conceived of without his knowledge, nor his knowledge without his decrees; wherefore it follows, that God's fore-knowledge does not evert or render his decrees fuperfluous, nor do his decrees deftroy his foreknowledge, or render that infignificant; of the two, the latter might rather be fuppofed, tho' it ought not by any means, fince God's fore-knowledge of future events neceffarily arifes from himfelf, his will, and the decrees of it, and are ftrictly, closely and infeparably connected with them.

2. It is faid, That "this argument is obnoxious to thefe dreadful confequences, that it plainly renders God the author of fin; and prefcience thus ftated, must be attended with a fatal neceffity." To which may be replied, That the fore-knowledge of God can never reasonably be thought to make him the author of fin, when even the decrees of God, refpecting finful actions, from whence his fore-knowledge of fin arifes, and upon which it is founded, do not make him fo. God determined the felling of Jofeph into Egypt, the betraying of Chrift by Judas, and the crucifixion of him by the Jews; and yet was the author of neither of them. Nay, should it be allowed what is fuggefted, That "to fay, God only doth foresee things future, because he

z Whitby, p. 492. Ed. 2. 470, 471.

@ Ib..

hath

*

hath decreed they fhould be fo, is to fay God moves and pre-determines the wills of men to thofe things which are evil;" tho', I think, the difference is very wide between God's decrees of future events, within himfelf from eternity, and his motions and predeterminations of the wills of men to any actions in time. But, fuppofing fuch motions and determinations of the wills of men to that which is evil; fince he moved David to number the people, and put it into the hearts of the Kings of the earth to fulfil bis will, and to agree to give their Kingdom to the beaft; even thefe do not make God the author of fin for the divine pre-determination, motion, and providential concourse refpecting men, do not at all alter the liberty of the will; men, under them, feel no power or force upon them; they freely will, and voluntarily do what they do, of which not God, but they are the authors. If therefore neither the pre-determinations of the wills of men in time, nor the decrees of God from eternity, make him the author of fin, much lefs his fore-knowledge. God fore-knew that Adam would fall, as Chrift did that Judas would betray him, for he told him of it before-hand; and yet God was no more the author of the fin and fall of Adam, than Chrift was of his

* 2 Sam. xxiv. 1. Rev. xvii. 17..

betray

betraying by Judas; nor did either Adam' or Judas feel any force or conftraint from this fore-knowledge, obliging them to fin; nor do they ever complain of it, or impute their fin and fall unto it. Prescience, thus ftated, introduces no fatal neceffity: it is, indeed, attended with a neceffity of infallibility refpecting the event; but not with a coactive neceffity upon the wills of men, which are left hereby entirely free, and fo they find themfelves in the commiffion of every action; neither the decree of God, nor his fore-knowledge, neceffitate men, or oblige and compel them to do the things decreed and fore-known; nevertheless, whatever is decreed and fore-known by God, is certainly, infallibly and immutably brought to pass according to his will.

3. It is urged, "That if there were any ftrength in this argument, it would prove that we should not deny the liberty fuppofed in all the arguments ufed against thefe decrees, but rather, prefcience it felf; for if those two things were really inconfiftent, and one of them must be denied, the introducing an abfolute neceffity of all our actions, which evidently deftroys all religion. and morality, would tend more, of the two, to the dishonour of God, than the denying him a fore-knowledge." It is easy to obferve,

whitby, p. 493. Ed. 2. 471, 473.

that

that this author was rather difpofed to deny the fore-knowledge of God, than to part with his favourite notion concerning the liberty of man's will lying in an indifferency to good and evil, and as oppofed to any fort of neceffity. The Socinians, upon this principle, have come into a denial of it; and the Arminians have fhewn a good inclination to it. Their champion, John Goodwin, has roundly declared, that there is no fore-knowledge, properly fo called, in God. This has been always the way of these men, that, if their notions would not comport with the being and perfections of God, they will fhape God and his perfections agreeable to their notions. Tho' it may be a confiderable difficulty to reconcile the prescience of God, and the liberty of man's will; yet there is no need to deny either of them: not the natural liberty of the will; this would be to deftroy the will it felf, which liberty is no ways infringed either by the fore-knowledge or decrees of God; tho' the moral liberty of the will, fince the fall, without the grace of God, must be denied: nor the prefcience of God; which introduces no fuch neceffity of our actions, which destroy religion and morality, or tends to the difhonour of God; fince it puts no coactive neceffity upon us, but

C

Redemption Redeemed, c. 3. f. 2. p. 29.

leaves us free to the commiffion of our actions; for to deny this perfection of God, would be to deny God himfelf; and, one fhould think, if either of these must be denied, it would be more eligible to deny man what may be thought to belong to him, than to deny that which fo evidently belongs to God.

4. It is obferved", "That if thefe Decretalifts may take fanctuary in the foreknowledge God hath of things future, the Hobbifts and the Fatalifts may do the fame; that the Hobbits do found their doctrine of neceffity upon the ninth chapter to the Romans, and the Fatalifts upon the certainty of divine prefcience and predictions; and that it was the fear of this, that the liberty of man's will could not be preferved, which made the Greeks embrace this impious doctrine, that God did not fore-know things future and contingent: whereas it is faid from Le Blanc, that the trueft resolution of this difficulty is, that prefcience is not the caufe that things are future; but their being future, is the cause they are foreseen.' 1 reply, That if the fentiments of the Hob bifts and Fatalifts were the fame with those who are called Decretalifts, they might juftly take, what this author ftiles, fanctuary in the fore-knowledge of God; or, in other

Whitby, p. 493, 494, 495. Ed. 2. 472, 473, 474.

words,