ADDRESS,

DELIVERED AT THE COMMENCEMENT IN 1815.

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Young Gentlemen,

In all those parts of the universe, which are subject to human remark, we recognise the effects of divine legislation. That there are certain laws, agreeably to which all changes in the material world are effected, is acknowledged by atheists; the inconsistency of admitting laws without a lawgiver notwithstanding. It is no more denied by the infidel, than by the religious philosopher, that similar causes uniformly produce similar results.

If Deity has suffered no particle of matter, however worthless, to exist, uncontrolled by laws, it will hardly be questioned, that intelligent beings have some kind of designation; in other words, that the object of their existence will be answered by

their proceding in a particular course, and frustrated should they pursue the opposite. Gravitation is not more a law to material objects, than virtue is to all beings, who are capable of it.

I know not that the present occasion can be better improved, than by addressing you on the immutable, independent nature of moral obligation; or of that virtue, which results from a compliance with it. 66 Morality," to use the words of an able writer, ❝is fixed on an immoveable basis, and appears not "to be, in any sense, factitious, or the arbitrary pro❝duction of any power, human or divine; but equally everlasting and necessary with all truth and rea

❝son."

When it is asserted, that morality is not the production of any power, human or divine, we do not deny, that those persons reason conclusively, as well as reverently, who infer the rectitude of a measure from the fact of its having been adopted by Deity;-because, being previously assured of his moral perfections; that is, of his infinite attachment to the eternal rules of truth, goodness, and justice, we conclude with unwavering confidence, that no particular act of his can violate these rules. In this however, it is by no means implied, that the standard of moral rectitude is factitious, or dependant on the will of any being whatever. The recti

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tude of actions does not depend on their proceeding from one being or another; but on their coincidence with the immutable principles of virtue. Almost all men think, with good reason, that they speak honourably of the Supreme Being, when they say, that all his measures are taken because they are right. Now this language implies, that there is, independent of all will, such a thing as right and wrong. If I say of the vernal forest, it is green, or of the sun, it is lu minous, I assert nothing, unless I affix some ideas to those epithets.

The immutable principles of morality necessarily result, we believe, from the nature of things, and from the relation, which they have one to another. As God is the author of all things, the relation, subsisting between them, may be considered, as depending on Him. But, while objects continue, in all respects, as they are, no change can be produced in their relations. A figure, which is now a square, may be turned into a circle. But, while it continues a square, it must have the relations of such a figure. Now, it is just as absurd to ascribe to Deity the power of changing vice into virtue, or virtue into vice, as to speak of his giving to a globe, so continuing, the properties and relations of a cube; or to speak of his making a whole, which is less than the sum of all its parts.

So certain it is, that the reality of moral obligation, or the distinction between virtue and vice, is not the creature of power, that were we to make the most absurd of all suppositions, viz. that there is no Intelligent Author of the universe, even then a distinction between right and wrong, and consequent obligation would still remain. Without investigating our origin, we are found to be in a situation, in which, by pursuing certain courses, we may contribute much both to the happiness of ourselves and others; and that, by following an opposite course, we can render both ourselves and them sufficiently wretched. Now, were the will of no Supreme Being consulted, nor any future retribution anticipated, I appeal to your understanding, whether it would not be right for a man to live in such a manner, as to render society regular and tranquil, and himself and others happy, rather than to form such dispositions and habits, as would produce misery in his own breast, and diffuse it among those around him? I would ask further, whether such a person, perceiving one course to be right, and another to be wrong, would not be under obligation to adopt the one and avoid the other?-whether this obligation would not be fastened upon him in every connexion, which he might form, and in every stage of life?

Some actions and feelings are intrinsically, or inde