as a body in general, with those qualities or accidents, which belong to other bodies in general.

That every material substance actually stands in this threefold relation to other substances, is not an hypothesis, but a plain statement of a fact, which, we take for granted, no one will dispute. According to Locke's division, it is evident that those qualities, which result from the particular Relations of specific substances among each other, are entirely omitted. The primary qualities as enumerated by him, consist entirely of the general relations of bodies, as universal parts of matter; while the secondary are formed altogether from the relations of bodies to our particular constitution. Taking, however, his arrangement for granted, it will still be true, that the difference between them does not consist in any fanciful resemblance which, as he supposes, exists between the pri mary qualities and the ideas of them in our minds; but must be sought for, in the circumstance which we have pointed out. And this may easily be proved. The taste of sugar, or the pain which intense heat creates, would have been just as well understood as they are at present, supposing them to be the only sensations, which we had ever experienced, from these respective senses; but had we never seen or touched but one object in our lives, it is clear that we never could have predicated of it, that it was either large or small, or have described its shape and nature as being either round or square, quick or slow, or indeed have formed any notion whatever respecting it, except that it was the cause of certain sensations arising in our minds: for except from comparison of bodies with each other, the ideas which we attach to such words as round, square, large, small, quick, slow, and innumerable others which might be mentioned, could not possibly have been conveyed to our understandings.

If what has now been said respecting the principles of our knowledge in all questions of real existence, should be allowed, it is evident that we shall, at once, be able to define the specific differences on which our ideas depend, when we talk of Truth and Reason, as distinguished from mere Facts, and from the information which we derive solely from experience. It is obvious, on mere inspection, that the subject of our reasoning in all discussions of pure mathematics, is extension or quantity, or motion, or some one or other among the general Relations, which may be predicated with certainty of all bodies, whatever their particular properties, in other respects, may be. Whereas, in chemistry, or electricity, or natural philosophy, the datum, from which we reason, is invariably some one or other among the Relations which bodies possess, as belonging to some particular class of substances, and not as mere parts of matter in general. Carrying then this distinction in our mind,

if we should now examine upon what principle it is, that we may deduce all geometrical truths (and the same might easily be shown of all other classes of truths) a priori, and why they cannot be denied without a contradiction in terms, the difficulty we think will be explained in a very few words. I require not to know whether the sides of a particular triangle be made of wood or metal, before I can affirm that its three angles are equal to two right angles; be→ cause this truth results, not from a comparison of the particular Relations, which belong to the substance from which it may happen to be made; but from a comparison of Relations, which necessarily belong to every substance which occupies space. Whether or not, however, a particular body will be dissolved if put into water, this is plainly a fact which I can only learn from experience; because this is not a necessary property of matter, which may be predicated universally of all bodies, but one which is only found in particular classes of them.

Again, if a person should deny that the loaf which is before me, will afford nourishment, there is in this no contradiction of terms; it is only saying, that the substance in question is not bread, but some other substance. But if instead of denying the particular Relation, in which the substance before me, stands to my particular constitution as bread, he should deny any of the general Relations belonging to it, as body; if he should affirm, for example, that it does not fill space, or that a part of it is greater than its whole, this is to affirm that body is not body; it is therefore a manifest contradiction in terms; it is not merely, as in the other instance, a particular error, but involves a proposition which is universally false.

We know not whether we have made ourselves so clearly understood as we might have wished; but we have trespassed so long upon the patience of our readers, that we must consult brevity, even at the risk of being obscure. The sum of what we have been saying may be included in a few words. Truth is an universal fact, and a Fact is a particular truth; and as Truth and Reason, like Fact and Experience, (to which they are opposed) are correlative terms in the present inquiry, if our readers are able to define the one, they can never be at a loss to explain the other. Whether, however, the definitions which we have been giving, be allowed or not, is of no material importance to the real argument; we have merely stated the principles to which our knowledge may be referred; and if the distinctions which we have suggested be founded in nature, our conclusion will not be affected, by any difference of opinion which may still exist as to names.

We wish only, before we conclude, to add one remark which is, perhaps, of some importance. If the principle by which we have just been endeavouring to distinguish between the primary and secondary qualities be true, in that case the question as to the ex

istence

istence of a material world, would seem to be at once banished from philosophy. That the mind actually perceives certain properties in the bodies around us, which are known by the name of primary qualities, such as extension, figure, solidity-this is a matter of fact which no writer, we believe, has ever called in question. The doubt has been, as to their existence, independently of a substance perceiving them. But if what we have been saying be allowed, the assertion of this fact constitutes the very definition of such qualities; and is precisely the exact point of distinction, in which our knowledge of them altogether consists. Finally, we may observe, that this way of viewing the subject, if once adopted, puts at once an end to all debate as to the comparative certainty of our knowledge. It seems to have been frequently imagined, that such qualities, as solidity, extension, number, and others of the same class, are more palpably inherent in bodies, than colour, taste, combustibility, and so on. And in one sense, perhaps, this may be asserted; but assuredly not in any sense which need at all affect the character of our belief. The property of gold to be dissolved in a certain acid, is just as certain, as its property to exclude all other substances from occupying the place which it fills. We may, if we please, distinguish between these properties, in the common way, and say, that the one is conveyed into our minds by this faculty, and the other by that; that Reason tells us it is impossible, that two bodies should occupy the same point of space, in the same instant of time; but that we have only Instinct to guide us, in expecting that the piece of metal, which I hold in my hand, will be dissolved in the liquid before me. No doubt it is plain that our knowledge in these two cases is different in kind; but there is nothing, in all this, to prove that it is different in respect to its certainty. It is surely just as possible for particular substances to possess particular relations among each other, as to possess others, which are mutually common to all bodies; and it is an evident absurdity to say, that the difference between solidity and solubility consists in the difference between Reason and Instinct, be these words defined as they may; for the things themselves are plainly different; and the perception of this difference is that which constitutes all the knowledge of them which we possess.

We had intended, before we finally concluded, to have said a few words on the subject of Mr. Hume's philosophy, which occupies a space in the present Dissertation and in the admiration of Mr. Stewart, altogether disproportioned, as we cannot help thinking, either to the ability which they display, or to the peculiar and most offensive character of the opinions, which it was the great and unworthy object of his metaphysical writings to enforce. With respect to the latter part of our remark, we do not doubt, in

deed we are confident, that Mr. Stewart must feel as we do, and as every good man must feel. But we cannot conceal our surprise at the extravagant and hyperbolical language in which he speaks of the Treatise of Human Nature,' viewing it solely in respect of its philosophical acuteness. It is a work which was disowned by its author, not on account of the opinions which it contained; for these he subsequently embodied in his Essays; but because it was written at an age, when his judgment was not mature, and because it was, on that account, unworthy of his subsequent reputation. The opinion of the public respecting it, is sufficiently exemplified in the fact, that notwithstanding the great popularity which the author afterwards acquired, a second edition of it was never called for, until within these last few years. We have read the book, on the strength of the recommendation which has been so lavishly bestowed upon it; and most cordially do we ac quiesce in the judgment, which the author himself and the public in general, have so unequivocally pronounced upon it. We would, without any hesitation, bind ourselves to produce more flagrant instances of bad reasoning, of unintelligible speculations, extravagant assumptions and crude hypotheses, from the first volume of the "Treatise upon Human Nature,' than from any work of celebrity, which has been written in our language, during the last century. And strange, indeed, would it be were it otherwise. A work whose professed object, at least whose manifest tendency, was to destroy the distinction between right and wrong, to disprove the existence of a God, and to sap the foundation of every principle, upon which the welfare of society and the eternal happiness of mankind depend, must necessarily, in every step of it, be opposed to truth and solid reasoning. It is really a contradiction in terms, to praise the philosophical genius of a man, who attempted to establish such utter absurdities as Hume openly supports in his Treatise upon Human Nature,' and more covertly in his Essays. He may have been an acute sophist, but he could not possess in his mind even the first elements of true genius in philosophy. There is an ingenious person of the present day, who has published more volumes than one, to disprove the Newtonian theory of gravitation; and every one who is informed of the fact, will be at once satisfied, as to the sort of ingenuity which such speculations must display. Can we then doubt as to the character of a system of metaphysics, which professes to call in question the great truths of natural religion? And is it not a valuable testimony in favour of the immutable foundations on which those truths repose, when we find, that so shrewd and sharp witted a man as Hume, was unable to impugn them, except upon principles of reasoning, by which he was also able to deny the truths of geometry, and to affirm that there was neither sun or moon or stars in the heavens, nor mind or matter, in the earth?

But

But it is time to draw our remarks to a conclusion; which we shall do with briefly expressing our hope, that nothing which we have said will lead Mr. Stewart to doubt the respect which we feel for his writings, so far as the talents which they display are concerned, or for the objects which, we are sure, it is the first wish of his mind to promote. If the objections which we have made to the principles of his philosophy are really not solid, they may, at least, be useful, in turning his attention to those parts of his theory which require light, or call for further confirmation. If on the other hand, as we of course suppose, but should be most unwilling to affirm, they are founded upon weighty and sufficient reasons, we cannot for one moment imagine, that any thing which we have said, will be construed by him, into an occasion of anger or complaint. To dispute warmly and earnestly against a man's favourite opinions necessarily puts his candour to the test; but if the opposition is conducted with civility and fairness, it certainly ought not, and more especially in matters of philosophy, to be any trial of his temper. In the heat of composition, and in the haste of argument, we may have appeared, at times,—though we are not aware of the occasion,-to forget for a moment the great reputation of Mr. Stewart; but we can truly assure him, that our fault has proceeded merely from forgetfulness; and that our wish and intention have uniformly been to deliver our sentiments with freedom, but at the same with courtesy; and without ever leaving it to be supposed, that we considered the consequences which we have deduced, in one or two instances, from his philosophy, as being any part of his opinions.

ART. XIV.—1. Nouvelles Annales des Voyages, de la Géogra phie et de l'Histoire ; publiées par MM. J. B. Eyriés et Malte

Brun.

2. Mémoire sur les Voyages exécutés dans l'Océan Glacial Arctique, au Nord de l'Amérique Septentrionale; par Le Chevalier Lapie, Geographe. Paris, 1821. WE really thought that the ghosts of Laurent Ferrer Maldo

nado and Bartolomeo de Fonté or de Fuéntes, had long ago been laid, and for ever, in the Red Sea; but we were mistaken, for here we have them once more revisiting the glimpses of the moon,' and haunting an unfortunate Frenchman, who designates himself Le Chevalier Lapie, géographe, a title of honour given by his countrymen to every paltry map-maker, of whom, from the specimen before us, we venture to set down the Chevalier as about one of the worst that Paris produces.

M. Malte