authorised by Parliament; and, consequntly, you may approve or disapprove, you may grant or refuse the supplies for carrying it into effect. Upon the whole, therefore, I know not how an engagement of this sort is to be considered as equally binding as the most solemn treaty. But we now understand, that a formal treaty has been negociated, which it is intended to lay before the house, and until that be done I cannot decide upon its merits or propriety. I dare say the house would naturally be inclined to receive, with the fondest partiality, every thing apparently tending to the advantage of the Spanish cause: but, sir, the state of our warfare, under such circumstances as I have already stated, and as his Majesty's ministers have conducted it, is truly extraordinary. If the Spaniards preferred that mode of warfare, which was of a desultory nature, instead of a continued warfare, then the British army could not have been of the least use in Spain; for a British army there must necessarily have pursued a plan wholly different from that of the Spaniards. I know not which system of warfare was proper to be adopted; but I say the two systems are completely incompatible. The Spaniards, in their own country, and pursuing a desultory mode of attack, have the power of dispersing and rallying again, as occasion might require; but this is not the case with a regular army. If you combine the two modes you must necessarily destroy the energies and efficacy of one of them. We have already seen this exemplified in the Spaniards. We have seen their regular army defeated, and almost destroyed by the enemy; while in another quarter we have found their irregular force very successful; which shews that the two modes of fighting are perfectly inconsistent.-Now, sir, let us see what has been the vigour of ministers upon this occasion. By vigour, I presume, is meant a prompt energetic use and application of the public force. Will you tell us of one instance of such promptitude and energy? I presume you cannot say it was displayed in Portugal; nor in Spain by sir John Moore's coming into the field after the Spanish army had been defeated? It was not then useful, because it was unable to keep the field by itself. It is an extraordinary circumstance, that the Convention of Portugal is made to rest in a great degree upon the speedy applicability of the British army in Spain, and yet the general of that army, sir Hew Dalrymple, tells you there was no preparation

made for its reception in that country for some considerable time after the Convention was concluded. Can it then be said, that the object of the Convention was carried into effect, or that any time was gained by it? If such measures deserve the name of being energetic, or useful, I am at a loss to know what sort of measures would be deemed the contrary.— As to that part of the speech which relates to Sweden, I have only to observe, that this country is placed in such a situation that I do not see how we can refuse to give the stipulated supply; but I cannot help lamenting, that there is not the smallest probability of any good arising from Sweden continuing to persevere. We are told that the king of Sweden deserves our support the more, because he refused the overtures made to him from Erfurth, relative to excluding the Spaniards from the negociation. Perhaps he deserves the applause of mankind for his bravery and perseverance; but what good, I may ask, can he thereby render to Spain or England? When this vote of supply was proposed last year, I ventured to say, that the most prudent use Sweden could make of the money, was to procure a peace for herself, as it was totally impossible for her to resist her enemies, or be of the least advantage to her allies. Nothing can be more hurtful to us in the eyes of the world than endeavouring to involve the smaller countries in Europe in hostilities with France. The immense superiority of our naval power, our commerce, and prodigious wealth, enable us to look to a long continuance of war, perhaps with safety; but what is that to the powers of the Continent? Their resources are not great; they have no means of offence against France; and what advantage can we derive from the misfortunes of other countries? Instead of being the arbiters and protectors of the Continent, we should, by so doing, be holding up ourselves as the cause of the ruin of other nations.-Having said thus much upon what comes under our notice in the speech itself, I must now take the liberty of making an observation or two upon what the speech omits to state-I mean in regard to what relates to the United States of America. Much correspondence has taken place betwixt the American government and this country, as well as between America and France; and we know that a direct overture was lately made by that power to us, and by us rejected. When the last session of

which all human exertion, and all human power, were subject even in such an empire as Great Britain. Admitting, therefore, in the most extensive degree, the responsibility of his majesty's ministers on this subject, he felt no apprehension at the prospect of meeting the charge of the rt. hon. gent. upon it. He felt confident, that it would be proved they had redeemed the pledge given by them to parliament in the last session; that they had carried on the struggle and applied the abundant resources of the country in a manner which, on mature reflection, appeared most likely to secure the object in view, an opinion which even past experience served only to confirm. He felt bold, therefore, in declaring that whenever the rt. hon. gent. should bring the subject before the House in a tangible shape, he should be fully enabled to prove, that his majesty's government had acted on the fullest conviction of the course, that would be most conducive to the success of the cause of Spain; and, if that cause should not succeed, the failure would result, not from any neglect on their part, but from greater engines of destruction having been brought against that country than it was in the power of Great Britain to afford means of defence. This was too large, too interesting, and too important a subject to be broken down in a debate of that sort. Opinion upon it must depend on considerations, that could not be superficially examined. But he must be permitted, however, to say a few words upon the subject; and here he must observe, that it was not very easy to collect the rt. hon. gent.'s sentiments as to the course of military policy which ought to have been adopted towards Spain. The right hon. gent. had described two modes in which our military assistance might have been afforded the one by furnishing the Spaniards with arms and ammunition merely; the other, (that which had besides been adopted by his majesty's government,) that of sending to their aid a regular military force. The right hon. gent. expressed his partiality for that species of warfare, recommended in their List of Precautions, by what he called the Supreme Junta. He certainly did recollect the paper alluded to by the right hon. gent. but it was circulated long before the Supreme Central Junta had an existence. The writer was unknown; it had no kind of authority; and it was impossible to ascertain, whether it expressed the general sentiments of the

nation. The right hon. gent. deprecated the introduction of a regular army to assist an irregular force. Certainly, early in the war, the Spanish troops were local and irregular; but this force was soon found to be ineffective. Even in Andalusia a regular army had been established, and it was not until they got a regular army, that the Spaniards were enabled to make an effectual struggle, and to reduce the power of the enemy by the defeat of Dupont at the memorable battle of Baylen. The course of events decided the question between a regular and an irregular force. When Madrid was evacuated, and the provinces purged of the French, every province felt the necessity of advancing its troops, and they had consequently been advanced and consolidated in the centre of the kingdom. His majesty's ministers had, therefore, no option-the option had been made by Spain. They had chosen the mode of regular warfare, and it would have ill-befitted the character of Great Britain to have shrunk from the contest, and to have said to the Spaniards: "We will give you money, we will give you stores, but we will not hazard our blood in your defence." Such language would

indeed have been most ungenerous towards our allies, and most unworthy of the spirit and general feeling of this nation, in support of the Spanish cause. What had this country to do with the prudence or impru dence of the Spaniards adopting the system of warfare laid down in the "Precautions?" Whether Spain was to contend against France in irregular warfare or by regular war, was a matter for her own option; and she had at that time made her option for regular war, and for giving battle to her enemies in the field. It was, therefore, the duty and policy of this country to support her cause in the same manner. The speech of the right hon. gent. was rather of a prudent cast, and not in that animated stile, in which another right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan), had, in the last session, represented the aiding Spain as paramount to all other duties. The right hon. gent. who spoke this night, seemed to think it was very improper and imprudent for a British army to enter Spain, without having some cautionary towns and forts surrendered to us, to secure retreat in case of calamity. For his part, he knew of no town of that sort which could be surrendered, except Cadiz; for as to Ferrol, it was not a town capable of answering the object proposed, nor of

our

protecting the embarkation of an army. Now, as it was evident, that if we were to make any operations at all, they must be in the North of Spain, he could not conceive that a proposal would be well received in that country for surrendering a town quite without the line of our military operations. If we had made such a proposal to that generous and high-spirited nation, he could not conceive that we could have thrown a greater apple of discord to disturb the harmony of cordial cooperation. As to another disposition of the forces which had been mentioned, that of sending sir Arthur Wellesley's force of 9000 men to the Pyrenees, to cut off the communication between the 60,000 French troops who were in Spain, and the rest of the 500,000 disposable troops, of which the right hon. gent. stated the enemy's army to consist, the bare statement of such a plan must convince the House of its absurdity. If the right hon. gent. had really no other advice to offer to the House and the country than what he had stated, he rejoiced that his majesty's government had adopted other measures. As to the complaint which the right hon. gent. had made of want of regular information, he could assure him, that it was his wish to lay before the House, as early as possible, every information that would not be prejudicial to the public service; and he was happy to state, that he saw no objection to the fullest information being granted with respect to the transactions in Portugal, one of those topics to which the right hon. gent. had promised to call the attention of the House. He also thought, that very shortly the fullest information might be given with respect to our operations in Spain; and he was sure, that when the time of discussion should arrive, he would be perfectly ready to meet the right hon. gent. either upon the principles or upon the details of the question. As to the idea which had been thrown out, of the propriety of directing our forces to Spain in the first instance, instead of Portugal, he must say there never was a fallacy more absurd than the idea of a very inferior force occupying the passes of the Pyrennees, and cutting off entirely the communication between two armies infinitely This fallacy seemed to arise

superior.

speedily as a ship when it has left the port. The difference, however, was very great: the ship had nothing to do but to go with the wind, and meet the enemy; whereas an army when landed had much difficuly in collecting provisions, and the means of transporting their necessary baggage. If the present administration were, however, to have waited till every thing was ready for the reception of our armies, they must have stood as still as the last vigorous administration, who actually did nothing while in office.-He would venture to say, from the melancholy experience of the fate of general Blake's army, that if a British army had landed at St. Andero, and scrambled as far as gen. Blake advanced, none of them would ever have come back. He was convinced that there was not a single military man who would support the idea of a campaign in the Pyrennees, for a British army. The right hon. gent. had stated, that the expedition which had atchieved the deliverance of Portugal had been sent to sea, to seck its fortunes, without any particular direction from government. The fact, however, was directly the reverse, because, most unquestionably the expedition under sir Arthur Wellesley did sail with a most precise and determinate object. It had been ordered to go immediately to the Tagus, without stopping at Corunna. This direction was given in consequence of precise information received from sir C. Cotton, (which, however, afterwards turned out to be unfounded,) that there were no more than 5000 French troops in Lisbon and the other forts upon the Tagus, and that sir Arthur Wellesley's expedition would be sufficient to dislodge them. The expedition then had been sent out with a precise object, and with precise instructions, but it would hardly be contended, that government should have tied up the hands and the discretion of such a meritorious officer as sir Arthur Wellesley so completely as to say, that he must on no occasion take advantage of any favourable circumstances which might occur in the varying and fleeting fortune of the war, without waiting until he had made a direct communication to government upon the subject, and had received their answer. It appeared to him that floating armies, under the command of trust-worthy officers, might be of great service, even when acting according to the circumstances of the times, without any particular directions from government; and he was confi

from the idea that an army, when once put itself on march the next to attack the enemy. There were some persons who appeared to think army once landed could act as

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