how little the allies had suffered, regular troops, backed by a and that they had been allowed motley assembly of yeomen, to escape none knew whither, militiamen, and volunteers, illdismay giving place to fury trained, ill-organised, indifferwhen copies of the Moniteur,' ently armed and equipped, containing accounts accounts of the utterly ignorant of war. battle, inspired if not dictated Patriotism indeed inspired by the Emperor, reached Lon- them all. Politicians sank don, and it was found that their differences to serve side Napoleon, magnificent in men- by side as volunteers; dacity, claimed a victory which thousand pulpits rang with had ended in the headlong exhortations to the manhood flight of the British fleet, in of the nation to do its duty spite of Villeneuve's efforts to in defence of king and country; force them to fight again. whilst poet, playwright, pam"The clamour against poor phleteer, and artist vied with Sir Robert Calder is gaining each other in appeals to the ground daily, and there is a pride of a free people and in general cry against him from mockery of "Little Boney' all quarters, wrote Lord and his soldiers. Yet over all Radstock; but the climax brooded fear. Patriotism could was reached when news was do so little against a knowreceived that Villeneuve had ledge of war learnt on a sailed northward from Ferrol, hundred victorious battlefields, and there ensued "a period if once the storm burst on the of bitter suspense and wide- English coasts, to avert which spread panic," and in London England relied, and rightly, on "the greatest alarm ever her ships. And now, though unknown to friend and foe alike, the crisis was past: the fleet, which had evaded Nelson and on which Napoleon relied for the realisation of his designs, had been brought into action, and far from being annihilated, had been permitted to escape almost unharmed. known." 1 The demand that Calder should be brought to trial to answer for his neglect became universal, insistent, not to be resisted. It is easy to understand the popular outcry against Calder, ignorant and unjust though it was. For years a great terror had hung like a shadow over England. Within sight of Dover cliffs the invincible soldiery of France, led by the foremost captain of the age, whose very presence seemed to presage victory, waited only for Villeneuve's coming to cross the narrow seas, a mighty host, to oppose which England had but a few thousands of The news of the outcry against him filled Calder with astonishment and indignation, and on hearing of it he wrote requesting that an inquiry might be held to enable him to vindicate his good name, urging that he might be sent home as soon as possible, "that my mind may be put at ease, and for the restitution of my 1 Minto. health, which has suffered of the enquiry may be, I feel seriously from my severe and he has a right to be treated long services"; but he was with respect," at the same time overwhelmed with grief on bidding her suspend judgment learning that he was to leave until after the trial. the ship which had carried his flag so long. "I am this instant honoured with your Lordship's letter," so he wrote to Nelson. "I own I was not prepared for its contents. Believe me, they have cut me to the soul. . My heart is broken," and he repeated his request that he might be allowed to go in any ship which Nelson might select, and be spared the additional humiliation of witnessing the arrival of the admiral nominated to succeed him. ... Though it was impossible to let him go until the arrival of reinforcements, in the presence of such grief and despair Nelson had not the heart to humiliate him further. He wrote to Lord Barham: "Sir Robert felt so much even at the idea of being removed from his own ship, which he had commanded in the face of the fleet. . . . I may be thought wrong as an officer to disobey the orders of the Admiralty by not insisting on Sir Robert Calder quitting the Prince of Wales for the Dreadnought, and for parting with a 90-gun ship, . . . but I trust I shall be considered to have done right as a man and to a brother officer in affliction. My heart could not stand it, and so the thing must rest." To Lady Hamilton he wrote: "I have given way to his misery, and directed the Prince of Wales to carry him to Spithead, for whatever the result So on the 14th October the Prince of Wales weighed anchor and set sail for England. In her went the captains upon whom Calder had called to give evidence at the trial, for of all who had sailed and fought with him, only one declined to stand by him now; but none dreamt that, after years of weary blockade, within a week the decisive battle of the would be fought and won. It was Calder's last and greatest misfortune that thus, by one short week, he lost the one chance of redeeming by his valour in action whatever error of judgment he might have committed. war Although the presence with the fleet of an Admiral whose past conduct had been called in question had proved embarrassing, Nelson watched the Prince of Wales sail homewards with profound sympathy for Calder a sympathy expressed again and again, and fully shared by Collingwood. Full well he knew what lay before the luckless Admiral on his arrival in England. He had noted the virulence of the attacks in the public press, the exasperation and the intense bitterness of public feeling, and had done his best to warn Calder of the serious nature of the ordeal through which he had to pass, which the latter, confident that he would be able to justify his actions, could not or would not realise. "I have given him advice as to my dearest friend," wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton. "He is in adversity, and if ever he has been my enemy he now finds me one of his best friends." And to Collingwood: "From my heart I hope he will get home safe and end his inquiry well." He openly expressed his surprise that he should have fought at all, and with bitter sarcasm suggested that if he were tried it should be for risking a battle in the face of odds so overwhelming and in a situation so perilous; and as he went into action on that fateful 21st October his thoughts turned to his unhappy friend, prompting the generous cry, "Hardy, what would poor Sir Robert Calder give to be with us now?" whilst Collingwood, writing after the battle, echoed this regret, "Truly sorry am I that Calder was not of the party, that he might have settled his account with Ville should have a majority of flag officers, of the twelve members nine were junior to him in rank, seven of them being only captains. The court was directed to investigate the Admiral's conduct on and after the 23rd July until he lost sight of the enemy's ships, and to try him "for not having done his utmost to renew the engagement, and to take or destroy every ship of the enemy,"-a limitation in the scope of the inquiry ignoring as it did his request that it might include his proceedings before and during the battle, against which Calder earnestly protested. The trial lasted four days, and, the main facts never being in dispute, its interest lies in the defence-a plea of justification. It was, however, proved that, whilst making minute inquiries respecting the state of his own ships, the Admiral took no steps to ascertain the damage sustained by the enemy; and that from the 22nd to the 24th July contrary winds made it impossible for the ships at Ferrol and Corunna to put to sea. The defence was based on three considerations- the necessity of protecting the Windsor Castle and the prizes; the impossibility of attacking at all on the 23rd, and of doing so with advantage on the 24th; and finally, the general strategic situation and the discretion allowed to every commander to act according "to the best of his judgment for the benefit of the country." it The first contention, though had carried great weight with Calder, paralysing his initiative and influencing his action throughout, was one that could not be sustained. In no way could the Windsor Castle and the prizes have been better protected than by defeating the enemy. Under ordinary circumstances the prizes, both of them old ships and unfit for further service, would have been burnt, so that the fleet might have resumed the action unhampered, a course which Calder had himself vainly advocated after the Battle of St Vincent; and that this was not done was due solely to the impossibility of removing the prisoners on account of the heavy swell which prevented boats going alongside. Not the least infamous of the accusations brought against the Admiral was the monstrous suggestion that they owed their preservation solely to his desire for prize-money. The Admiral, however, drew attention to the fact that his repeated requests for more frigates had been ignored, and that had they been available to tow the disabled ships he would have been relieved of all anxiety regarding them—a just complaint, made by almost every British commander. With regard to his failure to renew the action, Calder asserted with truth that on the 23rd it was impossible, as the wind lay with the allies; whilst the masts and spars of many of his ships had been so severely damaged as not to be in a fit state to carry sufficient sail, more especially as a considerable swell had arisen and the ships were rolling heavily; and that, though on the 24th the wind was in his favour, it was very light, and the allies were 80 far away that he "doubted whether he could have overtaken them, and certainly could not have done so without separating his squadron." Moreover, the allies being nearer Ferrol than he, and able to sail quite as fast, could have called up reinforcements by means of the signal-stations recently erected for this purpose along the Spanish coast. Even if it be admitted that it was not in his power to attack the combined fleet on the 23rd, this was not the case on the next day. In seamanship and sailing power the allies, especially the Spaniards, were no match for their adversaries. Many of their ships were badly damaged, and had the British borne down upon them, these "lame ducks" must have been overhauled, and Villeneuve would have been forced to fight at a disadvantage to protect them or to abandon them; for the power of manoeuvring lay with his enemy, whose leading ships, however much they might have outsailed their consorts, would have been supported as each in turn came up before the wind. Calder was on sounder ground as regarded the strategic situation. Throughout those July days he had been oppressed by an intolerable anxiety, such as no other commander throughout the war had been called upon to endure. Including the frigates he had but sixteen serviceable ships, and before him lay the combined fleet, worsted indeed, but not thoroughly beaten, outnumbering his own by nine, and still capable of offering a stubborn resistance. In Ferrol and Corunna he had left a squadron almost as numerous as his own, reported by his frigate captains as as getting ready to put to sea, which, for all he knew, they might have done, the wind being fair, as soon as his top-sails had sunk below the horizon, and when Stirling left Rochefort he had seen Allemand's squadron of five sail preparing to leave harbour. At any moment, therefore, he might have found himself opposed to a fleet three times as numerous as his own, a danger against which he had been repeatedly warned, whilst he himself could not hope for assistance. Even if he had defeated Villeneuve, his danger would still have been very great, for, with crippled ships, he might have been called upon to face Gourdon or Allemand, or possibly both. "I could not hope to succeed," he said, "without receiving great damage. I had no friendly port to go to, and, had the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons come out, I must have fallen an easy prey." He had referred to this danger in the last paragraph of the despatch he wrote to Cornwallis the day after the battle, a paragraph omitted by the Admiralty when the despatch appeared in the Gazette. "It will behove me," it ran, "to be on my guard against the combined squadron at Ferrol, as I am led to believe that they [Villeneuve and Gravina] have sent off one or two crippled ships there last night. I may therefore find it necessary to join you off Ushant at once; " and of the suppression of this paragraph as having tended to inflame public opinion against him, by withholding mention of the danger which threatened him, he bitterly complained. Finally, in proof of the discretion allowed to every commander, he cited the examples of Howe and St Vincent, both of whom had used it "for the benefit of the country," instead of "taking or destroying every ship of the enemy," without being held blameworthy. There was indeed ample justification for uneasiness; and Calder's appreciation of the danger of his position was singularly correct, for the battle of the 22nd July was fought on the exact spot appointed by Napoleon for the junction of his fleets, and, though Gourdon never put to sea, Allemand was close at hand, and on the very next day his squadron sailed across 8 sea strewn with the wreckage of battle. But Calder had But Calder had no certain knowledge that he was near; at the most it was a risk, and tremendous though it was, it was worth taking. The whole issue of the war turned on the destruction of Villeneuve's fleet before it could be reinforced, to have achieved which the loss of half Calder's own would not have been too high a price to have paid. A man of more heroic mould would have shut his eyes to dangers which to Calder were all too clear, and would have seen |