Ethics: Inventing Right and WrongPenguin UK, 30 ago 1990 - 256 páginas An insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity. |
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... descriptive meanings; but is it an equally hard fact that actions which are cruel in such a descriptive sense are to be condemned? The present issue is with regard to the objectivity specifically of value, not with regard to the ...
... descriptive meanings; but is it an equally hard fact that actions which are cruel in such a descriptive sense are to be condemned? The present issue is with regard to the objectivity specifically of value, not with regard to the ...
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... descriptive rather than even partly prescriptive or emotive or evaluative, or that it is not an essential feature of the conventional meaning of moral statements that they have some special illocutionary force, say of commending rather ...
... descriptive rather than even partly prescriptive or emotive or evaluative, or that it is not an essential feature of the conventional meaning of moral statements that they have some special illocutionary force, say of commending rather ...
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... descriptive meaning. Conversely, the main tradition of European moral philosophy from Plato onwards has combined the view that moral values are objective with the recognition that moral judgements are partly prescriptive or directive or ...
... descriptive meaning. Conversely, the main tradition of European moral philosophy from Plato onwards has combined the view that moral values are objective with the recognition that moral judgements are partly prescriptive or directive or ...
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... descriptive, meaning. Views of the other type hold that they are descriptive in meaning, but descriptive of natural features, partly of such features as everyone, even the non-cognitivist, would recognize as distinguishing kind actions ...
... descriptive, meaning. Views of the other type hold that they are descriptive in meaning, but descriptive of natural features, partly of such features as everyone, even the non-cognitivist, would recognize as distinguishing kind actions ...
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... descriptive, certainly not inert, but something that involves a call for action or for the refraining from action, and one that is absolute, not contingent upon any desire or preference or policy or choice, his own or anyone else's ...
... descriptive, certainly not inert, but something that involves a call for action or for the refraining from action, and one that is absolute, not contingent upon any desire or preference or policy or choice, his own or anyone else's ...
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accept action actual agent agreement apply argued argument believe called causal Chapter choice claim commendation concepts concern conclusion consequences considerations course demands descriptive desires determinism discussion dispositions distinction effect equal ethics example fact fairly follow function further give given happiness holds human ideals imperative important individual institution intended interests intrinsic keep kind least less limited logical matter maxims means merely moral moral judgements motive narrow natural notion objective objective values ordinary particular perhaps person point of view positive possible practical prescriptive present principles promising question rational reason reference relations requirements responsibility result rules satisfy seems sense similar simply situation social someone sort speaking specific stage standards statements subjective suggested supposed theory thesis things third thought true universalizability universalization utilitarianism utility values virtue wrong