Ethics: Inventing Right and WrongPenguin UK, 30 ago 1990 - 256 páginas An insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity. |
Dentro del libro
Resultados 1-5 de 40
Página
... possible that the subjective concern, the activity of valuing or of thinking things wrong, should go on in just the same way whether there are objective values or not. But to say this is only to reiterate that there is a logical ...
... possible that the subjective concern, the activity of valuing or of thinking things wrong, should go on in just the same way whether there are objective values or not. But to say this is only to reiterate that there is a logical ...
Página
... possible that people should have the same experiences in both. If we reject the positivism that would make the dispute between realists and phenomenalists a pseudo-question, we can reject Hare's similarly supported dismissal of the ...
... possible that people should have the same experiences in both. If we reject the positivism that would make the dispute between realists and phenomenalists a pseudo-question, we can reject Hare's similarly supported dismissal of the ...
Página
... possible in the aesthetic and moral fields as in any of those just mentioned. More than this, there is an objective distinction which applies in many such fields, and yet would itself be regarded as a peculiarly moral one: the ...
... possible in the aesthetic and moral fields as in any of those just mentioned. More than this, there is an objective distinction which applies in many such fields, and yet would itself be regarded as a peculiarly moral one: the ...
Página
... possible satisfactions of the person or persons whose actions are to be guided; but moral judgements seem to say more than this. This view leaves out the categorical quality of moral requirements. In fact both naturalist and non ...
... possible satisfactions of the person or persons whose actions are to be guided; but moral judgements seem to say more than this. This view leaves out the categorical quality of moral requirements. In fact both naturalist and non ...
Página
Ha alcanzado el límite de visualización de este libro.
Ha alcanzado el límite de visualización de este libro.
Otras ediciones - Ver todo
Términos y frases comunes
accept action actual agent agreement apply argued argument believe called causal Chapter choice claim commendation concepts concern conclusion consequences considerations course demands descriptive desires determinism discussion dispositions distinction effect equal ethics example fact fairly follow function further give given happiness holds human ideals imperative important individual institution intended interests intrinsic keep kind least less limited logical matter maxims means merely moral moral judgements motive narrow natural notion objective objective values ordinary particular perhaps person point of view positive possible practical prescriptive present principles promising question rational reason reference relations requirements responsibility result rules satisfy seems sense similar simply situation social someone sort speaking specific stage standards statements subjective suggested supposed theory thesis things third thought true universalizability universalization utilitarianism utility values virtue wrong