nisters have been unable to infuse their own spirit, and the spirit of the nation at large, into the generals they employ ?-Not a man amongst us doubled that Junot and his army would be brought prisoners to England; and we anticipated with a very pardonable, if not a laudable exultation, the arrival here, as captives, of some of Buonaparte's best troops commanded by his best generals. General Kellerman is the man to whom the honour of the victory at Marengo in a great measure belongs.How did it happen that Sir A. Wellesley, on the very day after his memorable victory, when he was fully able to appreciate the relative means possessed by himself and his enemy, should agree "that the French army should in no case be "considered as prisoners of war, that they "should be conducted back safe to France, "and be left in undisturbed possession of what they call their private property?" -Good God! Sir! Is the good old maxim, that one Englishman is a match for two Frenchman, to be reversed? Or what was there to prevent 30,000 Britons from making half the number of Frenchmen surrender at discretion? The possession of the forts, the strong position at Cintra, the want of victuallers, cannot be listened to. Had the French army victuallers to attend them when they entered the country as enemies? Cou'd not we, who were the friends and deliverers of the Portuguese, rely upon their assistance for a fortnight's or even a month's supply of provisions? At a time too when all the north of Portugal was open to us, Have the French armies had victuallers to attend them in their campaigns in Germany, Poland, and Dalmatia? -After the battle of the 21st we were, of we might have been, at the heels of the French army, with our bayonets in their loins; and, if properly pursued, even without the aid of cavalry, they would have had no time to take up or strengthen a position at Cintra. Junot knew this, and therefore endeavoured to stop us by negocia tion. He has accomplished by address what he in vain attempted with the sword. Portugal was no longer his object: that every bat man in his army knew must be lost: bat he wanted to save his troops, to keep unclipped the wings of the French eagles. He has succeeded, and in so doing he has pared the nails of the British lion. He has transferred to his own brow the laurels which his opponent has thus declared himself unworthy of. Indeed, he has done himself immortal honour, and our army has sustained a disgrace, which I only hope is not indelible. We admire CORNWALLIS for his masterly retreat with 5 sail of the line before

13; and shall we refuse our enemy the applause due to him tor escaping from a situation ten times more critical? Buonaparte will not withheld his praise, and you will soon see these conventions held up to the world in the Moniteur amongst the most glorious trophies of the French army.Our troops are now in possession of the forts of the Tagus;-ask our artillery and engineer officers what time it would hate required to occupy them by force.Were any thing wanting to Junot's triumph on this occasion, look at all the details of his stipulations; they contain demands which one should have thought no British officer would for a moment have listened to. If his garrisons march through Portugal, they are to be accompanied by British commissa. ries to provide for their subsistence. When they embark, all the horses are to be carefully embarked with them. Why, Sir, our com mander has positively engaged to carry home a larger number of French horses, than were sent from England with Sir A. Wellesley's army, by whom these Frenchmen have been beaten and whilst we are told, that that officer had no more cavalry with him, because horse transports are so scarce of dear, and whilst we are actually prevented by these causes from sending out all the cavalry we wish for the future operations of the campaign, our general has most ge rously undertaken to convey to Franc French horses.But, it seems, our t ports are not good enough for "His ext

lency the French commander in chief, a "the other principal officers of the French

army." OUR generals and officers may sail about the globe in West-Indiamen, of colliers; but Junot and his friends, forsooth, must be accommodated on board ships of war. If they had been brought prisoners to England, this might have been a proper distinction, and the emblem on the admiral's bow would have felt complacency at the freight; but that his majesty's ships should be sent into an enemy's port to land an enemy's army, and to have it said there, that we brought them so far because we could not make that army prisoners, is really exposing the ships to a dishonour, and bis majesty's officers to a degradation, which it is hardly in human nature to support.Ask lord Mulgrave and lord St. Vincent, or any other lord of the admiralty, if our ships are fit for this sort of service. It is a known fact, that many of our public ministers, representatives of his majesty, have been exposed to great inconvenience and even danger, for the want of this very accommo dation which is to be obtained for General

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Junot; they have been told that packetboats, or bye-boats, or fishing-boats, are good enough; nay, Sir, the conqueror of Maida, Sir John Stuart, with difficulty obtained for his accommodation a small brig of war, when he last went out to take the command of our army in Sicily: but M. Junot must pompously sail into Rochfort in a British 74. If there belongs a large portion of French insolence to the formation of this demand, there is in yielding to it a degree cfpusillanimity, which, as an Englishman, I am altogether ashamed to characterise. But, it is not only the Frenchmen, their horses, their arms and baggage, their CO rounds of anmunition, that we are thus to take care of for them; -but all their private property, ngthing of which can be taken away, must also be secured, landed on the coast of France, and, I suppose, insured at Lloyd's, at his majesty's expence, against the dangers of the seas:-a pretty employment this for British seamen !!! Except the sight of the Danes voluntarily and for money assisting us in fitting out their own ships last year at Copenhagen, I never, since I was born, beard of any thing so mean and so dastardly.

-Junot may have squeezed any sum out of his duchy of Abrantes, his followers may baye.extorted with thumb-screws moidores or ingots of gold from the unfortunate Portuguese, his coffers may be full of the produce of that rapine aud plunder which has been long since denounced, to the vengeance of indignant Europe,-YET ALL IS TO BE SACRED! The British seamen and soldiers, the conquerors of Vimeira, the deliverers of Portugal, are to aid and abet these most atrocious robberies. They are to make themselves accessaries of the fact. They are to receive the stolen goods, and to convey them to a place of safety !!!-Either the French are or are not robbers and plunderers. If they are, Englishmen are now their accomplices. -What will our good friend and ally, the Prince Regent, say to all this? What will he say, when he learns, that we have not only thus prevented his subjects from recovering their stolen goods, insured an asylum and indemnity to the robbers, but that we have, in fact, wrested from him the sovereignty of his country? For, if this convention, this surrender of British honour, be fulfilled, his royal highness is not at liberty to call to account any one of his subjects who may have been foremost in giving aid and assistance to an invading enemy, and whose freachery may have afforded that enemy the means of prolonged resistance when attacked by the allies of his royal highness.That these shameful terms were not extended to

secure a safe retreat to the Russian fleet, is due, not to the spirit of our military negoci. ation, but to the resistance of Sir Charles Cotton. The convention which he signed with the Russian admiral is second in impro◄ priety only to that concluded with Junot but at least he has not returned the enemy's ships to their country with 60 rounds of cartridges to each gun.-To have agreed to the conditions set forth in the 7th article of the armistice shews such an absence of judg ment, of spirit, of common sense, that I really can hardly believe my eyes when I see Sir A. Wellesley's name put to it. Whilst we are thus spontaneously, and without condition, giving up the whole French army, who ought to have been considered as our prisoners, what have we done for our friends the Spaniards? Look at the 18th article of the definitive convention. You will there find, that, in exchange for the Spanish troops detained on board ship in the port of Lisbon, which are thus graciously delivered to him, our commander-in-chief engages to obtain from the Spaniards a number of civil and military Frenchmen detained in Spain in consequence of certain occurrences in that country. If the British general receives a civil answer to his requisition on this head, it can only be in favour of the peculiar situation in which Spain now stands towards this country. At all events, he will be told, that before he again ventures to negociate on military matters, he should take a lesson from Castanos.I write, Mr. Cobbett, in some haste, and therefore can notice only cursorily these and other points that have excited my grief as well as my surprise. The putting H. I. and R. My. Napoleon I. (whom this country has never officially acknowledged in that copacity) by the side of our most gracious sovereign; the leaving the French in possession of Lisbon till the embarkation of their second division; the engagement to interpret every doubt in favour of the French army; the whole tenour of the 16th article; the 20th, which relates to hostages; the impropriety of a lieut. colonel of the army stipulating, without authority, for Sir C. Cotton, whose flag was flying at the main mast head; all these things afford, in add to what I have already said, ample and abundant matter for regret, and, as I think. for censure on those who acted for this country. They all bear the appearance of a beaten and despondent mind. If the French had been our conquerors, instead of we

theirs, these articles could not have been worded more to their advantage-But, I must not ask to occupy too much of your

present Register; perhaps I may hereafter return to the subject.—One topic only, but that a most important one, I will yet revert to. It seems that on this, as on other eccasions, the public is to remain in doubt who is the author of so much mischief and calamity. One naturally looks to the commander-in chief as the responsible person: in furtherance of this idea, Sir A. Wellesley's friends assert, that he had not only no share in framing the conditions, but that he even protested against them, and that he signed the armistice only at the positive and peremptory command of his superior office". If he should hereafter be able to substantiate this assertion, it will absolve him from blame, whist twofold vengeance will be called for on the head of Sir Hew Dalrymple. But, I own to you, I cannot believe this story; nor can I believe, until it is proved, that Sir H. Dalrymple is so empty, so vain, so self-conceited a character, astohrive insisted upon such a measure, in opposition to Sir Arthur's advice. His own dispatch, and the armistice itself, contain internal evidence to the contrary. He could have assumed the command of the army but a very few hours before the armistice was signed; it must therefore have been done by the advice of his predecessors in command. On this point. however, the British public must and will have full and undisguised information.— Here, then, is a new, and I trust it will be an efficacious lesson, to our military and naval commanders, not to outstep the boundary of their functions. Since when is it that generals at the head of their armies, instead of fighting, are to make treaties, or conventions, and to convert themselves into diplomatic ministers, issuing full powers, which they do not themselves possess, to their subordinate officers? This right and power used to be reserved to the sovereign; and generals contented themselves with simply agreeing to or refusing the terms of capitulation proposed by their opponents.was in hopes that the capitulation of Copenhagen would have been a sufficient warning of the ill consequences of deviating from the old established rule; but I now confess that it requires more faith than I am master of to continue my confidence in that man as a negociator (however meritorious he may be in other respects) who has set his name to, and been the prime mover in, two such unwarrantable transactions. Perhaps, if his Majesty's ministers had taken proper notice of the former of the two, they would not now be subject to the mortification of joining in the universal censure of the latter.

-I am, Sir, your humble servant,—Ax ENGLISHMAN.London, 19th Sept. 1508.

-I

The Convention of Lisbon still continues to make every tongue eloquent, and every heart bleed, in those parts of the island where the Extraordinary Gazette has found its way; and as we farther learn, throughout the army of Portugal, whose labours have terminated so unsuccessfully. The honour of the country has been sacrificed, its fairest hopes blasted, the reputation of its arms tarnished, the resources of the enemy increas ed and concentrated, the plunder of our allies sanctioned, the pride of our invinci ble navy insulted, and the feelings of our gallant seamen injured and corroded beyond expression. One can feel, therefore, but⠀tle inclination to laugh at the authors of such wrongs. Who can think, without tears rage and bitterness, of an English fleet at this moment employed in carrying home a well appointed French army, along with ther colours, arms, ammunition, baggage, and plunder, in order to unite in a fresh exped tion against the liberties and honour of Spair A corse, a deep curse, wring the heart an wither the hand, that were base enough to vise and execute this cruel injury on the country's peace and honour. But all the world is now calling out, who gave Daly ple, and Burrard, and Cotton, their pointments? The country should have led out as loudly as we did, who Whitelocke his appointment? and then the occasion for clamouring now would have been removed--Dalrymple and Burrad would never have had their appointments, But why are these men to be singled out They are not the only persons implicated in the mischief. Come forth, Sir Arthur Wellesley! You are the man who first sign ed, in the 5th article of your treaty, ** that "the French army should in no case be con "sidered as prisoners of war" to the men who had the very day before conquered them: but, above all, you signed that article of an armistice, by which you agreed that an enemy's fleet should ride in safety in the Tagus," after our army and fleet had ob"tained possession of the town and port of "Lisbon !" Human credulity can hardly believe that any thing so monstrously inju rious to your country could have entered into the heart of the basest of her sons, and still less into yours, which we believe to be proud and imperious enough. You might as well bare signed, that Portsmouth and Plymouth should be neutral ports for an enemy's fleet to ride in. If the situation of your had obliged you to stipulate for the safety of an enemy's army, what obliged you to pro

affairs

vide for the security of an enemy's fleet? you might, without risk, have left that where you found it, and as you found it. For ten long months had it been blockaded in the Tagus; its escape, on all the principles of human calculation, was impossible; and, indeed, nothing short of two battles won by a British army, and one, treaty signed by a British general, could at last have set it free. Be it then observed, while we are appreciating the disgraces of our naval and military negociators, that Sir Charles Cotton has only sent the Russian seamen home-Sir, Arthur Wellesley would have sent home both the men and their ships, and actually signed a treaty to that effect. Sir Hew Dalrymple consented that the French army should be liberated, but stipulated that it should be landed in the north of France; but Sir Arthur Wellesley agreed, without any such specification (art. 5)," that the French army "should in no case be considered as prisoners of war; that all those of whom it consists, should be conveyed to France, with arms and baggage, and all their private property of every description, no part of which should be wrested from "them." The final convention, therefore, is but built upon the provisional armistice, and is really restrictive of its most injurious stipulations. But chiefly, Sir Arthur WelJosley is the first man with a British uniform

upon

his back, that has put his signature to the bottom of a treaty, at the head of which stood the recognition of "his Imperial and Royal Majesty Napoleon I." What his Royal Majesty George III. may say to this, we know not; but we hope and trust it will be some bar to the admission of one whom we could mention, into the Royal Party, the Family Council, the King's Friends; and that those who have overturned thrones, and demolished potentates, in the eastern hemisphere, will at least be viewed with some jealousy, in their acknowledgement of regal and imperial titles, in the western, which their country does not acknowledge. Sir Arthur Wellesley having, therefore, seat home the French army, has now nothing left but to bring himself home, and meet the greeting aspect and kindly salutations of a country grateful for those favours of which his superiors in command were the immediate dispensers, but of which he was a distinguished participator.-Before we conclude, we shall say a few words on Sir Arthur Wellesley's appointment to this commind. The public, it is true, thought better of his talents than they have been found to deserve. But those who elevated him to his situation had nearer opportunities of

observing, and ought to have estimated more justly the extent of his capacity, and the firmness of his mind. It is in vain, therefore, to say, that some part of his disgrace is not reflected on his patrons: and we are the more anxious that this should be understood, because we see the same influence, which has raised hini, still exerted to protect him. Why was his preliminary treaty sent to the press in French'only, as if, while he acknowledged the legality of his Napoleon's title, he had owned the pre-eminence of the language which the Corsican speaks? Why, but to circumscribe as much as possible the knowledge of his previous concessions, and to make it appear that Cotton had liberated the Russian seamen; that Cotton had sent them to man the Swedish flotilla which was captured at Sweabourg; that Dalrymple had sent home the French army, with all their baggage and ammunition, to join in the destruction of Spain; that Dalrymple had given them up their plunder? Whereas Wellesley's treaty stipulated all this, and moreover, that the chief port of a kingdom should be neutral towards its own enemies. When, therefore, the commanders of this wretched expedition are brought to their trial, let them meet with fair and impartial dealing; let.not the proceedings of one of them be given to the public in a language which it does understand, while those of another are veiled in a tongue which it does not understand: such conduct is infamous.. And, above all, let there be no procrastination in the punishment of delinquents who have grossly injured three kingdoms, England,' Sweden, and Spain; and let us wipe off the imputation of treachery, under which we must most justly suffer with all our allies, if we do not take ample vengeance on those' who have dared, by a shameful conventional arrangement, and, in defiance of their country's most solemn obligations, to assist Russia in manning her fleets against Sweden, and France in augmenting her forces against Spain.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.-From the London Gazette Extraordinary, Friday, Sept. 16.

Downing Street, Sept. 16, 1808.-A dispatch, of which the following is a copy, was received yesterday evening from lieut. gen. Sir Hew Dalrymple, commanding his majesty's troops in Portugal, addressed to lord viscount Castlereagh, one of his ma jesty's principal secretaries of state, and brought by capt. Dalrymple, military secretary to Sir Hew Dalrymple.

Head Quarters Cintra, Sept. 3.-My