"But there is yet one Part of our Meffage on the Be "half of your People to be imparted to you, That we "have an ancient Conftitution (not many Ages fince experimented) it grieves us to mention it: That if the King, through any evil Counfel whatever, or through a weak Obftinacy, or Contempt of his People, fhall “ alienate himself from them, and refufe to govern by "the Laws and Statutes of the Realm; if he fhall throw "himself headlong into wild Defigns, and ftubbornly "execute his own fingular arbitrary Will,Then follows the Right of the People, dreadfully afferted. But they afterwards go on,

"That this Kingdom may not, by your evil Counsel"lors be fubverted, this Kingdom fo honourable, and "above all the Nations in the World, most famous in "War, may not now, in your Time, through the Di"ftractions of ill Government, be miferably laid waste ; "That the Title and Infcription of these Miseries, may never be placed as a fcandalous Mark upon your Reign, and this unhappy Age: Recal, we befeech you, your Royal Mind from fuch foolish and perni"cious Counfels; and whofoever they are that fuggeft "fuch Matters to you, do not only not hearken to them, "but totally remove them from you; for in Time of Danger it will be found they can no ways effectually " ferve you.

The Reafon and Honefty of this wrought fo much upon the King, that in three Days Time he came to his Parliament, though with fome Reluctance; when Michach de Pole was impeached of high Crimes and Mifdemeanors, and turned out of his Office, and another put in his Place by Confent of Parliament, as was likewife the Treafurer, another Favourite.

But it ought to be remembered, for the Inftruction of thefe Times, that upon the King's defiring a Supply at the fame time, that he feemed to hefitate at the difcarding Pole, the Commons anfwered, That he did not need the Tallage of his Subjects, who might fo easily furnis himself of so great a Sum of Money from him that was his Debtor, as the Articles of Impeachment fet forth.

As for Robert de Vere, Duke of Ireland, the King's most dangerous Favourite, the Parliament, to fhew their Prudence

Prudence and Moderation, chose rather to give him a vaft Sum of Money, upon Condition that he would go to Ireland, than to endure the Influence of his Counfels near the King's Perfon. But after all this, the good Commons had no fooner gained their Points, than they freely gave the King a Supply.

Before they broke up (continues my Author) the Parliament observing, by the Covetoufnefs of the King's Minifters, that the public Revenue was vainly lavished, the King insufferably abused (partly through Negligence to fearch out the Truth, partly through a refolute Humour to fupport thofe beyond Reafon, whom he had once advanced) that the common People, by continual and grievous Burdens, were miferably impoverished; the Rents of the great Men much impaired, and their poor Tenants, in many Places, forced to abandon their Husbandry, and leave their Farms empty and defolate ; and that by all this the King's Officers alone became immeafurably rich: They therefore chofe a Number of confiderable Men to infpect, treat of, and determine, all Affairs, Caufes and Complaints, arifing from the Death of Edward III. to that Time; as likewise of the King's Expences and his Minifters, and all other Grievances happening within that Time.

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The Hiftorian farther obferves, That when the Parliament endeavoured at an Act of Resumption, the just and frequent Way to repair the languishing Condition of the Nation, Michael de Pole told the King, it was to the King's Dishonour, ad dedecus Regis, and forced him from it; to which the Commons antwered, Although they were wearied out by Toils and Expences, they would "never grant the King a Subfidy, until, by Authority “ of Parliament, he should actually resume all that be"longed to the Crown of England. And that it was "more to the Dishonour of the King to leave fo many "of his poor Subjects in intolerable Want." Yet could not all good Counfel work, till by Parliament that great Man was banished; which was no fooner done, but an Act of R. fumption followed; fo true it is, and it ought to be a perpetual Leffon to Pofterity, That whenever the People of England defire to redress Grievances, and recover what they have been plundered of, the Work must begin

with

with the Impeachment of corrupt Minifters. The Weight of a Parliament will ever bear down a bad Man, how great foever.

It is certain, a King who would reform the State for the general Eafe and Benefit of his People, muft expect to meet with some Difficulties, especially if those nearest him, and who have his Ear, are Partakers in the Abufes he would correct: All Sort of Rubs will be laid in the Way, and the Fears of fuch as may be called to an Account, will make them fet all kind of Engines at Work. They who are confcious of their Guilt and apprehenfive that the Juftice of the Nation should take Notice of their Thefts and Rapines, will try to give all Things a falfe Turn, and fill every Place with their falfe Suggestions; they'll accufe innocent or lefs guilty Perfons, that fo by putting the People upon a wrong Scent, they may avoid the Purfuers, and efcape unpunished.

Sometimes they will fpirit the Chief, if not the only, Evidence away: At other Tines they will endeavour to blaft the Reputation of fuch as would enquire into their Actions. And though, perhaps, there are no other poffible Ways left to fupply the State, but by making them difgorge, and bringing them to a Reftitution, yet they will pretend that all Motions leading thereto, and all Enquiries of this Nature, are nothing but Spite, the Effects of Difcontent, and the Refult of Faction. And that the full Knowledge of their Crimes may never reach the Prince's Ear, they endeavour to engrofs him to themfelves, by mifreprefenting all that are not of their Cabal, as diffaffected to his Perfon and Government. They'll find out falfe Colcurs for their Proceedings, and cover their Corruption and Rapine with the Pretence of their Mafter's Service; nay, rather than fail, they'll throw the Odium of the whole upon him.

By thefe falfe Suggeftions, well meaning Perfons have often been frightened from reaching at great Offenders: And even the best Patriots, by feeing with what Warmth and Zeal Corruptions are defended, have been wearied into Silence; and this has made fome of our Kings believe, that either the Offenders were got above the Laws, or that the People confented to those Things they did not think fit to punish. But wife Princes fee through all this.

They

They know that an honest Minifler will be content with moderate Gains; and that no Merit can give a Man a Title to rob the Public: That a few may complain without Reason but that there is Occafion for Redress when the Cry is univerfal.

;

They fee through all their little Artifices, and cannot but be fenfible, whatever Colours they may give to their Villainy, that Mankind must abhor to behold a few enriched with the Spoils of a whole Country, and to see private Perfons fecuring to themselves, in fpight of Parliament, a vast ill-gotten Wealth in the Poverty of the Public; and therefore they will be the first to defire every Thing fhould be looked into, and all poffible Thrift fet on Foot that may cafe the People: They will make Choice of fuch Minifters as are likelieft to handle the Nation's Money with the cleanest Hands : They will propose, with Pleasure, themselves, that those Evils may be corrected, which a few have committed at the Expence of the whole Kingdom; that the Thefts upon the Public be looked into and punished. They will not ftay to be asked, that thofe Servants may be called to an Account who have broken their Truft, and in their Offices confented to the Plunder of the Nation, though they should have had no Share in it themselves, knowing that our Laws put little Difference between a Minifter that contracts actual Guilt himself, and him who permits others to commit a Crime, which by the Authority of his Office he might have prevented.

And indeed the Reason is plain; for it is the Interest of Princes, when they come to understand the true State of Things, fo to do. They cannot be unwilling to prevent their own Ruin; and fuch a King never wants Affiftance, who will look into Abufes: And their Faction, who have been guilty of Mal-Administration, will be found very weak, when he is once in earneft to have what has been amifs amended, because but a few are Gainers by Mifgovernment, and a Multitude are injured by it.

'Tis true, Plunderers have now and then out-braved the Laws and escaped, when in their Depredations upon the Public, there have been a great many concerned, and they became fafe by the Multitude of those who

have

have been Partakers in the Booty; and yet there are Examples in former Reigns, where the true Lovers of our Conftitution have couragiously attacked and brought to Condemnation Men in the highest Posts of Authority, and those fortified by the Multitude of the Perfons concerned in the Plunder; and fhall not the popular Hue and Cry, which fo hotly purfues the Robbers at this time, the Wants of the Nation calling fo loud for Vengeance, the univerfal Voice of the People, crying Refund, Refund, awaken fome honest Patriots, fome brave Spirits, to infift upon the most rigorous Punishment of a few; I fay a very few Mifcreants (would I could call their Booty fmall too) given up by the whole Body of the Kingdom, and detelted by all Mankind, but their Affociates ?

And how is this great and honeft Design likely to be better executed than by imitating the Parliaments of Richard the Second, (though perhaps it had been as proper fooner) in afferting the immediate Neceffity of redreling Grievances, and rejecting every other Confideration, till that is done; which is not only the ancient Conftitution of this Government, but the most probable Way to come at Offenders, when timely taken, by fhewing a proper Refolution in their Profecution, and by that Means giving them no Opportunity to concert Meafures with the Accomplices in their Crimes, or to withdraw themselves or their Effects from Justice.

Whether or no Richard's Parliament did prudently in giving fo great a Power to a select Number of Men, after they were dismissed, I shall not decide; but they certainly took one Method, not only wife but Parliamentary; I mean, that they themselves, during their Seffion, went into a Committee of the whole Houfe, to confider of the State of the Nation; and this plainly gained them their Point. This is always the great Day of a Parliament, and valuable to Englishmen : Then the Subject feels his Strength, and vindicates his Liberties. And whether the Reprefentatives of the People affembled at this Day in Parliament (than which I am fure there never was any that better understood their Duty to their King and Country) will follow the fame Method, Time will fhew.

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