Collective Action

2-person Prisoner's Dilemma achieve activity Anatol Rapoport argues argument assumption asymmetry behavior Brian Barry by-product theory choice collective action collective action problems collective benefits commonly compelling contexts contingent choosing contract by convention contractarian contributions cooperation coordination equilibria coordination game costs and benefits Cournot analysis defect discussed in chapter dominating strategy Economics environmental equilibrium example exchange expect extrarational fair firms game theory group action H. L. A. Hart Hence Ibid increases indifference curves individual interactions interest groups issue iterated Prisoner's Dilemma k-subgroup large groups latent groups less level of supply lobbying logic of collective matrix moral motivations narrow self-interest narrowly rational norm Olson's one-shot one's ongoing organization outcome paradox payoff perhaps Petersburg Paradox play political pollution possible provision Rapoport relevant rule sanctions sense Sierra Club single-play Prisoner's Dilemma small-number social Social exchange theory stag hunt static substantial tion vote