an equitable accommodation of differences, but would not comply with the demand of reftitution as a preliminary condition, his Britannic majefty having taken no steps but such as the hostilities previously committed by the French,, and a regard to his own honor, and the rights of his crown and people, rendered juft and indifpenfable." War being now confidered on both fides as virtually, though not actually declared, the French court iffued an order to feize all Britifh veffels in the French harbors, and began with great affiduity to repair the fortifications of Dunkirk. The naval preparations at Breft were profecuted with unremitting diligence; a vast number of transports were collected in the different ports in the channel, and numerous bodies of land forces were seen moving from all parts towards the coafts of Normandy, Picardy, and Bretagne. About the close of March, the king fent a meffage to parliament, stating, "that he had received repeated and authentic advices that a defign was actually formed by the French court for the invafion of Great Britain; that he had taken the proper precautions for putting the kingdom in a posture of defence; that, in order farther to strengthen himself, he had made a requifition of the Helian troops which the landgrave had, by the late treaty, agreed to furnish "An address was immediately presented, thanking his majesty in warm terms for this seasonable and prudent requifition. And, in a few days, Mr. Fox, encouraged by the prevailing unanimity of the house, moved a second address, " befeeching his majefty that, for the more effectual defence of his kingdoms, and for the better fecurity of the religion and liberties of his fubjects, he would be graciously pleased to order twelve battalions of his electoral troops to be forthwith embarked for England." This alfo was carried by a very great majority, and, in the course of the enfuing month, these troops actually arrived. Such was the confternation excited throughout the kingdom by the idea of an invafion, that these measures of the minifter were received with great and general general applaufe: though it appeared, in the view of Europe at large, not lefs unaccountable than difgraceful, that England fhould, at the commencement of a foreign war, deem herself unequal to provide for her own internal fafety; and fhould have recourse to the aid of foreign mercenaries for the protection of her laws and liberties, when none of the natural means of defence were wanting, when her naval force was confeffedly far fuperior to that of the enemy, and her armies were not engaged, as formerly, in fighting Quixotic battles on the continent.* At the close of the feffion, the fpeaker, Mr. Onflow, on presenting the money-bills for the royal affent, addreffed the king in a fpeech replete with fentiments so just and constitutional, expreffed in language fo bold and animated, as to merit the moft diftinguished regard.-After fpecifying the extent, and remarking the liberality of the grants, exceeding those of any former period, he declared, "that the COMMONS of ENGLAND hoped the fword, fo bravely drawn and so effectually supported, would be entrusted only in capable and honeft hands; and that the naval strength of Great Britain will do service as much greater as it is exalted higher than ever before. His majesty's faithful commons apprehended that the present critical juncture convinces that alliances on the continent, as they are unnatural, so they must ever be prejudicial to the true interest of England; that there is no gratitude to be expected from, no dependence to be placed on fuch allies, who, fupported as they have been by the blood and treasure of this kingdom, have taken the opportunity C C 2 Les François annoncèrent avec oftentation qu'ils fe preparoient à faire de leur côté une defcente en Angleterre. Ils répandirent des troupes, le long des côtes de la Bretagne et de la Normandie; ils firent construire des bateaux plats pour tranfporter ces troupes, et affemblèrent quelques vaiffeaux à Brest. Ces démonftrations épouvantèrent les Anglois; il y eut des momens où cette nation, qui paffe pour fi fage, se crut perdue. Le roi George afin de la raffurer eut recours à des troupes Hanovriennes et Heffoifes. Oeuvres de Frederic II. tom. 2. tunity of the first profpect of present profit to break through every tie. Not difcouraged, however, by the ingratitude of allies, or the ambition of enemies, they have with pleafure beheld the sword drawn to vindicate the national honor and interest-proud to let all the world fee that England is able to fight her own battles, and to ftand by her own natural strength. Though ever attached to his majesty's perfon," he declared, "nevertheless, that there were circumstances existing at which nothing but their confidence in his majefty's justice, and love to his people, could hinder them from being most seriously alarmed. Subfidies to foreign princes, when already burdened with a debt scarcely to be borne, cannot but be feverely felt-an army of foreign troops, a thing UNPRECEDENTED, UNHEARD-OF, UNKNOWN, brought into England, cannot but alarm. Still they had reliance upon his majefty, and hoped that their burdens might be lightened, their fears removed, as foon as poffible; and, in the mean time, that the sword of these FOREIGNERS should not be intrusted a MOMENT out of his own hand to any other perfon whatsoever." The unanimous approval of the principles and sentiments inculcated in this spirited addrefs reflects certainly great honor on the house, and it is much to be regretted that they should ever have been induced, in practice, to deviate from them. This speech, however, discovers fymptoms of democratic refolution, which, had the liberties of the country been openly invaded, would have displayed itself in a manner fatal to minifters, terrible to kings! Whether the French ever seriously meditated a descent upon the English coaft, remains, after all, extremely doubtful; and it appears highly probable, that the preparations which occafioned this univerfal alarm were defigned chiefly, or folely, as a veil to disguise their real defign of an attack upon the island of Minorca. And, while the attention of the English miniftry and nation was fuperfluoufly occupied with the armaments of Breft and Dunkirk, it seemed entirely entirely to escape their notice, that a formidable fleet was, at the very fame time, equipping at Toulon; till at length its destination becoming notorious, a fquadron very incompetent to the purposes of the expedition was detached to the Mediterranean, under admiral Byng, an officer of whom the public knew little more than that he was the son of the gallant and heroic viscount Torrington. This armament, confifting of ten fhips of the line, afterwards joined by two or three others, failed from Spithead April 7, 1756, and, on the fecond of May, the admiral arrived at Gibraltar, where he was informed that the French fleet under M. de la Galiffoniere, confifting of thirteen fhips of the line and transports, on board of which were embarked fifteen thousand land forces, had failed from Toulon on the tenth of April, with a view to a descent on the island of Minorca, and were now actually engaged in the fiege of Fort St. Philip. On this intelligence, the admiral transmitted dispatches to England, written in a style of great apparent dejection, "lamenting that he was not fent out in time to prevent the landing of the French; complaining of the bad condition of the fhips, and of the total deficiency which he found at Gibraltar of all the neceffary requifites for careening and refitting. He figned his opinion of the impracticability of throwing any supply of troops into the fortress, and of the impolicy of attempting it, if feafible, as the siege could not be raised without the co-operation of a landforce, and any reinforcement of men would consequently only increase the number of prisoners, which must ultimately fall into the hands of the enemy." This extraordinary letter being confidered by the ministry as a virtual accufation of their negligence or incapacity, and as plainly ominous of the lofs of the place, they determined to convince the admiral that such language was not to be held with impunity. On approaching Minorca, the admiral defcried the British colors ftill flying on the castle of St. Philip's: and, at the fame time, the French fleet appearing to the fouth-eaft, fouth-eaft, he formed the line of battle, and, about two o'clock, threw out fignals to bear away two points from the wind and engage. Admiral Weft, who commanded the van division, perceiving the inconfiftency of the two orders, chofe to comply with the laft, and bore away with his divifion feven points from the wind, as abfolutely neceffary to bring the enemy to a close and regular engagement. Finding himself, however, not fuftained by his commander, he could not purfue the advantage he had gained without imminent danger of having his communication with the remainder of the fleet entirely cut off. When the commander was exhorted by his captain to bear down upon the enemy, in order to fupport the ships of the van, admiral Byng coolly replied, "that it was his determination to keep the line of battle entire; and that he would avoid the error of admiral Matthews, who, in his engagement with the combined fleets of France and Spain off Toulon, had broke the line by his precipitation, and had exposed himself by his rafhness to a fire which he could not fuftain. Under color, therefore, of preferving the line of battle entire, in order to fight with the more advantage, it could fcarcely be affirmed that he fought at all--the distance at which he engaged being fo great that he received only fome few shots in his hull, and not a fingle man was killed or wounded on board the admiral's own fhip, a noble second-rate of ninety guns. M. de la Galiffoniere was well pleafed to perceive the British commander so little in earnest, and, having no urgent reasons on his part to wish for a continuance of the fight, he bore away under an easy fail towards evening; and, though the British admiral made the fignal for chafing, it fo happened that the French were not overtaken, and, next morning, they were entirely out of fight. On inquiry into the condition of the fleet after this engagement, it was found, that three of the principal fhips were so much damaged in their mafts, that they could not keep the fea with fafety, that about two hundred men were killed and wounded in the en gagement, |