cause of the Bible." "His writings are calculated to do valiant service for the Evil One." His "crude speculations" are "miserable," "degraded," "degrading." He is "a subject meriting a psychological examination." Prof. D. exhausts the dictionary of words of reproach, and seems to revel in so doing; returning to the same invectives again and again, as if he never would have done. Yet he says, "Temptations to remark and criticism follow one all through the pages of this work. There is so much to complain of, we have had to cull sparingly, not to run to a tedious length." If he does not think his papers long, he should have lived in the long geological periods, and have had for his auditors the ugly, waddling monsters of the antehuman world.

exception to the general manner. This is in painfully bad taste, and it betrays the critic into unfairness. One illustration is cited here, though not full or very decisive, as to his manner, as showing how unfounded are the impressions made on those who read the criticism only. It is the calling the reading adopted by the author for the third verse of the eleventh of Hebrews, "a liberty taken with the Greek text." Let this expression be weighed, and then read, what it hardly seems the critic could have read, his author's statement of merely the "external evidence" for his reading: "Under this head we may cite the exact concurrence of the Latin Vulgate, and the old Peschito, or Syriac version. The Arabic version follows them; but, being of a later date, is not therefore of so high authority, although still more ancient, than any extant Greek manuscript. We venture to say that the proof, drawn even from a large number of these, is outweighed by this joint testimony of the two oldest versions of the New Testament. Any number of manuscripts may have been copied out one from the other; but it would be exceedingly difficult to explain how both these earliest translations give precisely the same rendering, unless there had been that in the then common reading of the Greek text which fully warranted it. The reader who will take the pains to examine other varying passages, in which these two old versions concur, and to observe how uniformly their joint testimony is supported by the internal evidence, will see ample reason for the deference we pay to them as the best proof of a genuine, ancient reading. In both the Syriac and the Vulgate, the sense is clear and precisely similar: So that the things that are seen were made from things that are unseen,' - ·ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. What adds great weight to this rendering is the fact, that it is sustained by the Greek commentators generally; by Erasmus, Grotius, and other distinguished scholars of former centuries; and by Tholuck, Olshausen, Ebrard, and others of the most modern period."

The impression which the critic labors to give, that his