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him, if possible :-Intimates, that if the Empire were to lose in him the most powerful Protestant Prince, and the firmeft fupport of the German Liberries, the project would be revived which gave occasion to the thirty years war ; the undertakers of which would promise themselves so much the more easily to fubdue the German Empire: in which cafe, all the laws, civil and ecclefiaftical, which the States had purchased with their lives and for. tunes, would be trampled under foot. Lastly, the King endeavours to induce them to make his case their own; to convince them, that their ruin is included in his; and to animate them to become his auxiliaries : promising thein, upon all occasions, an effectual affiftance for the support of their liberty, and every right lawfully obtained, which the Aulic Council, too often, tròd under foot.Protesting next, in the strongest and moft folemn manner, against every thing contained in the said Commifforial Decree, injurious to him; and finally reserving to himself, in like manner, his rights and liberties, as well as the juft fatisfac. tion which a Crowned Head, and an eminent Elector of the Empire, was entitled to demand, according to the Law of Nations, and the fundamental Constitutions of the Empire, from a Council which has shewn so little regard for his dignity, at the Diet of Ratisbon.

The third and fourth Parts of this state-collection are of a Dature and tendency so fimilar to each other, that both might very easily have been run into one: and, indeed, if one general face had been deduced from the whole, the whole would have been more perípicuous, and the process more fatisfactory; the repetitions they now abound with, ferving as mucn to perplex fome Readers, as to inform others; and having an obvious tendency to disgust

, in fome degree, all. It is true, the cabinets of . Princes are very rarely thus exposed; so that a very small degree of curiosity, will bring numbers to inspect the contents, and so far, at least, the Pruffian cause will be undoubtedly served by any Exposition, of any kind. But, if the public, from this fpecimen, should happen to infer, that all cabinets, as well as all families, may poffibly have their secrets, which would as ill bear day light; the reputation of Kings and Ministers, and the reverence to be obferved with regard to the mysteries of State, will be but little advanced by it. Leaving, however, to Sovereigos, those confiderations which properly belong to them, we shall content ourselves, with treating thefe other two papers in such a way as appears to us least open to the objections which lie against the papers themfelves.

The first is called, A Memorial in vindication of the King of Pruffia's conduci, from the fulse imputations of the Court of Saxony.

And the last, A Memorial, setting forth the conluet of the Courts of Vienna and Saxony towards the King of Prussia, and their dan. gerous designs against bim; together with the original documents in proof of them. Rav. Dec. 1756. Tt

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The introductory paragraph to the first of these, maintains, “That the King of Prudlia's motives of action were not of fuch a nature as required darkness rather than light; but that his Majesty, in tenderness to a Prince, whom he did not desire to treat as an enemy, had only hinted the motives in the declaration he publilhed upon his entrance into Saxony: Flattering himself, that by recalling the remembrance of palt times, and insinuating his apprehenfions for the suure, the Saxor court would have perceived of itself, that his Majetty was well informed of all its secret machinations ; consequently, inhcad of oppofing his measures, would raiher have found it their wifcit courle to have endeavoured to co operate with him in carrying them into execution :--Adding, that the resiliance of that court, the faise colours they had laid on his conduct, and the calumnies they had railed, had obliged him to enter into details he would have been glad to suppress, for the sake of convincing all Europe, he had done nothing but what found policy, reason, and justice itself had didated."

This ierves to account, in some veasure, for the dead filence observed in the expofition of his MI jelly's inotives with regard to Saxony; and to obriare a doubt which might otherwise have arisen, that his Majely had truck his blow fiiit, and had afterwards, by the dint of learch and re-search, discovered the Saxon provocations.

What immediately follows, is a charge of ingratitude against the court of Saxony, for having fo foon forgot the obligations they acknowleged in che trcaty of Delden ; a repetition of that other charge, already recited, concerning the concert for dividing the Prufian dominions, together with a re specification of what was to be the Saxon share of tliein ; a pretty strong invective against Count Brubl, for proposing it as ihe price of his master's friendSluip to every power that made application for it; a reference to a letter from Count Rutowiki to Xarihal Brown, relatiog to the prefent circumliances, which accidentally fell into the King's hands ; Count Fleming's negotiations at Vienna, as proofs that a secret concert was forming between the two courts : assertion

upon aflcrtion, that the King was able to support all he had alleged by au hentic vouchers, then in his hands; and an appeal to the impartial world, whether his Majesty, thus provoked and endangered, could, or ought to have done Icfs for his own preservation.--So far, then, it must be underttood, the memorial turns upon what preceded his Majelly's entrance into Saxony; ar.d if he had fufficient reasons to warrant that step before he took it, it is farther said, that he mer with abundant corroboratives afterward. Such as the magazines which had been long forming, and by which the Sixon' troops were then subfifted; the resolution taken by the King of Poland to put himself at the head of his army, and to poft himfelf in such a manner as might belt facilitate his junction with the Auftrian army; and the discovery of a road lately cut through the mountains of Bohe

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mia, and marked at certain distances with posts, bearing this remarkable inscription, The Military Road.

The remaining topics are all, or most of them, such as have been touched upon before. -As, the insufficience and insecu. rity of the Saxon offer of neutrality; the neceflity of difarming so determined and so infidious an enemy; his Majesty's extreme fenfibility of the King of Poland's fituation; afcriprions of it to the pernicious councils of Count Bruh!; the falthood of the reports 1pread by that Minister concerning the excelles committed by the Pruflians; che sufferings of the Saxons; the indignities faid to be offered to the Queen ; the removal of the Archives, &c. And in the close, the King avows, That he has no design against the King of Poland, or his dominions; that he lays no claims, pretends to no acquisitions, no, not of an inch of ground there;

and that tho' it be true, that the proceedings of the Saxon coure 1 gave his Majesty an indisputable right to deal guite otherwise

with him, he would, nevertheless, perfitt firmly in his refolution of restoring the King of Poland to the full and peaceable pofierfion of all his dominions, as soon as it could be done without endangering his own.

We are now come to the fourth and last of these pieces, which, it must be owned, belong rather to the political than the literary si province; but which muit

, nevertheless, have a place in the read. ing of the times.--And herein we are not only furnished with the same course of facts, positions, arguments, and conclusions, made current through such a variety of channels before ; but also

with a series of vouchers, drawn from originals, now reiting in This Pruflian Majesty's cuftody, to support them; fo introduced, 19., arranged, and commented upon, at first, as may best serve the

Prussian cause; but afterwards annexed at large, for the common use of the common world.

The eventual treaty of partition between the courts of Vienna )

and Dresden, of May the 18th, 1745, is given as the basis of

the whole building ;-and it is said, the treaty of Dresden, of Dec. 180 25; the same year, was, perhaps, but a few days old, before the :: court of Vienna made no fcruple to propose to that of Saxony, a to new treaty of alliance, in which the coniraking parties were like

wise to renew the said treaty of eventual partition : which fact, it is also said, can be proved by the very draught of it then de. livered at Dresden ;-and this proposal, it seems, the Saxon ministry did not decline, but only demurred to; thinking it would becter consolidate their plan, if they could act under the countenance of a defensive alliance between the two courts of Vienna and Petersburgh.---This, however, is no otherwise proved, than by the specification of such a treaty, which did atually take place on the 22d of May, 1746, following. The body, or ostensible part of this creaty, is also admitted to be innocent enough for public inspection ; being calculated only to serve as a fkseen for hix secret articles, of which the fourth was levelled fingly against Ti 2

Piulia,

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Prusia, as by the article itself, inserted among the vouchers or documents, is apparent for though the Emprefs-Queen fets out with a protestation, that she will religiously observe the treaty of Dresderi, slie afterwards explains how little religion would serve for such a purpose, viz. -" If the King of Prulia should be the " first to depart from this peace, by attacking either her Majesty o the Empress Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, or her Majesty

the Empress of Rufia, or even the republic of Poland, in all " which cases the rights of her Majesty the Emprefs-Queen to Si

lefia, and the county of Glatz, would again take place, and re+ cover their full effect, the two contracting parties thall mutually * affilt each other, with a body of 60,000 men, to reconquer ** Silesia, &c.” The observations made upon this article are, That there were the titles of which the Emprefs-Queen proposed to avail herself, for the recovery of Silesia : that every war, in which Prussia could be concerned with Ruffia or Poland, was to be deemed an infraction of the treaty of Dresden, though neitherof those powers had any concern in that treaty; and though the latter was not even in alliance with the court of Vienna : that by comparing the conduct of that court with this article, from jis date, it is very visible, she thought to attain her end, either by provoking the King to commence a war againt her, or by kindling one between his Majeity, or one of the other two before mentioned powers, by her secret intrigues and machinations : and that, consequently, it was no wonder, that the treaty of Petersburgh has ever since been the hinge on which the Austrian politics have turned; or that their negociations have been principally directed to firengthen it by the accession of other Powers.

The facts next advanced are, That the court of Saxony was the first power invited into it : that this invitation was made in the beginning of the year 1717, and that the said court eagerly accepted the invitation: as appeared by their furnishing Count de Vicedom, and the Sieur Pezold, their Ministers at Peterburgh, with the necessary full powers for that purpose; by ordering them to deciare, that their court was not only ready to accede to the treaty itself, but also to the secret article against Pruflia, and to join in the arrangement made by the two crowns; provided meaTures were better taken than before, as well for the security and defence of Saxony, as for its indemnification and recompence, in proportion to the effort and progress which should be made : by farther specifying, that if, upon any fresh attack from the King of Prussia, the Empress Queen should, by their assistance, happen not only to reconquer Silesia, and the county of Glatz, bat also reduce him within narrow bounds, --the King of Poland, as Elector of Saxony, would stand to the partition fiipulated between his Polith Majesty and the Empress Quecn, by the convention signed at Leipfic, May 18. 17455 and by charging Count Loss, the Saxon Minister at Vienna, at the same time, to open a private negotiation for an eventual partition of the conquests which Mould

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be made on Prussia, by laying doivn,' as the basis of it, the faid partition-treaty of Leiplic.-I'he particulars of all which are to be seen in the documents annexed; that is to say, in the initructions given, May 23, 1747, to the Saxon Ministers at Petersburgh ; in the memorial accordingly delivered by those Minilters to the - Ruflian court, Sept. 2 jj 1747; and in the instructions given to Count Loss, at Vienna, Dec. 21, 1747.

The memorial then proceeds in these words : “ It has, indeed,

been affectedly fappoled, throughout this negotiation, that the " King would be the aggressor against the court of Vienna. But "* what right can the King of Poland draw from thence to make * conquetts upon the King? Or, if his Polith Majesty, in the

quality of an auxiliary, will also become a belligerani party, ** It cannot be taken amiss, that his Majesty should treat him ac

cordingly, and regulate his conduct by that of Saxony. This sa is a truth which has been acknowleged even by the King of * Poland's own privy council, in the opinion they gave when " consulted upon the accession to the treaty of Petersburgh ; wit. "ness the two extracts, (also added to the documents) wherein the * said privy council gave the King to underiland, That the prin

ciple laid down in the fourth secret article of the treaty of

Petersburgh, went beyond the common rules : and that if * his Polith Majesty should approve of it, by acceding thereto, “ his Pruslian Majesty might look upon it as a violation of the treaty

of Dresden." What follows next, is a course of Saxon. artifices, to keep the negotiation in hand, without putting the last hand to it : At Paris, declaring, folenmly, the treaty of Petersburgh contained nothing * more than was in the German copy, which had been communicated to the court of Frence; no secret or separate article having been communicated to the King of Poland: At Petersburgh, profesling always a readiness to accede in form to the faid treaty; but always finding some pretence to postpone it.—Thus, when invited afresh in the year 1751, they sent powers and instructions to the Sieur Funck at Petersburgh accordingly; but withal required, that the King of England, as Elector of Hanover, should be induced to accede firit. And when his Britannic Majeily declined all concern in that mystery of iniquity, recommended another alfiance, of a nature innocent enough to bear being produced and avowed: Retaining, neverthelets, their original purpofe, to put in for a share of the Prussian spoils, whenever the proper opportunity fhould offer." In proof of which several clauses out of the Saxon dispatches are produced." But then it is not unfit to be observed by the way, that neither the dispatch of June 16, 1756, from Count Flemming, the Saxon Minister at Vienna, to Count Bruhl, nor that of the Siear Funck at Petersburgh, of June, 1753, [it is in this order they are ranged in the memorial] out of which the two following clauses are laid to be taken, arc annexed to the documents." Your Excellency knows," (lays Count Flem

ming)

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