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determination of the government to prevent the sailing of any vesse that might be suspected of being the property of a citizen of the Confederate States was made so manifest, that he had concluded it would be better for him to endeavor to close the contract and go where he could have more liberal action ;" and it appeared from the further correspondence that he had agreed to do this, even on condition of forfeiting the cotton-certificates which he had already deposited as security. The Pampero was seized on the 10th of December, and legal proceedings were instituted, a verdict was entered against her by default, and she remained under seizure until some months after the termination of the civil war.

Iron-clad razit at

As regards the other vessel building in Messrs. Thompson's yard at Glasgow, on which the authorities, as has been mentioned, were keeping watch, Mr. Adams, writing respecting the Glasgow. seizure of the Pampero, reports as follows, (January 28, 1864;)

One good effect of these various proceedings has been to remove all further anxiety respecting the destination of the formidable iron-clad ram in process of construction at the same place. That she was ordered in the first instance by the rebels, I have no manner of doubt; she has now been purchased by the Danish government, as I learn from the Minister, M. de Bille.

The Rappahannock.

In September, 1863, an old gun-boat named the Victor, being considered as rotten and unserviceable, was sold by the British government to a private firm. The firm having afterward applied for the masts and sails of the vessel, the question of granting the application was referred to Earl Russell, who advised, as a measure of precaution, that the masts and sails should for the present be reserved. On the 24th November, 1863, she suddenly left Sheerness, where she was being prepared for sea, at midnight, and crossed over to Calais.* She was still in a condition quite unfit to go to sea, her rigging being incomplete and her crew deficient. At Calais her commander declared her to be a confederate vessel of war, though she was neither equipped, manned, nor armed. She was allowed to remain, and to make such repairs as were necessary to render her seaworthy, but the precautions. taken by the authorities to prevent her being made more serviceable for warlike purposes rendered her practically useless for the confederate service. It having been discovered that large additions had been made to her crew, the French government refused to permit her departure, and she was eventually abandoned by her officers."

"Contrast, again," says the Case of the United States triumphantly, "the course of the French government with that of the British government in like cases. What vessel bearing a commission was ever disturbed by a British gun-boat, no matter how flagrant might have been her violations of British sovereignty ?" Had those who ask this question forgotten the case of a certain vessel called the Canton, or Pampero, which was served exactly in the same manner, having first had a gun-boat placed alongside of her and having been afterward seized?

No information had been received by the government tending to throw any suspicion on the Victor before her departure. Evidence having subsequently been furnished by Mr. Adams to Lord Russell tending to implicate various persons in the fitting-out of this vessel and the obtaining a crew for her, prosecutions were instituted against such

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of them as seemed to have rendered themselves liable to punishment, and several of them were convicted or pleaded guilty. Among others, proceedings were taken against Mr. Rumble, an officer in the government dock-yard at Sheerness, and, though he was acquitted, the government marked their displeasure at his conduct by dismissing him from his appointment and placing him upon half-pay, as an officer in whom they could no longer put any confidence.1

In consequence of the events connected with the Rappahannock, the British government at once gave orders that no more ships should be sold out of the navy during the continuance of the war.

An advantageous offer having been made to the admiralty, in December, 1863, for two vessels (the Reynard and Alacrity) which it was thought desirable to dispose of, the matter was referred to Earl Russell, who gave as his opinion that "it would be much better at the present time not to sell any vessels to private firms, as it is impossible to obtain any sufficient assurance in regard to what may be done with vessels when sold out of the navy."2

It was also thought right to keep careful watch on another vessel, the Amphion, which had already been sold to a private firm, The Amphion. and the police authorities were directed to make inquiries on the subject in January, 1864.3 The vessel was at that time lying dismantled and dismasted. In March following Mr. Adams wrote to call Lord Russell's attention to the subject, and a constant watch was kept on her by the police. She seems to have been in a state quite unfitted for war purposes, and her destination was stated to be Copenhagen. She was eventually stranded on the British coast a few months later, and broken up.4

The Hawk.

On the 1st April, 1864, the suspicions of the customs collector at Glasgow having been excited by certain peculiarities of construction in a vessel recently built at Renfrew, and named the Hawk, he referred the matter to the authorities in London. Pending their decision he refused the application made for a pass to enable her to leave for the latter port.5 On the 16th of the same month Mr. Adams addressed a representation to Lord Russell on the same subject. The Hawk shortly afterward left for London, as was at first believed, without a clearance, and the owner was called upon for explanations. The vessel was also subjected to strict examination by the police and customs authorities. The explanations of the owner proving satisfactory, and no evidence appearing to justify further measures, she was allowed to depart-went to the West Indies, and returned, and was never employed for any warlike purpose.

The Ajax, the Her

the Louisa Ann Fan

ny.

Four other vessels formed the subject of representations by Mr. Adams at the commencement of the year 1865—the Ajax, cules, the Virginia, the Hercules, the Virginia, and the Louisa Ann Fanny. As to the first of these vessels, investigations had already been made by the customs authorities at Dublin, while she was lying in Kingston Harbor. In each case inquiries were made not only by the home authorities, but by the governors of Bermuda and Nassau. None of the vessels in question were ever used for other than commercial purposes.

I have only further to mention the case of the flotilla of gun-boats

1 British Appendix, vol. ii, p. 674.

2 Ibid., vol. v, p. 201.

3 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 566.

4 Ibid., pp. 568, 571, and 572.

♪ Ibid.. »p. 539–541.

procured for the Chinese government by Mr. Lay, which it was intended should be manned and officered by British sailors Anglo-Chinese fleet. under the command of Captain Sherard Osborn.

On the 28th of February, 1863, a letter was addressed to Mr. Lay, by Earl Russell's directions, requesting him to give the particulars of the vessels obtained by him for that purpose, and the information given by Mr. Lay was communicated to Mr. Adams, to whom it was likely to be of service in distinguishing the vessels really destined for the service of the Emperor of China from those reported to be so, as a pretext for other purposes connected with the confederate service.

On the arrival of the fleet in China, a difference arose with the Chinese government as to the terms on which the command of the fleet should be held, and Captain Osborn eventually declined the appoint

ment.

Under these circumstances the British minister at Peking was of opinion-an opinion which was shared by his American colleaguesthat if the fleet was allowed to remain in the hands of the Chinese government, there was great danger of the vessels being bought for employment as confederate cruisers. It was therefore arranged that Captain Osborne should take back part of the fleet to Bombay and part to England, and there dispose of them for the Chinese government; and the vessels were brought back accordingly.

On hearing of this arrangement the British government gave orders that every precaution should be taken to prevent their passing into the hands of any belligerent power. The sale of one of the vessels at Bombay was stopped; but as she was merely an unarmed dispatchboat, the prohibition was subsequently removed. The other ships were held in the custody of the government, and the law-officers having advised that the sale within the British dominions of armed ships of war, already equipped for a different purpose, was not contrary to the foreign-enlistment act, the government determined upon taking upon themselves the responsibility of detaining them unsold. A committee was accordingly appointed to assess the values of the vessels, and the Chinese government were assured that they should not ultimately lose by any delay in the sale. Several overtures for the purchase of one or other of the ships fell through in consequence of the stringent nature of the guarantees required against their employment by belligerents, or from other causes; and they were in consequence not disposed of till after the close of the war. The delay and consequent deterioration of the vessels caused a loss of over £100,000, which was made good by the British government to that of China.

General result.

It thus appears that, during the whole course of the civil war, two ships only were built in Great Britain for, and actually employed in, the service of the confederates. Four others were intended to be built and equipped, but were arrested while in the course of construction. Four merchant-vessels, though not adapted for warlike purposes, were converted into vessels of war by having guns put on board, but out of the jurisdiction of the British government-two of them in confederate ports-and this by reason of the impossibility of getting ships of war built, owing to the active vigilance of the authorities. And it is upon this foundation that Great Britain is represented as having been "the navy-yard of the insurgent States," and that men who must be supposed to have a conscientious appreciation of what is just and right, accuse Earl Russell and Her Majesty's government of "a consistent course of partiality toward the insurgents," and of "a want of diligence bordering upon willful uegligence.'

In the United States argument the proceedings of other governProceedings of ments are compared with those of Great Britain, to the other governments. disparagement of the latter. Thus, of Brazil, it is said: We beg leave to refer this high tribunal to the administrative regulations of the Brazilian Empire for the enforcement of neutrality in all the ports of the empire, in the amplest manner, by efficient action on the part of the imperial ministers, and of the provincial presidents.

Brazil.

In the American case, and the documents to which it refers, there is sufficient indication of the loyalty and efficiency with which the Brazilian government maintained its sovereignty against the aggressive efforts of the confederates.

After the correspondence which I have already inserted, I may very well say that not even with Her Majesty's government or officers did the correspondence of the United States Government assume so angry a tone as that which pervades the letters between the American minister and the Brazilian government.'

Portugal.

Portugal is referred to in the American argument in these terms: As to Portugal, we refer to the correspondence annexed to the American Counter Case, to show that she also never pretended that her neutral duty was confined to the execution of the provisions of her penal code. She also put forth the executive power of the Crown to prevent, repress, or repel aggressive acts of the confederates in violation of her hospitality, or in derogation of her sovereignty. Nay more, the government of Portugal, finding its own naval force inadequate to prevent the confederates from abusing the right of asylum in the Western Islands, expressly authorized the American Government to send a naval force there for the purpose of defending the sovereignty and executing the law of Portugal. On turning to the documents referred to, I find that Portugal did what, as a neutral power, it was bound to do, namely, interfere to prevent the Azores from being made a depot of munitions of war or coal for the confederate cruisers.

With reference to the authority given to the United States Government to send a naval force to the Azores, all that appears is, that when Mr. Harvey, the United States minister, informed the Viscount Sá da Bandeira, the minister for war, then acting as minister for foreign affairs, what was going on at the Azores, the minister said, "that the islands in question had been used and abused by corsairs and pirates during centuries; that they were exposed and unprotected, and therefore might be so employed again, and that the best plan would be to send a sufficient force there to protect American ships against threatened depredations, and to punish criminal offenders." In other words, the Americans were to take care of themselves. This is dignified by the name of "defending the sovereignty and executing the law of Portugal." I may add that when the confederate steamship Stonewall was at Lisbon she was allowed to supply herself with coal, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the American consul. In conformity with the general rule she was required to leave in twenty-four hours. The American argument informs us that

France.

When attempts were made by the confederates to construct and equip cruisers in the ports of France, on complaint being made by the minister of the United States, the construction of these vessels was arrested; and when a builder professed that vessels under construction, with suspicion of being intended for the confederates, were in fact intended for a neutral government, the French ministers required proof of such professed honest intention, and carefully watched these vessels to make sure that they should not go into the service of the confederates. On this point we quote the language of the minister of marine, as follows:

"The vesssels of war to which you have called our attention shall not leave the ports of France until it shall have been positively demonstrated that their destination does not affect the principles of neutrality, which the French government wishes to rigidly observe toward both belligerents."3

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The documents annexed to the Counter Case of the United States do not contain more than a small selection of the correspondence relating to this subject, which is given in greater detail in the mémoire and documents submitted by the United States to the French courts of justice in the "Affaire Arman," documents which, to quote the words of the mémoire itself, "show most clearly the dangers to which M. Arman and his associates exposed the maintenance of peace between France and the United States."1

The suit in question was instituted in November, 1867, on the part of the United States against MM. Arman, Voruz, and others, for the recovery of moneys disbursed by Bullock, acting as agent of the Confederate States, for the construction of six vessels of war in France.

After explaining that the measures taken by the British government in respect of the seizure of both the Alexandra and Pampero, and the detention of the Birkenhead rams, had compelled the confederates "to seek in France the market they were losing on the other side of the channel," the mémoire proceeds to relate that their choice fell on M. Lucien Arman, (member for Bordeaux in the French legislative assembly,)" whose official position seemed calculated to secure greater freedom and certain impunity for the execution of these orders." An agreement was accordingly entered into with Arman by Bullock, who stated in the contract that with a view to establish regular communications by steam between Shanghai, Osaca, Yedo, and San Francisco, he wished to procure in France four steamers of great speed, fitted to carry from ten to twelve guns, for their protection in those distant parts.”3

Arman undertook to build two of these steamers in his own yards at Bordeaux, and sub-let the building of the other two to " another deputy of the corps législatif," M. Voruz, of Nantes. Besides these four steamers he further entered, on the 16th July, 1863, into a fresh agreement with Bullock "for two iron-clad steam-rams."

One difficulty had to be removed before the final ratification of these contracts, and that was the restriction placed by the royal ordinance of 1847 on the exportation of arms and munitions of war.

It has been already shown that this enactment had no reference to the special subject of neutrality, and simply formed part of that general legislation by which the state in France has frequently sought, in its own interest, to place restraints upon private commerce in articles of a warlike character. In the present instance, however, its practical effect was to interfere with the arming of the vessels. Accordingly, M. Arman applied to the government for permission to arm the four vessels, which were building ostensibly for service in the China Seas, and this was readily granted, on the faith of his assurance, by the Marquis de Chasseloup-Laubat, the minister of marine.

In the following September the knowledge of these facts was betrayed to Mr. Bigelow, then United States consul at Paris, by a clerk of M. Arman, who furnished him, at the same time, with the originals of the deeds drawn up between his employer and the confederate agent, Bullock, as well as of the correspondence exchanged between the parties, and other papers, which placed beyond possibility of doubt the existence of an intention on the part of Arman to violate the neutrality of France.

Mr. Dayton at once brought the matter under the notice of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, then minister for foreign affairs, and followed up his

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