miles; 8. Nogent, three miles; 9. Charenton, two miles; 10. Ivry, one mile and three-quarters; 11 and 12. Bicêtre and Montrouge, each one mile from the enceinte; 13. Vanves, one mile and a quarter; 14. Issy, one mile and a half; 15. Valérien, three miles. These forts are all of perfect construction, the smallest being capable of holding 4000 men. At the time when the forts were constructed the extreme range of hollow projectiles did not exceed two and a half miles; and the mind of the engineer failed to grasp the idea that a time would come, as it has come, when the effective range of shells would be five miles. It should, therefore, be remembered that it was with a view to the conditions of artillery science at the time of their construction that the forts were located; and the disadvantage to the present defence of Paris occasioned by the intervening progress of that science is very considerable. On the north and east, indeed, the forts afford even now a sufficient protection to the city; but the western and southern fronts are weak, for reasons we shall endeavour to explain. First, on the west, it will be observed, by reference to a map, that the Seine, flowing from the point of its southern bend at Sêvres to that of its northern bend at St. Denis, covers the enceinte for an extent of fourteen miles, and is nowhere at a greater distance from the ramparts than two miles; that is to say, everywhere within easy range of the guns from the ramparts. The river here serves the purpose of a wet ditch, the passage of which could not prudently be attempted by an enemy at any point. One mile from the river and three miles from the enceinte, due west from the centre of the Bois de Bologne, was placed the fort of Valérien, which for its size and strength merits the appellation of a fortress; and this was the only exterior defence along the front of fourteen miles above referred to. Now, the distance of Valérien from St. Denis, the nearest fort on the north, is eight miles; and from Issy, the nearest fort on the south, is six miles; leaving, therefore, a considerable space on each side where the besiegers might approach their batteries to the Seine without the risk of serious injury from the guns of the different forts. To remedy this defect, the French, after Sedan, interpolated two new works-the redoubts of Courbevoie and Genevilliers-between Valérien and St. Denis; and two others, those of Montretout and Sêvres, between Valérien and Issy; but, before these could be armed, they were forcibly occupied by the Germans, and although the latter subsequently abandoned all but Sèvres, they have been useless to the defence. Turning now to the south, and commencing from the left, we find the forts Issy, Vanves, Montrouge, Bicêtre, Ivry, located on a range of heights running nearly parallel to the enceinte, at an average distance of one mile and a half. But towards the country there is a second range, parallel to and 200 feet higher than the first, viz. that of Clamart, Chatillon, and Villejuif, which, being only a mile from the line of forts, affords sites for the besiegers' batteries, distant only two and a half miles from the enceinte. Thus the forts which, under the conditions existing at the time of their construction, would have been effective in protecting the city from vertical fire, are not now effective for that purpose. From the heights of Clamart and Chatillon a range of five miles would command the whole of Paris south of the Seine. It is not necessary, therefore, that the besiegers should capture these forts as a preliminary to a bombardment. What is the reason, then, why no such measure has been adopted? The general mode in which the Germans have waged their war ought to be a sufficient proof that no considerations of sentiment or humanity would be allowed to interfere with any method which might promise success at the earliest possible moment. And we are convinced that the one only reason why two millions of human beings, the greater part being helpless women and children, have been spared the horrors of a bombardment, has been the recognition by the German leaders that in an artillery duel they would have been overmatched. According to a Berlin telegram, dated 19th October, the complete siege train had arrived before Paris before that date, but no attempt has yet been made to mount the guns. In ordinary sieges the advantage to the assailant consists in the power to choose one corner or angle of the besieged place for attack, and, by the construction of numerous batteries on a long curved line embracing that angle, to obtain a convergent or concentrated fire on the works adjacent to the angle, in reply to which the fire of the besieged must be divergent, an advantage which results surely in silencing the fire of the place. But the vast circumference of Paris, which is the principal cause of its strength, renders this method inapplicable. The attack and defence are practically limited to a long straight line; and the besieged have built quite as many earthen batteries between two adjacent forts, for the defence, as the Germans have constructed for the attack. Supe riority in an artillery duel would therefore | Vanves, because their capture would open a resolve itself into a question of preponderance in number and power of guns. The composition of the German siege train must be as yet mere matter of conjecture. Trustworthy details of the armament of Paris are likewise wanting; but as a matter of probability, it ought to be superior both in number and power to that of the besiegers, since the French could have mounted the heaviest known guns at their leisure, and neither the number nor the weight of these was limited before the war by difficulties of transport, which have formed so serious a hindrance to the German operations. It would be of small advantage to the besieged that they should possess a superior artillery, if they were obliged to distribute their guns equally all round the defences to provide against a possible attack at any point, while the enemy could mass the whole of his heavy guns for the attack of two or three adjacent forts. But these are not the conditions of the case we are considering. Both from their sorties and other means of intelligence the French possess accurate information as to the locality of the German siege trains, and consequently as to the points threatened with attack; and we cannot doubt, therefore, that by means of the circular railway they have been able to concentrate at those points the greater number of their heavy guns, and that these would be found to be at once more numerous and more powerful than those of the besiegers.* We are inclined to regard the south-western angle of Paris, towards Sêvres, as the weakest point in the city armour; and Mr. Conybeare, in his valuable letters to the 'Times,' has shown good cause for believing that if the German batteries ever opened fire it would be for the purpose of first reducing the two adjacent forts of Issy and * A correspondent of the Times' has lately shown reason for supposing the following details to be correct : The French forts are armed with heavy ship guns-viz., 10-inch, throwing a projectile of 500 lbs.; 9-inch, throwing 300 lbs.; 7-inch, throwing 180 lbs.; and other pieces ranging from 64-inch downwards. Besides these heavy guns have been cast in the Paris foundries for arming the new earthen batteries interpolated between the forts, and at some places constructed considerably in advance; as at Mont Avron, in front of Rosny; Hautes Bruyères and Moulin Saquet, in front of Bicêtre and Ivry; and a new work one mile in front of Valérien, which has lately thrown a shell as far as the outskirts of Versailles. The most powerful gun at the command of the besiegers is believed by the same writer to be one having a calibre of 94 inches, and decidedly inferior to the French 104-inch gun. larger gap than would be created by the reduction of any other three forts, uncovering as it would do the long line of ramparts extending from behind Montrouge to behind Valérien; and because from the sites of Issy and Vanves, supposing them captured, a five-mile range would command all the best parts of the city of Paris, as well north as south of the Seine. But from the preceding remarks it will be gathered that we do not estimate highly the German chances of success in such an attempt. The earthen batteries of the besieged are interpolated between permanent works erected with masonry, while the besiegers' batteries are all of earth. Some idea may be formed of the difficulty of keeping guns covered under a fire from the artillery of the day, from the result of an experiment made at Shoeburyness in 1863, where the Armstrong 100-pounder shell gun, firing from a distance of 2000 yards, made a clear breach thirty feet wide in a hard-rammed earthen parapet twenty feet thick in three hours. Since that date artillery science has made great advances, and the same result would be now obtained by a gun firing from a distance of 7000 yards. These views are supported by the following extract from a letter of the Times' correspondent at Versailles, dated 27th November: : 'I was a little surprised to find the German lines so far retired. It was explained by the advance of the French lines at Villejuif and by the erection of the new batteries which enfiladed part of the former position; and I learnt that my old observatory at the Bavarian redoubt had been utterly razed to the ground by those ruthless forts.' Indeed there is little doubt that the random fire of the forts has occasioned both much loss and no little extra trouble to the German engineers. As a sort of compensation to the garrison for their short rations, the besiegers are subject to some special disadvantages from the peculiarity of their position. As all idea of reducing Paris by force was abandoned, the attitude of the besiegers became purely defensive, and the hardships occasioned by the constant wearying watchfulness necessitated thereby have been very serious. For many weeks it was felt that sorties in force might be expected at any moment: rendering it necessary to keep large bodies of men at their different alarm-posts at all hours, ready for instant action; and reminding us of the good old border days, when the troopers 'Carved at the meal with gloves of steel, For the same reason the German troops who, in the early days of the siege, dwelt comfortably in houses and villages, were compelled to exchange these for encampments in the open, the sites of which were chosen with a view to rapidity of concentration. It is probable that great hardships and much sickness have been occasioned to the besiegers by this attitude of constant watchfulness. We must now turn to the actual events of the campaign, which the foregoing remarks are designed to illustrate. The fall of Toul and Strasburg, both after a brilliant defence, in the last week of September, liberated 80,000 German troops, part of whom were sent to reinforce the investment of Paris; while the remainder, about 70,000, were formed into an army under the command of General Von Werder, to be employed in subjugating Lyons and the south-east. Meanwhile a French army had been gathering on the Loire, having its headquarters at Bourges, about 55 miles south of Orleans, a place containing a large cannon foundry, and of strategical importance, situated as it is within the loop formed by the Loire, and at the junction of the different roads leading to Tours, Blois, Orleans, Gien, and Nevers, all commanding passages over the river. In the early days of the great siege the Germans drew their subsistence from the zone of country surrounding Paris; but that becoming exhausted, their foraging columns. were necessarily detached farther and farther from their supports on all the different roads radiating from the capital; and as large bodies could not be spared for this service, the troops employed therein incurred risk increasing with the distance to which they were detached. Thus the Germans were repulsed with some loss in two attempts to enter St. Quentin, a town lying 100 miles north The whole military and political system of France was at this time in a state of hopeless confusion, without any directing head. The absurd arrangement of entrusting the Prefects with the military command of their respective departments, was producing its natural results in disconnected and useless efforts and conflicting authority. Marseilles and Lyons were threatened with a red republican insurrection, which was only prevented by the good sense and patriotism of the masses. The Prefect of Lyons, without a shadow of justification, arrested General Mazure in command of the troops in that city; and Admiral Fourichon, in disgust because this arbitrary and senseless act was ap-east from Paris. They were likewise twice proved by his colleagues of the Government delegation at Tours, resigned the Portfolio of War. On the other hand, thirteen departments banded together to demand the nomination of a general independent of ministerial authority, to organise the defence of the western provinces. Numerous bodies of Francs-tireurs wandered independently over the country, inspiring as much terror among the inhabitants as the Germans themselves; and at Tours, under the eyes of the Government delegation, the officers of one of these corps were besieged in their hotel and threatened with death by their mutinous followers. The only hope of extrication from this chaos was in the advent of some capable and energetic man, who should be endowed with supreme authority, and with resolution to enforce it. The chief interest of the war centred round Paris and Metz. The operations elsewhere have been of minor importance, and have exercised no appreciable influence. The sieges of Schelestadt, Neuf Brisach, Belfort, &c., being exterior to their general line of operations, were only undertaken by the Germans for the purpose of completing the conquest of Alsace, which they had determin d to annex to Germany; and our limits forbid any further reference to them. defeated and deprived of the provisions they had collected at Dreux, 50 miles due west from the capital. In revenge they burnt the thriving village of Cherizy near the town, as well as all the farms and houses along their line of retreat to Houdan. At Ablis, a beautiful village 45 miles from Paris, on the Chartres railroad, a squadron of Prussian Hussars, there billeted, were surprised in the night by Francs-tireurs; as a punishment for which Ablis was afterwards burnt with circumstances of great atrocity. Early in October the German parties pressed so closely upon Orleans, that General Reyan, with the advanced guard of the Army of the Loire, which had by this time attained a real existence under General La Motterouge, although sadly deficient in discipline and equipment, advancing north of the city, encountered and drove back the Germans from Artenay to Etampes. This sign of life on the part of the French it was thought prudent to stifle at once by detaching from the investing force before Paris the 1st Bavarian Corps under Von der Tann, who on the 10th of October, with his own corps, the 22nd Prussian division, and Prince Albrecht's cavalry, attacked General Reyan at Artenay, and drove him back to the forest of Orleans. Reyan had with him only 15,000 men and one battery of 8-pounders, whilst Von der Tann had sufficient guns to have enabled him to dispense with the greater part of his infantry altogether. Reyan's beaten and demoralized troops carried dismay into Orleans. On the 11th the Germans attacked the positions of the French in the villages covering the town; and after a battle lasting from 10 A. M. to 7 P. M., the French retired over the bridges of the Loire in the direction of Bourges. The army of the Loire before these encounters numbered 60,000 men. Of these, 15,000 were left all day on the 10th to withstand a force three times their numerial strength, and possessing six times their effective value as a military body; while 45,000 of their comrades were kept idle within easy reach of the battle-field. General La Motterouge was now relieved of his command, and the army of the Loire looked forward to a brighter future under D'Aurelle des Paladines,- -a General on the retired list, with the reputation of a resolute soldier and stern disciplinarian, qualities much needed at the time, and of the possession of which he has since given abundant proof. Meanwhile the Deus ex machinâ, the good angel who was to evoke order out of chaos, had descended out of heaven in a balloon. M. Gambetta, after some decidedly sensational aerial adventures, arrived safe at Tours; and his irrepressible energy, sanguine enthusiasm, and undoubted talent for organisation, soon galvanised into fresh and vigorous life what appeared to be the latest throes of the national resistance. Gambetta, combining in his own person the functions of the Ministers of War and of the Interior, was now virtually dictator of France. Flying about the country like a meteor, he gave such energy to defensive measures that the formation of three new armies was commenced and rapidly effected, viz. : 1. The Army of the North, under Bourbaki, with head-quarters at Lille. 2. The Army of Brittany, under the Count de Kératry, a Breton noble of ancient lineage and large local influence, 3. The Army of the Centre, with headquarters at Vendome. On the 27th October there occurred, in the surrender of Metz, perhaps the most calamitous event for France of this most calamitous war, since it now appears certain that if Bazaine had been able to hold out until the French victory of Bacon, that is, just fifteen days longer, the Germans must have raised the siege of Paris. The capitulation must always form a dark page in the history of the French army. Our space does not admit of any detail of the siege; but the statement of Marshal Bazaine, if correct, that when he surrendered he had only 65,000 men available for offensive operations, supplies, when collated with the numbers comprised in the capitulation, at once the strongest condemnation of the soldiery and an undeniable excuse for their commander. The German soldiers treated the inhabitants of Metz with great kindness and consideration, and on the day after the surrender the entire German army voluntarily gave up their bread rations to feed the French prisoners-an instance of generosity we have all the greater pleasure in recording, that we feel it our duty to refer to the behaviour of the rest of the German troops in very different terms. The surrender of Metz weighted the adverse scale of France's destiny with 225,000 additional enemies. Of the seven corps composing the investing force, the 2nd marched straight to reinforce the besiegers of Paris; the 7th was detailed to garrison Metz and to assist in reducing Longwy and Thionville; the 1st and 8th were led by Manteuffel towards Lille; while the 3rd, 9th, and 10th Corps were led by Prince Frederic Charles towards Orleans,* with the intention of filling the gap between Von der Tann on the Prince's right, and Von Werder, at Dijon on his left, and of afterwards pushing forward their long line systematically to the subjugation of the South. The 9th October, which witnessed the surrender of Verdun, brought to the French as a compensation in another quarter their first gleam of success. After the battles before Orleans, Von der Tann, reduced to his own corps by the recall of the 22nd division to Paris and the detachment of Prince Albrecht's cavalry to Chartres, remained inactive on the Loire. A force of 20,000 men, including Prince Albrecht's horsemen, was at Chartres on the 21st October, to hold in check the army of Brittany; and Von der Tann's right flank was covered by a detachment at Chateaudun. Columns of various strength, detached from the investment on the different roads, occasionally suffering a reverse, formed a large semicircle round the west of Paris from Compiègne on the north, by Montdidier, Breteuil, Beauvais, Evreux, Chartres, and Chateaudun, to Orleans on the south. In the beginning of November the French army of the Loire, divided in four corps, numbered 120,000 men-a fair proportion, * It was a marching detachment of Prince Frederick Charles's army that was surprised at Chatillon by Ricciotti Garibaldi. comprising Papal Zouaves, Foreign Legion, &c., being old soldiers. The energy of Gambetta had provided it with a respectable field artillery, and the merciful severity of General D'Aurelle had succeeded in establishing a discipline to which French troops had lately been strangers. One corps had been left at Mer, on the north bank of the Loire, to cover Tours; and on the 6th November the remaining three corps, moving from their head-quarters at La Ferté (twelve miles south of Orleans), crossed the river at Beaugency and formed, with the corps from Mer, a general line extending from the Loire on the right, to Marchenoir, behind the forest of that name, on the left. The communications, with Paris, of Von der Tann who was about Orleans with 25,000 men, being threatened by this disposition, that General on the 7th sent a body of 6000 men to dislodge the French from the forest of Marchenoir, who were repulsed with loss. On the 9th the French advanced to attack Von der Tann, who had meanwhile taken up a position covering his line of retreat towards Paris. After an obstinate defence, prolonged throughout the day with varying fortune, the Bavarians, greatly outnumbered, fell back on the 10th in good order to Toury, where they were reinforced by 20,000 Germans, who had been summoned from Chartres on the first alarm. On the 11th this force was raised to 60,000 by the arrival of the 13th Corps, under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, who then assumed the command of the whole. Two guns, a number of provision and ammunition waggons, and about 1000 prisoners -many of the latter being sick and wounded Germans taken in Orleans-were captured by the French. The victory of Bacon' came in good time to revive the spirit of Paris and of the Provinces. The history of the siege, from the first investment up to the period at which we have arrived, must be briefly summarised. On the 30th September the French made their first sortie against Chevilly and l'Hay towards the south, drove in the enemy's outposts, and penetrated to Thiais and Choisy, where they found strongly-entrenched positions, mounted with field-guns. Being encountered at these places by the German reserves the French retired in creditable order, having suffered considerably greater losses than they inflicted. On the 10th October, an attempt made by Gustave Flourens, at the head of the National Guards of Belleville, to transfer the organisation of the defence to the Commune of Paris, was frustrated by the firm attitude of the remainder of the National Guard in sup port of the de facto Government. The spirit of the city was now thoroughly aroused. Large guns were cast for arming the new earthen batteries constructed between the forts, which last were mounted with powerful ship-guns, many of them ranging to a distance of nearly five miles. Fieldguns were being turned out in large numbers, and the women of Paris were making a million cartridges daily. Surgeon-Major Wyatt, writing at this time from within the city, says:— markable, and no exceptions are asked for, the 'The zealous patriotism of all ranks is reRothschilds taking their turn of duty on the ramparts, equally with all the other citizens, as privates in the Garde Mobile. The Prussians have now certainly lost all chance of success by assault, for delay has rendered the place almost impregnable. ' The garrison made a second sortie on the 13th October, in three columns, against the besiegers' works on the heights of Clamart, Chatillon, and Bagneux, on the south of the city. Great improvement was apparent in the manner of handling and serving their field-guns, as well as in the manoeuvring of their troops. On the 21st the French, sallying from Valérien, attacked the enemy's lines from Bougival to Garches, and withdrew after four hours' fighting, which was very honourable for the young French troops. On the 29th, a few battalions of Mobiles, sallying from St. Denis, surprised some companies of Prussian Guards in the village of Le Bourget (about one mile and threequarters from Fort Aubervilliers, on the road to Brussels). The French held this post until the following day, when, an order having been received by the General commanding the Prussian Guards to retake it at any cost, it was recaptured after a desperate resistance, in which both sides suffered heavily. This operation was undertaken without authority from the Governor of Paris, and was altogether a piece of mismanagement, since, if it was desirable to leave a small French force in so advanced a position, it should have been solidly supported. While the negotiations for an armistice, commenced at Versailles by M. Thiers on the 4th November, were still in progress, Paris was electrified by the news of the victory of Bacon; and the apprehension that the Government was about to conclude an armistice unfavourable to the defence of Paris, excited a popular tumult, headed by Flourens and his partisans, in the course of which General Trochu and his colleagues were for some hours held prisoners in the Hôtel de Ville. As a consequence of that tumult, the powers of the Government were ratified by a plé |