Ethics: Inventing Right and WrongPenguin UK, 30 ago 1990 - 256 páginas An insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity. |
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... present concerned with the merits or faults of such a position. These are first order moral views, positive or negative: the person who adopts either of them is taking a certain practical, normative, stand. By contrast,
... present concerned with the merits or faults of such a position. These are first order moral views, positive or negative: the person who adopts either of them is taking a certain practical, normative, stand. By contrast,
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... such a descriptive sense are to be condemned? The present issue is with regard to the objectivity specifically of value, not with regard to the objectivity of those natural, factual, differences on the basis of which differing values are.
... such a descriptive sense are to be condemned? The present issue is with regard to the objectivity specifically of value, not with regard to the objectivity of those natural, factual, differences on the basis of which differing values are.
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... present under consideration. What is more confusing is that different second order views compete for the name 'subjectivism'. Several of these are doctrines about the meaning of moral terms and moral statements. What is often called ...
... present under consideration. What is more confusing is that different second order views compete for the name 'subjectivism'. Several of these are doctrines about the meaning of moral terms and moral statements. What is often called ...
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... imperative. Again, an imperative remains hypothetical even if we change the 'if' to 'since': the fact that the desire for X is actually present does not alter the fact that the reason for doing X is contingent upon the desire.
... imperative. Again, an imperative remains hypothetical even if we change the 'if' to 'since': the fact that the desire for X is actually present does not alter the fact that the reason for doing X is contingent upon the desire.
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... present desire that his future desires should be satisfied – then a counsel of prudence is a categorical imperative, different indeed from a moral one, but analogous to it. A categorical imperative, then, would express a reason for ...
... present desire that his future desires should be satisfied – then a counsel of prudence is a categorical imperative, different indeed from a moral one, but analogous to it. A categorical imperative, then, would express a reason for ...
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accept action actual agent agreement apply argued argument believe called causal Chapter choice claim commendation concepts concern conclusion consequences considerations course demands descriptive desires determinism discussion dispositions distinction effect equal ethics example fact fairly follow function further give given happiness holds human ideals imperative important individual institution intended interests intrinsic keep kind least less limited logical matter maxims means merely moral moral judgements motive narrow natural notion objective objective values ordinary particular perhaps person point of view positive possible practical prescriptive present principles promising question rational reason reference relations requirements responsibility result rules satisfy seems sense similar simply situation social someone sort speaking specific stage standards statements subjective suggested supposed theory thesis things third thought true universalizability universalization utilitarianism utility values virtue wrong