immediately to raise the siege of Prague, and afterward to evacuate Bohemia.

General Lloyd's reflections on the siege of Prague, and the battle of Kolin, are too interesting to be here omitted. The siege of Prague, with about fifty thousand men in it, he observes, was an imprudent and dangerous measure, more especially as the king of Prussia was then in circumstances that required some decisive stroke, and that as soon as possible; that Prague covers no essential pass into the country, and contained no considerable magazine, neither was it necessary for the king to form one there, because the country itself furnished abundantly all kind of subsistence; that if, instead of besieging this town, his Prussian majesty had sent twenty thousand men, the morning after his victory, in pursuit of the Austrian right wing, which had fled to Beneschau, and marched with the main body of his army to Bohmisch-Brodt, against mareschal Daun, it is more than probable he might have destroyed both; that they certainly could not have retired without losing their artillery and baggage, and must have fallen back with the utmost expedition on the Danube; that prince Charles of Lorrain must likewise have marched to the Danube, in order to join the remainder of the Austrian army, as he could not, in his then situation, have undertaken any thing of himself; that this would have given the king of Prussia all the time necessary to reduce Olmutz, and even Prague itself, which must have been left to a common garrison; but that, allured, by the uncertain and vain, though flattering hope of making fifty thousand men prisoners, he lost sight of Daun and the Austrian right wing, and with it an opportunity of giving some decisive blow; that when informed of the enemy's approach, he had still time to repair the fault he had committed," he might, and ought to have raised the siege of "Prague, and have marched with his whole forces against "mareschal Daun;" and if he had succeeded, it is highly

probable

probable that he might also have routed prince Charles, before he could have reached the Danubeз'.

In regard to the battle of Kolin itself, this ingenious author very judiciously remarks, that as his Prussian majesty was in proportion much stronger in cavalry than infantry, he ought to have chosen the most convenient ground on the enemy's front for that species of troops; and that as he had given them an opportunity, by making his dispositions in open day, to reinforce their right and its flank, whither they had brought two-thirds of their army, he ought to have refused both his wings, and have made an effort with his cavalry, sustained by his infantry and artillery, on the enemy's centre, where they had only cavalry, and therefore most probably would have been forced to give way: whereas, by persisting to attack their right, he could bring only his infantry into action, the ground being very improper for cavalry, as well on account of the ravines and woods, as of the villages before the enemy's front: that having resolved to attack the Austrian right wing, the king of Prussia should have brought thither all his infantry, leaving only a line of horse on his right, which would have been sufficient, as the enemy's left could never quit its advantageous position, and descend into the plain; that this would have enabled him to sustain properly his vanguard, which was left exposed; to have taken the enemy in flank, and to have gained the battle. In a word, it appears from these reflections, that the king of Prussia erred in forming an attack where he could not conveniently combine the different species of arms, whereas the enemy had both infantry and cavalry, with a great artillery, to sustain the points attacked; in letting his vanguard advance so far, that it could not be supported by the line; and in attacking with too little infantry, considering the nature of the ground. Hence the loss of the battle. Nor were the arms of his Prussian majesty, or those of his allies, more fortunate in other quarters. No sooner

did the Russians, who had hovered long on the frontiers, enter the kingdom of Prussia, than general Lewhald was ordered to oppose their progress. He accordingly assem- . bled an army of thirty thousand men, in the month of June, and took post at Insterburgh, in order to observe the motions of the enemy. Meanwhile general Fermor, with one division of the Russian army, assisted by a fleet from Revel, carrying nine thousand land forces, investJULY 3. ed Memel; and, after a short siege, made himself master of that important place, which was of infinite consequence to the Russians, as they could make it a military station, and a magazine of provisions and stores, that might be constantly supplied by means of their navy.

AUG. 3.

This enterprise being successfully executed, the whole Russian army, consisting of sixty-two thousand foot, and nineteen thousand horse, with near twenty thousand Tartars, Calmucks, and Cossacks, united under mareschal Apraxin, on the river Russ, and advanced toward the Pregel. General Lewhald, on the approach of the enemy, quitted his camp at Insterburgh, and retired to Wehlaw, where he continued until he received positive orders to hazard a battle. Having reconnoitred the position of the Russians, who had passed the Pregel, and were encamped at Gross-Jagersdorff, near Norkitten, he accordingly attacked them unexpectedly, at five o'clock in the morning, with great fury. Though thus in a manner surprised, they recived the shock with a firmness that astonished him; and after a warm and general action of three hours, during which victory remained doubtful, and every possible exertion had been made, he was forced to retreat, with the loss of two thousand men3.

Unacquainted with the valour and discipline of the Russian infantry, since found to be the best in Europe, Lewhald deprived himself of the power of making a vigorous or successful effort in any one point, by extending

33. Prussian account of the battle. The Russian account is imperfect and contradictory.

his little army in a line opposed to that of the enemy; which he in vain endeavoured to break, as they had every where, through this mistaken disposition, a much greater number of men in action than he could possibly present34. In vain did he attempt to cut their army in two, and take them in flank, by penetrating through certain openings. They received the Prussians on the point of the bayonet, and forced them to give way. He drew off his army, however, in good order, and re-occupied his former camp at Wehlaw.

While the Russians, now victorious, were ravaging the king of Prussia's dominions on one side of Germany, the French were stripping him of his possessions on the other, and laying the electorate of Hanover under contribution. After the duke of Cumberland passed the Weser, he continued to retreat before mareschal d'Etrees, until he reached the village of Hastenbeck. Having chosen an advantageous post, he there attempted to make a stand, on the 25th of July; but being worsted, after a vigorous resistance, he was obliged to quit his station. Instead, however, of marching, immediately after the action, as prudence seemed to dictate, toward Wolfenbuttle, Halberstadt, and Magdeburg, where he might ha é formed a junction with the Prussian forces, his royal highness retired to Hoya, under pretence of covering Bremen and Verden; though, in reality, in order to keep up a communication with Stade, whither had been removed the archives, and most valuable effects of Hanover.

In the meantime that electorate, abandoned to the enemy, was laid under contribution. And the duke de Richelieu, the celebrated conqueror of Minorca, having succeeded to the chief command of the French army, soon saw himself master of Bremen and Verden, and obliged the duke of Cumberland to take refuge under the cannon of Stade. There, encamped between the Aller and the Elbe, it was supposed his royal highness would be able to maintain his ground till the close of the campaign, as the season was already far in the decline.

34. Lloyd, vol. i. p. 145.

But

the

the enemy having taken effectual measures for cutting off his communication with the Elbe, he was under the necessity of signing the singular convention of Closter

seven; by which an army of thirty-eight thousand SEPT. 8. Hanoverians, Hessians, and other troops in the pay of his Britannic majesty, was dissolved and distributed into different quarters of cantonment, without being disarmed 35, or considered as prisoners of war. The French were left, " till the definitive reconciliation of the two sovereigns," in full possession of the countries they

had

35. The court of France afterward insisted on the disarming of the troops, though the convention had observed a profound silence on that head. It only stipulated that on the cessation of hostilities, the auxiliary troops should be sent home, and that such part of the Hanoverian army as the duke of Cumberland could not place in the city of Stade, should go and take quarters in the country beyond the Elbe, and not be recruited. (See the Articles of the Convention itself, and the Vindication of the king of England's conduct as the elector of Hanover, published by authority.) Notwithstanding the notoriety of this fact, two cotemporary authors have affirmed, that in consequence of the convention of Closter-seven, "thirty-eight thousand Hanoverians laid down their arms!" Contin. Hist. Eng, vol. ii. Annual Reg. 1758.

36. This indefinite mode of expression gave rise to one of the most intricate disputes that ever employed the pens of political writers; and, as self-interest dictated the arguments on both sides of the question, much ingenuity and force of reasoning were displayed. The French with great plausibility, maintained that no other meaning could reasonably be affix. ed to the words of the convention (which, however, they attempted to mend by certain jesuitical expressions) than that which was natural and obvious: that the suspension of arms was to continue; and they, consequently, in possession of their conquests, till a general pacification. Parallel of the Conduct of the King of France with that of the King of England.) The English ministry, on the other hand, affirmed, that the suspension of arms was a mere military regulation, which was to continue in force only till the issue of a negociation, then depending, begun by his Britannic majesty, in quality of elector of Hanover, and the suddenly expected declaration of the courts of Vienna and Versailles relative to such negociation: that this was the reason why it was not thought necessary to fix the time the suspension of arms was to last. It was drawn up, they said, by the generals of the two armies, who mutually agreed that it should be of force