prosecution for piracy. The character of the vessel is then a matter in pais, and may be established by general evidence. United States v. Furlong, 5 Wheaton's U. S. Supreme Court Rep., 184. To show a vessel to be American, so as to give jurisdiction to punish offenses committed on board of her, it is enough to show, in the first instance, that she sailed from and to an American port, and was apparently owned and controlled by citizens of the United States. It is not necessary to produce her register. United States v. Peterson, 1 Woodbury & Minot's U. S. Circuit Ct. Rep., 305. But a ship engaged in a whaling voyage, without having surrendered her register or taken out an enrollment and license, pursuant to the act of July 18, 1793, was held not an American ship, within the purview of the act of March 3, 1835, ch. 40, punishing any of the crew of an American ship for an endeavor to make a revolt. United States v. Rogers, 3 Sumner's U. S. Circuit Court Rep., 342. Compare a somewhat different provision as to the effect of passports of persons, in Article 323. 10 TITLE VII. DOMICIL. CHAPTER XXI. Domicil, original and secondary. XXIII. Effect of change of domicil. CHAPTER XXI. DOMICIL, ORIGINAL AND SECONDARY. Domicil" defined. ARTICLE 280. "Domicil 281. Kinds of domicil. 282. Original and secondary. 284. Every person has one domicil. 285. Original domicil of legitimates. 288. Continuance of domicil. 289. Wife's secondary domicil. 290. Child's secondary domicil. 291. Ward's secondary domicil. 292. Domicil of insane persons, &c. "Domicil" defined. 280. The term "domicil," as used in this Code, means the seat' of permanent residence-the home." 1 Ortolan, (Explication Historique de Inst. Justinien, t. I., p. 402, 6 ed.,) rejects the definition of domicil as the place where a person has his principal establishment," for the reason that domicil is not a place at all, in the sense of being a portion of space. He substitutes the following: "The seat, or home, (le siége, la demeure,) which a person is deemed in law to have always for the exercise of certain rights or the application of certain laws." Boileux, I., p. 212; Puchta, Vorlesungen, I., S. 99, § 45, (5th ed.:) 2 Kent's Commentaries, 540, note, (8th ed.,) support the definition above given. See, also, Westlake's Private International Law, p. 31, note a, and p. 35, Rule 2. Demante, I., p. 197; Duranton, I., no. 351 ; Bug sur Pothier, I., p. 3; Valette sur Prudhon, I., p. 236, cited Mourlon, I., p. 188. The definition of Lord WESTBURY, Bell v. Kennedy, House of Lords, 6 Session Cases, 3 series, p. 78; "The relation which the law creates between an individual and a particular locality,” if not open to the objection of Ortolan, ubi supra, that it is too vague to be of use, is only a statement of domicil; ¿. ., the status arising from it. Although it is true that domicil is in law what residence is in fact." (Ortolan, p. 403,) yet "domicil is the legal conception of residence;" (Westlake, § 30 ;) and this legal conception is predetermined in particular cases, not in view of all the facts of these cases, but of some only, which are taken as controlling, because it is considered that they are, in the majority of instances, most likely to lead to a conclusion in harmony with the fact. But when such special facts are taken as controlling for any other reason than this likelihood, a purely arbitrary extension is given to the term domicil, which ought to be rejected, and the alternative taken of placing these cases in some other category. Thus the minor's domicil, after his parents' death, follows that of the guardian. This rule is founded upon its correspondence with the fact in the great majority of instances. Should it be considered as also established that the succession to such minor's property is not to be changed by the guardian's change of domicil, the rule itself should not be rejected, but this proposition should be inserted among the rules of law relating to succession. See Westlake, Private Int. Law, § 36. 2 Political Code, Reported for New York, § 6. Kinds of domicil. 281. Domicil is either: 1. Original; or, 2. Secondary. Original and secondary. 282. The original domicil is that of the person at the time of his birth. All others' are secondary. 1 At any other time, whether at the place of the original domicil, or elsewhere. Derivative and voluntary. 283. A secondary domicil is derivative, when dependent upon the domicil of another person. Otherwise, it is voluntary. Every person has one domicil. 284. No person can be without a domicil,' or have at one time more than one domicil.' But one may have a residence, for a particular purpose, at a place other than his domicil.' 1 Political Code, Reported for New York, §7; Boileux, I., p. 214; Westlake's Private Intern. Law, pp. 33-38; Story, § 47. 2 Political Code, Reported for New York, §7; Boileux, I., pp. 214, 215 ; Mourlon, I., p. 198; Westlake, 316, 325; McLaren's Law of Wills and Succession, 7, p. 4; Brent v. Armfield, 4 Cranch's U. S. Circuit Ct. Rep., 579; Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barbour's (New York) Rep., 504. The case of a person whose birth-place is unknown, buying two country houses in different countries under the same cirumstances, and dying in one of them, (suggested in 4 Phill. Intern. Law, § 59,) is provided for by Articles 287 and 288. 3 Chaine v. Wilson, 1 Bosworth's (New York) Rep., 673; Frost v. Brisbin, 19 Wendell's (New York) Rep., 11; Douglas v. Mayor of New York, 2 Duer's (New York) Rep., 110; 4 Phillimore's Intern. Law, § 55. Original domicil of legitimates. 285. The original domicil of a child which is legit imate, or has been acknowledged by its father before its birth, is determined by the domicil of its father at the time of its birth; or, if its father is then dead, or has no voluntary domicil, by the domicil of its mother. See Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 New York Rep., 356, 371; Westlake's Private Intern. Law, § 35; Brown v. Lynch, 2 Bradford's Surrogate (New York) Rep., 214. Original domicil of illegitimates. 286. The original domicil of an illegitimate child is determined by the domicil of its mother at the time of its birth, unless previously acknowledged by its father. Child of unknown parentage. 287. The original domicil of a child whose parents are unknown, is the place of its birth, or where it is first found. Continuance of domicil. 2 288. The existing domicil' continues until another is gained, or until the death of the person, whichever first occurs, except as provided in article 301.* 1 This is true not only as to the original domicil, but also in reference to the derivative domicil; e. g., of the wife; (Pennsylvania v. Ravenel, 21 Howard's U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 103; Westlake, § 42;) or minor; Doe v. Litherberry, 4 McLean's Rep., 454; Goods of Patten, 6 Jurist, N. S., 151; Boileux, I., p. 121. 2 A domicil cannot be lost until another is gained. Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Vesey's Ch. Rep., 787; Graham v. Public Adm'r, 4 Bradford's Surrogate (New York) Rep., 127. 3 The exception refers to the abandonment of a secondary domicil, with intent to acquire the original domicil. Wife's secondary domicil. 289. The domicil of the husband is the domicil of his wife, except: 1. When she is living apart from him,' separated by the decree of a competent tribunal,' or by his consent, such separation being allowed by the domicil of each ;* 2. When he has committed an offense which, by the law of her actual residence, entitles her to a divorce," which she claims ;" 3. When she or some other person is the committee of his person;' 4. When some person other than her husband is the committee of her person." Bremer v. Freeman, 1 Deane's Rep., 212; Political Code, Reported for New York, $7. 1 Pothier, Contr. de Marriage, § 524; 4 Phillimore, Intern. Law, §§ 71 -73. 2 Vescher v. Vescher, 12 Barbour's (New York) Rep., 640; Barber v. Barber, 21 Howard's U. S. Supreme Ct. Rep., 582; Williams v. Dormer, 2 Rob., 505; 2 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, (2d ed.,) § 125; (1st ed.,) § 728; Pothier, ubi supra, § 522; Allison v. Catley, Session Cases, 2nd series, I., 1025, 15th June, 1829; McLaren's Law of Wills and Succession, p. 15, § 29; Boileux, I., pp. 222, 223, note 1; Westlake, Private Int. Law, § 42 ; contra, Merlin, Répertoire de Jurisprudence, Domicile, § 5, no. 1; Dalloz, Domicil, no. 9; Zacharie, p. 280, § 140. Doubted, per Lord KINGSDOWN, in Dolphin v. Robins, 7 House of Lords Cases, 420; 3 Macqueen's Rep., 581; Re Daly's Settlement, 22 Jurist, 525. It has even been held that a decree of separation cannot impose any particular domicil upon her. Dijon, 28 Ap., 1807; 6 Dalloz, t. 6, p. 379. 3 This is indispensable. Mourlon, I., p. 194, (4th ed.); Bishop, (2nd ed.,) 1, § 634; 2, § 129; 1 McLaren's Law of Wills and Succession, p. 15, § 29; Dolphin v. Robins, 3 Macqueen's Rep., 563-584. 4 Westlake, § 363. See Connelly v. Connelly, 7 Moore's Privy Council Rep., 438, 471. 5 364. Bishop, ubi supra, 2, § 128, (2nd ed.;) § 730, (1st ed.;) Westlake, §§ 42, Whether the exception extends as far as to allow the wife to establish a domicil in a different judicial locality from that in which her husband's |