pedition had not taken place, the Danish without effecting any thing. (Hear! hear! hear!)-After these transactions in the North of Europe, the affairs of Spain next engrossed the attention of the world. The government of France having made its iniquitous attempt upon the independence of that nation, (an attempt deserving of all the censure and reprobation which the hon. mover has so eloquently pronounced upon it,) an opportunity of ardent hope to this country, and of probable deliverance to Europe, presented itself, such as we had not witnessed since the revolution of France in 1789. This was an event of the greatest importance, an event big with the greatest consequences, and which demanded the greatest attention of the king's ministers: they, and they only, were capable of forming a just opinion concerning it. It was impossible to conceive that such a country as Great Britain could view such passing events with indifference, or without taking a very prominent part in their direction. The question for those entrusted with the management of our concerns, was to obtain the necessary knowledge, and to bestow upon it, when acquired, the most mature consideration. It is upon this principle the conduct of his majesty's ministers, with respect to the war in Spain, in my opinion, is to be appreciated. It is in the recollection of this House, that we were first acquainted with the exertions of the Spanish people a very short time previous to the prorogation of Parliament. The right hon. gentlemen opposite at that period studiously avoided to make any comIn munication on that subject to this house. They had determined to apply to their own credit, all the glory and advantage, which the cause of Europe may derive from their co-operation with the Spanish people. They, and they alone, were aware of the wishes and objects of that nation; all that was known was known by them; all that was done, was done by them; all that was advised was advised by them. When, therefore, the Spanish nation undertook to resist the power and usurpation of France, and when the government of this country had determined to co-operate in that effort, the natural course of duty was to decide on the system best calculated to insure the important object. It will not be denied that the maturest reflection was necessary, and that this country, in the application of its means, should not take any precipi tate steps. We had to recollect, that if Spain was successful in its struggle, such an event would not only, in its immediate effects, prove highly beneficial, both to them and Great Britain, but that the relative power of France would have been considerably diminished. Had we succeeded in placing upon the throne of Spain, a prince hostile to the present dynasty of France, and friendly to this country for its services in its cause, the designs of France against the peace and independance of Europe would have vanished into air. When, therefore, such consequences hinged upon the decision of our counsels, I can, without fear of contradiction, assume, that in our system of co-operation, ministers should have been comprehensive in their views, and energetic in carrying them into execution. The most prominent object for their consideration, we should suppose, was the nature of the warfare which was most likely to be successfully carried on by the Spanish people: Whether it was to be conducted in the field, according to the modern system of military tactics in Europe, or whether it was to be considered as a kind of desultory attack by the host of the Spanish population, supplied by Great Britain with arms and military equipments, throughout every province of that peninsula. This mode of warfare has been recommended by the advantages which it affords an armed population, favoured by a mountainous country, capable of enduring the severest privations, and of profiting by every incident to harass the enemy against which it is opposed. When such a system is carried to its whole extent, the most powerful invading army may be brought to conclude, from its great loss of blood and treasure, that it were wiser to desist than persevere in such an hazardous attempt. These were the two schemes, one of which, in contemplating the affairs of Spain, ought to have been pursued. But his majesty's ministers seem, from their conduct of the war in Spain, not to have decided. System they had none : on one day they gave the preference to this plan, and on the next they changed it for another. If any reliance can be placed on the communications which have been made in the various newspapers, as to the proceedings of the Board of Enquiry, it would seem that sir A. Wellesley was sent out by his majesty's government without any specific instruction, without any direction whither he was to proceed, or with what authority in Spain to consult. Indeed he appears to have sailed with a sort of adventurous roving commission:-to do whatever he pleased!-It is next to be considered, whether the force under his command was sufficient for any really serviceable object. For I can conceive nothing less likely to serve the Spanish cause, than to send out to that country a force not competent to keep the field itself, and not able to co-operate with the force which we were told the Spaniards had in arms. If I am wrong in the statements I have considered it my duty to make, no blame is imputable to me. I have been kept in ignorance, and therefore have a right to refer to the communications which, whether right or wrong, have appeared in the public journals. From these it appears, that sir A. Wellesley had, on his arrival at Corunna, consulted with the Junta of Gallicia, and that that body had recommended to him not to debark at St. Andero, bat to proceed to Portugal and make that country a point of union and connection between the northern and southern provinces of Spain. That the Junta of Gallicia were very anxious to get rid of a French force, in possesion of a country on their rear, is what few could doubt; but how a compliance with their wishes, by the commander of a British army, could have tended to the delivery of Spain, is that to account for which all men are at a loss. Because, if Spain had been relieved by the expulsion of the French force from its provinces, there was little doubt that the enemy, in possession of Lisbon, would have been compelled to submit. The smaller country was dependent on the greater for its deliverance from the invaders; but it by no means followed, that the possession of Portugal extended a reciprocal protection to Spain. How did the facts unfold themselves? You have expelled the enemy from Portugal, and since that he has entered Madrid, defeated three Spanish armies, and is at this moment in pursuit of your's. (Ilear, hear, hear!) We learn this night from his Majesty's Speech, that his arms, though at first honourable, have terminated in an Armistice and Convention, of some of the articles of which his Majesty has felt himself obliged to declare his formal disapprobation. When or where this disapprobation has been declared, is to this moment a secret to me. I find from others, whom I should suppose to have better information, that they never heard of this disapproval, nor ever met with any person who had. But even had we heard of this disapproval before, we are to this moment left in ignorance of what parts of these two transac by a right honourable friend (Mr. T. Grenville) not now in the House. It was then, we were told by him, that by having transports when they were not wanting, we were sure to have them at hand in the moment of urgency. By what fatality I ask the noble lord is it, that all his characteristic energy seems to have set upon the present state of things? (Hear, hear, hear!) Is this the testimony, which under the administration of the noble lord, Great Britain exemplifies to the continent of Europe, of her military powers, and of the tions his Majesty's disapproval was expressed. Was it to the substantial points of the Convention of Cintra, or was it to those Articles which recognized the titles of the head of the French government, and the general who in Portugal commanded the French army? It is not a little surprising to be told that his Majesty had declared his disapproval, whilst at the same time no explanation is given of the points to which it was directed. But it would be far more surprising to find that this House was not determined to canvass the whole of this transaction, in order fully to ascer-strength and comprehension of those who tain what were the points which called for manage her resources? Indeed, if their censure, and to whom the delinquency was effects had not proved most lamentable to to be attributed. (Hear, hear!) But it the security of Europe, and the character was not only in sending the British troops of this empire, it would afford a most proto Portugal in preference to Spain, that lific source of ridicule to review the minis the vigour of the King's ministers was il- terial operations of the noble lord. An lustrated. It was also to be traced in the army sent without instructions, without various equipments of the army. It was plan, almost destitute of cavalry, and defeit in the want of artillery, in the derange-ficent in stores; the artillery not fit for ment of the commissariat, in the scanti-the operations which should have been ness of the cavalry force. (Hear, hear, pursued, whilst the horses, (the accounts hear!) If the newspapers be correct in given of the state of which, if it were not their accounts, the defence of all the gene- for the melancholy consequences, were rals employed in Portugal, for acceding truly ridiculous) were represented as blind to the disgraceful Convention of Cintra, and laine, and some even as dying of old rested principally upon the ill provided age. These, at least, are the statements state of the British army, and its inability of the general oflicers whom the noble on that account to fulfill the object for lord had selected; and if they are not sawhich it was appointed. And, yet, the tisfactory to himself, he alone is to blame ministers who planned and sent out that for their inaccuracy, having appointed Expedition are the men, on whose able and three commanders in chief with a rapidity energetic exertions this House and the greater than the relays of post horses, from country is now called upon to rely, for the whom, of course, no very intelligent acproper and successful management of these counts were to be expected.-Now, let us vigorous efforts which his Majesty's Speech examine the reasons stated by the genehas told us are necessary to bring this aw- rals for acquiescing in the Convention. ful contest to a favourable result. Is it Time, say they, was thus obtained to fornot more consistent with common reason?ward the British army to Spain. The Is it not more suited to the duties we owe Convention was signed definitively on the the British people to presume, that from 30th of August; and yet the British army the experience of the past, such men are was not ready for action in Spain for two unsafe to trust with the destinies of the months, uay, some of the troops did not future; Was the noble lord (Castlereagh) leave Portugal for ten weeks after. Is it opposite so stinted as to that species of only for the conveyance of the troops of force or so stinte as to the means of its France that the noble lord can find transconveyance, that for a British army, des- ports? These he can convey in British tined to act in the field against the enemy, shipping, to be again, almost immediately he could only obtain 200 cavalry? Who on their debarkation, employed in Spain, that reverts to the proceedings of this whilst by that very measure he subjects, House, in the last session, but must re- in a dreadful season, the British army to a member that noble lord, almost with tears march of 500 miles. It is impossible to in his eyes, and in a tone of despondence pronounce adequately upon that disgracethat arrested commiseration, regretting ful measure; there is so much in every the exhausted state in which he asserted part of it of mystery, enigma and riddle. that department of the public service was, We are now told, that his Majesty has through a feeling of false economy, left expressed his formal disapprobation of sympathising with the national feeling, ap proached the throne with their sentiments, and a most vigorous reception they did meet with indeed. (hear! hear!) The right hon. gentlemen had certainly anticipated a complete triumph over the Lord Mayor and Common Council of London; but subsequent events proved that his majesty's citizens could rally. The Corporation tell his Majesty, that they think the Convention disgraceful, dishonorable to the some parts of the Convention; and yet his interests: they call for investigation and If it In giving assistance to the Spaniards, there|pular feeling. That was perhaps the feelwere, as I before stated, two modes of pro- ing of the moment, but ministers were ceeding. What the opinions of the Spa- bound to consult for the permanent interests niards themselves are I profess myself of the public, and it was therefore their totally ignorant. The fact is, that this duty to investigate and ascertain by every ignorance does not proceed from any want possible mode, whether they ought to of diligence on my part in making inqui- risk an English army at all in Spain, or ries; but for want of any authentic source confine their assistance to the supplies I from which information could be procured. have mentioned. I do not wish to impute Did the Spaniards make application for a blame to them for having sent a British regular force to be sent into their coun- force to Spain, if the Spaniards themselves try, or for money, arms, ammunition, applied for it, and if it was the opinion of clothing, and all other necessaries to ena- competent judges, that there was a probable them to prosecute the war against bility of enabling them thereby to keep such armies as France had the power of the field against their powerful enemy. pouring into their country? I ask this We have instances in our history of our question, because if Spain with such assis- having been before in a similar situation tance could not carry the point of keeping and under similar circumstances. The inout any fresh reinforcements, there was dependence of the United Provinces was little probability of preventing that coun- effected principally by the assistance of try from being over-run. In investi- England. Queen Elizabeth for her own gating this matter we should have consi- safety, against the designs of Spain, assisted dered what was the amount of the dispo- those who revolted against its tyranny and sable force of France. To guide us in oppression; and I wish that ministers had regard to this point, we have a recent adverted, in the present instance, to the document to refer to for information. In conduct of that wise princess, and her wise papers which were laid before Parliament administaation. None of the present miin the beginning of the year 1806, just nistry can think themselves disgraced by after the failure of the third coalition, there a comparison with lord Burleigh; and yet appears a Memoir from the court of Vienna we find that queen Elizabeth, pressed as to that of St. Petersburg, stating the amount she was by the power, the rancour, the of force which France could probably persevering hostility of Spain, did not habring against the allied Powers. From zard the whole force of her dominions, nor this document it appears that the French proceed to send any number of troops aforce was then estimated at 500,000 men, broad, without some assurance of safety in exclusive of the imperial guards, which case of disaster. She, by the advice of consisted of 15,000 men. This was the her ministers, took care to possess what opinion of the court of Vienna before were called cautionary towns, and thereby France had over-run Germany and Poland assured herself of a retreat, and gained a and some other countries of Europe, and safe point whither to send reinforcements, previously to her connection with Russia. as well as a security that the United ProThe disposable force of France must, vinces should not abandon her in the contherefore, have been since considerably test in which they were engaged. I know increased; and it was consequently most not what has taken place between the material for this country, before it adopted English and Spanish governments upon any measure whatever, to consider well the that subject; but, I perceive, that in his propriety of employing her troops in Spain, Majesty's late Declaration it is stated, that where there was a likelihood of such im- certain obligations exist which are consimense numbers being brought against dered equally binding as the most solemn them. Never, I believe, was sympathy so treaty. From what I yet know of the strong, as that evinced in England in matter, I cannot agree in the propriety of favour of the Spanish cause. Yet, though any such sentiment: I should not, howsuch had been the enthusiasm of the na- ever, think of abandoning them in the tion at large, and however ardent the peo-hour of misfortune; but I cannot admit, ple might be in lending assistance to support such a glorious struggle, it was the duty of those, who were intrusted with the management of the national force, to consider in every point of view the propriety or impropriety of complying with the poVOL. XII. that we should consider our present obligations in the light of a solemn treaty: for what is the nature of such an engagement? It is entered into in a moment of hurry and precipitation; it has not been laid before us, and therefore, is, as yet, un E |