ten thousand) who perfectly understand Mode and Figure, and the Reafon upon which those Forms are eltablifh'd: whereas a due and orderly placing of the Ideas, upon which the Inference is made, makes every one, whether Logician or not Logician, who understands the Terms, and hath the Faculty to perceive the Agreement or Difagreement of fuch Ideas (without which, in or out of Syllogifm, he cannot perceive the Strength or Weaknefs, Coherence or Incoherence of the Difcourfe) fee the want of Connection in the Argumentation, and the Abfurdity of the Inference.

And thus I have known a Man unskilful in Syllogifm, who at first hearing could perceive the Weakness and Inconclufiveness of a long artificial and plaufible Difcourfe, wherewith others better skill'd in Syllogifm have been misled. And I believe there are few of my Readers who do not know fuch. And indeed if it were not fo, the Debates of moft Princes Councils, and the Business of Affemblies would be in danger to be mifmanag'd, fince thofe who are rely'd upon, and have ufually a great ftroke in them, are not always fuch, who have the good luck to be perfectly knowing in the Forms of Syllogifm, or expert in Mode and Figure. And if Syllogifm were the only, or fo much as the furest way to detect the Fallacies of artificial Difcourfes; I do not think that all Mankind, even Princes in Matters that concern their Crowns and Dignities, are fo much in love with Falfhood and Mistake, that they would every where have neglected to bring Syllogifm into the Debates of moment; or thought it ridiculous fo much as to offer them in Affairs of confequence: a plain Evidence to me, that Men of Parts and Penetration, who were not idly to difpute at their cafe, but were to act according to the Refult of their Debates, and often pay for their Miftakes with their Heads or Fortunes, found thofe fcholaftick Forms were of little ufe to difcover Truth or Fallacy, whilft both the one and the other might be fhewn, and better fhewn without them to thofe who would not refufe to see what was visibly. fhewn them.

Secondly, Another Reason that makes me doubt whether Syllogifm be the only proper Inftrument of Reason in the Discovery of Truth, is, that of whatever ufe Mode and Figure is pretended to be in the laying open of Fallacy (which has been above confider'd) thofe fcholaftick Forms of Difcourfe are not lefs liable to Fallacies than the plainer ways of Argumentation: And for this I appeal to common Obfervation, which has always found thefe artificial Methods of Reasoning more adapted to catch and intangle the Mind, than to inftruct and inform the Underítanding. And hence it is, that Men even when they are baff'd and filenc'd in this fcholaftick way, are feldom or never convinc'd, and fo brought over to the conquering fide: they perhaps acknowledg their Adverfary to be the more skilful Difputant; but reft nevertheless perfuaded of the Truth on their fide; and go away, worsted as they are, with the fame Opinion they brought with them, which they could not do, if this way of Argumentation carry'd Light and Conviction with it, and made Men fee where the Truth lay. And therefore Syllogifm has been thought more proper for the attaining Victory in Difpute, than for the Difcovery or Confirmation of Truth in fair Enquiries. And if it be certain, that Fallacy can be couch'd in Syllogifm, as it cannot be deny'd, it must be fomething elfe, and not Syllogifm that must discover them.

I have had Experience how ready fome Men are, when all the Ufe which they have been wont to afcribe to any thing is not allow'd, to cry out, that I am for laying it wholly afide. But to prevent fuch unjuft and groundless Imputations, I tell them, that I am not for taking away any Helps to the Understanding, in the attainment of Knowledg. And if Men skill'd in, and us'd to Syllogifms, find them affifting to their Reafon in the discovery of Truth, I think they ought to make ufe of them. Ali that I am at is, that they fhould not afcribe more to thefe Forms than belongs to them; and think that Men have no ufe, or not fo full a ufe of their teafoning Faculty without them. Some Eyes want Spectacles to fee things clearly and diftin&tly; but let not thofe that use them therefore fay, nobody can tee clearly without them: Those who do fo will be thought in favour with Art (which perhaps they are beholden to) a little too muft to deprefs and difcredit Nature. Reafon, by its own Penetration where it is ftrong and exercis'd, ufually fees quicker and clearer without Syllogifm.

If ufe of thofe Spectacles has fo dimm'd its Sight, that it cannot without them fee Confequences or Inconfequences in Argumentation, I am not fo unreasonable as to be against the ufing them. Every one knows what best fits his own Sight. But let him not hence conclude all in the dark, who use not just the fame Helps that he finds a need of.

Probability.

1. 5. But however it be in Knowledg, I think I may truly fay, it is of far Helps little in lefs, or no ufe at all in Probabilities. For the Affent there, being to be deter- Demonstrati min'd by the Preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs, with all on, les in Circumftances on both fides, nothing is fo unfit to affift the Mind in that, as Syllogifm; which running away with one affum'd Probability, or one topical Argument, purfues that, till it has led the Mind quite out of fight of the thing under Confideration; and forcing it upon fome remore Difficulty, holds it fait there, entangled perhaps, and as it were manacled in the Chain of Syllogifms, without allowing it the liberty, much lefs affording it the Helps requifite to fhew on which fide, all things confider'd, is the greater Probability,

fence with it!

§. 6. But let it help us (as perhaps may be faid) in convincing Men of their Serves not to Errors and Mistakes: (and yet I would fain fee the Man that was forc'd out of increase our his Opinion by dint of Syllogifm) yet ftill it fails our Reafon in that Part, which, Knowledg, but if not its highest Perfection, is yet certainly its hardest Task, and that which we most need its help in; and that is the finding out of Proofs, and making new Discoveries. The Rules of Syllogifm ferve not to furnish the Mind with those intermediate Ideas that may fhew the Connection of remote ones. This way of reasoning discovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of marthalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The 47th Propofition of the firft Book of Euclid is very true; but the Discovery of it, I think, not owing to any Rules of common Logick. A Man knows first, and then he is able to prove fyllogiftically. So that Syllogifm comes after Knowledg, and then a Man has little or no need of it. But 'tis chiefly by the finding out thofe ideas that fhew the Connection of diftant ones, that our Stock of Knowledg is increas'd, and that ufeful Arts and Sciences are advanc'd. Syllogifm at beft is but the Art of Fencing with the little Knowledg we have, without making any Addition to it. And if a Man fhould employ his Reason all this way, he will not do much otherwise than he, who having got fome Iron out of the Bowels of the Earth, would have it beaten up all into Swords, and put it into his Servants Hands to fence with, and bang one another. Had the King of Spain imploy'd the Hands of his People, and his Spanish Iron fo, he had brought to light but little of that Treasure that lay fo long hid in the dark Entrails of America. And I am apt to think, that he who fhall employ all the Force of his Reason only in brandishing of Syllogifms, will difcover very little of that Mafs of Knowledg, which lies yet conceal'd in the fecret Receffes of Nature; and which I am apt to think, native ruftick Reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to open a way to, and add to the common ftock of Mankind, rather than any fcholaftick Proceeding by the ftrict Rules of Mode and Figure.

§. 7. I doubt not nevertheless, but there are ways to be found to affift our ReaOther Helps fon in this molt ufeful Part; and this the judicious Hooker incourages me to fhould be fay, who in his Eccl. Pol. l. 1. §. 6. fpeaks thus: If there might be added the fought. right Helps of true Art and Learning (which Helps I must plainly confefs, this Age of the World carrying the name of a learned Age, doth neither much know, nor generally regard) there would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in Maturity of Fudgment between Men therewith inur'd, and that which now Men are, as between Men that are now, and Innocents. I do not pretend to have found, or discover'd here any of those right Helps of Art, this great Man of deep Thought mentions; but this is plain, that Syllogifm, and the Logick now in ufe, which were as well known in his days, can be none of thofe he means. It is fufficient for me, if by a Discourfe, perhaps fomething out of the way, I am fure as to me wholly new and unborrow'd, I fhall have given occafion to others, to caft about for new Difcoveries, and to feek in their own Thoughts, for those right Helps of Art, which will fcarce be found, I fear, by those who fervilely confine themselves to the Rules and Diaates of others. For beaten Tracks lead these fort of Cattle (as an obferving Roman calls them) whofe Thoughts reach only to imitation, non quo eundum eft, fed quo itur. But I can be bold to fay, that Vol. I. Τε

this

lars.

this Age is adorn'd with fome Men of that Strength of Judgment, and Largeness of Comprehenfion, that if they would imploy their Thoughts on this Subject, could open new and undiscover'd ways to the Advancement of Knowledg.

We reafon a. 8. Having here had an occafion to fpeak of Syllogifm in general, and the bout Particu- Ufe of it in Reasoning, and the Improvement of our Knowledg; 'tis fit, before I leave this Subject, to take notice of one manifeft Mistake in the Rules of Syllogifm, viz. That no Syllogiftical Reasoning can be right and conclufive, but what has, at least, one general Propofition in it. As if we could not reason, and have Knowledg about Particulars: Whereas, in truth, the Matter rightly confider'd, the immediate Object of all our Reasoning and Knowledg, is nothing but Particulars. Every Man's Reasoning and Knowledg is only about the Ideas exifting in his own Mind, which are truly, every one of them, particular Exiftences; and our Knowledg and Reafoning about other things, is only as they correfpond with thofe our particular Ideas. So that the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of our particular Ideas, is the whole and utmost of all our Knowledg. Univerfality is but accidental to it, and confifts only in this, That the particular Ideas, about which it is, are fuch, as more than one particular thing can correfpond with, and be reprefented by. But the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of any two Ideas, and confequently our Knowledg is equally clear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of those Ideas be capable of reprefenting more real Beings than one, or no. thing more I crave leave to offer about Syllogifm, before I leave it, viz. May one not upon juft Ground enquire whether the Form Syllogifm now has, is that which in Reafon it ought to have? For the Medius Terminus being to join the Extremes, i. e. the intermediate Ideas by its Intervention, to fhew the Agreement or Difagreement of the two in queftion, would not the Pofition of the Medius Terminus be more natural, and fhew the Agreement or Difagreement of the Extremes clearer and better, if it were plac'd in the middle between them? Which might be eafily done by tranfpofing the Propofitions, and making the Medius Terminus the Predicate of the First, and the Subject of the Second. As thus,

Omnis Homo eft Animal,
Omne Animal eft vivens,

Ergo omnis Homo eft vivens.

Omne Corpus eft extenfum & folidum,

Nullum extenfum & folidum eft pura extenfio,

Ergo corpus non eft pura extenfio.

One

I need not trouble my Reader with Inftances in Syllogifms, whose Conclufions are particular. The fame Reason holds for the fame Form in them, as well as in the general.

1.Reafon fails §. 9. Reafon, tho' it penetrates into the Depths of the Sea and Earth, eleus for want of vates our Thoughts as high as the Stars, and leads us thro' the vaft Spaces and large Room of this mighty Fabrick, yet it comes far fhort of the real Extent of even corporeal Being; and there are many Inftances wherein it fails us: As,

Ideas.

Firft, It perfectly fails us, where our Ideas fail. It neither does, nor can extend it felf farther than they do. And therefore wherever we have no Ideas, our Reasoning ftops, and we are at an end of our Reckoning: And if at any time we reason about Words, which do not ftand for any Ideas, 'tis only about thofe Sounds, and nothing else.

2. Because of . 10. Secondly, Our Reason is often puzzled, and at a lofs, because of the Obobfcure and Scurity, Confufion or Imperfection of the Ideas it is imploy'd about; and there we are imperfect I- involv'd in Difficulties and Contradictions. Thus not having any perfect Idea deas. of the least Extenfion of Matter, nor of Infinity, we are at a lofs about the Divifibility of Matter; but having perfect, clear and diftin&t Ideas of Number, our Reafon meets with none of thofe inextricable Difficulties in Numbers, nor finds it felf involv'd in any Contradictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect Ideas of the Operations of our Minds, and of the beginning of Motion or Thought, how the Mind produces either of them in us, and much im

perfe&er

perfecter yet, of the Operation of GOD, run into great Difficulties about free created Agents, which Reafon cannot well extricate it felf out of.

. 11. Thirdly, Our Reafon is often at a ftand, because it perceives not those Ideas, 3. For want of which could ferve to fhew the certain or probable Agreement or Difagreement of any two intermediate other Ideas and in this, fome Mens Faculties far outgo others. Till Algebra, Ideas. that great Inftrument and Inftance of human Sagacity, was discover'd, Men, with Amazement, look'd on feveral of the Demonftrations of antient Mathematicians, and could fcarce forbear to think the finding feveral of thofe Proofs to be fomething more than human.

§. 12. Fourthly, The Mind, by proceeding upon falfe Principles, is often ingag'd 4. Because of in Abfurdities and Difficulties, brought into Straits and Contradictions, with- wrong Principles. out knowing how to free it felf: And in that cafe it is in vain to implore the help of Reason, unless it be to difcover the Falfhood, and reject the Influence of thofe wrong Principles. Reafon is fo far from clearing the Difficulties which the building upon falfe Foundations brings a Man into, that if he will purfue it, it entangles him the more, and engages him deeper in Perplexities.

Terms.

. 13. Fifthly, As obfcure and imperfect Ideas often involve our Reafon, fo, 5. Because of upon the fame Ground, do dubious Words, and uncertain Signs, often in Difcour- doubtful fes and Arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle Mens Reason, and bring them to a Non-plus. But these two latter are our Fault, and not the Fault of Reason. But yet the Confequences of them are nevertheless obvious; and the Perplexities or Errors they fill Mens Minds with, are every where obfervable.

intuitive,

14. Some of the Ideas that are in the Mind, are fo there, that they can be our highest by themselves immediately compar'd one with another: And in thefe the Mind degree of is able to perceive, that they agree or disagree as clearly, as that it has them. Knowledg is Thus the Mind perceives, that an Arch of a Circle is lefs than the whole Circle, without Reaas clearly as it does the Idea of a Circle: And this therefore, as has been faid, foning. I call intuitive Knowledg; which is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no Probation, nor can have any; this being the highest of all human Certainty. In this confifts the Evidence of all thofe Maxims, which no Body has any Doubt about, but every Man (does not, as is faid, only affent to, but) knows to be true, as foon as ever they are propos'd to his Understanding. In the Discovery of, and Affent to these Truths, there is no ufe of the difcurfive Faculty, no need of Reafoning, but they are known by a fuperior and higher degree of Evidence. And fuch, if I may guefs at things unknown, I am apt to think, that Angels have now, and the Spirits of juft Men made perfect fhall have, in a future State, of Thousands of Things, which now either wholly efcape our Apprehenfions, or which, out fhort-fighted Reafon having got fome faint Glimpfe of, we, in the dark, grope after.

§. 15. But tho' we have, here and there, a little of this clear Light, fome The next is Sparks of bright Knowledg; yet the greateft part of our Ideas are fuch, that Demonftratiwe cannot difcern their Agreement or Difagreement by an immediate comparing on by Reasonthem. And in all these we have need of Reasoning, and muft, by Difcourfe and ing Inference, make our Discoveries. Now of these there are two forts, which I fhall take the liberty to mention here again.

Firft, Thofe whole Agreement or Difagreement, tho' it cannot be feen by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examin'd by the Intervention of other Ideas, which can be compar'd with them. In this Cafe when the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate Idea on both fides, with thofe which we would compare, is plainly difcern'd, there it amounts to Demonstration, whereby Knowledg it produc'd; which tho' it be certain, yet it is not fo eafy, nor altogether fo clear as intuitive Knowledg. Because in that there is barely one fimple Intuition, wherein there is no room for any the leaft Miftake or Doubt; the Truth is feen all perfectly at once. In Demonftration, 'tis true, there is Intuition too, but not altogether at once; for there muft be a Remembrance of the Intuition of the Agreement of the Medium, or intermediate Idea, with that we compar'd it with before, when we compare it with the other; and where there be many Mediums, there the Danger of the Mistake is the greater. For each Agreement or Difagreement of the Ideas must be obferv'd and feen in each Step of the whole Train, and retain'd in the Memory, just as it is; and the Mind must be sure that no part of what is neceflary to Vol. I. Tt 2

make

make up the Demonftration is omitted or overlook'd. This makes fome Demonftrations long and perplex'd, and too hard for those who have not Strength of Parts diftinctly to perceive, and exactly carry fo many Particulars orderly in their Heads. And even thofe, who are able to mafter fuch intricate Speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one Review before they can arrive at Certainty. But yet where the Mind clearly retains the Intuition it had of the Agreement of any Idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c. there the Agreement of the firft and the fourth is a Demonftration, and produces certain Knowledg, which may be call'd Rational Knowledg, as the other is Intuitive.

To fupply the §. 16. Secondly, There are other Ideas, whofe Agreement or Difagreement Narrowness of can no otherwife be judg'd of, but by the Intervention of others, which have this, we have not a certain Agreement with the Extremes, but an ufual or likely one: And nothing but Judgment upin these it is that the Judgment is properly exercis'd, which is the acquiefcing of on probable the Mind, that any Ideas do agree, by comparing them with fuch probable MeReafening. diums. This, tho' it never amounts to Knowledg, no not to that which is the lowest degree of it; yet fometimes the intermediate Ideas tie the Extremes fo firmly together, and the Probability is fo clear and ftrong, that Affent as neceffarily follows it, as Knowledg does Demonftration. The great Excellency and Ufe of the Judgment is to obferve right, and take a true Estimate of the Force and Weight of each Probability; and then cafting them up all right together, chuse that fide which has the Over-balance.

Intuition, De- §. 17. Intuitive Knowledg is the Perception of the certain Agreement or Difamonftration, greement of two Ideas immediately compar'd together. Judgment.

Rational Knowledg is the Perception of the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas, by the intervention of one or more other Ideas.

Judgment is the thinking or taking two Ideas to agree or difagree, by the intervention of one or more Ideas, whofe certain Agreement or Difagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath obferv'd to be frequent and ufual.

Confequences . 18. Tho' the deducing one Propofition from another, or making Inference of Words, and in Words, be a great part of Reason, and that which it is usually imploy'd about; Confequences, yet the principal A&t of Ratiocination is the finding the Agreement or Difaof Ideas.

greement of two Ideas one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a Man, by a Yard, finds two Houses to be of the fame Length, which could not be brought together to measure their Equality by Juxta-Pofition. Words have their Confequences, as the Signs of fuch Ideas: and things agree or disagree, as really they are; but we obferve it only by our Ideas.

Four forts of §. 19. Before we quit this Subject, it may be worth our while a little to reArguments. flect on four Sorts of Arguments, that Men, in their Reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of, to prevail on their Affent; or at leaft fo to awe them, as to filence their Oppofition.

1. Ad Verecundiam.

2. Ad Ignorantiam.

3. Ad Homi

hem.

First, The firft is, to alledg the Opinions of Men, whofe Parts, Learning, Eminency, Power, or fome other Caufe has gain'd a Name, and fettled their Reputation in the common Efteem with fome kind of Authority. When Men are establish'd in any kind of Dignity, 'tis thought a breach of Modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the Authority of Men who are in poffeffion of it. This is apt to be cenfur'd, as carrying with it too much of Pride, when a Man does not readily yield to the Determination of approv'd Authors, which is wont to be receiv'd with Refpect and Submiffion by others : and 'tis look'd upon as Infolence for a Man to fet up, and adhere to his own Opinion, against the current Stream of Antiquity; or to put it in the ballance against that of fome learned Doctor, or otherwife approv'd Writer. Whoever backs his Tenets with fuch Authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the Caufe, and is ready to ftile it Impudence in any one who fhall ftand out against them. This, I think, may be call'd Argumentum ad Verecundiam.

§. 20. Secondly, Another way that Men ordinarily ufe to drive others, and force them to fubmit their Judgments, and receive the Opinion in Debate, is to require the Adversary to admit what they alledg as a Proof, or to affign a better. And this I call Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.

§. 21. Thirdly, A third way is, to prefs a Man with Confequences drawn from his own Principles, or Conceffions. This is already known under the name of Argumentum ad Hominem. §. 22.