IN 1776, Adam Smith published his great work, the 'Wealth of Nations.' Few books, if any, have influenced so powerfully the minds of statesmen, or have done so much to alter the policy of nations, as this treatise of the recluse and absent-minded Glasgow professor. Many of the leading politicians of Smith's time read it with profit and admiration. Burke, the deepest political thinker of his age, delighted to find it corroborate not a few of the conclusions which his own subtle intellect had already worked out. Pitt, the most powerful Prime Minister England has ever seen, studied it while at college, and showed, when in office, that he had not done so in vain. In a speech on the Budget, delivered in 1792, he referred to Adam Smith as 'an author now, unhappily, no more; whose extensive knowledge of detail and depth of philosophical research will, I believe, furnish the best solution to every question connected with the history of commerce or with the systems of political economy.' The great object of Smith, in his speculations on trade, was, in the words of Dugald Stewart, to illustrate the provision made by nature in the principles of the human mind, for a gradual and progressive augmentation in the means of national wealth, and to demonstrate that the most effectual plan for advancing a people to greatness is to maintain that order of things which nature has pointed out; by allowing every man, as long as he observes the rules of justice, to pursue

his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and his capital into the freest competition with those of his fellow-citizens. Every system of policy which endeavours, either by extraordinary encouragements to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the capital of the society than what would naturally go to it, or by extraordinary restraints to force from a particular species of industry some share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it, is, in reality, subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote.' Though strongly advocating Free Trade, Adam Smith was far from anticipating that it would be adopted by this country. To expect, indeed,' he says, 'that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudice of the public, but, what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it.' In Smith's time, and for many years afterwards, this was the opinion held by the vast majority of people. It is true that, as far back as 1783, Lord Shelburne, familiar with the teaching of Adam Smith and the French Economists, denounced monopoly as always unwise, but for no nation under heaven so unwise as for England; and said that all that we ought to covet upon earth was Free Trade and open markets. But no Minister of the Crown was found willing to act up to Shelburne's theory till more than sixty years after. Heavy taxes continued to be laid upon what, above all things, ought not to be taxed-the nation's food-supply; healthy competition in manufactures was prohibited by large import duties; the wealth of the country was thought to be increased by attention being paid to the petty and isolated welfare of single classes rather than to the welfare of the people at large. To carry into practical effect the doctrines long before taught by Adam Smith, to free the food of the people from artificial restrictions, and to promote freedom of trade in all departments of commerce, was the work of Richard Cobden and his associates in the Anti-Corn-Law League.

The Corn Law of 1815.

223

Though Corn Laws, of a more or less vexatious nature, existed in England from a comparatively early period, it will be sufficient for our purpose to begin with the Corn Law of 1815. When the war came to a close, foreign grain began to pour in large quantities into our ports, and of course prices came down rapidly. In 1812, wheat had fetched 122s. 8d. a quarter; in 1815, it had fallen to 63s. 8d Immediately the cry got up from the landowners that foreign competition would ruin them; the cry was echoed by the farmers, whose rents had been fixed on the supposition that the high prices they had been obtaining during the war would continue; and the aid of Parliament was sought to protect the agricultural interest.' In 1815, a Bill was introduced providing that the importation of corn should be prohibited whenever the price fell below 8os. a quarter, except corn from the British Colonies, which was allowed to come in whenever the average price was 67s. As the landlord interest greatly predominated in both Houses, the Bill was carried by large majorities, though it encountered strenuous opposition from many who saw that to pass it was an act of glaring injustice and selfishness. A masterly protest (said to have been drawn up by Lord Grenville), subscribed by ten peers, was entered on the Journals of the House of Lords. 'We think ' (so ran their Lordships' third reason of dissent) that the expectations of ultimate benefit from this measure are founded on a delusive theory. We cannot persuade ourselves that this law will ever contribute to produce plenty, cheapness, or steadiness of price. So long as it operates at all, its effects must be the opposite of these. Monopoly is the parent of scarcity, of dearness, and of uncertainty. To cut off any of the sources of supply can only tend to lessen its abundance; to close against ourselves the cheapest market for any commodity must enhance the price at which we purchase it; and to confine the consumer of corn to the produce of his own country is to refuse to ourselves the benefit of that provision which Providence itself has made for equalising to man the variations of climate and of seasons.'