hundred men, he was informed, under the command of M. de Burlemaque, with a numerous train of artillery, and that the lake was occupied by four large armed vessels. With a sloop and a radeau, which he had built with all possible dispatch, he destroyed two of the enemy's vessels. But the declining season obliged him to postpone farther operations, and return to CrownPoint, where the troops were put into winter quarters about the end of October. General Amherst now saw himself in a very aukward situation for a commander in chief. Though his success was great, he had found it impossible to attain the prime object of his enterprise; a junction with general Wolfe, which was considered as essential to the fortunate issue of the campaign. And what was yet more disagreeable, he had not, during the whole summer, obtained the least intelligence of the condition of that commander, on the operations of whose slender and unsupported army so much depended; a few obscure and alarming hints excepted, of his having landed in the neighbourhood of Quebec, where he was in danger of being crushed by the whole force of Canada, under the marquis de Montcalm. Happily he was not so ignorant of the fate of the expedition against Niagara. Having received an account of the progress of it before he left Ticonderoga, he had detached brigadier-general Gage to assume the command of the troops in the room of general Prideaux, who was unfortunately killed by the bursting of a eohorn, while directing the operations against the fort, to which he had been suffered to advance without the least molestation. Meanwhile the command of that expedition devolved upon sir William Johnson; who prosecuted with equal judgment and vigour the plan of his predecessor. He pushed the attack of Niagara with such intrepidity, that 8. Letter from general Amherst to Mr. secretary Pitt, in Lond. Gazette, Nov. 27, 1759. Knox's Campaigns, vol. i. ii. the the besiegers soon brought their approaches within an hundred yards of the covered way. Alarmed at the danger of losing this interior key of their empire in America, the French collected a large body of regular troops, drawn from the neighbouring garrisons, Detroit, Venango, and Presque Isle, in order to raise the siege. With these, and a party of savages, they accordingly resolved to attempt the relief of the place, and put themselves in motion for that purpose. Apprised of their intention, general Johnson ordered his light infantry, supported by some grenadiers and regular foot, to take post between the cataract of Niagara and the fortress. He posted the auxiliary Indians on his flanks; and while he thus prepared himself for an engagement, he took effectual measures for securing his dines and bridling the garrison. The enemy appeared about nine o'clock in the morning, and the battle was begun with a horrid scream from the hostile Indians, according to their barbarous JULY 24. custom. It was this scream, called the Warwhoop, the most frightful sound which imagination can conceive, that had struck a panic into the army under Braddock, and had on other occasions carried terror to the hearts of European soldiers. But having now lost its effect upon the British troops, it was heard with a contemptuous indifference. And the French regulars were so warmly received by the English grenadiers and light infantry, while their savages were encountered by other savages, that they were totally routed in less than an hour, and the place surrendered the same day9. The taking of Niagara effectually cut off the communication between Canada and Louisiana, and consequently was a great step toward the conquest of both. But the reduction of Quebec was a still more important object; and if general Amherst had been able to form a junction with Wolfe, it would have been attended with equal certainty, as a proportional force would have been employed to accomplish it. 9. Lond. Gazette, Sept, 8, 1759. Knox, ubi sup. A's As events happened, the issue of this grand enterprise seemed very doubtful. The land-forces did not exceed seven thousand men. They were, however, in good health and spirits. Having been embarked at Louisbourg, under convoy of the admirals Saunders and Holmes, they were safely landed, toward the end of June, on the isle of Orleans, formed by two branches of the river St. Lawrence, a few leagues below the city of Quebec. There the soldiers and sailors found every refreshment; and there general Wolfe, who was accompanied by the brigadier-generals Monckton, Townshend, and Murray, published a spirited but somewhat romantic manifesto, vindicating the conduct of the king his master, in making this hostile invasion, and offering protection to the inhabitants of Canada, with the entire possession of their property and the free exercise of their religion, provided they took no part in the dispute for dominion between the crowns of France and England. He represented to them the folly of resistance, as all hopes of relief were cut off, while the British fleet commanded not only the navigation of the river St. Lawrence, but the empire of the sea; and he reminded them, that the cruelties. exercised by the French against the English subjects in America, would excuse the most severe retaliation. But Englishmen, he said, were too magnanimous to follow the barbarous example: and he concluded with extolling the generosity of Great-Britain, in thus stretching out to them a hand of humanity, when it was in her power to compel their obedience1o. As that manifesto produced no immediate effect, Wolfe was under the necessity of considering the Canadians as enemies, and saw himself exposed to all the difficulties of a general commanding an army in a country where every thing is hostile to him. These difficulties, on examination, appeared so great, that, although naturally of a sanguine temper and an adventurous spirit, he 10. Printed Manifesto. began began to despair of success before the commencement of operations. "I could not flatter myself," says he, in his celebrated letter to Mr. Pitt, "that I should be able "to reduce the place." Nor is this to be wondered at. Beside the natural and artificial strength of the city of Quebec, which is chiefly built upon a steep rock on the northern bank of the river St. Lawrence, and farther defended by the river St. Charles, which places it in a kind of peninsula, Montcalm, the French general, was advantageously posted in the neighbourhood, with a force superior to the English army. To undertake the siege of the town, in such circumstances, seemed contrary to all the established maxims of war. Resolved, however, to make every possible exertion before he abandoned the enterprise committed to him by his sovereign, and the event of which was already determined in the fond imaginations of his admiring countrymen, Wolfe took possession of point Levi, on the southern bank of the St. Lawrence, and there erected batteries against the town. But these batteries, by reason of their distance, made small impression upon the works, though they destroyed many houses, and greatly incommoded the inhabitants. The fleet could be of little use, as the elevation of the principal fortifications placed them beyond its reach, and even gave them a degree of command over it. The English general, therefore, became sensible of the impossibility of reducing the place, unless he could erect his batteries on the northern side of the river. But as this seemed a mat ter of infinite difficulty, his grand dilemma was, how to effect it?-Nor could all his penetration resolve the question. The northern shore of the river St. Lawrence, for a considerable way above Quebec, is so bold and rocky, as to make it impracticable to land in the face of an enemy. Below the town, the French army was strongly encamped, between the rivers Montmorency and St. Charles. If the first river should be passed, and the French driven from their entrenchments, the second would would present a new, and almost insuperable barrier against the victors. With all these obstacles, Wolfe was well acquainted; but he also knew, to use his own heroic language, "that a victorious army finds no diffi"culties!" He therefore resolved to pass the river Montmorency, and bring Montcalm to an engagement. JULY 31. In consequence of this resolution, part of the British. army was landed at the mouth of that river, and the main body was ready to ford it higher up, when certain unpropitious circumstances made it necessary to withdraw the troops, and relinquish the design. General Wolfe's original plan was, to attack first a detached redoubt close to the water's edge, and apparently situated beyond reach of the fire from the enemy's entrenchments, Should they attempt to support that fortification, he doubted not of being able to bring on a general action; and if they remained tame spectators of its fall, he could afterward cooly examine their situation, and regulate accordingly his future operations. But observing the enemy in some confusion, he rashly changed his purpose; and listening only to the ardour of his courage, determined immediately to attack the French camp. With that view, orders were sent to the generals Townshend and Murray, to keep their divisions in readiness for fording the river. Meantime, thirteen com. panies of English grenadiers, and part of the second battalion of royal Americans, which had been first landed, and directed to form upon the beach, until they could be properly sustained, rushed impetuously toward the enemy's entrenchments; as if, in their ungovernable fury, they could have borne down every thing before them, But they were met by so strong and steady a fire from the French musquetry, that they were instantly thrown into disorder, and obliged to seek shelter in or behind the detached redoubt, which the enemy had abandoned on their approach. There they continued for some time, 12. Letter from general Wolfe to Mr. secretary Pitt, in London Gagette, Oct. 6, 1759. before |