Ecclesiasticam (1642), Annotationis in Vetus Testamentum, Annotationis in Novum Testamentum (1644), and Annales et Historia de Rebus Belgicis (1657). JUSTIFIABLE CAUSES OF WAR. Now as many sources as there are of judicial actions, so many causes there may be of war. For where just determinations cease, war begins. Now in law there are actions for injuries not yet done, or for those already committed. For the first, when securities are demanded to prohibit any future injuries, or acts of violence; for the second, that the injuries already done us may be punished, or recompense given to the injured person; both which are excellently distinguished by Plato, but as for reparation, it belongs to what is or was properly our own, from whence real and personal actions do arise, or to what is our due, either by contract, by default, or by law. Most men assign three just causes of war-defence, the recovery of what's our own, and punishment, which three you have in Camillus's Denunciation against the Gauls, Omnia quæ defendi repetequi et ulcisci fas est; whatever may be defended, recovered, or revenged; in which account, if the word recovered be not taken in a greater latitude, it will not include the exacting of that which is our due; which exaction was not omitted by Plato when he said, that war was not only necessary, if any man should be either violently oppressed, or plundered; but also if imposed upon, or treated in any fraudulent manner. which agrees that of Seneca: It is a very equitable saying, and founded on the law of nations, Pay what you owe. And it was a part in the form used by the Roman herald, that they neither gave, paid, nor did, what they ought to have given, paid, and done and as Sallust has it in his history: I demand my own by the law of nations. Το St. Austin, when he said, that those wars which are to avenge our injuries are generally termed just; he took the word revenge in the larger sense for making restitution, which appears in the Sequel, where there is not so much an enumeration of the parts, as an illustration by examples. So, says he, That nation or city may be invaded that shall neglect to punish what is wrongfully done by their own subjects, or to restore what is unjustly taken from another. Comformable to this did the Indian King (as Diodorus informs us) accuse Semiramis, that she had commenced war against him, without having received any manner of injury. Thus the Romans argued with the Senones that they ought not to make war on a people that had given them no reasonable provocation. Aristotle observes that, Men usually make war on those who are the first aggressors: so Curtius, speaking of the Abian Scythians, They were reputed the most innocent of the Barbarians; they never took up arms but when highly provoked; the first cause, therefore, of a just war, is an injury which, though not done, yet threatens our persons or our estates. We have before observed, that if a man is assaulted in such a manner, that his life shall appear in inevitable danger, he may not only make war upon, but very justly destroy the aggressor; and from this instance, which every one must allow us, it appears that such a private war may be just and lawful; for it is to be observed, that this right or property of self-defence is what nature has implanted in every creature, without any regard to the intention of the aggressors; for if the person be no ways to blame, as for instance, a soldier upon duty, or a man that should mistake me for another, or one distracted, or a person in a dream (which may possibly happen), I do not therefore lose that right that I have of self-defence; for it is sufficient that I am not obliged to suffer the wrong that he intends me, no more than if it was a man's beast that came to set upon me. It is a matter of dispute whether we may kill or trample on innocent persons, who shall hinder that defence, or escape, that is absolutely necessary for the preservation of our lives. There are some even among divines who think it lawful. And certainly, if we have regard to Nature only, the respect that we owe in general is of less moment than the preservation of ourselves; but the law of charity, especially the evangelical, which has put our neighbor upon a level with ourselves, does plainly not permit it. It was well observed of Aquinas, if apprehended rightly, that in our own defence we do not purposely kill another; not but that it may be sometimes lawful, if all other means prove ineffectual, to do that purposely by which the aggressor may die; not that this death was so much our choice, or primary design (as in capital punishments), but the only means we had then left to preserve ourselves; nay, and even then, one would wish, if possible, rather to fright or disable him, than to be obliged, even by mere necessity, to kill him. But here it is necessary that the danger be present, and as it were immediate; for I grant, if a man takes arms, and his intentions are visibly to destroy another, the other may very lawfully prevent his intentions; for as well in morality, as the laws of nature, there is no rule but what admits of some latitude. For they are highly mistaken, and deceive others, who presume that a man's fearful apprehensions may be a just reason that he should kill another. 'Tis very justly observed by Cicero, that there are many inconveniences proceeding from fear, when a person shall intend some injury to another, merely out of fear that if he should omit that opportunity, he may possibly endanger his own safety. So Clearchus, in Xenophon: I have known many people moved either by some false report, or by suspicion, who for fear of others, and to be beforehand with them, have done irreparable injuries to those who never would have offered, nor ever designed to offer them any hurt in the world." So Cato, in his oration for the Rhodians: Shall we ourselves be first guilty of that, for which we so freely accuse others. If then I am not threatened with any present danger, if I only discover that somebody has laid a plot and ambuscade against me, that he designs to poison me, or by suborning witnesses to procure an unjust sentence against me, why in this case I must not kill him; if either such a danger can be possibly avoided any other way, or at least, that it does not then sufficiently appear that it may not be avoided. For time gives us frequent opportunities of remedy, and there are many things happen, as the proverb has it, betwixt the cup and the lip.-The Rights of War and Peace. GUARINI, GIOVANNI BATTISTA, an Italian poet, born at Ferrara, December 10, 1537; died at Venice, October 4, 1612. His grandfather and his great-grandfather occupied the chair of Greek and Latin in the University of Ferrara, and published several works in Latin. Guarini studied at Ferrara, Pisa, and Padua, visited Rome, and on his return to Ferrara was appointed Professor of Belles-Lettres in the University. When about thirty years old he entered the service of Duke Alfonso II., and was employed by him in several diplomatic missions. In 1582 he withdrew from court to his country house, where he found leisure for the cultivation of poetry, which his public life had constrained him to neglect. He edited the Gerusalemme and the Rime of Tasso, and then composed his dramatic poem Il Pastor Fido, first printed in 1590. Alfonso, fearing to lose the poet, summoned him again to court, and made him Counsellor of State. He passed twelve years at the courts of Mantua, Ferrara, Florence, and Urbino. Guarini published several other works, among them L'Idropica, a comedy; Il Segretario, a dialogue; Rime, a collection of sonnets and madrigals; and Letters. Il Pastor Fido passed through forty editions during its author's lifetime. In the following scene from Pastor Fido Mirtillo is introduced by Corisca into the presence of VOL. XII.-8 Amarillis, who, blindfolded, expects to play a game with her female companions. He declares his love; she rejects him because she is the destined wife of Silvio. Corisca, wishing to injure Amarillis, listens to what they say. SCENE FROM PASTOR FIDO. [Amarillis, Corisca, Mirtillo.] Amarillis.-Indeed, Aglaura, I have caught thee now; Thou fain would'st fly, but I will hold thee fast. Corisca (aside).-Surely unless I had by violence Thrust him upon her, I had toil'd in vain To rouse his courage. Am.-Thou wilt not speak, ah! art thou she or no? Cor. Here I'll lay down his spear, and to the bush To observe what will ensue. (She retires.) Am.-I know thee now, I know thee by thy tallness and short hair, Thou art Corisca; and the very one I wish'd to catch, that I might cuff thee well Just as I please; here then, take this And this; this also; this again; not yet? Not yet a word? But since 'twas thou that bound'st me, Unbind me quickly now, my dearest heart, And thou shalt have the sweetest kiss that e'er What knots on knots are here! Why didst thou tie so hard? Now 'tis thy turn, thou next must be the buff. So now 'tis loos'd. (Seeing Mirtillo.) Ah me! whom see I here! Leave me, thou traitor! Oh! I shall expire! Mirtillo.-My life, compose thyself. Am.-Leave me, I say, Unhand me; what! make use of force to nymphs! |