Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval TradeCambridge University Press, 16 ene 2006 - 503 páginas It is widely believed that current disparities in economic, political, and social outcomes reflect distinct institutions. Institutions are invoked to explain why some countries are rich and others poor, some democratic and others dictatorial. But arguments of this sort gloss over the question of what institutions are, how they come about, and why they persist. This book seeks to overcome these problems, which have exercised economists, sociologists, political scientists, and a host of other researchers who use the social sciences to study history, law, and business administration. |
Índice
Contents | 3 |
Institutions and Transactions | 39 |
1 | 46 |
Institutions as Systems in Equilibria | 55 |
The Merchant Guild | 91 |
Endogenous Institutions and GameTheoretic Analysis | 124 |
Institutional Dynamics as a Historical Process | 153 |
Current Ones | 187 |
The Empirical Method of Comparative and Historical | 305 |
Interactive ContextSpecific Analysis | 373 |
Institutions History and Development | 379 |
Appendixes | 407 |
B Is Homo Sociologicus Strategic? | 421 |
ReputationBased PrivateOrder | 428 |
References | 453 |
489 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todo
Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade Avner Greif Vista previa restringida - 2006 |
Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade Avner Greif No hay ninguna vista previa disponible - 2006 |
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