bal; 'deriving,' as Mr. Stewart conclusively observes, 'whatever speciousness they may possess, from the unprecedented latitude given to the meaning of common terms. After telling us, for example, that "all our internal feelings, excepting our sensations, may be called ideas," and giving to the word association a corresponding vagueness in its import, he seems to have flattered himself that he had resolved into one single law, all the various phenomena, both intellectual and moral, of the human mind.' When it is once determined to call every thing of which we are conscious, an idea, and every kind of connexion among our thoughts, an association, what difficulty is there in showing that all the phenomena of mind are cases of the association of ideas? But what advantage,' continues Mr. Stewart, 'do we reap from this pretended discovery; a discovery necessarily involved in the arbitrary definitions with which the author sets out? Its only effect is, by perverting ordinary language to retard the progress of a science, which depends more than any other, for its improvement, on the use of precise and definite expressions.'

Condillac, a greater philosopher than Hartley, furnishes, we may observe, another striking instance of this arbitrary sort of generalization in his attempt to shew that all the faculties and operations of the mind, are in reality only sensations transformed. All the just distinctions of words and things are here clearly sacrificed to a passion for generalization. This is indeed the rock upon which ingenious minds are most apt to split. But it ought to be recollected that if it is unphilosophical, unnecessarily to multiply ultimate principles, that it is no less unphilosophical prematurely to generalize. It is the business of the metaphysician to endeavour, by a refined analysis, to discover the primary principles of our intellectual nature; but he ought to take care that his advances have the sanction of the cautious maxims of inductive philosophy. Mr. Stewart, therefore, holds the language of a true philosopher when he expresses his determination rather to subject himself to ridicule for the timidity of his researches, than not to follow the footsteps of those faithful interpreters of nature, who, disclaiming all pretensions to conjectural sagacity, aspire to nothing higher, than to rise slowly from particular facts to general laws.'

The philosophy of the mind, in order to have any chance of improving upon former advances, must share at least some degree of that estimation which the other sciences enjoy. But we are told, by some persons, that when the pretensions of this boasted philosophy are sifted to the bottom, it will be found that it is incapable of making any substantial additions either to our knowledge or to our power. To counteract these depreciatory views, is the main object of Mr. Stewart in his preliminary dissertation. He rightly judges that his favourite science has much at issue in such an inves

tigation. The public seems already sufficiently disposed to neglect if not to undervalue it; and if the idea should prevail that it has nothing either new or useful to communicate, it is pretty clear that all remaining curiosity about the laws of the intellectual world would be extinguished, and all farther improvement of this great and interesting department of knowledge entirely abandoned. The occasion of this important discussion, which occupies the far greater part of the preliminary discourse, is stated by Mr. Stewart in the following passage.

When I first ventured to appear before the public as an author, I resolved that nothing should ever induce me to enter into any controversy in defence of my conclusions, but to leave them to stand or to fall by their own evidence.-As this indifference, however, about the fate of my particular doctrines, arose from a deep rooted conviction, both of the importance of my subject, and of the soundness of my plan, it was impossible for me to be insensible to such criticisms as were directed against either of these two fundamental assumptions. Some criticisms of this description I had, from the first, anticipated; and I would not have failed to obviate them in the introduction to my former work, if I had not been afraid to expose myself to the imputation of prolixity, by conjuring up objections for the purpose of refuting them. I longed, therefore, for an opportunity of being able to state those objections in the less suspicious words of another; and still more in the words of some writer whose talents might contribute to draw the public attention to an argument in which I conceived the credit of my favourite studies to be so peculiarly interested. For such an opportunity, I am indebted to a very able article in the Edinburgh Review, in reply to which I shall have occasion to obviate most. of the objections which I had foreseen, as well as various others which, I must own, had never occurred to me.' Prel. Dissert. pp. 29, 30.

The article to which Mr. Stewart here particularly refers, is the review of the excellent account which he some years ago published of the Life and Writings of Dr. Reid. In his survey of the scope and spirit of that great philosopher's writings, he insisted a good deal upon the general analogy between the inductive science of mind, and the inductive science of matter; maintaining that the same rules of philosophizing were equally applicable, and equally promised advancement to both. In the article alluded to, it was on the other hand argued, that induction can only be applied to the study of the mind in the way of observation,-that observation without experiment never increases our power,—and that all that the observer of mind can do, is merely to classify and give names to phenomena perfectly notorious to all mankind. Mr. Stewart here largely controverts all those positions, and vindicates the claims of the philosophy of the mind to increase both our knowledge and our power, in terms to which all must allow

the praise of uncommon eloquence; but the vindication would, we think, have been more complete, had he illustrated, with greater precision, the nature and results of intellectual analysis, and developed more fully the relations which connect this science with the other branches of our knowledge. His reply, however, is, upon the whole, powerful and conclusive; and as it necessarily calls upon us to advert to the arguments of his antagonist, we think it right once for all to state, that we greatly admire the acuteness and fertility of thought with which they are supported, and regret that such rare talents for metaphysical speculation should be employed to underrate the importance of thetaphysical science.

The position which this writer so confidently maintains, that the metaphysical enquirer can disclose nothing of which all his pupils were not previously aware,' appears to us, we must say, to be nothing less than absurd; and has led the critic into inconsistencies which all his ingenuity has not been able to veil. The epithets of important' and 'valuable,' so liberally bestowed upon the speculations of Mr. Stewart, would come very well from a writer who admitted the usefulness of metaphysical inquiry; but we profess ourselves unable to discover how they can be made to tally with an argument intended to prove that all ideas of metaphysical utility are visionary, and that mankind would have lost nothing though the philosophy of the mind had never existed. Neither do we see how any one can talk of Locke as worthy of being ranked with Newton, who wishes to make us believe that this great metaphysician could only draw the attention of mankind to conclusions just about as notorious as these,' that each of us has ten fingers and ten toes, and a certain number of teeth, distinguishable into masticators and incisors!' How, again, can any science be remarkable for 'profundity,' all the truths of which are said to be just as much known to the clown as to the philosopher? Or what can there be to 'gratify and exalt a keen and aspiring curiosity,' where discoveries are 'obvious and easy to such humble judges of intellectual resource as horse-jockies and bear-dancers!'

But, leaving these incongruities and witticisms, we proceed to remark, that the metaphysical disputes which obtain among mankind, would be utterly unaccountable, were it true, as the Reviewer maintains, that all men have equal knowledge of all the operations of their minds. Without going back to those dark and unscientific ages, when false metaphysics constituted

'The schoolman's glory and the churchman's boast,' we would beg to be informed, how the most enlightened men come, at this day, to be divided in opinion regarding intellectual phenomena, as to which, upon this principle, every person knows

all that it is possible to know? How could any opinion about the mind be shown to be erroneous, if the knowledge of the phenomena of mind is of the same kind in all? If we all know, absolutely, every thing that can be known about the laws which regulate our intellectual operations, how comes it that there is ever any hesitation, or any difference of opinion as to the question of the freedom of the will, for example-or, as to the principle upon which we approve and disapprove in matters of morality-or, as to the origin and character of our passions and affections? There could evidently be no difficulty or difference as to these or any other questions regarding our intellectual constitution, if all the connections and laws of mental operation,-if the genesis of all our ideas and feelings, were equally and perfectly known to every one. We may here observe, that the disputes and uncertainties to which we have alluded, give no ground to the opinion which we often hear from the superficial, that there is nothing satisfactory in the science of the mind,-that all its principles are unsettled,and that there is no hope of farther light. The uncertainties which still hang over some of its principles afford indeed a proof that we have still something to discover, and therefore a proof that the Reviewer's assertion is wholly unfounded; but no proof whatever that we shall never attain to a state of greater knowledge and certainty. Many errors, by which the progress of this science was long impeded, have at length disappeared, and many points, long contested, have been finally settled by more enlightened inquiries. There is, therefore, every reason to conclude, that by persevering in the proper road of investigation, farther advances will yet be made, and the domain of uncertainty more and more narrowed. Si homines per tanta annorum spatia viam veram inveniendi et colendi scientias tenuissent, nec tamen ulteriùs progredi potuissent, audax proculdubio et temeraria foret opinio, posse rem in ulterius provehi. Quòd si in via ipsa erratum sit, atque hominum opera in iis consumpta, in quibus minimè oportebat; sequitur ex eo, non in rebus ipsis difficultatem oriri, qua potestatis nostræ non sunt; sed intellectu humano, ejusque usu et applicationi; quæ res remedium et medicinam suscipit.*

The great argument of the Reviewer is, that it is absurd to suppose mankind can have any thing new to learn about phenomena of which all have been conscious. We are all equally conscious of all our intellectual operations; and, therefore, to talk of discoveries within the sphere of consciousness is an abuse of words. It is upon this ground he concludes that the philosopher cannot tell even the clown any fact about his internal constitution of which he

* Nov. Organ. L. I. Aph. 94.

was not aware before. We all arrive, says he, 'at a perfect knowledge of our minds, as we do of our native parish, without study or exertion.' What a striking contrast between this opinion and that of Mr. Hume! To hope,' says this penetrating writer, ⚫ that we shall arrive at the knowledge of the mind without pains, 'while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous.' They, indeed, who have ventured to look closely into their minds, with a view to any disputed metaphysical principle, or who recollect what has been said by all the greatest philosophers, of the peculiar difficulty attending the scrutiny of the intellectual phenomena, and the very opposite judgments which have been delivered in regard to them,-such persons will be not a little startled, we should think, to be told that, after all, we have a perfect knowledge of our minds, and that too independent of all study or exertion!

We are not at all interested to determine whether or not the word discovery, when used with strict propriety, can be applied to the conclusions of the metaphysician regarding the laws of mind. If the intellectual philosopher is not to be ranked as a discoverer, because all the facts with which his science is conversant have always existed in our consciousness, this is merely a matter of verbal criticism; and does not at all affect the proposition that our knowledge of the laws to which these facts belong is capable of being substantially encreased by metaphysical inquiry. It is true, that we are all equally conscious of all the intellectual functions; but it does not by any means follow that our actual knowledge of them is equal and perfect. Were that the case, it would be impossible, as we have already shown, to account for the difficulties and contradictions of metaphysical science. Consciousness is merely that involuntary and momentary perception which the mind has of any present thought or feeling. Its fugitive intimations leave no traces whatever in the memory, and only become subservient to our knowledge of the laws which regulate the intellectual phenomena, in so far as they are made the objects of careful and continued reflexion. It is owing to the great difficulty and complexity of this operation, and the fugitive and subtle nature of its objects, that there is so much uncertainty and contradiction in our metaphysical opinions. Reflexion involves the deliberate exercise of attention, recollection, and comparison;-processes to which the bulk of mankind never think of subjecting their thoughts, but to which it is necessary habitually and methodically to subject them, in order to arrive at an accurate knowledge of the laws of the mind. It is only in this way that we can discover the latent relations and dependencies of its various phenomena; and every unnoticed relation which reflexion enables us to perceive, forms a

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