to their morals and to their health, is considered as equally deserving censure *.

There is a calling, which is seldom followed by itself; I mean the furnishing of funerals, or the serving of the pall. This is generally in the hands of cabinet-makers, or of upholsterers, or of woollen-drapers. Now if any Quaker should be found in any of these occupations, and if he should unite with these that of serving the pall, he would be considered, by such an union, as following an objectionable trade. For the members of this Society having discarded all the pomp, and parade, and dress, connected with funerals, from their own practice, and this upon moral principles, it is insisted upon that they ought not to be accessary to the promotion of such ceremonials among others.

Poor children are frequently sent by parishes to cotton-mills. Little or no care is taken of their morals. The men, when grown up, frequently become drunken, and the girls debauched. But the evil does not stop here. The progeny of these, vitiated by the drunkenness and debauchery of their parents, have usually diseased and crippled constitutions, which they perpetuate to a new generation; after which the whole race, I am told, generally becomes extinct. What Christian can gain wealth at the expense of the health, morals, and happiness of his fellow-creatures?

VOL. II.

F

The

The trade of a printer, or bookseller, when exercised by a Quaker, has not escaped the animadversions of the world. A distinction, however, must be made here. They, who condemn this calling, can never do it justly but in supposed cases. They must suppose, for example, that the persons in question follow these callings generally, or that they do not make an exception with respect to the printing or selling of such books as may convey poison to the morals of those, who read them.

A Quaker-tailor is considered as a character which cannot consistently exist. But a similar distinction must be made here as in the former case. It cannot surely be meant that, if a Quaker confines himself to the making of clothes for his own Society, he is reproachable for so doing, but only if he makes clothes for every one without distinction, following, as he is ordered, all the varying fashions of the world.

A Quaker-hatter is looked upon in the same light as a Quaker-tailor. But here a distinction suggests itself again. If he makes only plain and useful hats for the community and for other Quakers, it can

not

not be understood that he is acting inconsistently with his religious profession. The charge can only lie against him, where he furnishes the hat with the gold and the silver-lace, or the lady's riding-hat with its ornaments, or the military hat with its lace, cockade, and plumes. In this case he will be considered as censurable by many, because he will be looked upon as a dealer in the superfluities condemned by his own religion.

The last occupation I shall notice is that of a silversmith. And here the censure will depend upon a contingency also. If a Quaker confines himself to the selling of plain silver articles for use, little objection can be raised against his employ. But if, in addition to this, he sells gold-headed canes, trinkets, rings, ear-rings, bracelets, jewels, and other ornaments of the person, he will be considered as chargeable with the same inconsistency as the follower of the former trade.

In examining these and other occupations of those in the Society, with a view of seeing how far the objections, which have been advanced against them, are valid, I own I

have a difficult task to perform. For what standard shall I fix upon, or what limits shall I draw, on this occasion? The objections are founded in part upon the principle, that individuals ought not to sell those things, of which their own practice shows that they disapprove. But shall I admit this principle without any limitation or reserve? Shall I say, without any reserve, that a Quaker-woman, who discards the use of a simple ribbon from her dress, shall not sell it to another female, who has been constantly in the habit of using it, and this without any detriment to her mind? Shall I say again, without any reserve, that a Quaker-man, who discards the use of black cloth, shall not sell a yard of it to another? And if I should say so, where am I to stop? Shall I not be obliged to go over all the colours in his shop, and object to all but the brown and drab? Shall I say again, without any reserve, that a Quaker cannot sell any thing, which is innocent in itself, without inquiring of the buyer its application or its use? And if I should say so, might I not as well say that no Quaker can be in trade? I fear that to say this would be to get into a

labyrinth,

labyrinth, out of which there would be no clew to guide us.

Difficult, however, as the task may seem, I think I may lay down three positions, which will probably not be denied; and which, if admitted, will assist us in the determination of the question before us. The first of these is, that no member of this Society can be concerned in the sale of a thing, which is evil in itself. Secondly, that he cannot encourage the sale of an article, which he knows to be essentially, or very generally, that is, in seven cases out of ten, productive of evil. And thirdly, that he cannot sell things, which he has discarded from his own use, if he has discarded them on a belief that they are specifically forbidden by Christianity, or that they are morally injurious to the human mind.

If these positions be acknowledged, they will give ample latitude for the condemna tion of many branches of trade.

A Quaker-bookseller, according to these positions, cannot sell a profane or improper book.

A Quaker-spirit-merchant cannot sell his liquor but to those, who he believes will

use