guished officer of Marmont's staff, whose soldierly qualifications Perrævos admits, even whilst reprobating his arrogance and obstinacy. The Greek Government had employed him to raise and train-discipline we fancy he hardly could-a regiment after the manner of France; and now sent him with his Taktikos, as they were called, to whom a small band of Philhellenes was attached, making together about 1,200 men, to join Karaiskakis at Eleusis. Thence they marched, 5,300 in all, to Khaidari, a village half-way between Eleusis and Athens. Here, after some skirmishing, they repulsed a body of Turks, whereupon Karaiskakis wished to hurry on and occupy the Piræus, but was prevented by Fabvier's positive refusal to advance. At Khaidari, therefore, they encamped; Karaiskakis occupying a walled garden in a hollow, Fabvier, a slightly entrenched hill on his right, and Perrævos, with a very small corps, a detached field-work upon a hill nearer the Athenian olive groves. "On the 8th of August, as the rays of the sun, glaring over Mount Hymettus, illuminated the peaks of Korydalos, a body of 8,000 foot and 2,000 horse, appeared advancing from the olive groves. The former, headed by Kiutahi, forming the right wing, moved towards the detached field-work; the latter, under Omer Pasha of Karystos, were on the left. Our commander, issuing from the garden, visited all the posts, encouraging the Greeks, exciting in them the love of glory, reminding each man of his own and of his father's deeds. Fabvier, without orders from the commander, sent 300 Taktikos to attack the horse, who were ascending a long hill and making for the garden, in hopes, even if they could do no more, to prevent the sending of reinforcements to Perrævos. The height of the hill concealed the two parties from each other until they reached the summit, which they did simultaneously, and stood motionless, as if entranced by the unexpected encounter. The Greek officer first gave the word to fire; and the Turks, though they lost nine men by this one volley, instantly returned it, and wounded three Taktikos, including the officer, who, wounded as he was in the thigh, shouted, "Fire! fire!" The second rank, instead of imitating the conduct of the front rank, shamelessly turned to fly, and then the front rank followed. The Pasha, seeing this unhoped-for retreat of the Taktikos, dashed fearlessly after them, and in about ten minutes killed eighteen, and took sixteen prisoners. Col. Fabvier upon this occasion violated the duties, not only of war, but of philanthropy also; for whilst his comrades were slaughtered before his eyes,-whilst he was expressly ordered by the commander to save them, he looked upon the tragical event as comical. The indignant Karaiskakis led in person 200 men against the Turkish horse; who, finding themselves so near the strongest Greek post, turned about and trotted off to their general, singing hymns of victory. Elated thereby, the whole army moved. * It may be observed, once for all, without entering into the question of "Who is wrong and who is right?" that some discrepancy, not to say contradiction, exists between Frank and Greek accounts. against Perrævos. The movement seemed strange; for horse and foot approached in a mingled mass, with the exception of the standardbearers, who were a few steps in advance. Perrævos directed that they should be suffered to come quite close, no one firing till he should give the signal by discharging his own piece, and that the firing should then be continuous and well-aimed, especially at officers. Haughty and fearful was the onslaught of the Turks; but in ten minutes of hard fighting, the desperate resistance of the Greeks humbled their arrogance. The death of the general of cavalry, who was a relation of the general-in-chief, Kiutahi, contributed not a little to the victory, diffusing such gloom and alarm through the army, that the horse immediately retreated, followed by the foot. Upon this unexpected retreat Perrævos wrote to the commander: : "Most magnanimous commander!-Thou hast seen the tremendous attacks, and the unexpected retreat of the enemy. To make the most of our victory, I think it were well that half the regulars, and a third of the irregulars, should move on the right, the same on the left; thy magnanimity might join us to form the centre, and thus we should all attack the enemy, before he has time to fortify himself. He has already commenced digging. THE PERRÆVOS,' 66 6 "General Perrævos!-Thy notion pleased me, and, agreeing with what thou hast written, brother, I straight summoned Col. Fabvier, and read thy letter to him; but he answered abruptly, "You will execute your schemes, I shall execute mine." Speaking these words, he returned to his regiment without saying or listening to anything further. "Brother! thy gallantry, and the defence of thy post, have this day saved the whole camp, and given an auspicious beginning to my command. May all the posts copy the example of thine! Then will victory sound her trumpet for the Greeks. Hold out, brother; and I hope that about ten o'clock I may persuade the other leaders to execute the proposed scheme. "The brother and Commander, -Military Memoranda. "G. KARAISKAKIS.' These hopes were disappointed, and the victor found it advisable to fall back in the night. In this battle 11 Greeks were killed, 17 wounded. The Taktikos had 22 wounded, but no more killed than the before-mentioned 18, save that the next day the Turks beheaded their 16 prisoners. 500 Turks were reported killed; the number of their wounded seems never to have been known to the Greeks. Shortly afterwards, Karaiskakis and Fabvier separated; the former introduced some reinforcements into Athens, and then returned to Parnassus. It was not till the following spring that he again attempted to relieve the besieged city. Great changes had by this time taken place. A third National Assembly, sitting at Træzene, had elected Count Capodistrias President of Grecce, and appointed Lord Cochrane Commander-in-chief by sea, Sir Richard Church by land. Karaiskakis, hoping to find energy and im partiality in the new Government, sent Perrævos to Trazene, to propose measures for raising the siege of Athens; and Perrævos had recourse to Church, under whom he had formerly served in the Ionian islands, and who is the only foreigner whom he really praises. Of him, in the earlier work, he had said: "This admirable man I knew personally, but for a brief season; his reputation I had known for years. During my short experience, whilst associated with him, I found him, as a ruler, endowed with the qualities of Epaminondas and Themistocles; but marvelled still more when I listened to another Thrasybulos, another Pelopidas."-History of Suli and Parga. We could not deny ourselves the pleasure of transcribing this Greek opinion of an Englishman, we regret to say no longer high in King Otho's councils: but now return to Trazene. Church received his former major kindly, invited him to dinner, and listened to his plan of operations. This was, that the fleet should attack Euboea, and Karaiskakis with his army occupy Thermopyla, being enabled so to do by the stationing vessels off the adjacent coast to feed the troops. By thus depriving the besiegers of all co-operation from Euboea, and cutting off their supplies from Thessaly, he calculated upon reducing them to a state of insulation and destitution, in which they could not long find it practicable to continue the siege. Church approved, and promised to recommend these measures to Lord Cochrane and the Government; and Perrævos went back exulting to rejoin Karaiskakis, who was then encamped at the Piræus. But when the two Commanders-in-chief appeared, the General proved to be strangely subjected to the Admiral; and the latter, professedly adopting, so far modified the plan, that he declared the siege of Athens must be raised by defeating the Turks in a pitched battle, before he would set about executing his part of it. In vain Karaiskakis, supported by Church, represented that the enormous disparity of numbers made defeat in a pitched battle, upon equal ground, inevitable. Cochrane persisted, and claimed obedience. He further required that the attack should be made according to a scheme of his own, well adapted, perhaps, to British soldiers, but which Karaiskakis judged wholly unsuited to such troops as his. His judgment was but too correct; he was, however, spared the pain of sceing his apprehensions justified. He was sitting with some of his officers, gloomily anticipating the probable results of the enforced attack upon the Turkish lines, when he was startled by a sudden firing in the direction of Munychia. It appeared that a party of intoxicated sailors had gone close up to a Turkish post, and been attacked by its little garrison; that the Greeks, from their nearest post, had run to the assistance of the sailors; and that, on either side, reinforcements had poured in till considerable numbers were engaged. Karaiskakis, in a state of irritation, most likely, at the taunts which his cautious generalship had provoked from the impetuous Cochrane, deemed it incumbent upon him to take the direction of, or rather join in, this extemporaneous affray, in person. He mounted and galloped to the scene of action. "Here had Atropos, it appears, determined to cut the thread of our hero's days. Ares, envious of Hellenic fortune, succoured the Ottomans. As the hero, on horseback, paused upon a small elevation, preparing his weapons for the assault, he was recognised by a Turkish horseman, who alighted, took deliberate aim, and wounded the terror of the Ottomans, the tower of strength of the Greeks, in the lower abdomen."-Military Memoranda. He The wound was mortal. Karaiskakis was lifted off his horse, and calling his comrades around him, gave them his last instructions and advice touching the conduct of the war. then embarked for Salamis, where the military hospital was established, but died on board the vessel that was conveying him thither. It has been said that he refused to let a Philhellene surgeon dress or examine his wound. Perrævos mentions nothing of the kind; but, considering what must, at that moment, have been his feelings with respect to Philhellene colleagues or commanders, it does not seem unlikely. Lord Cochrane's injudicious scheme was, at least, as ill executed as it was conceived. The Greeks were completely routed, and lost, including the prisoners beheaded by the Turks, 825 men, a number for them unprecedentedly large. The army retreated, the fleet sailed away, and Athens surrendered. With this catastrophe ends, we think, the interest of these volumes. At the battle of Navarino, at Ibrahim's operations in the Morea, our author was not present. With the question of the fairness or unfairness of Capodistrias's dealings between his brother A. A. Capodistrias and Prince Demetrius Ypsilanti, we choose not at present to meddle: and, though our author attached himself to the latter during the campaigns of 1828 and 1829, he scarcely sketches his commander's operations, because the Prince's secretary, Philemon, has written, and means to publish an account of them. We now, therefore, take our leave of Colonel Christopher Perrævos, in whom and his writings we flatter ourselves we have introduced to the British public no uninviting specimen of Romaic literati and literature. 109 ART. V.-1. Observations on the Present State of our National Defences. By The Lord Viscount Ranelagh. London: 1845. 2. Observations on the Improvement of Harbours and the Formation of Roadsteads. By Commander Westbrook, R.N. THE charge of inaction and of indifference to our national defences has very frequently been brought against the authorities in Downing-street, sometimes with a semblance of truth, as in the instance of Sir Robert Walpole, at others as a mere partycry, as was the case under Mr. Addington's administration; but, perhaps, it was never louder, or more universally raised, than at the present time; it has been sufficient for a few to exclaim, “Voilà un lièvre," for the whole country to start in chase, and the pursuit might, in the main, be beneficial to the country, by keeping the attention of the Executive closely directed to this object, if it did not at the same time tend to diffuse a spirit of unreasonable doubt and nervous excitement throughout the community, making the people mistrustful of their own energies, and of those means of defence by which our shores were guarded in the memorable days when even "Austria bent and Prussia broke." Lord Ranelagh's excellent pamphlet has been published very opportunely; for while it fairly points out the great advantage which steam-communication gives to the Continental Powers, and the necessity of preparing ourselves for whatever events, or coalitions, time may bring against us, it does not indulge in denunciations of the past policy of Ministers, nor in bitter personalities against the French nation; neither does it awaken unreasonable fears, by unreasonable and fanciful suggestions; it is clear, straightforward, thoroughly English, both in letter and spirit, — such a work as might be expected from an officer who has acquired, with the experience of a military career, habits of cautious and vigorous thought. -- But even Lord Ranelagh, whose conclusions are in general just and temperate, has, in some degree, exaggerated the dangers which threaten us: for instance, he tells us, that when the railways now projected in France are formed, and the steam-fleet required by the Prince de Joinville is equipped, "In such a state of things, certain in event, and probably not distant in time, unless our defences are not only strengthened, but altogether changed, a declaration of war on the part of France would be |