had not been received till after the conclu- same question was discussing in London, sion of the Convention of Cintra. On the and it is not a little remarkable that the 14th Sept. lord Wm. Bentinck was sent to very same decision was agreed to, at the attend the Supreme CentralJunta, whichwas same time, in both places ;-the marquis of installed at Aranjuez, on the 24th of the Romana's opinion upon this subject was in same month, in order to confer with them writing, and was ready to be laid upon the upon the subject. On the 25th of Sept. cable of the house. This was a circumorders had been sent to sir Hew Dalrymple stance of such strong and singular coincito move forward with his army towards dence, that he left it to the consideration the north of Spain; and on the same day of gentlemen, if it did not carry with it in sir David Baird received orders to embark its coincidence a strong evidence of its for Ferrol or Corunna. It was not, how-propriety. It appeared then, that lord Wm. ever, till the 29th of September, that the Bentinck's letter was dated the 29th of first letter from lord Wm. Bentinck was September, and on the 9th of the following written, containing the Answers of the Su-month sir David Baird sailed; and again, preme Junta to certain Questions, which he had been directed to submit to them, as well with respect to the entrance of the British army into Spain, as in regard to the manner in which it should be employed there. The Answers thus received were, that the fate of Spain depended on an early co-operation of a British force; and to the second question, that which was most important in a military point of view, was, that they wished our forces to be concentrated as one British army; and general Castanos received orders to confer with lord Wm. Bentinck as to the best mode of carrying those wishes into effect. It was proposed that the army in Portugal should make for Burgos, by the route of Salamanca, and sir David Baird debark his troops at Corunna This intelligence was received at Lisbon on the 8th of October; and here he was free to acknowledge that one of the lamented consequences of the Cintra Convention had been the occupation of the transports, which might perhaps have been otherwise employed; but by that Convention 20,000 tonnage of transports were engrossed in conveying to France 25,000 of French troops; but at the same time he wished it to be distinctly understood, that still there had been transports that might have served to convey our army by sea, to the northern provinces of Spain; but sir John Moore decided otherwise, and in making the very judicious decision that he had made, he was influenced by abstract reasons, not merely by any inconvenience arising out of the occupation of so large a tonnage of transports. Had he gone by sea to Corunna, he would have had to march his army through Gallicia, the poorest province in Spain, and the least calculated to supply an army that was to provide itself on its march. While the question respecting the operations of the British forces in Spain was pending at Madrid, the very that on the 17th of September we received the intelligence of the Convention of Cintra, and that on the 25th of the same month the Instructions were sent out for the army in Portugal to march. He could not see where ministers had been guilty of unnecessary delay.-As to that of the troops not being immediately permitted to land, he could only say, that from a prior and distant application made to his majesty's government for British troops on the part of the Juntas of Gallicia and Oviedo, ministers had a right to expect that no obstacle would have been thrown in the way of any troops they might have afterwards sent. Our troops under general Baird having sailed on the 9th of Oct. he (lord C.) had previously wrote a letter to general Broderick in Gallicia, acquainting him with the expeditions then going out, and requiring him to try every means to secure them accommodations on their landing, and provide for their continuing their march. This letter, though addressed to general Broderick, was, in case of his absence, to be opened by captain Kennedy. General Broderick was then in Gallicia with gen. Blake. Capt. Kennedy accordingly opened the letter, acted upon it, and acknowledged the receipt of it on the 1st of Oct. He (lord C.) wrote also to general Leith on the 30th of Oct. and to lord Wm. Bentinck, then on the frontiers of Leon. In consequence of these letters the necessary communications had been made to the respective Juntas, but he was sorry to say, that the Juntas had, in fact, neglected to act according to them. He did not wish to censure or complain of their conduct, but such was the fact. After the landing it was proposed to the marquis Romana to change the destination of his corps from Corunna, with which he complied, and there was then an army, including the Asturias and Blake's, and Romana's, of from 50 to 60,000 men. The right hon. gent. had given way | the South, and surely never was a diverto an expression of surprize, that the sion more completely effected. It had movements of the British army should have left the whole south of Spain free, and been so slow, and those of the French com- given it a repose for six weeks or two paratively so rapid: but the surprize of months. When sir John Moore had susthat right hon. gent. would probably cease pended his retreat, his subsequent march when he recollected the difference between to Sahagun and Saldanah was not proceedan army fully equipped and one not ed upon on mere abstract grounds. Sir equipped;-between an army that can seize John Moore had received a letter, interupon every thing on its way that can faci- cepted by a corps of cavalry, to which litate its march, whether provisions, or his hon. relative (gen. Stewart) belonged; carriages ;--and an army that cannot have the letter was Berthier's, promising reinany such resource; and another consider-forcements to Soult, but when he had got ation, too, not to be forgotten, was, that the roads in France, where the greater part of this expedition was manifested, were of a very superior quality to those of Portugal, through which our armies had to march. On the 14th of Nov. sir John Moore arrived at Salamanca, and never was an army, considering all the fatigues it had undergone, all the hardships sustained, all the difficulties surmounted, to he found in a more perfect state of discipline, or in better condition. He was joined by sir D. Baird on the Douro, and though the Spanish armies under Romana and that of Estramadura, had, prior to the arrival of sir John Moore, suffered severe reverses, still it was an unfair test of the general spirit of the people. They had at that period the most difficult task imposed upon them, that could devolve to a nation in such circumstances; it was at the same time to make head against a powerful enemy, and to make a government.-There was certainly one circumstance much to be regretted that they did not put one person at the head of their army, so as to make it one great machine in the hands of some one powerful leader, and not have its force divided and broken down into small and insulated bodies. When gen. Moore arrived first at Salamanca, he had reason to expect that Buonaparté would have directed his force against the British troops, rather than against Madrid: and there was great reason to hope every thing from the spirit, which, according to gen. Hope's report, whose column had passed through Madrid, was prevalent in that city. They shewed every symptom of the greatest zeal and energy. He admitted that there was more languor in the northern provin ces, but Castile had always been that part of Spain that had distinguished itself most in every patriotic ebullition. After the march of the army from Salamanca, the only object was to draw off the force of the enemy from pushing his conquests to to Sahagun, and discovered that Buonaparté was bearing down on him from Madrid, he then had no option but to re tire on Astorga, at the same time that he felt no doubt, that if he could have come upon Soult, the result would have been worthy of his great character. -He could not conclude without adverting to that part of the right hon. gent.'s speech, that seemed to imply that our losses in Spain had been more than what had been stated by his hon. relation; he believed that statement would be found to be correct; as to the artillery, he denied that the French got a single piece: what could not be carried off had been spiked; there was certainly a trifling escort with a few pieces of artillery on their way to Romana's army; this he apprehended had fallen into their hands, and it was of those they had so vaunted. He ridiculed the notion of our military character being lost in consequence of the late reverses, and asked if the disgraces of Vimiera and Corunna were to be blotted from the memories of Englishmen? If, however, they were anxious for inquiry, they might go into a Committee that would occupy them three months; but nothing was a greater mistake, than the supposition that those who called for inquiry, meant that they wanted information (Hear!). He left it with confidence to the house to say, whether any case had been made out to justify the motion of the right hon. gent.; and where no case was made out no enquiry could be called for. Mr. Tierney observed, that there never was a speech which called so much for animadversion as that which the noble lord had just closed. The noble lord said that there was no prima facie case against ministers. There were, however, few men in England who would agree with him in that opinion; there would not one, he believed, be found to agree with the noble lord, if the whole country were to be polled over. The prima facie case was this; that | availing.-The noble lord had said, that England had sent out to Spain an army of it was degrading to the house to go into a 153,000 men, and that they had returned committee to enquire into this subject. again under the fire of the French cannon! Was it degrading to do that which alWhat had this army done in the peninsula most every man in the country must that had not been undone? If he had elo- feel to be the duty of the house of comquence sufficient, he might describe in mons?-But then the noble lord said, glowing terms the victories of sir A. Wel- Why don't you wait for the Papers ?". lesley in Portugal; but the prima facie The reason was obvious, the motion was case was, that, owing to the councils of not a censure upon the government; what ministers, all that he and others had done was called for was a Committee of Inquiry, was in vain; and that we had no hopes of and there the noble lord would have an maintaining ourselves in Portugal, except opportunity of producing all the docuit was the good pleasure of Buonaparté ments which he might think material for to leave it in our possession; for he pre- his own justification. To move for docusumed the noble lord would not venture to ments from day to day, as the noble lord state that Buonaparté might not, if he proposed, could furnish no accurate inforpleased, be now in as complete possession mation either to the house or the public; of Portugal as he was twelve months ago. for after one set had been produced, anoAfter all the promises of the noble lord, ther set might appear necessary, and so aud the mighty hopes that were held out, the matter might be protracted to the end the little prima facie case that remained of the session. What he wanted was viva was this, that the almost unparalleled voce evidence; he wanted to examine offibravery of our troops had not been able to cers who had served under the gallant save the country from disgrace (loud cries Moore, to learn what were his sentiments of no! no! and hear! hear! from the mi- on the subject; he wanted to know how nisterial benches). He could not be un- the troops had been equipped; what was derstood to mean that any slur attached to the nature of the commissariat; and whethe army or its officers. But this cheer ther it was not so grossly ignorant of the was truly kind now; for never had he method of supply that the army was starvheard any speech from a secretary of state ing in the midst of plenty? (Hear! hear!!). so little cheered as those which the noble The noble lord then came to details, and lord bad delivered on the present and on a nothing, he said, could be done till the former occasion (a laugh and cries of hear! Supreme Government was constituted at hear!). Our failures were not owing to the Aranjuez, in September. But had not the army, but to the military councils which noble lord the means of ascertaining what his majesty, unfortunately for the country, they might require by a previous commuhad chosen. And while he paid the truest nication with those, who, it was well tribute of applause to the bravery and skill known, would form part of that governof the former, he could not look at the ment? Might he not form some idea of imbecility of the latter without indigna- what the wants of the Spaniards would be, tion and contempt. If he were merely and make his preparations accordingly? to state the case, it would bear him out in But the noble lord plainly said, that sir what he said. After all the boasting of David Baird's troops were not ready till the noble lord and his colleagues; after the end of September.-What a confession all the hardships to which our army had was this from the noble lord, who talked been exposed, the only triumph was, that so much of vigour and promptitude, and we had got most of our troops back again! of transports upon transports! But, he "The noble lord, it must be confessed, was certainly did confess, that the troops were a man of a most singular disposition, for not ready to sail till the close of Septemhe was pleasant on this occasion; and ber, and, if this should appear to be the what served to make others sad, made him case, on inquiry, then the noble lord was merry (hear! hear!). The noble lord had culpable. Two years had not elapsed talked of his right hon. friend's prudence since a draft had been made from the miin bringing forward this motion while helitia of nearly 40,000 men, with a view to had his troops together. He sincerely wished the noble lord had followed that policy with regard to Spain, and brought the troops there to act in a body at a period when their exertions would have been any contingency or emergency of this sort; but the noble lord said, that nothing could be done till October. On that point, he differed very much in opinion from the noble lord, as he might have known before what might be wanted to enable him to a situation was sir John Moore placed! he nothing was heard of but universal insur- But matters, sufficient, indeed, to counterbalance the authority even of the noble lord. -But so it was, that Buonaparté, whether right or wrong, got to Madrid, and then sir John Moore formed the resolution to advance. Now, he wanted much to know whether sir John Moore had received instructions to advance at that particular moment? And he also wanted to know why the troops that were embarking, to the number of 13,000 men, were not sent forward immediately to his assistance in his retreat? Great advantages might have resulted from this: in the first place, gen. Moore might have been alive, and if 10,000 men, a great proportion of which were actually in the transports, had been sent to Corunna, then a real diversion might have been effected; for the army might, perhaps, have maintained itself for some time in that place, and in reality obliged Buonaparté to turn his whole attention to that quarter. But instead of this, he had heard that Buonaparté having seen the British army on the road to Lugo, had turned the greater part of his force again towards the south, and left it 'to one of his generals, with what he conceived to be a sufficient body of troops to execute the object.-Now, what was Buonaparte's prima facie case? He had promised to crown his brother in Madrid within three weeks of the time when he passed the Pyrenees. He had done so. He had promised to drive the English into the sea; and though he was not able to do this exactly, our army, it was well known, was obliged to embark under the fire of the French cannon. The noble lord's prima facie case was directly the reverse.. He had promised every thing, and done worse than nothing. You could never send any where more than 50,000 men; but no nation after this would ever trust to 50,000 men, or 100,000, if directed by such military councils. But then the noble lord said, that it was a great object to create a diversion in favour of the South of Spain, where the people were all hostile to the views of France; why, so they were also in the North; but if any Spanish gentlemen were examined at the bar, they would in all probability say, that after all our promises and exertions we had for them done nothing.—Why did not sir John Moore retreat into Portugal ? If that gallant general had been left to his own discretion, he was persuaded he would have retreated upon Vigo and Portugal. ["His Letter says the contrary," was VOL. XII. whispered by some of the ministers across the table.] Well, that might be, but he might have been of one opinion at the date of that letter, and of a very different one at another time. He wanted to know why we had not taken possession of Ferrol; if the government of Spain had not sufficient confidence in us to grant us this much, why were troops sent to that country at all? But he could not help again asking why sir John Moore had not fallen back on Portugal? The fact was, that this lamented general knew well that he was acting under an administration not very friendly to him; at the same time he did not mean to insinuate that the noble lord had behaved in an illiberal manner to sir John Moore; but certainly the situation of that gallant officer was a most unhappy one. He must have been sensible of the expectations that were encouraged in the country, every newspaper from which was filled with the most crroneous accounts of his situation, and with paragraphs, stating sir John Moore would do this, and sir John Moore would do that. The gallant general must have felt the cruel hardship of his situation, and the little hope he could have of very strong support, if he should happen to do any thing that was wrong; a thing not easily avoided amidst the difficulties with which he was surrounded. But, then, the noble lord had dwelt upon the rapidity of the movements of the French troops, and rested a considerable share of his justification upon this circumstance. Now it was very singular in this prima facie case (to use a favourite expression,) that there was nothing to obstruct the plans of the noble lord, but what he might have known very well before. Buonaparté had taken no pains to conceal the tiine of his marching. He marched on the 5th of Nov. from Bayonne, and he told you so. The sun shone in October; the rain fell in November, and the snow in December; all which were common things, and the noble lord might have learnt them from Moore's Almanack. But the noble lord said, “who could resist such engines of destruction" (he believed that was the precise expression) as the French carried with them." Why, the engines of destruction were horse, foot, and artillery, not uncommon engines of destruction in war (hear! hear!); and the noble lord might have foreseen that the French would possess them, and the failures in fact must be attributed to ministers, unless they could 4 A |