120 His Fable, Subject, scope in ev'ry Page; VARIATIONS. VER. 123. Cavil you may, but never criticize.] The author after this verfe originally inferted the following, which he has however omitted in all the editions: Zoilus, had thefe been known, without a Name COMMENTARY. P. without the ftudy of Homer and Virgil. These therefore he principally recommends to complete the Critic in his Art. But as the latter of thefe Poets has, by fuperficial judges been confidered rather as a copier of Homer, than an original, our Author obviates that common error, and fhews it to have arisen (as often error does) from a truth, viz. that Homer and Nature were the fame; and how that the ambitious young Poet, though he scorned to floop at any thing fhort of Nature, when he came to understand this great truth, had the prudence to contemplate Nature in the place were fhe was feen to moft advantage, collected in all her charms in the clear mirror of Homer. Hence it would follow, that though Virgil ftudied Nature, yet the vulgar reader would believe him to be a copier of Homer, and though he copied Homer, yet the judicious reader would fee him to be an imitator of Nature: the fineft praife which any one, who came after Homer, could receive. Be Homer's works your ftudy and delight, 125 Thence form your judgment, thence your maxims bring, 131 And trace the Mufes upward to their spring. To copy nature is to copy them. VER. 130. VARIATIONS. When firft young Maro fung of Kings and Wars NOTES. 140 VER. 130. When firft young Maro, etc.] Virg. Eclog. vi. Cum canerem reges et prælia, Cynthius aurum Vellit. It is a tradition preferved by Servius, that Virgil began with writing a poem of the Alban and Roman affairs; which be found above his years, and defcended first to imitate Theocritus on rural fubjects, and afterwards to copy Homer in Heroic poetry. P. Some beauties yet no Precepts can declare, 145 Are nameless graces which no methods teach, COMMENTARY. } VER. 141. Some beauties yet no Precepts can declare, etc.] Our author, in these two general directions for studying Nature and her Commentators, having confidered Poetry as it is, or may be reduced to Rule; left this fhould be miftaken as fufficient to attain PERFECTION either in writing or judging, he proceeds [from ver. 140 to 201.] to point up to thofe fublimer beauties which Rules will never reach, nor enable us either to execute or tafle: beauties, which rife fo high above all precept as not even to be defcribed by it; but being entirely the gift of Heaven, Art, and Reason have no further share in them than just to moderate their operations. Thefe Sublimities of Poetry, like the Mysteries of Religion (fome of which are above Reafon, and some contrary to it) may be divided into two forts, fuch as are above Rules, and fuch as are contrary to them. VER. 146. If, where the rules, etc.] The firft fort our author defcribes [from ver. 145 to 158.] and fhews, that where a great beauty is in the Poet's view, which no stated Rules will direct him how to reach, there, as the purpose of rules is only to attain an end like this, a lucky Licence will fupply the want of them: nor can the Critic fairly object to it, fince this Licence, for the reafon given above, has the proper force and authority of a Rule. દા NOTES. VER. 146. I, where the rules, etc.] "Neque enim rogationibus plebifve fcitis fancta funt ifta præcepta, fed "hoc, quicquid eft, Utilitas excogitavit. Non negabo "autem fic utile effe plerumque ; verum fi eadem VOL, I. K Some lucky licence answer to the full Th' intent propos'd, that Licence is a rule, In prospects thus, fome objects please our eyes, NOTES. 150 155 } "illa nobis aliud fuadebit Utilitas, hanc, relictis magi"ftrorum autoritatibus, fequemur." Quintil. lib. ii. cap. 13. P. VER. 150. Thus Pegasus, etc.] We have observed how the precepts for writing and judging are interwoven throughout the whole Poem. The fublime flight of a Poet is first described, foaring above all vulgar bounds, to fnatch a Grace directly which lies beyond the reach of a common adventurer. And afterwards, the effect of that grace upon the true Critic: whom it penetrates with an equal rapidity; going the nearest way to his beart, without paffing through his Judgment. By which is not meant that it could not stand the teft of Judgment; but that, as it was a beauty uncommon, and above rule, and the Judgment habituated to determine only by rule, it makes its direct appeal to the heart; which, when once gained, foon brings over the Judgment, whofe concurrence (it being now enlarged and fet above forms) is eafily procured. That this is the Poet's fublime conception appears from the concluding words: " and all its end at once attains. For Poetry doth not attain all its end, till it hath gained the Judgment as well as Heart, 160 Great Wits fometimes may gloriously offend, 165 I know there are, to whofe prefumptuous thoughts Those freer beauties, ev'n in them, feem faults. 170 COMMENTARY. VER. 159. Great Wits fometimes may gloriously offend, etc.] He describes next the fecond fort, the beauties against rule. And even here, as he obferves (from ver. 158 to 169.] the offence is fo glorious, and the fault fo fublime, that the true Critic will not dare either to cenfure or reform them. Yet ftill the Poet is never to abandon himself to his imagination: The rules laid down for his conduct in this refpect, are these; 1. That though he tranfgrefs the letter of fome one particular Precept, yet that he be ftill careful to adhere to the end or spirit of them all; which end is the creation of one uniform perfect Whole. And 2. That he have, in each inftance, the authority of the dif penfing power of the Ancients to plead for him. These rules obferved, this licence will be feldom ufed, and only when he is compelled by need: which will difarm the Critic, and screen the offender from his laws.. VER. 169. I know there are, etc.] But as fome modern Critics have had the prefumption to fay, that this laft reafon is only justifying one fault by another, our author goes on [from ver. 168 to 18.] to vindicate the Ancients; and to fhew that this severity of opinion proceeds from mere Ignorance. As where their partiality will not let them fee that this licence is fometimes neceffary for the fymmetry |