the poisoning of fountains by men from abroad. This one illustration will suffice, but the number that could be given is almost without limit. Finally, Mexican administrations had so insecure a tenure of existence that officials lived only for the day; political opponents were so cunning and unscrupulous and the public so wanting in confidence and intelligence that no avoidable responsibility was willingly incurred; the ministers themselves were in most cases unequal to their tasks, and all of them had more work than could be done; and the eternal doctrine of Mañana (to-morrow) always provided a convenient way of escape. In short, the recognition of Texas presented itself to the Mexican mind as a great sacrifice of honor and interest, on the recommendation of one country that was considered a perfidious, arrogant, and over-prosperous rival, eager to acquire the territory; of another that was regarded as hateful in war and hateful in peace; of a third that was known to be a creditor and believed to be a schemer; and of a fourth that was looked upon as a handful of insolent, ungrateful beggars, at once the scum and the dregs of Christendom; while all the complications of Mexican politics and all the peculiarities of Mexican character tended to recommend the policy of inaction.13

By the middle of February, 1844, Bankhead, the British minister in Mexico, received official information by the way of Van Zandt (the Texan chargé at Washington), Elliot (the British chargé in Texas), and the Foreign Office that the United States had informally proposed annexation to the Texan government, and one can hardly doubt that he communicated to the Mexican officials a piece of news so important in itself and so well calculated to justify the course recommended by England. All the steps made known by the American newspapers were closely followed from that time on, and many articles directed against the project, which appeared in the anti-administration journals of the United States, accusing the government of bad faith towards Mexico, of greed, and of duplicity, were reproduced in the official Diario and in other Mexican papers. To suggest what their effect upon the public mind must have been, it is enough to mention that an article from the Anti-Slavery Standard of New York was presented as an impartial account of Tyler's proceedings. The popular Democratic view that the presidential election had settled the question of annexation did not escape notice; and the President's messages of December, 1844, were carefully scanned. Whatever others asserted, the Mexican consul at New

13

(Fountains) Pakenham, no. 55, October 5, 1833, F. O., Mexico, LXXX.

Orleans insisted continually in his despatches home that annexation was now only a question of time.14

On February 14, 1845, the passage of Brown's resolution, which embodied that project, by the House of Representatives was known at Mexico, and this news created "great consternation" in the cabinet, reported Bankhead. Cuevas, who then held the portfolio of foreign relations, immediately asked the opinion of this sensible diplomat, who chanced to be with him when the information arrived, and was earnestly counselled to be moderate and cautious. Soon after, Bankhead followed up this advice by entreating him to delay no longer the acknowledgment of Texan independence. Cuevas replied that a proposition to recognize the revolters would be instantly rejected by Congress unless backed and aided by England and France, but, with an assurance of that support, would certainly pass. "I reminded his Excellency ", reported Bankhead, "that any assistance from England must be a moral one, for that whatever disposition may at one time have existed to go beyond that line, had now been withdrawn"; and this unsatisfactory assurance was all that could be obtained.15

The following month Cuevas laid before Congress a Memoria. On the portion of it relating to Texas he had consulted Bankhead, and one may suppose had been influenced by him. In this paper the minister argued that under Santa Anna the foreign affairs of Mexico had been very badly managed, and endeavored to bring against the hostile attitude maintained towards the Texans all the unpopularity of the now overthrown tyrant-the ministry, as he explained, having been "blind, and wholly carried away by the impetuous genius of the man who dominated it". He then proceeded to adduce reasons for adopting a new method in handling the matter. It is impossible to regain our lost territory, he argued. The people are all aliens; they have no sympathy with Mexico; and they can neither be exterminated nor compelled to join heartily with us. Military success against them, if possible, would cost more than it would be worth; and the only real chance would be

14 December 26, 1843, the British Foreign Office sent to Bankhead a copy of a despatch from the British chargé in Texas dated October 31, which reported an interview with Houston at which the chargé had been shown a despatch from Van Zandt dated September 18, stating that the American Secretary of State had informally proposed the annexation of Texas, F. O., Mexico, CLX. (mails usually passed between Mexico City and London in about six weeks); Diario, June 15, 1844, etc.; Arrangoiz, consul, no. 58, June 17, 1844, no. 60 (res.), June 19, 1844, no. 26, February 4, 1845, Sria. Relac.

15 Diario del Gobierno, February 14, 1844; Bankhead, no. 19, March 1, 1845, F. O., Mexico, CLXXXIV.

to induce colonists from other nations to settle there and neutralize the influence of the Americans. War, then, is not feasible. Equally grave is the problem of recognition. The national honor and the integrity of the national territory are involved in that question. If independent, Texas would carry on smuggling operations and would be the ally and tool of the United States. Worse yet, however, would be the absorption of that region by its great neighbor, for while "the independence of Texas perhaps would not make necessary a war with the American republic; from its annexation, this must inevitably result." It is, therefore, "not strange that the idea be suggested of a negotiation which, based upon our rights, should be worthy of the Republic and should ensure definitively the respect with which the United States must regard Mexico". If such a course be pursued, the nation, in case of war, can reckon upon more sympathy [than could otherwise be expected] and upon the co-operation of that just and enlightened policy which prevails in the world today "."

16

66

Meantime reports from Arrangoiz, the consul at New Orleans, made the success of the annexationists appear still more certain. On March 8, he wrote that even the fear of war would not stop the United States, and a week later that, although most of the Texan newspapers condemned the terms of Brown's resolution, it would be accepted by the people. The Mexican public became greatly excited and the government found it necessary to despatch troops northward; but on March 20 Bankhead informed Elliot that all the bravado of threatening hostilities meant nothing and that Mexico was disposed to receive overtures with a view to recognition. This assurance Cuevas had authorized him to give.17

On the very next day came official information that the American Senate and President had acted in favor of annexation. Cuevas immediately sent for Bankhead, who endeavored to calm his excitement; and later both the English and the French ministers discussed the situation with the Mexican secretary and strongly recommended moderation. Congress was officially informed of the news on March 22 and that body immediately put on a warlike front. It was proposed in the lower house to abrogate the treaty of amity and commerce existing between the United States and Mexico, shut out American trade, and prohibit the restoration of commercial inter16 Memoria, March 11, 1845; Bankhead, no. 46, April 29, 1845, F. O., Mexico, CLXXXV.

17 Arrangoiz, no. 47 (res.), March 8, no. 51 (res.), March 14, 1845, Sria. Relac.; Bankhead, no. 27, March 31, 1845, F. O., Mexico, LXXXIV.; id. to Elliot, March 20, 1845, ibid.

course except on the basis of non-annexation; and a few days later it was moved that "under the existing circumstances the Government should listen to no proposition having for its object the recognition of the independence of Texas, and under no circumstances to propositions looking toward the annexation of that Department to the United States "; and the resolution even undertook to make it legally treasonable to "promote either of these designs by speech or writing". A letter to Shannon, though moderated by the British and French representatives, broke off diplomatic relations with him; yet, as the London Times noted at once, it did not reassert the claim of Mexico to the Texan territory, and it was plain to close observers that the government had not been controlled entirely by the feelings of the public or even by their own.18

On the afternoon of April 7 a fearful earthquake shook the capital and filled the inhabitants of the city with mourning and alarm. Immense damages were caused, the halls of Congress were so much injured that sessions could no longer be held there, and shocks continued to work havoc the following day. Whether this visitation had any effect on public sentiment cannot be known, but a spirit of seriousness must have been promoted by it, and the government may have argued that the superstitious masses would feel doubtful whether heaven approved of their bellicose excitement. At all events, on April 8 Bankhead wrote that he believed Congress would accept "any fair plan" for acknowledging the independence of Texas.19

Two days later the official journal published the note that Almonte had addressed to the American government after the President had signed the annexation resolution, protesting against his action and announcing an intention to withdraw from the country. This document was of course well suited to stimulate public opinion at Mexico, for it described the absorption of Texas as "an act of aggression the most unjust which can be found recorded in the annals of modern history", and assumed an equally high tone all the way through. Much more noteworthy, however, was Buchanan's reply, published at Mexico on the same day, for it declared suggestively that the admission of Texas to the American Union was now irrevocably decided upon so far as the United States were

15 Bankhead, no. 27 (see note 17); Diario, April 11, 1845; La Voz del Pueblo, March 29, 1845; Shannon, no. 9, March 27, no. 10, April 6, 1845. State Dept., Desps. from Mins., Mexico, XII.; Cuevas to Shannon, March 28, 1845, Diario, March 28, 1845; Times, May 10, 1845.

19 México á través de los Siglos, IV. 539; Bankhead to Elliot, April 8, 1845, F. O., Texas, XXIII.

concerned, and added explicitly that only a refusal of the other party to accept the terms and conditions upon which her admission depended could frustrate the design. This language, though far from being so intended, was a strong argument in favor of the proposed negotiations with Texas, and some of the quick-witted Mexicans. doubtless caught the hint.20

Scarcely was the ink of the Diario dry, when the opportunity came to take advantage of Buchanan's suggestion. It was the earnest wish of England and France, now acting in concert regarding the matter, to prevent the annexation of Texas to the United States; and the British representative on the ground had believed for some time that, if Mexico would give the Texans an assurance of security by recognizing their independence, they could be induced. to maintain their nationality. In this opinion President Jones professed to concur. Accordingly, at the very end of March, when the Congress of the United States was known to have passed annexation resolutions, these gentlemen, with the French representative and the Texan secretary of state, who was opposed to the policy of joining the American Union, came together and drew up certain. "Conditions preliminary to a treaty of peace", based upon the principles of recognition by Mexico and a pledge on the part of Texas to remain separate from all other countries. For obvious reasons it was deemed highly important to bring clearly before the authorities at Mexico the arguments for accepting this plan and to obtain their concurrence in the shortest possible time. On both grounds it seemed best that the British chargé should present the matter personally, and that gentleman, taking great pains to deceive the public as to his destination, slipped away south as quickly as he could.21

On the evening of April 11 the British frigate Eurydice came in at Vera Cruz. Without loss of time her captain landed, and as soon as possible he set out for Mexico City, carrying-it was understood-despatches for the British minister. With him went an in

20 Diario, April 10, 1845; Almonte to Calhoun, March 6, 1845, Sen. Doc. No. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., p. 38; Buchanan to Almonte, March 10, 1845, ibid., p. 39; (hint) México á través de los Siglos, IV. 539.

21 As this paragraph is aside from the main line of the paper and is based upon a large number of documents, it is thought best to give no references. The sources are all of a clear and unquestionable character, it is believed. The Texans' proposal was as follows (Sen. Doc. No. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., p. 88): “I. Mexico consents to acknowledge the independence of Texas; II. Texas engages that she will stipulate in the treaty not to annex herself or become subject to any country whatever; III. Limits and other conditions to be matter of arrangement in the final treaty; IV. Texas will be willing to remit disputed points respecting territory and other matters to the arbitration of umpires."