Ethics: Inventing Right and WrongPenguin UK, 30 ago 1990 - 256 páginas An insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity. |
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... with no pretence of receiving them as innate laws of nature. I hope that the explanation of this paradox will become clear in the course of the book. J.L.M. January 1976 Part I: The Status of Ethics Chapter 1 The Subjectivity.
... with no pretence of receiving them as innate laws of nature. I hope that the explanation of this paradox will become clear in the course of the book. J.L.M. January 1976 Part I: The Status of Ethics Chapter 1 The Subjectivity.
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... course, this is undeniable; but it is not to the point. The kinds of behaviour to which moral values and disvalues are ascribed are indeed part of the furniture of the world, and so are the natural, descriptive, differences between them ...
... course, this is undeniable; but it is not to the point. The kinds of behaviour to which moral values and disvalues are ascribed are indeed part of the furniture of the world, and so are the natural, descriptive, differences between them ...
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... course, the moral sceptic cannot leave it at that. If his position is to be at all plausible, he must give some account of how other people have fallen into what he regards as an error, and this account will have to include some ...
... course, the moral sceptic cannot leave it at that. If his position is to be at all plausible, he must give some account of how other people have fallen into what he regards as an error, and this account will have to include some ...
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... course if there were objective values they would presumably belong to kinds of things or actions or states of affairs, so that the judgements that reported them would be universalizable; but the converse does not hold. A more subtle ...
... course if there were objective values they would presumably belong to kinds of things or actions or states of affairs, so that the judgements that reported them would be universalizable; but the converse does not hold. A more subtle ...
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... course insisting on the universalizability of moral judgements, as opposed to the objectivity of goodness, would yield only the same result. 5. Standards of evaluation One way of stating the thesis that there are no objective values is ...
... course insisting on the universalizability of moral judgements, as opposed to the objectivity of goodness, would yield only the same result. 5. Standards of evaluation One way of stating the thesis that there are no objective values is ...
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accept action actual agent agreement apply argued argument believe called causal Chapter choice claim commendation concepts concern conclusion consequences considerations course demands descriptive desires determinism discussion dispositions distinction effect equal ethics example fact fairly follow function further give given happiness holds human ideals imperative important individual institution intended interests intrinsic keep kind least less limited logical matter maxims means merely moral moral judgements motive narrow natural notion objective objective values ordinary particular perhaps person point of view positive possible practical prescriptive present principles promising question rational reason reference relations requirements responsibility result rules satisfy seems sense similar simply situation social someone sort speaking specific stage standards statements subjective suggested supposed theory thesis things third thought true universalizability universalization utilitarianism utility values virtue wrong