be no longer responsible for their teaching to the State. This is the principle of non-interference as applied to Church and State.

Our purpose in the present article is not so much to assail or defend this principle as to attempt some discussion of the more distant consequences of its application. Nevertheless we will say this much, that it is certainly entitled to a fair and hopeful trial. For the contrary principle has been tried long enough and has utterly failed. Surely if it may be said of any institution it may be said of State churches-" weighed in the balance and found wanting.” What a long and dark catalogue of wars and persecutions is directly attributable to them. Even now we have Europe threatened with war arising out of the conflicting claims of priests and statesmen in the State churches of Germany, and in England the fury of party-spirit within the State church-a spirit which State patronage provokes and fosters-calls loudly for the remedy of disestablishment.

But even if State churches had never been tried and found wanting, there would still be much to be said for the principle of thenon-interference of the State with religion. A good deal might be said from the State point of view, and a good deal more we think might be said from the Church point of view. Whatever may be thought as regards those older forms of government which are now rapidly passing away from the civilised world, it might be urged that at least in a democratic state the object of government ought to be to stimulate people to think and act for themselves, and not to keep them in leading strings. But if a government provides a religion for the people, it puts a premium on abstinence from thought, in the very highest fields of thought, and it renders unnecessary the corporate action which is the due result of such thought. The effect is even worse than this, indeed; for if the State patronises one or more forms of religion, it gives those forms, be they better or worse, a great advantage in the eyes of the people, and so it puts a heavy clog upon freedom of thought. And without freedom of thought we hold it to be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for any man to get a firm grasp of true religion.

But besides, why should the State go out of its way to undertake so very delicate a responsibility? If you pay a servant on other people's account to do certain work for them, you are bound to see that he does the work satisfactorily. A State which pays churches incurs by so doing visitatorial responsibilities in regard of those churches, which it cannot neglect without laches of duty, and which

it cannot discharge without constant risk of dangerous collision with church authorities.

But from the point of view of the Church, the argument in favour of non-interference is stronger still. Does the Church believe in her own Founder's words? He said, "My kingdom is not of this world." Is a kingdom "not of this world" to be maintained by State prestige, State patronage, and State sanctions? Is it right that such a kingdom should enter into concordats with the kingdoms of this world, in virtue of which it surrenders a part of its spiritual independence for money and rank? The true sons of the church will always indeed. be the most loyal and dutiful subjects. But their loyalty ought always to be "for conscience' sake," because " the powers that be are ordained of God," and not because they are the chartered officers or the paid mercenaries of the State. But moreover, the churches ought always to be ready to resist for conscience' sake, if need be, as well as to submit. And human nature is such that it will be always more difficult for people to resist a government for conscience' sake, if their whole temporal welfare is at the mercy of government.

We think, therefore, that the non-interference of the State with the religions of the people is a just, fair, and expedient principle, and we think that it ought to be regarded especially by the churches with favour and hopefulness.

The

The first and most obvious consequence of the application of this principle was the abolition of State aid. If the State was not to interfere in religion, it was not, of course, to subsidise religion. only question really remaining was in what way the abolition was to take effect. And the fact that the churches were allowed five years from the passing of the Act to prepare for the change, as well as an absolute title to their landed property, proves how far the question was from having reached the "burning point."

The five years have now elapsed and the principle is fairly under way, and it would be a great mistake to suppose that the abolition of State aid is the only consequence of its application. We believe that much more important consequences will follow which have scarcely as yet begun to develop themselves. And we think that the manner of their development will depend greatly upon the action of the churches.

The people of Australia, as we have already said, have brought with them to this country the laws of England. But in England there is a State religion; and in countries where there is a State

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religion, offences against that religion are offences against the State. But if there is no State religion such offences are no longer necessarily offences against the State. If non-interference with the religions of the people is to be the principle acted on by the Government, we shall, have to distinguish between sins and crimes. The State will continue to punish crimes with temporal and material penalties, and the churches must be left to deal with sins by means of such spiritual censures as they may be able to wield. The different religious bodies are by no means always agreed as to what is or is not sin. The Jews think it sin to treat the seventh day of the week as a common day. All Christians think it sin to treat the first day of the week as a common day. Most Christians think secular work unlawful on that day, except in cases of necessity or charity. Some Christians think recreation unlawful on that day. Some Christians think certain other days of equal obligation with the first day of the week. Just so some Christians think it unlawful to baptize infants, and some Christians think it unlawful to eat meat on certain days.

It is obvious that if the principle of non-interference is to be acted upon, none of these differing parties can expect the State to enforce any of these opinions. The State cannot forbid people either to work or play on Sundays on the ground of either being sinful, any more than it can forbid meat to be eaten on Fridays or pork on any day, upon the same ground. Indeed, even if all the religious bodies were agreed in condemning a particular act as a sin, they still could not expect the State to punish it on that ground. They would have to show that it was also an offence against the person or property, or against public peace or decency. Suppose, for example, that a man were to hire a public hall and publicly announce a lecture in which he would undertake to prove that there was no God, all religious bodies would unite in condemning his act as a sin. But we do not see how they could expect the State to interfere to forbid him.

If the State is not to interfere with the religions of the people, then all opinions, as far as the State is concerned, have an equal right to express themselves.

Of course if a man should proceed to illustrate his opinion, whatever it was, by language which was indecent, or which tended to provoke a breach of the peace, he would become amenable to the State law. But this would be the case all the same whether the indecent or offensive language were used by theist or atheist, in

defence of religion or against it. It follows, then, that whatever laws exist amongst us (such, for example, as Act 29 Car. II. c. 7; or 21 Geo. III., c. 47) by which sins are punishable as if they were offences against the State, must either be suffered to fall into disuse, or else repealed, or at least altered so as to be brought into accordance with the principle which governs our State action towards religion.

If the State is not to interfere with the religions of the people, then the State cannot punish one man for publicly maintaining that the world made itself, and that there is no life after death; or another man for giving a public entertainment on Sunday; or another man for eating meat on Friday; or another man for eating pork; or another man for administering baptism to an infant. Each of the actions named is sinful in the eyes of one religious body or another-some of them in the eyes of all. But none of them is an injury to person or property, or a violation of public decency, or provocative of a breach of the peace.

But now the repeal of all such laws will speedily carry us to a point where the State and the churches will find themselves upon the same ground, and where, in consequence, they must come to an understanding with each other if there is to be peace and goodwill between them.

For there are certain questions of the highest importance both to State and to Church, and as these come to be dealt with the principle of non-interference by itself will not fully solve them. There are different kinds of non-interference. If I and my neighbour are travelling on the same road, neither ought to interfere with the other. But neither ought to push forward regardless of the fact that the other has to use the same road. Now the State and the churches have often to use the same road, and if either insists upon ignoring the presence of the other, goodwill cannot be maintained between them.

The State qui State is bound to be non-religious, but it is not bound to be anti-religious. Indeed we should rather say that it is bound not to be anti-religious. For if the State is anti-religious, it will make the churches disloyal. And it is not good statesmanship

to make the churches disloyal.

Marriage is a matter of

Let us take an instance in illustration. the highest importance both to the State and to the church. Marriage laws therefore are ground whereon there must be an understanding between the State and the churches, if there is to be good

will between them. The principle of non-interference alone will not suffice to settle the question. What sort of non-interference is it to be?

Is the State in its dealing with marriage to be anti-religious, or is it simply to be non-religious? When the existing marriage laws were passed, the principle of non-interference had come to be understood as the governing principle of our legislation. And it was strictly applied in those laws. But it was not applied in a sense hostile to the churches. If it had been so applied, ministers of religion would not have been in any way referred to in the marriage laws.

The legislature would simply have required that all persons wishing to be married should come before the State registrars and make certain declarations and sign certain forms before them, and it would have been enacted that such persons and only such persons should be held to be legally married. Of course people who wished for the blessing of the church might go to a clergyman, but they must, in any case, go also to the registrar.

This would have been strictly in accordance with the principle of non-interference. But by such a course the State would have ignored the religious bodies altogether. It would have taken up not a non-religious, but an anti-religious attitude.

Means were found of avoiding this without any violence to the principle of non-interference. The Marriage Act of 1859 provided that all ministers of religion might on certain very easy conditions be recognised as registrars of marriages without salary. They would then be bound under penalties to see that the declarations and signatures required by the law were made and forwarded to the proper quarter, and each might add afterwards such religious ceremony as his church might order. The State said in effect to the churches-marriage is a matter of the highest concern to us, and we must deal with it in our own interests. But we are aware that it is matter of concern to you also, and we will so deal with it in our interests as not to make it difficult for you to deal with it in your interests also.

But we have said above that the repeal of all laws which punish sins as if they were offences against the State, will very soon bring us to ground like this where the State and the churches must come to an understanding if there is to be goodwill between them.

The weekly day of rest is certainly an institution of the highest importance to the churches. And we think that by a democratic