1 fent Good or Evil is really fo much as it appears. And therefore were every Action of our's concluded within it felf, and drew no Confequences after it, we fhould undoubtedly never err in our Choice of Good; we should always infallibly prefer the beft. Were the Pains of honeft Industry, and of starving with Hunger and Cold, fet together before us, no body would be in doubt which to chufe: Were the Satisfaction of a Luft, and the Joys of Heaven, offer'd at once to any one's present Poffeffion, he would not ballance, or err in the Determination of his Choice. §. 59. But fince our voluntary Actions carry not a'l the Happiness and Mifery that depend on them, along with them in their prefent Performance, but are the precedent Causes of Good and Evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are pafs'd and ceafe to be; our Defires look beyond our present Enjoyments, and carry the Mind out to abfent Good, according to the Neceffity which we think there is of it, to the making or increase of our Happiness. 'Tis our Opinion of fuch a Neceffity, that gives it its Attraction : without that, we are not mov'd by abfent Good. For in this narrow Scantling of Capacity, which we are accuftom'd to, and fenfible of here, wherein we enjoy but one Pleasure at once, which, when all Uneafinefs is away, is, whilst it lafts, fufficient to make us think our felves happy; 'tis not all remote, and even apparent Good, that affects us. Because the Indolency and Enjoyment we have, fufficing for our prefent Happiness, we defire not to venture the Change; fince we judg that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. For who is content, is happy. But as foon as any new Uneafinefs comes in, this Happiness is disturb'd, and we are fet a-fresh on work in the purfuit of Happinels. §. 60. Their Aptnefs therefore to conclude that they can be happy without it, From a wrong is one great Occafion that Men often are not rais'd to the Defire of the greateft Judgment of abfent Good. For whilft fuch Thoughts poffefs them, the Joys of a future State what makes a nece Jary part move them not; they have little Concern or Uneafinefs about them; and the of their Hap Will, free from the Determination of fuch Defires, is left to the pursuit of pines. nearer Satisfactions, and to the removal of those Uneafineffes which it then feels, in its want of and longings after them. Charge but a Man's View of these things; let him fee, that Virtue and Religion are neceffary to his Happiness ; let him look into the future State of Bliss or Mifery, and fee there God, the righteous Judg, ready to render to every Man according to his Deeds; to them who by patient continuance in well-doing feek for Glory, and Honour, and Immortality, eternal Life; but unto every Soul that doth evil, Indignation and Wrath, Tribulation and Anguish To him, I fay, who hath a profpect of the different State of perfect Happiness or Mifery, that attends all Men after this Life, depending on their Behaviour here, the Measures of Good and Evil, that govern his Choice, are mightily chang'd. For fince nothing of Pleasure and Pain in this Life can bear any proportion to endlefs Happinefs, or exquifite Mifery of an immortal Soul hereafter; Actions in his power will have their preference, not according to the tranfient Pleasure or Pain that accompanies or follows them here, but as they serve to fecure that perfect durable Happiness hereafter. §. 61. But to account more particularly for the Mifery that Men often bring more partià on themselves, notwithstanding that they do all in earnest purfue Happiness, we cular Account must confider how Things come to be reprefented to our Defires, under deceitful of wrong Judg. Appearances: And that is by the Judgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To fee how far this reaches, and what are the Caufes of wrong Judgment, we muft remember that things are judg'd good or bad in a double fenfe. Firft, That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely Pleasure or Pain.. Secondly, But because not only prefent Pleasure and Pain, but that alfo which is apt by its Efficacy or Confequences to bring it upon us at a distance, is a proper Object of our Defires, and apt to move a Creature that has forefight; there fore things also that draw after them Pleasure and Pain, are confider'd as Good and Evil. 9. 62. The wrong Judgment that misleads us, and makes the Will often faften on the worse fide, lies in mifreporting upon the various Comparisons of these. The wrong Judgment I am here fpeaking of, is not what one Man may think of the Determination of another, but what every Man himself must confess to be Vol. I. Q2 wrong. ments. In comparing prefent and futures Caufes of this. wrong. For fince I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent Being really feeks Happiness, which confifts in the Enjoyment of Pleafure, without any confiderable Mixture of Uneafinefs; 'tis impoffible any one fhould willingly put into his own Draught any bitter Ingredient, or leave out any thing in his power, that would tend to his Satisfaction, and the compleating of his Happinefs, but only by wrong Judgment. I fhall not here fpeak of that Miftake which is the Confequence of invincible Error, which fcarce deferves the name of wrong Judgment; but of that wrong Judgment which every Man himself must confess to be fo. §. 63. I. Therefore as to prefent Pleasure and Pain, the Mind, as has been faid, never mistakes that which is really Good or Evil; that which is the greater Pleasure, or the greater Pain, is really just as it appears. But tho' prefent Plea fure and Pain fhew their difference and degrees fo plainly, as not to leave room for mistake; yet when we compare prefent Pleasure or Pain with future, (which is usually the Cafe in the most important Determinations of the Will) we often make wrong Judgments of them, taking our measures of them in different Pofitions of Distance. Obje&s, near our view, are apt to be thought greater than thofe of a larger fize, that are more remote: and fo it is with Pleasures and Pains; the prefent is apt to carry it, and thofe at a diftance have the difadvantage in the comparison. Thus moft Men, like fpend-thrift Heirs, are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to come; and fo for small matters in Poffeffion, part with great ones in Reverfion. But that this is a wrong Judgment, every one muft allow, let his Pleasure confift in whatever it will: fince that which is future, will certainly come to be prefent; and then having the fame advantage of Nearnefs, will fhew it felf in its full Dimenfions, and discover his wilful Mistake, who judg'd of it by unequal Measures. Were the Pleasure of Drinking accompany'd, the very moment a Man takes off his Glass, with that fick Stomach and aking Head, which, in some Men are fure to follow not many hours after; I think no body, whatever pleasure he had in his Cups,' would, on these conditions, ever let Wine touch his Lips; which yet he daily fwallows, and the evil fide comes to be chofen only by the Fallacy of a little difference in time. But if Pleasure or Pain can be fo leffen'd only by a few hours removal, how much more will it be fo by a farther diftance, to a Man that will not by a right Judgment do what Time will, i. e. bring it home upon himself, and confider it as prefent, and there take its true dimenfions? This is the way we ufually impofe on our felves, in refpect of bare Pleasure and Pain, or the true degrees of Happiness or Mifery: The future lofes its juft Proportion, and what is prefent obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the wrong Judgment, whereby the abfent are not only leffen'd, but reduc'd to perfect nothing; when Men enjoy what they can in prefent, and make fure of that, concluding amifs that no Evil will thence follow. For that lies not in comparing the Greatness of future Good and Evil, which is that we are here fpeaking of; but in another fort of wrong Judgment, which is concerning Good or Evil, as it is confider'd to be the Cause and Procurement of Pleasure or Pain, that will follow from it.... 4. 64. The Caufe of our judging amifs, when we compare our prefent Pleasure or Pain with future, feems to me to be the weak and narrow Conftitution of our Minds. We cannot well enjoy two Pleafures at once, much less any Pleasure almost, whilst Pain poffeffes us. The prefent Pleafure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, fills our narrow. Souls, and so takes up the whole Mind, that it scarce leaves any thought of things abfent: or if among our Pleasures, there are fome which are not ftrong enough to exclude the Confideration of things at a distance; yet we have fo great an abhorrence of Pain, that a little of it extinguishes all our Pleasures: a little Bitter mingled in our Cup, leaves no Relifh of the Sweet. Hence it comes, that at any rate we defire to be rid of the prefent Evil, which we are apt to think nothing abfent can equal; because under the prefent Pain, we find not our felves capable of any the leaft degree of Happiness. Mens daily Complaints are a loud proof of this: The Pain that any one actually feels, is still of all other the worft; and 'tis with anguifh they cry out, Any rather than this; nothing can be fo intolerable as what I now Juffer. And therefore our whole Endeavours and Thoughts are intent to get often rid of the prefent Evil, before all things, as the firft neceffary Condition to our §. 65. Add to this, that abfent Good, or which is the fame thing, future Pleafure, especially if of a fort we are unacquainted with, feldom is able to counter-ballance any Uneafinefs, either of Pain or Defire, which is present. For its Greatnefs being no more than what fhall be really tafted when enjoy'd, Men are apt enough to leffen that, to make it give place to any prefent Defire; and conclude with themselves, that when it comes to Trial, it may poffibly not anfwer the Report, or Opinion, that generally paffes of it; they having often found, that not only what others have magnify'd, but even what they themfelves have enjoy'd with great Pleafure and Delight at one time, has prov'd infipid or nauseous at another; and therefore they fee nothing in it for which they fhould forego a prefent Enjoyment. But that this is a falfe way of judging, when apply'd to the Happiness of another Life, they must confefs; unless they will fay, God cannot make those happy he designs to be fo. For that being intended for a State of Happiness, it must certainly be agreeable to every one's Wish and Defire: Could we fuppofe their Relishes as different there as they are here, yet the Manna in Heaven will fuit every one's Palat. Thus much of the wrong Fudgment we make of prefent and future Pleasure and Pain, when they are compar'd together, and fo the abfent confider'd as future. ing Confe 9. 66. II. As to things good or bad in their Confequences, and by the aptnefs is in Inconfiderthem to procure us Good or Evil in the future, we judg amifs feveral ways. 1. When we judg that fo much Evil does not really depend on them, as in Truth there does. 2. When we judg, that tho' the Confequence be of that Moment, yet it is hot of that Certainty, but that it may otherwife fall out, or else by fome Means be avoided, as by Induftry, Addrefs, Change, Repentance, &c. That thefe are wrong ways of judging, were eafy to fhew in every Particular, if I would examine them at large fingly: But I fhall only mention this in general, viz. That it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater Good for a lefs, upon uncertain Gueffes, and before a due Examination be made proportionable to the Weightiness of the Matter, and the Concernment it is to us not to mistake. This, I think, every one must confefs, efpecially if he confiders the ufual Causes of this wrong Judgment, whereof these following are fome. quences of Actions §. 67. 1. Ignorance: He that judges without informing himself to the utmost Causes of this: that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of judging amifs... C * up II. Inadvertency: When a Man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and prefent Ignorance, which mifleads our Judgments as much as the other. Judging is as it were ballancing an Account, and determining on which fide the odds lie. If therefore either fide be huddled in hafte, and feveral of the Sums, that should have gone into the Reckoning, be overlook'd and left out, this Precipitancy caufes as wrong a Judgment, as it it were a perfect Ignorance. That which moft commonly caufes this, is the Prevalency of fome préfent Pleasure or Pain, heighten'd by our feeble paffionate Nature, moft ftrongly wrought on by what is prefent. To check this Precipitancy, our Understanding and Reafon was given us, if we will make a right ufe of it, to fearch, and fee, and then judge thereupon. Without Liberty, the Understanding would be to no purpose: And without Understanding, Liberty (if it could be) would fignify nothing. If a Man fees what would do him good or harm, what would make him happy or miferable, without being able to move himfelt one ftep towards or from it, what is he the better for feeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfe& Darknefs, what is his Liberty better, than if he were driven up and down as a Bubble by the force of the Wind? The being acted by a blind Impulfe from without, or from within, is Wreng Fudg little odds. The first therefore, and great ufe of Liberty, is to hinder blind Precipitancy; the principal Exercife of Freedom is to ftand ftill, open the Eyes, look about, and take a View of the Confequence of what we are going to do, as much as the Weight of the Matter require. How much Sloth and Negligence, Heat and Paffion, the Prevalency of Fashion, or acquir'd Indifpofitions, do feverally contribute on occafion to these wrong Judgments, 【 fhall not here farther enquires. I fhall only add one other falle Judgment, which I think neceffary to mention, because perhaps it is little taken notice of, tho' of great Influence. §. 68. All Men defire Happiness, that's paft doubt; but, as has been alreament of what dy obferv'd, when they are rid of Pain, they are apt to take up with any is neceffary to our Happiness. Pleasure at hand, or that Cuftom has endear'd to them, to reft fatisfy'd in that; and fo being happy, till fome new Defire, by making them uneafy, difturbs that Happinefs, and fhews them that they are not fo, they look no farther; nor is the Will determin'd to any Action, in pursuit of any other known or apparent Good. For fince we find, that we cannot enjoy all forts of Good, but one excludes another; we do not fix our Defires on every apparent greater Good, unless it be judg'd to be neceffary to our Happiness; if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is another occafion to Men of judging wrong, when they take not that to be neceffary to their Happinefs, which really is fo. This Miftake mifleads us both in the Choice of the Good we aim at, and very often in the Means to it, when it is a remote Good: But which way ever it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the Means as not neceflary to it; when a Man miffes his great End, Happiness, he will acknowledg he judg'd not right. That which contributes to this Mistake, is the real or fuppos'd Unpleasantnefs of the Actions, which are the way to this end; it seeming fo prepofterous a thing to Men, to make themselves unhappy in order to Happiness, that they do not eafily bring themfelves to it. We can things. . 69. The laft Enquiry therefore concerning this matter is, Whether it be change the A- in a Man's power to change the Pleasantnefs and Unpleasantnefs that accompagreeableness nies any fort of Action? and to that it is plain, in many cases he can. Men of Difagreeableness in may and fhould correct their Palats, and give a relifh to what either has, or they fuppofe has none. The Relifh of the Mind is as various as that of the Body, and like that too may be alter'd; and 'tis a mistake to think, that Men cannot change the Difpleafingness or Indifferency that is in Actions into Pleafure and Defire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due Confideration will do it in fome cafes; and Practice, Application and Custom in most. Bread or Tobacco may be neglected, where they are fhewn to be useful to Health, because of an Indifferency or D.frelifh to them; Reafon and Confideration at first recommends, and begins their Trial, and Use finds, or Custom makes them pleasant. That this is fo in Vertue too, is very certain. A&ions are pleasing or difpleafing, either in themselves, or confider'd as a means to a greater and more defirable End. The eating of a well-feafon'd Dish, fuited to a Man's Palat, may move the Mind by the Delight it felf that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other End: To which the Confideration of the Pleafure there is in Health and Strength (to which that Meat is fubfervient) may add a new Gufto, able to make us fwallow an ill-relifh'd Potion. In the latter of these, any Action is render'd more or lefs pleafing, only by the Contemplation of the End, and the being more or lefs perfuaded of its Tendency to it, or neceffary Connexion with it: But the Pleasure of the Action it felf is best acquir'd or increas'd by Use and Practice. Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a diftance we look'd on with Averfion; and by Repetitions wear us into a liking of what poffibly, in the firft Effay, difpleas'd us. Habits have powerful Charms, and put fo ftrong Attractions of Easiness and Pleasure into what we accuftom our felves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least be ealy in the Omiffion of A&tions, which habitual Practice has fuited, and thereby recommends to us. Tho' this be very vifible, and every one's Experience thews him he can do; yet it is a part in the Conduct of Men towards their Happiness, neglected to a degree, that it will be poffibly entertain❜d as a Paradox, if it be faid, that Men can make Things or Actions more or lefs pleafing to to themselves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may juftly impute a great deal of their wandring. Fashion and the common Opinion having fettled wrong Notions, and Education and Custom ill Habits, the juft Values of things are mifplac'd, and the Palats of Men corrupted. Pains fhould be taken to rectify thefe; and contrary Habits change our Pleafures, and give a relifh to that which is neceffary or conducive to our Happiness. This every one must confefs he can do, and when Happiness is loft, and Mifery overtakes him, he will confefs he did amifs in neglecting it, and condemn himself for it: And I ask every one, whether he has not often done fo? wrong Fudg §. 70. I fhall not now enlarge any farther on the wrong Judgments and Neg- Preference of lea of what is in their power, whereby Men mislead themselves. This would Vice toVertue make a Volume, and is not my business. But whatever falfe Notions, or fhame- a manifeft ful Negled of what is in their power, may put Men out of their way to Hap-ment. piness, and distract them, as we fee, into fo different Courfes of Life, this yet is certain, that Morality, eftablifh'd upon its true Foundations, cannot but determine the Choice in any one that will but confider: And he that will not be fo far a rational Creature as to reflect seriously upon infinite Happiness and Mifery, muft needs condemn himself as not making that ufe of his Understanding he should. The Rewards and Punishments of another Life, which the Almighty has establifh'd as the Enforcements of his Law, are of weight enough to determine the Choice, against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can fhew, when the eternal State is confider'd but in its bare Poffibility, which no body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquifite and endless Happiness to be but the poffible Confequence of a good Life here, and the contrary State the poffible Reward of a bad one; muft own himself to judg very much amifs if he does not conclude, that a vertuous Life, with the certain Expectation of everlafting Blifs which may come, is to be prefer'd to a vicious one, with the Fear of that dreadful State of Mifery, which 'tis very poffible may overtake the Guilty; or at beft the terrible uncertain Hope of Annihilation. This is evidently fo, tho' the vertuous Life here had nothing but Pain, and the vicious. continual Pleafure: which yet is, for the most part, quite otherwife, and wicked Men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their prefent Poffeffion; nay, all things rightly confider'd, have, I think, even the worst part here. But when infinite Happiness is put in one Scale against infinite Misery in the other; if the worst that comes to the pious Man, if he mistakes, be the best that the Wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can without Madnefs run the venture? Who in his Wits would chufe to come within a Poffibility of infinite Mifery, which if he mifs, there is yet nothing to be got by that Hazard? Whereas on the other fide, the fober Man ventures nothing against infinite Happiness to be got, if his Expectation comes to pafs. If the good Man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not miferable, he feels nothing. On the other fide, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he mistakes, he is infinitely miferable. Muft it not be a moft manifeft wrong Judgment, that does not prefently fee to which fide, in this cafe, the Preference is to be given? I have forborn to mention any thing of the Certainty or Probability of a future State, defigning here to fhew the wrong Judgment that any one muft allow he makes upon his own Principles, laid how he pleases, who prefers the fhort Pleasures of a vicious Life upon any Confideration, whilst he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future Life is at leaft poffible. .71. To conclude this Enquiry into human Liberty, which as it ftood be- Recapitula fore, I my felf from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious Friend of mine, tion fince the Publication, fufpecting to have fome miftake in it, tho' he could not particularly fhew it me, I was put upon a ftricter Review of this Chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very eafy and fearce obfervable Slip I have made, in putting one feemingly indifferent Word for another, that Difcovery open'd to me this prefent view, which here, in this Jecond Edition, I fubmit to the learned World, and which in fhort is this: Liberty is a Power to act or not to act, according as the Mind directs. A Power to direct the operative Faculties to Motion or Reft in particular Inftances, is that which we call the Will. That which in the Train of our voluntary Actions determines the Will to any Change of |