which he had required; namely, " that she had no in"tention to attack him either this year or the next." He had constituted her, he said, arbitress of peace or war; and her military preparations and mysterious replies left him no room to doubt which alternative she had chosen, though she declined a liberal and open decision of the momentous question.

In order to invade Bohemia with success, it is not only convenient, but almost necessary, to take possession of Saxony. The king of Prussia, who had projected the invasion of that kingdom, and who hoped to be able to reduce it to obedience before the empress-queen could assemble her troops, or any of the other confederates be in a condition to attack him, therefore resolved to occupy his electorate; a measure in which he thought himself justified, as he knew that the elector had concurred in all the schemes formed by the courts of Vienna and Petersburg for the ruin of the house of Brandenburg, and waited only for an opportunity to co-operate also in the execution of them. He accordingly entered Saxony with a great army, consisting of seventy battalions and eighty squadrons, divided into three bodies, which pursued different routes, and assembled, by concert, in the neighbourhood of Dresden.

AUG. 29.

SEPT. 6.

SEPT. 18.

Unable to resist so powerful a force, Augustus abandoned his capital, which was immediately occupied by the Prussians, and joined his little army of fourteen thousand men encamped at Pirna. That camp which was deemed impregnable, he had not chosen merely on account of its strength, but also because he thought its position secured him a communication with Bohemia, whence only he could expect succour, and whither he might retire in case of necessity, Relying on these advantages, on the attachment of his subjects, and his intimate connections with the court of Vienna, he scornfully rejected the reasonable requisition of the king of Prussia, that, as a proof of the sincerity of his suspicious professions of neutrality, he should withdraw

withdraw his army from the strong post which it occupied, and order the troops to return to their former quarters, in different parts of the electorate.

This refusal induced the king of Prussia to change his plan of operations. As he had no magazines in Bo hemia, he did not think it safe to penetrate into that kingdom, and leave the Saxons masters of the Elbe behind him. He therefore resolved to surround their camp; and, as he could not hope to force it, to oblige them to surrender, by cutting off their supplies, before he proceeded farther. With this view, he encamped at Gross Zedlitz, in the neighbourhood of Pirna, and soon reduced the Saxon army to the greatest distress. Meanwhile he sent two large detachments, one under mareschal Keith, the other under mareschal Schwerin, to the frontiers of Bohemia, in order to keep the Austrians in awe, and deprive them of the power of making any vi gorous effort for the relief of the Saxons, by obliging them to divide their forces. Keith took post at Johnsdorff, and Schwerin at Aujest, opposite Konigsgratz.

That was a cautious rather than a great line of conduct. Had the king of Prussia marched into Bohemia with the main body of his army, the moment he found the king of Poland reject his propositions of neutrallity ⚫ leaving twenty thousand men to block up the Saxon, camp at Pirna, he might have made himself master of the whole kingdom, before the Austrians could have been in a condition to oppose him. Olmutz, and even Prague, must soon have fallen into his hands, both being yet unprovided against a siege'3; whereas, by the

plan

13. Hist. of the late War in Germany, by major-general Lloyd, who served several campaigns in the Austrian army, and afterwards in that of prince Ferdinand. "The conquest of these two places," adds this intelligent author," would have enabled his Prussian majesty to begin the "next campaign in Moravia, at least, and perhaps on the Danube, with "the siege or blockade of Vienna; whence he might, without any risk, "have sent a considerable corps to the frontiers of Hungary, and the 31 army destined to guard Saxony into the empire, between the sources of

"the

plan that he pursued, the empress-queen had leisure to assemble two considerable armies in Bohemia, and to put its principal towns in a state of defence. The smallest of these armies, commanded by prince Piccolomini, took post at Konigsgratz, in order to oppose Schwerin; the largest under mareschal Brown, encamped at Kolin, and was destined to march to the relief of the Saxon army, as soon as the necessary preparations could be made for that purpose.

SEPT. 23.

These preparations being completed, mareschal Brown quitted his camp at Kolin, and advanced to Budyn on the Egra, in order to concert measures with the Saxons for accomplishing their enlargement. Now seemingly sensible of his mistake, in not having entered Bohemia, the politic and enterprising Frederic, having left a body of troops to continue the blockade of Pirna, joined the division of his army under Keith, and resolved to give battle to the Austrian army under Brown. Such an opportunity he soon found.

The Austrians having passed the Egra, and encamped at Lowositz, his Prussian majesty thought it necessary to pass the mountains of Bascopol and Kletchen; to put the defiles behind him, and occupy the avenues leading to the plain before mareschal Brown's camp, that he might without difficulty attack him, if he should judge it convenient. He accordingly SEPT. 80. left Tirmitz, to which he had advanced from Johnsdorff, and arrived at Welmina about eight o'clock in the evening. Fearing the enemy might decamp in the night, and occupy the mountains of Radostitz and Lobosch; and, by that movement, not only render it impossible for him to attack them, but even ob- ост. lige him to fall back to Ausig, he resumed his OCT. 1. march, and occupied the mountains, of which he was apprehensive the Austrians would take possession.

"the Maine and the Upper-Danube. The first would have hindered the 44 empress-queen from receiving any succours from these countries, and "the last would have effectually prevented those princes, who were the "king of Prussia's enemies, from uniting against him." Ibid.

By

By break of day the Prussian army, consisting of sixty-five squadrons, and twenty-six battalions, with one hundred and two pieces of cannon, was formed in order of battle; the infantry in two lines, and the cavalry in three, behind. The right wing of the infantry was posted in the village of Radostitz, at the foot of the hill of the same name. Before that hill rises another, called the Homolkaberg; which although much lower than the former, is yet so high as to command all the plain below, as far as the village of Sulowitz. To this hill the king of Prussia afterward extended his right wing, and placed a battery of heavy cannon upon it. His centre occupied the valley formed by the Homolkaberg and the Loboschberg; and on the latter his left wing was posted.

The Loboschberg is a remarkably high and steep mountain, and extends into the plain almost to Lowositz. That side of it is covered with vineyards, which are separated by stone walls. In these mareschal Brown had posted a large body of Croats, who were sustained by several battalions of Hungarian infantry. Parallel to those mountains, and at some hundred yards distance from the foot of them, runs a marshy rivulet; which in many places spreads itself in the plain, and forms a kind of lake. Between this rivulet and the hills, on which the Prussian army was formed, strikes a very deep ravin, or sewer, hollowed by land floods, from Sulowitz to Lowositz. The only passes over that ravin and rivulet are at these two villages, and by a narrow stone bridge between them. The ground behind the rivulet rises a little, especially toward Sulowitz; and on this rising ground the Austrian army, consisting of seventy, two squadrons and fifty-two battalions, with ninety-eight pieces of cannon, was posted. It was formed in two lines; the infantry in the centre, and the cavalry, as usual, on the wings. A little before the commencement of the action, however, the cavalry on the right wing marched forward, and occupied the plain to the left of the

village

village of Lowositz. That village mareschal Brown had ordered to be fortified, and had placed some of his best infantry in it, with a great quantity of artillery. He had likewise raised a strong battery, and some redoubts on the plain before it. By these means he thought he had rendered his right inaccessible, as his centre and left, covered by the marshy rivulet and the ravin already mentioned, certainly were. He therefore resolved to wait battle in that position.

The action began about seven in the morning, between the left wing of the Prussians and the troops which mareschal Brown had posted in the Loboschberg. But, in consequence of a thick fog, through which nothing could be seen at the distance of an hundred yards, no considerable advantage was gained, on either side, till near noon, when the fog began to clear up. It was soon entirely dissipated; and the hostile armies stood full in view of each other, agitated with anxious hopes and fears. The king of Prussia, having examined the Austrian army for some time, judged its right to be the weakest, for many reasons, but chiefly because it was commanded from the Loboschberg. He therefore ordered his second line to enter into the first, with the cavalry in the centre, that he might occupy the Homolkaberg and Loboschberg in force. This being readily executed, the whole army was put in motion, inclining always to the left, whence the projected attack was to be made; and the left wing being reinforced and protected by the fire of a numerous and well served artillery, marched down the Loboschberg toward Lowositz, and drove the Croats out of the vineyards into the plain.

Mareschal Brown believing that the fortune of the day depended on his being able to keep possession of Lowositz, threw almost all his right wing into it. The action, therefore, was here long and obstinate. At length, however, it was determined in favour of the Prussians. Seeing his right wing forced to give way, the Austrian general ordered his left to advance through the village of

Sulowitz,