Ethics: Inventing Right and WrongPenguin UK, 30 ago 1990 - 256 páginas An insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity. |
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... desires. But however determinate it is, the objective appropriateness of standards in relation to aims or desires is no more of.
... desires. But however determinate it is, the objective appropriateness of standards in relation to aims or desires is no more of.
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... desires. Something may be called good simply in so far as it satisfies or is such as to satisfy a certain desire; but the objectivity of such relations of satisfaction does not constitute in our sense an objective value. 6. Hypothetical ...
... desires. Something may be called good simply in so far as it satisfies or is such as to satisfy a certain desire; but the objectivity of such relations of satisfaction does not constitute in our sense an objective value. 6. Hypothetical ...
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... desire of the agent's can figure in the antecedent of what, though conditional in grammatical form, is still in ... desires in question. Of course, it could still be a hypothetical imperative, if the implied reason were a prudential ...
... desire of the agent's can figure in the antecedent of what, though conditional in grammatical form, is still in ... desires in question. Of course, it could still be a hypothetical imperative, if the implied reason were a prudential ...
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... desire for X by way of Y's being a means to X. In Kant's own treatment, while imperatives of skill relate to desires which an agent may or may not have, imperatives of prudence relate to the desire for happiness which, Kant assumes ...
... desire for X by way of Y's being a means to X. In Kant's own treatment, while imperatives of skill relate to desires which an agent may or may not have, imperatives of prudence relate to the desire for happiness which, Kant assumes ...
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... desires or purposes or chosen ends. Then what I am saying is that somewhere in the input to this argument – perhaps in one or more of the premisses, perhaps in some part of the form of the argument – there will be something which cannot ...
... desires or purposes or chosen ends. Then what I am saying is that somewhere in the input to this argument – perhaps in one or more of the premisses, perhaps in some part of the form of the argument – there will be something which cannot ...
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accept action actual agent agreement apply argued argument believe called causal Chapter choice claim commendation concepts concern conclusion consequences considerations course demands descriptive desires determinism discussion dispositions distinction effect equal ethics example fact fairly follow function further give given happiness holds human ideals imperative important individual institution intended interests intrinsic keep kind least less limited logical matter maxims means merely moral moral judgements motive narrow natural notion objective objective values ordinary particular perhaps person point of view positive possible practical prescriptive present principles promising question rational reason reference relations requirements responsibility result rules satisfy seems sense similar simply situation social someone sort speaking specific stage standards statements subjective suggested supposed theory thesis things third thought true universalizability universalization utilitarianism utility values virtue wrong