from Austria, but the Emperor Maximilian did not choose to abandon the state of peace in which he then was with the Porte, and, moreover, he was not well pleased with the Pope for having sanctioned the elevation of Cosmo de Medicis, second Duke of Florence, to the sovereign title of Grandduke of Tuscany. So he excused himself, making promises for the future. Don Sebastian of Portugal, who perhaps already meditated the rash expedition to Africa which cost him his crown and dominions, and, as most believe, his life, pleaded the ravages the plague had made in his dominions, and the necessity of attending to the defence of his own coasts, as motives for declining to co-operate. Even Persia was invited by the republic to join the league against the Turks, but declined provoking so powerful an enemy. The Italian princes, weakened by the frequent wars of the sixteenth century, and divided amongst themselves, could render but small assistance. Genoa sent a single galley, the Duke of Savoy another, the Knights of Malta three galleys, and the Dukes of Florence and Urbino a small number of soldiers. The Pope, foreseeing future danger to his own dominions from the ambition of the Turk, but having no galleys, agreed to equip and maintain twelve of those that lay useless in Venetian ports.

There was one potentate whose assistance, if obtainable, would compensate the numerous disappointments encountered by Venice in her quest of allies, and that was Philip II. of Spain. At that time, says Tomaso Contarini, in his Relatione di Spagna, "the states and powers of the world were almost all united under those two great monarchs, the Turk and the King of Spain." It was for the interest of Spain, as mistress of Sicily and Naples, and of part of the African coast, to check the intrusion of the Turks; but, upon the other hand, Venice had on similar occasions refused her aid, and had maintained her alliance with the Infidel, suffering Rhodes to be captured, and leaving to the Spaniards the glorious task of relieving Malta. The conscience of the Republic reproached her with these derelictions, and made her fear a refusal; but the case was urgent,

and the attempt must be made. The Pope sent Monsignore Luigi Torres, a churchman of much prudence and diplomatic skill, to the King of Spain. Philip, after due reflection, replied that he could not then make up his mind about joining the league, which required further consideration, but that he would assist the Venetians, and would at once give orders to Juan Andrea Doria, his admiral in Sicily, to join the papal and Venetian squadrons with the galleys under his command. The Pope had named Marco Antonio Colonna to the command of the twelve vessels equipped at his cost.

Meanwhile Selim II. had sent an ambassador to Venice to demand the cession of Cyprus, declaring that he would consider a refusal tantamount to a declaration of war. In the letter intrusted to his envoy he styled himself Sovereign of Cyprus, as heir to the rights of the Soldan of Egypt. He complained of imaginary aggres sions of Venetian subjects, of shelter afforded to pirates in the ports of Cyprus, and of the molestation of pilgrims to Mecca; he offered his friendship if the kingdom in question was given up to him, and swore in the contrary case to conquer it by force of arms, and to carry fire and sword into all the other provinces of the republic. To so arrogant and injurious a message as this there could be but one reply. On receiving it Selim rejoiced at the rejection of his terms, and prepared for instant action. Mustafa, pasha of Cairo, was named chief of the whole invading force, and sailed from the Dardanelles at the end of May (1570), with thirty-six galleys and a large number of transports laden with artillery, ammunition, horses, and necessary stores, under command of Aali Pasha, Selim's brother-in-law. He had been preceded by eighty galleys and thirty galiots, commanded by Piali Pasha, a Hungarian renegade, in whom Selim had great confidence, and who was appointed general of the naval forces of the expedition. The two fleets joined upon their way, and after pausing at Rhodes to take on board some janizaries and other soldiers necessary for the sieges they projected, on the 1st of July they reached the shores

of Cyprus. The Venetians were less prompt in their proceedings. Zanne and Palaviccino lay for two months at Zara, waiting orders, ill supplied with provisions, and with a contagious malady decimating their crews. At last they quitted that anchorage, and on the 23d June reached Corfu with seventy galleys. There they were to wait for the rest of the fleet, and for the Spanish and Roman squadrons. The former was expected from Messina, the whereabout of the latter was unknown. During the stay of Zanne at Zara, the Doge of Venice, Pietro Loredano, died suddenly, many said by poison, administered because he was one of the few Venetians who desired at any cost to preserve peace with the Turk. He was succeeded by Luigi Mocenigo, the fourth doge of that family; and the place of procurator, vacated by that election, was conferred upon Sebastian Veniero, proveditore of Corfu, a valiant officer, but too impetuous and irritable, whose name frequently recurs in the history of the war then about to commence. Before Zanne's arrival at Corfu, he had accomplished an enterprise of some consideration, capturing by surprise the Turkish fortress of Sopato; and at about the same time Marco Quirini, captain of the gulf of Venice, took and utterly destroyed the fort of Maina, returning unmolested to Corfu with slaves and booty. But meanwhile that which should have been the main object of the Venetian fleet was unattended to, and Cyprus remained without reinforcements. It was not until the 23d July that Zanne quitted Corfu for Candia, in order to recruit his crews, whose numbers were greatly reduced by disease, and to be nearer to Cyprus, in case it should need his aid. At that date Mustafa had already been for three weeks in Cyprus, with one hundred and sixty galleys, an army of at least fifty-six thousand men, and thirty pieces of heavy artillery. Seeing himself unopposed on disembarkation, he resolved to march at once upon Nicosia, the capital of the island, in whose centre it was situated. This was contrary to the expectation of Astor Baglione, the governor of Cyprus, who expected Famagusta to be first attacked, as nearer to the sea

and of less strength, and who had consequently shut himself up in the latter place, leaving Nicosia in charge of his lieutenant, Nicolo Dandolo, an officer of very moderate capacity. The fortress of Nicosia was some miles in circumference, and required a large garrison; instead of which it contained but ten thousand men, most of them inexperienced in war, and so scantily provided with fire-arms that they had to use halberts. There were but fifteen hundred regular troops, more than half of the remainder consisting of civilians belonging to the town and to the surrounding country. The fortifications, recently repaired by engineers from Venice, were in a pretty good state; but before there was time to lay in the necessary supplies of ammunition and provisions, Mustafa was before the walls, and commenced a vigorous cannonade. Piali had advised him to begin with Famagusta, as the easiest prey; but Mustafa held it unworthy of his reputation to begin where there was least peril and difficulty. In numbers, in warlike appliances, and in military skill, the Nicosians were infinitely overmatched by the Turks; and they felt that their only chance of intimidating the besiegers, and of seriously diminishing their numbers, was by assuming the offensive. Accordingly, on the 15th August, a furious sortie was made, the hour chosen being that at which the Turks usually were asleep in their quarters. So vigorous was the sally that the assailed fled in all directions, suffering great loss; and the confusion extended soon to Mustafa's tents, and to the ranks of his janizary guard. But presently the Turks recovered from their panic: the cavalry came up, and the Venetians, having no reserve to cover their retreat, suffered severely, losing some of their principal officers, and leaving one hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy. This was their first and last sortie. Considering, however, the circumstances under which it was made, it was a most daring exploit, and it greatly revived the hopes of the besieged, and gave some uneasiness to Mustafa. He repeatedly assaulted the place, but his troops were invariably repulsed with considerable loss; and as the garrison refused to capitu

intended as a present for the sultan. But whilst the vessels were still within a few miles of the coast, they were suddenly destroyed by the explosion of their powder magazines, nothing remaining of them but a few planks floating on the water. Some historians attribute their destruction to accident; others, adopting a more romantic version, declare it to have been the work of one of the captives, a beautiful girl, who preferred death to dishonour. Of the catastrophe there can be no doubt, but its cause must ever remain uncertain.

The loss of Nicosia, quickly followed by that of the whole island, is attributed by Señor Rosell, with every appearance of reason, and upon the strength of Italian authorities, to the neglect of the Venetians. Had they, when they first perceived the hostile intentions of the Turk, employed a part of their resources to strengthen and garrison their colonies, and especially Cyprus, Selim's avowed object, instead of attending solely to the fitting out of a fleet which came too late to save the island, they might have retained their valuable colony. Such was the advice given them by the celebrated Duke of Alba, in a letter dated from Brussels, the 31st March 1570, to be found in the appendix to Señor Rosell's work, in which the duke strongly recommends to them to cargar sus plazas, to supply their fortresses well with the best soldiers they have, so that they may gain time-the greatest enemy, he says, of those who besiege strong places-until at last, the numbers of the foe being diminished, relief may be taken to the besieged. But at the same time he recommends that the places should be so provided as if they never were to be relieved. It has been seen how little the republic profited by these wise counsels.

When the news of the fall of Nicosia reached the combined fleet, another council of war was held, at which contrary opinions were emitted, and some angry discussion took place. Colonna attempted to assume the supreme command, and to control Doria, who declared that he acknowledged no superior but Don John of Austria, captain-general of the Spanish navy.

Very high words passed between Colonna and Don Carlos Davalos, who commanded a strong body of infantry on board the Spanish galleys. Doria interposed his authority, and ordered his subordinate to retire, or the quarrel might have come to blows. Doria then required that Colonna should show him his authority for acting as he did; and it soon became evident that the three powers had made no express arrangement on the important subject of command, but that each pretended to be independent, and even to a right of commanding the other two; whilst, in the instructions given to the generals, no provision had been made for settling the difficulties that could hardly fail to spring up from the want of one directing head. Finally, a few days after the stormy councils, the fleets separated, but met again at Candia, whence Doria, the season no longer allowing of naval operations in those seas, departed, early in October, for Sicily, with the consent of Colonna and Zanne, which he had thought proper to ask out of courtesy. The conduct of the three admirals after the fall of Nicosia, their disputes and their separation, have given rise to much discussion amongst historical writers. Señor Rosell vindicates Doria and casts blame upon Colonna, taxing him with presumption, and with having, in concert with Zanne, abandoned the Spanish fleet. It is not unnatural that a Spanish writer should take this view of the question, but he also brings Italian authorities to his support. The controversy, however, is not now of sufficient interest to be worth dilating upon in this place.

Leaving a garrison in Nicosia, Mustafa laid siege to Famagusta. He pitched his camp at three miles from the town, and daily sent horsemen to ride up to its walls, and to exhibit to its inhabitants the heads of the principal persons killed at Nicosia stuck upon the heads of lances. Neither this bloody menace, nor the fair promises of which he afterwards was layish, had the slightest effect upon the defenders of Famagusta, who were resolved, as they afterwards showed, to fight to the death, and who, in two sallies, drove the Turks from their trenches, destroying, with the guns of the fortress, three redoubts that they

had thrown up. The reduction of the place not appearing so easy as had been anticipated, Mustafa postponed it until the spring, and went with the fleet in quest of that of the Christians, which he knew from his spies to have separated into two portions. Deprived of the assistance of the Spaniards, the Venetian and Roman squadrons were not in condition to make head against the Turk, the news of whose approach was very unwelcome to them, especially as they had just lost eleven galleys, and had others damaged by a storm at sea. Fortunately, high and contrary winds frustrated Mustafa's design, and he at last changed his plan, and went to winter at Constantinople. Zanne took advantage of his absence to throw a reinforcement of sixteen hundred infantry into Famagusta, and thence went to Corfu, to seek orders from the senate, by whom he was shortly afterwards, either by reason of his ill health, which incapacitated him for the command, or because his conduct of the campaign was disapproved (Señor Rosell says the latter was the cause), removed from his command. It was bestowed upon the proveditore, Sebastian Veniero, who had for his lieutenant Agostino Barbarigo, a man, says Señor Rosell, of singular discretion, and very well beloved by his fellow-citizens. Meanwhile Colonna, passing through many perils, and suffering much damage-including the loss of his own galley, which was struck by lightning and reduced to ashes at last reached Rome, where, although he arrived with scarcely a shadow of his squadron, he was received with great demonstrations of joy.

Such was the unsatisfactory state of affairs at the close of the campaign of 1570. Meanwhile, Pius V. used every exertion to bring about the much- desired league, whose object was to be the humbling of the power of the Turk. Conferences were held at Rome between the representatives of the Pope, the King of Spain, and the Republic of Venice; and Maximilian of Austria was again urged to join in the projected alliance. He would gladly have reconquered the part of Hun

gary that had fallen under the Moslem yoke, but his treasury was low; he was bound by a truce of eight years, signed with the Grand Seignior, and he could not seriously entertain the proposals of the Venetian ambassador. The conferences were prolonged, many difficulties intervened, and at one time Venice, doubting of a favourable result, and cherishing little hope of alone bringing the war to a successful issue, was near entering into negotiations with the Porte, when Muhammed, the Grand Vizier, jealous of Mustafa's triumph, had persuaded Selim to offer peace to the senate-a principal condition of which would have been the cession of Cyprus by the latter, or at least the payment of a tribute, if they were allowed to retain the island or the town of Famagusta. Before, however, these negotiations had commenced, the Pope, learning that Venice had sent a special envoy to Constantinople, nominally to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, feared some underhand dealings, and despatched Colonna to assure the Doge and senators of his desire to carry out the league, and of his willingness to yield certain points that had proved impediments to its completion. The conferences were resumed, and finally, on the 25th May, a perpetual treaty of alliance against the Turks, and also against the Moors of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, was sworn to, and signed by the three ambassadors, on the part of Rome, Spain, and Venice. Don John of Austria was appointed captain-general of the league, and Colonna was to replace him in case of absence or accident. No one of the contracting powers was at liberty to conclude peace or truce with the Porte without the consent of the others. The league was not published in Venice until the 2d of July, but before then the Pontiff, with great zeal and diligence, had sent a legate to Spain, to urge Philip II. to hasten his preparations, and also to Austria and Portugal to press them to join the alliance. The legate deputed to Spain was received with great pomp and magnificence, upon the details of which Señor Rosell complacently dwells. But before