march, or from the flying attacks of the enemy's cavalry, than from the slaughter of a pitched battle. It was to have been expected, that as our power increased and our hame became more formidable, and as the more disciplined and numerous forces of the greater Indian princes fell beneath our at tack, the remainder, inferior in strength, and spared because of their apparent insignificancy, would not have dared to have opposed even the wishes of our govern ment. On the contrary, however, they seem to have become not only more bold and courageous, but to have opposed us with more skill, firmness, and success. It has not unfrequently happened, that the conquered, by frequent defeat, have at length been taught and enabled to overcome their former conquerors. This consequence, however, must result with much more difficulty, and after a much greater length of time, in India, than in most other countries. The difference in point of skill, discipline, firmness, and even personal courage, between the European and the Indian troops, is much greater than exists between the forces of any two European powers: the habits and manners of the Indian states; the state of society, and the strong hold which prejudice and habit possess over their minds, must not only widen the difference arising from the former causes, but preserve it, without be ing broken in upon or weakened, for a considerable length of time. As nearly, however, to the military qualities of the European troops as we have brought our Seapoys, so nearly, in the course of time, may we justly apprehend that the native princes, profiting by what they have seen and felt of our armies, and urged on by the desire of revenge and the hope of regaining their territories, will bring their forces. It is to be hoped, that the effects of the disparity will not be weakened to our disadvantage, or the resemblance itself has tened, by the arrival and assistance of French troops. Hitherto, the history of the year has presented nothing either interesting in itself, or which promised to be followed by important consequences. Bonaparte saw his plans succeeding on every side: in the North he had engaged the emperor of Russia in a tedious and protracted warfare with Sweden. Whatever ultimate or permanent consequence this produced to the two rival monarchs, he was certain of being a gainer by it. Sweden might be conquered; at any rate she must be considerably weakened, and ren dered a more easy and secure prey for him to seize, whenever he had leisure, and it suited his plans to march his army against her. Whe ther Sweden was conquered or not, Russia was exhausting her forces, and rendering herself less able to oppose his designs, either on herself or on what remained of the freedom of Europe. In the south of Europe, he seemed to be proceeding with equal or more certainty of final success to the accom plishment of his wishes. In his attempt on the throne of Spain, he had, indeed, rather changed the character of his means: contrary to his disposition and his former conduct, he proceeded with slow ness and caution, instead of rapidly and with open force. He seem ed also unsteady and changeable in the policy he pursued. No doubt could be entertained that he meant to possess himself more completely than he had hitherto done of the Q2 power power and resources of Spain; but it did not seem easy to deter mine whether he would permit the Bourbon family to remain on the throne, or place on it, as his puppet king, the prince of peace. Still, notwithstanding the myst ry in which he involved his measures the slowness and hesitation with which he proceeded; and the unnatural predilection which he had taken up for intrigue and duplicity, where the object of his ambition appeared so easily attainable by open force no doubt was entertaind that Spain would fall yier his power, and become wha ever he had determined it should be. Against Bitom alone, of all the powers on whose destructhen he had revolutely bent his mind, his force and his policy were completely impotent. Possessed of all the sea coast on the continent of Europe, from the entrance of the Baltic to the shores of Greece, he yet felt his inability to exclude her manufactures. Every decree that he successively issued, proclaimed new restrictions and denounced additional vengeance; yet the wants of Europe were still supplied by the vigilance and activity of Bri tish commerce. But, though Britain could bid defiance to the im politic acts of his impotent rage, she possessed no means of assisting the continent to recover its freedom. The elasticity of indepen dence seemed almost worn out by the constant and unintermitted pressure of French despotism; when, on a sudden, Spain presented the unexpected appearance of general and tormidable resistance to the plans of Bonaparte. As this event gave a new tone to the feelings and hope of Europe, a new character and direction to the counsels and operations of Britain, and called again into action the genius and the forces of Bonaparte, it must be regarded as a leading and paramount object in detailing most of the future events of the year. CHAPTER VIII. Affairs of Spain--Necessity of a Retrospec beyond the Commencement of the Year-Sources of Information-Cevallos's Exposition-Advantages ca joyed by its Author-Objections to the Credibility of the Exposition, cen idred and answer.d-Devotion of Spain to France-Bonaparte's Sch.me against that Country dgsed at the reary of Tilsit-Measures pursued to accomplish it-Span driv d of ber best Troops-Proposal to the Price of Asturias to marry a French Princ ss- -Pretended Conspiracy of the Prince against bis Fiber-Different Accounts of it-Treaty and Convertion between the King of Spain and Bonaparte, for the Dismemberment sj Portugal-French Troops introdu ed into Spain under this Treaty-Nece in which bey got Possession of Barc.lona-Number of French Troops ibat cutered Spain-Proposed Emigration of Charles to America-Disturbanc at Aranjuez-Arvest of the Prince of Peace-Abdication of Charle, and Accessi.n of Ferdinand-Inquiry into the Nature of the Abdicat on-l test of Charles against bis Abdication-Arts by abich Ferdinan! is persuaded to se ve hladrid to meet Bonaparte-Bonaparte's Le ter o Ferdinand-Ferdinand arrives at Bayonne Inned of bonap rie's Determination that be must renounce the Throne of Spain-Conference of Gevallor and Champagny on the Subject--nterrupte by Bonaj rte-lis vilent Behaviour-Charles brought to В yonne-Condition: Renunciation of Fe dinand in favour of bis Father-- Re u d-Crespondence on the Subje.t-R signation of Charles in favour of Bon parte, and bis Mardate to the Supreme Junta--Ferdinand Reng ation His Address in to the Spanish Nation-Recari ulation of the Arts employed by Bonaparte to get Possession of the Throne of Spain - Bo parte's Degree fi assemtling the Spanish Depu ies- His Addre's to be Spanish Nation-Proceedings of Murat at Madrid –Demands e Sword of Francis I-His Ifluence over the Junta-Ferdinand's Orders to them interced--Insrrection at Madrid-Mura appointed President of the Funta-Is Address, and that of the Inquisition, on the Insurrectiof Madrid- burles's Address on the same Occasion-Forlorn and deserted State of the Spanish Nation. F Norder that we may be enabled to lay before our readers a clear, full, and connected view of the circumstances and events which produced or preceded the revolu. tion in Spain, it will be necessary to go back beyond the commencemeat of the year; and, setting out as nearly as possible from the period at which Bonaparte digested and matured his plan against the tiberties of that country, to trace in their proper order the different steps by which he endeavoured to accomplish his purpose. The importance and magnitude of the are about to record would render the adoption of this course desirable and proper, in order that the narrative might possess that unity, method, and completeness, without which it must lose much of its interest and impression, even though the events that occurred in Spain, towards the dose of 1807, had been known to us then with such accuracy and certainty, as to have enabled us to have presented them to our readers in our last volume, in a clear, but Recessarily unfinished narrative, event we But at that time almost every thing was obscure with respect to Spain, except the distraction and weakness of her councils, and the determined but undefined purpose of Bonaparte to avail himself of these circumstances. Much that actually took place in the capital did not reach this country, except through the suspicious medium of the French papers, or the unauthenticated reports of private letters; and when, after much scrutiny and comparison, what seemed to be the exact and real truth had been separated from exaggeration or falsehood, the circumstances appeared so ill-connected, and so completely without purpose or object, that though the evidence on which they rested commanded our assent, their driftless or contradictory nature obliged us to give up the task of tracing them back to their cause, or speculating on their probable result, with feelings of weariness and perplexity. Had they, indeed, at that time, offered to the hope or imagination the most indistinct or fleeting promise of what they af terwards realized, they would Q 3 thave have been watched with more earnestness; and the future advantage to which they pointed might have invigorated our patience and understanding, so as to have enabled us to have developed the mystery in which they were involved. But presenting nothing clear du ring their progress, but the weakness and humiliation of the royal family of Spain; and promising nothing probable in their consequence, but the accomplishment of the wishes of Bonaparte, without resistance or difficulty, the mind felt unwilling to undertake the laborious and unpleasant task. Besides the transactions which reached this country in an unauthenticated form or involved in mystery, it was evident that many events must have occurred to fill up and connect the series :--of these it was probable that some were known to many on the spot ; while, from the nature of others, and the secrecy in which they happened, and the rank and character of the persons to whom they related, there seemed little reason to expect that they would ever fully be laid open to the world. The attention and interest of Europe, never attracted to these events singly or strongly, were soon afterwards called to the unlooked for resistance of the Spanish nation. The astonishing and unexpected nature of this resistance; the alternate dread and hope with which it was viewed; and the rapidity and magnitude of the events a which it gave birth, left no room for the indulgence or exercise of that curiosity, which could dwell on the subordinate but intimatelyconnected facts that preceded and occasioned it. Had not the cause, of Spain called for their full development, it would most probably have been left for the re search or ingenuity of future his torians; and the first and feeble causes of the revolution in Spain might have remained as obscure and perplexed as those which have preceded the struggles of other nations for their liberty and independence. In order to rouse to its highest pitch the indignation of the Spa niards against their oppressor, and to hold him up to the rest of the world and to posterity in the perpetration of one of his most foul and tyrannical acts, it was thought proper to publish an authentic document of his behaviour to the royal family of Spain. This document was entitled, An Exposition of the Practices and Machinations which led to the Usurpation of the Crown of Spain, and the Means adopted by the Emperor of the French to carry it into Execution. The author of it is don Pedro Cevallos, first secretary of state and dispatches to his Catholic majesty Ferdinand VII. From this document we shall draw most of the materials for that part of the his, tory to which it relates; incorpo rating in their proper order and connection the narrative of those events which, though happening within the same period of time, are omitted by Cevallos, as being suf ficiently known, or not immediately bearing upon his subject. Before, however, we make use of this document, of the genuineness of which not the smallest doubt can be entertained, it seems proper to inquire into the credibility to which it is entitled. The period of time during which the transactions took place of which don Pedro Cevallos gives an account, reaches from the peace of Tilsit in 1807 to the middle of May 1808, when Bonaparte had succeeded succeeded in his views against the royal family of Spain. In. every circumstance that occurred during this time he was consulted as first secretary of state to Charles IV, and subsequently to Ferdinand VII. With respect, therefore, to the opportunities and advantages he possessed, there can be no doubt that he is fully qualified to give a full and authentic narrative of the transactions he records. It is proper, however, to remark, that when Joseph Napoleon was advanced to the throne of Spain on the forced resignation of the royal family, don Pedro Cevallos accepted under him the same situation he had enjoyed under Charles and Ferdinand. This circumstance, at first sight, may seem to throw a doubt on the credibility of his narrative; but if it be examined coolly and impartially, it will be found that, however it may affect his character for consistency, or cast a shade over the purity and firmness of his patriotism, the effect it ought justly to produce on the authenticity of his statement will be very slightly, if at all, disadvantageous. In one point of view indeed it is suspicious-looked on by his countrymen with a watchful and distrustful eye, as having entered the service of Bonaparte; the hope of replacing himself in their confidence and good opinion may have led him to soften or misrepresent the part he himself took in the transactions he records. This conjecture, however, whether true or false, is of comparatively little moment, since it is for the detail of practices and machinations of Bonaparte, not for a view of the conduct of don Pedro Cevallos, that we consult his document. As we wish to meet and obviate every probable or specious objection before we begin to use the work, we shall notice another that has been urged, lying more directly, if not with more force, against the use of the narrative as a historical document. The objects of Cevallos in、 his publication avowedly were, to defend or exculpate his own conduct in accepting a situation under Joseph Bonaparte, and to rouse the hatred of the Spaniards against the emperor of the French. The most effectual and certain mode of attaining both these objects, it may be said, would be by exaggerating the crimes of Bonaparte :-this would evidently rouse the Spaniards to 'indignation and vengeance; and these feelings would so completely occupy their minds, that they would have no leisure to weigh the consistency and patriotism of Cevallos, even if they had been dis-` posed to regard with suspicion the man who had laid open the crimes of Bonaparte. The most obvious and satisfactory reply to this objection may be drawn from an attentive and candid perusal of the narrative itself. Had the idea of exculpating his own conduct, and painting Bonaparte in the most odious and criminai colours, been so powerfully present to his mind as to have influenced his narrative, the effect would have been evident in the tone of its style, as well as in the inconsistency of its story. Instead of relating the circumstances as they occurred, with even less animation, and fewer breaks of invective against Bonaparte, or appeal to the Spaniards, than would naturally have been looked for-the narrative would have been abrupt and declamatory. If effect had been the sole, or even the principal obQ4 ject |