1866. week ending Jan. 6.. 13.. "20. .. 27. Feb. 3. "10. 17. TREASURE MOVEMENT FOR 1866. Receipts. Exports. Sub-Treasury In banks at close from to foreign Customs Interest Gold Certificates $685,610 640,503 2,334,694 1,130,789 944,878 1,449,074 3,206,180 1,578,194 16,852,568 2,706,403 1,928,641 15,265,372 279,842 2,598,400 2,137,048 13,106,759 115,204 2,081,280 2,221,423 10,937,474 120.179 1,916,700 2,376,735 10,129,806 94,828 2.992,900 2,158,009 10,308,758 2,608.796 119,-79 5,893,280 1,995,796 14,213,351 75,453 3,386,934 1,183,343 2,125,000 2,664,934 17,181,130 556,234 2,297,836 882.712 2,101,000 1,706,835 16,563 237 236,671 2,464,482 328,593 1,498,400 1,919,483 15,015,242 170,297 2,509,419 174,911 361,280 1,886,419 13,945,651 3,500 2,451,345 225,414 1,376,000 216,842 2,663.010 63.140 3,016,840 122,628 2,857,704 49,800 5,038,460 2,274,704 11,035,129 117,312 2.535,568 35,169 4,200,000 1,971,568 9,495,463 73,880 2,246,307 40,506 4,137,140 2,711,181 7,061,900 2.417,391 2,648,000 2,542,814 1,702,000 2,358,455 940,100 292,568 4 3,409 3,251,734 445,489 2,893,008 " 24. 1,209,048 560,193 Mar. 3... "10. 1,469,286 1,318,271 1,247,249 12. 19.. 26 4,658,000 3,110,000 2,842.0 10 1,895,334 11,930,202 2,120,100 11,436,295 1,760,307 8,243,937 2,227,181 10,914,997 1,943,391 13,970,402 2,069,814 13,595.465 1,929,454 19,376,929 Since Jan 1........ $14,254,521 26,565,431 56,165,850 21,367,711 68,158,7.0 42,114,112 $.. The following exhibits the amount of treasure exported from New York to foreign countries from January 1 to the last Saturday in May for fifteen years: From the above it will be seen that the exports of Treasure for the month have reached over twenty three millions of dollars. This supply came in great part from the sales of the Assistant Treasure at New York. In sympathy wi.h this new demand gold has risen during the month, and closed at 1401. Below we give the course of gold for the month: The following table shows the daily fluctuations of exchange (long) on London, Paris, Amsterdam, Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin at New York for May, 1866: 36%@36% 71%@72% 5.. 41% @41% 30.. 41%% @41% 31.. 41@41% .109%@109% 517 @515 41 @414 .1094@109% 516@513% 41 @414 .109%@109% 515 @5114 41%@42% 79%@80 .109%@109% 516%@512% 41% @41% 36%@37 721⁄44@734 36%@37 724@734 36%@37 724@734 364@37% 73 @731⁄21⁄2 304@37% 734@74 364@374 73%@74 262@37 734@74 36% @37 734@73% 36%@37 73/4@73% 364@374 734@73% 364@374 734@73% 364@374 734@73% 364@374 784@73% 78% @80 36 @374 71 @74 764@784 35 @36% 693⁄4@71% 77 @7834 35%@36% 70%@71% 77 @79- 35%@36% 70%@71%% 78 @79 36 @364 71 @71% 78%@79 36%@36% 71%@72X 783⁄41⁄44@791⁄4 79 @79% 36%4@36% 72 @72%% 79% @80 794@79% 79%@80 79%@80 79%@80 JOURNAL OF BANKING, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE. Failure of the Merchants' National Bank at Washington-Government Deposits in BanksThe Bill Providing for the Redemption of National Bank Notes, &c-New York, Boston, and Philadelphia Bank Returns. THE month among banking circles which has just passed is especially noteable on account of the disastrous collapse of the Merchants' National Bank at Washington. The opprobrious circumstances attending this failure are detailed in an official preliminary report which has been issued and published by the daily press, but we have not room for it here. Moreover, if we are not misinformed, the truth is not all known as yet, and further surprising disclosures will shortly be made. One of the most noteworthy circumstances connected with this failure is the small extent to which the customers of the bank are sufferers. On the first of January last the deposits of private persons were officially reported at $602,309. Had the bank failed, then the loss of individual depositors would have been very heavy. From some causes, which require explanation however, these private deposits, on the day of the failure, were reduced to $38.610. In other words, more than half a million of dollars appears to have been paid to preferred creditors a short time before the crash. Now, from this point of view, it is a singular coincidence that the government deposits between 1st January, and the failure increased from $94,225 to $762,312, and a more remarkable circumstances still is that over a quarter of a million of government money was placed in the bank within a fortnight of the closing of its doors by complete in. solvency. It has for a long time been no secret that the Merchants' National Bank did not enjoy the high credit which should be indispensable to every bank which is permitted to enjoy the prestige of being a depository of public money. The United States Treasurer, Mr. Spinner, it has accordingly been in some quarters supposed, must have known something of the loss of credit of the bank. It is certain that he has acted with commendable caution in drawing down his deposits. On this subject, Mr. Spinner, in a letter to an evening paper, makes the following statement: "Now the facts are, that there was standing to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States only $3,858 83. On the day of the failure the bank issued a certificate that $1,155 31 was deposited on account of its semi-annual duty, and on the same day General Robinson directed the bank to pass from his credit to that of the Treasurer of the United States the sum of $51,258 93. No money passed in either of these last two transactions, and both were made when it was known that the bank had failed So far as the Treasurer's account was concerned, there was and is now standing legitimately to his credit less than four thousand dollars, while he holds in his hands securities, exclusive of what will be required to redeem the entire circulation of the bank, that would on a sale to-day exceed one hundred and thirty thousana dollars. The truth is, that but for the disobedience of orders of a mili ary officer, and the indiscretion of two officers in the Treasury Department of neither of which the Treasurer had knowledge-no harm could by any possibility have come to the government." Under the 45th section of the National Banking law, it is the right of Mr. Freeman Clarke, as Comptroller of the Currency, to order, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, an official examination of the affairs of any National Bank. That, in the case of the Merchants' National Bank this examination should have been deferred until after the failure is on every account greatly to be regretted. By falsifying its returns, or by some other contrivances, a disingenuous shaky bank might deceive everybody in the office of the Comptroller of the Currency; but it could scarcely deceive many watchful officers in other bureaus of the Treasury Department. Several disbursing officers, at any rate, must have been in the secret. Now, it is the obvious duty of these subordinates to report to their chief, the Secretary of the Treasury, any and every case of irregularity on the part of the depositorses of public money. If there be no regulation requiring this, such a rule should be made without delay. For how, otherwise can it be known by Mr. McCulloch what banks require looking after, and what public depositories should have their deposits of government money reduced or removed. How long ago certain disbursing officers have been aware of the dangerous position of the bank we are not told, but there is every reason to believe that the meeting of the 20th April, at which the official examiner says that Lieut. Col. E. E. Paulding, Paymaster United States Army, was present, was the last of a series of anxious consultations of the "friends of the bank." After this meeting, when the insolvent condition of the bank was well known, Col. Paulding, instead of taking measures to draw out the $300,000 of Government funds which he had deposited there, proceeded next day to place $200,000 more in the bank, two other dishonest officers of the Government adding $43,000 more. Not. withstanding this evidence of fraudulent and concerted purpose we do not hear that any of the parties to the crime have as yet been arrested, with the exception of Col. Paulding himself, who will probably be tried by court martial, and the President of the bank. The preliminary inquiries are, indeed, still going on, and some of the features of this disgraceful affair may assume a different color as more light is shed upon them. In view of this investigation we have only to ask on the part of the publie that the fullest publicity be given to the facts, and the severest punishment to the men who shall be found guilty of contriving and conniving at so heinous a crime. Among the subordinate points on which the public desire information is the almost unlimited command which Paulding seems to have had of Government money. We have every reason to believe that our paymasters and other disbursing officers have, with very few exceptions, proved themselves worthy of the highest trust; but we must object in the most positive and emphatic ma ner to the allowing of Government funds to lie in the hands of any pay officer longer than is absolutely necessary. His office is to disburse and not to hold the public money. His bonds are fixed at a rate which indicates that he is never to hold more than a very iimited amount and for a very limited time. Our disbursing officers must be made to understand that the money entrusted to them must be placed, with the least possible delay, in the hands of the creditors of the Government. So far, however, have we diverged from the right and safe rule, that Paymaster Paulding accommodate his friends with a loan of half a million of dollars, and certain banks, it is reported, are accustomed to offer inducements of a pecuniary character to disdursing officers to place Government funds on deposit with them. Any paymaster who receives any such gratuities, whether as interest or any other form, should be instantly disgraced and dismissed the service. It is worthy of note that no less than sixteen officials in various bureaus had money deposited in the Merchants' National Bank. As its capital was $306,000, the stockholders will, of course, be responsible for the debts of the bank under the stockholders' liability clause of the National Banking law. The currency now outstanding amounts to $179.810. It is supposed by some persons that as the Government will redeem broken bank notes from the proceeds of the bonds deposited at Washington for that purpose, these notes will pass as freely now as before the bank stopped payment. This is a mistake. The notes of a broken National Bank are no longer legal tender from or to the Government. They will be eventually paid by the Treasury, and destroyed. But the law does not provide that they shall be paid except after such a day as may be fixed for that purpose. The subject of the redemption of National Bank notes is again prominently brought forward by the introduction into the Senate of a bill, providing that "each bank must select, subject to the approval of the Comptroller, a bank in New York, Boston, or Philadelphia at which to redeem its circulating notes at par." It is to be regretted that a bill making this necessary reform should not have been introduced till so late a period in the session. The time has now come when efficient redemption of the bank note circulation can no longer be dispensed with. In the interests of economy it is urged by many persons that all the National Bank notes should be called in, because the profit of the issue accrues to private persons; while the greenbacks should remain out, because the profit is all gained by the Government. We are not prepared to concur in this view. One of the reasons for preferring bank currency to irredeemable government notes, has been usually said to be that irredeemable notes can be kept afloat to an amount beyond the wants of business. These wants are not fixed, but vary with the season of the year, and with numerous other circumstances. In proportion as there is an excess of paper money afloat, depreciation takes place, and inflation of prices naturally results. Bank notes, on the other hand, if redeemable, can scarcely be long kept out in excess of the monetary wants of the country. Hence, they are not so liable to become redundant, and to produce perturbation of values; for they flow back in a constant stream to the issuer for payment, and the current of the circulation is thus kept at its proper height. Since, without redemption in New York, it is impossible to keep bank notes at par, efforts have been making ever since the National Banking law was passed to have it made more perfect. That enactment, it will be remembered, does not appoint the monetary centre of the country as the place of redemption, but allows the banks to select any one of a dozen other places in preference to and instead of New York. Experience has abundantly shown the truth of the position we have always taken on this question, that our bank notes cannot be permanently kept as a sound uniform currency, except they be compulsorily redeemable in New York, or what is the same thing, in one of the three great cities. As might be expected the obligation of redemption entails a loss of profit, and is objected to by some of the interior banks. These institutions, however, must learn to rise above the sordid views of private advantage. It is for their interest that the National banking system should be permanent; and without redemption of the bank note this will be impossible. Had an unredeemed paper currency been tolerable to the people of the United States, the National Bank currency would never have been allowed to be issued at all. When these institutions were authorized by Congress, greenbacks were already out, and would have answered the purpose of a currency well if their quantity could have been kept adequate. The profits of issuing such an irredeemable currency are immense. Put those profits, for reasons that appeared sufficient, Congress refused to the National Treasury. Irredeemable notes being out to the extent of 400 millions, and further issues being inadmissible, we created the new banks for the special purpose of issuing 300 millions of notes that should be redeemed, and so redeemed as to be kept steadily at par throughout every State in the Union. The franchise bestowed on the banks was more valuable than any ever given to private persons in this country before. The people have a clear right, therefore, to exact that each National bank, wherever situated, shall take care of its own notes; and that its stockholders while they enjoy their privileges shall perform their duties The second section of Mr. Clarke's bill is of interest as providing that no bank "shall make loans or discounts or pay dividends" except it has on hand the full amount of its reserve of 25 per cent on its notes and its deposits. This is a conservative provision and will, we suppose, be adopted as will also per |