time when Nicole wrote with such depth and truth in the reign of Louis XIV.,-"A declaration of war is a sentence of death pronounced by one prince against the subjects of another who has opposed his will." But what the good and wise Nicole forgot to say is, that the execution of that sentence of death involves some danger to those charged with it by their sovereign, and implies, par contre coup, the infliction of a similar sentence on a good many of his own subjects. . . . We have more and more accustomed ourselves to aim at that false greatness which consists in making perpetual encroachments on our neighbours, or keeping them continually on the qui vive, and enjoying their inquietude as a tribute of due deference to our assumed supremacy. We have become intoxicated with this barren and pernicious pleasure, and we never could forgive those of our sovereigns who neglected to purvey it for us.' ed as in no small degree traceable to an It has sometimes been made matter of reproach to England by Liberal Frenchmen that she showed herself so ready to take the proffered hand of a Prince who had strangled a Republic-the short-lived Republic imposed on France by the Paris revolutionists of February, 1848. But if England had waited to renew her alliance with France till France was ruled by statesmen who had faithfully adhered to republicanism, that alliance could not have been renewed at all. No one of the leaders of the majority of the National Assembly affected such adherence to the Republic -no one of them took the slightest pains to disguise aversion to it as an unforeseen and unwished political catastrophe― a triumph over national opinion, only won by surprise. No one of them would have hesitated to take any opportunity that of fered of overthrowing a form of government which recalled reminiscences of mobterrorism and dictatorship-a terrorism and dictatorship which the language held by some of the most prominent Republicans in 1848 showed that only the power was wanting, not the will, to renew. When Napoleon III. held out his hand to England and showed that preference for her alliance which he has also shown since at some critical epochs of English dominion, as well as of French policy, it would have been a strange political puritanism on our part to reject as an ally a Prince whom France had accepted as a Sovereign. 'Yes, France will have to expiate, one way or other-with the blood of her children, if she succeeds; with the loss of her greatness, perhaps of her very existence, if she fails-the series of faults committed in her name by her Government, since the day when the dismemberment of Denmark was commenced under her eyes-since the day when France favoured that great disorder in the vain hope of profiting by it.' The French refusal of joint action in the case of Denmark with England placed the latter power, as Prevost-Paradol justly remarks, in a similar mortifying position of inability to follow up the 'prave ords' of Lords Russell and Palmerston by corresponding action, to that in which France had found herself placed the year before by the English refusal of joint action in the case of Poland. If any feeling of rancour And here we may cite the independent on that score, or on that of the previous nontestimony of Prevost-Paradol to the truth concurrence of the English Government in that the extensive and deplorable distur- the Imperial proposals for an European Conbance of the peace of Europe, which com- gress, provoked the French Government to menced four years back with the break-up leave England isolated at the Danish crisis, of the old German Bund and the cam- that Government had good cause to rue the paign of Sadowa, may fairly be consider-indulgence of any such feeling, when it find itself isolated in turn two years after-sight of those consequences should have de- In the Preface to his fourth and last 'Now at length,' he exclaimed [1867], 'we find ourselves confronted by that German Question which, at this day, effaces all others, and to which the natural instinct assigns the first place in public solicitude. It called itself the Danish before it called itself the German question, and history will place on record the opening of that Danish question as the precise point of time at which France had it in her power to take her choice between two opposite lines of policy, not less freely, and with not less decisive consequences, than Hercules in the famous legend had to take his choice between vice and virtue. At the Conferences of London everything invited the French Government to assume a firm and unequivocal attitude in favour of Denmark. The sympathy of France for an old and faithful ally; the good will of England, who, from the first to the last day of those Conferences, pressed us to oppose a resolute "No" -pronounced in common with her, and to be supported if necessary by joint action-to the further progress of the iniquitous enterprise of the German Powers; lastly, the paramount and evident interest of France to prevent the aggrandisement of Prussia from aggravating the effects of the treaties of 1815 in that part of them the most full of menace to French greatness. There was the path of virtue-a path easy if ever was path to follow-and, had it been followed, no effusion of blood would have, in all probability, been necessary once more to demonstrate that the sincere and complete union of France and England suffices at critical epochs to preserve order, and vindicate respect for law in Europe. Let it be remembered that this keen prospect of the future was taken in 1867, while the Krupp cannon were yawning, innocent of shot or shell, on the festal Champ de Mars, while the Benedetti rough-drafts of treaty were sleeping snugly in the pigeon-holes of the Berlin Foreign Office, and the disastrous War of 1870 was in the womb of Time. The best apology for what must be called French recreancy on the Danish question was the absorption of French forces in Mexico at that most momentous. crisis for Europe. Mexico may, in fact, be considered to have commenced the ruin of the Second Empire, as Spain did of the First. Less of a crime-though avoidable national bloodshedding must be a crime at all times-the Mexican expedition of Napoleon III. was a similar blunder, on a more distant stage and ish invasion of Napoleon I.: the blunder of on a smaller scale, to the unprovoked Spanattempting by mere military force, necessarily transient in its operation, to subjugate alien and uncongenial races on their own soil. Le jeu ne valait pas la chandelle, whether in Spain or Mexico; and in both cases la chandelle was in urgent requisition for nearer use. On the day, said Prevost-Paradol, when the separation of policy between France and England gave the German Powers free scope for the iniquitous spoliation of Denmark, 'On that day Prussia and France were, so to speak, set in motion against each other, like two trains on a railway, which, starting simultaneously from opposite and distant points, meet each other at length upon the same line. After a long circuit-shorter, however, than might be supposed-the two trains suddenly come in sight of each other. Alas! they are not only each charged with the wealth of nations, but many a heart beats in each animated by no national enmity, and sensible only of the sweetness of life, which they are about to lose. How many tears will the blood cost, which is thus predestined to flow! None wish this ter rible shock to take place-all exert themselves to prevent it. Steam is shut off, brakes are put on. All in vain the impulse has been given too far back, the momentum acquired is too great for resistance. It is inevitable that the sacrifice to human folly should be consummated-to human folly unhappily armed with absolute power.' 'The French Government had adopted a different policy-the precious policy of proportional and simultaneous aggrandisement of France and Prussia. The deliberate surrender of Denmark to German cupidity; the unfortunate appearance of a secret understanding with Prussia in Italy to force Austria by every possible means to war; finally the precarious and degrading dependence on the loyalty and moderation of Prussia, and the eventual necessity of entering the lists ourselves, either to support Prussia and Italy if imperilled by Austria, or to snatch from Prussia, victorious and probably If Prevost-Paradol illustrates by his refaithless, the compensation indispensable to trospect of the past the mispolicy which led French greatness; or, in the last resort, at our own risk and peril, to seek that compensation to war, he illustrates it, we must add, not less for ourselves at the cost of inoffensive Belgium; vividly by showing his own share in it, -such were the inevitable alternative conse- which made him, like M. Thiers, an accesquences of a tortuous policy, from which fore-sory before the act to the onslaught of France on Germany, at length determined | pretended to national unity would justify on in the Imperial councils : 'They talk to us,' he said, in a letter to the Courrier du Dimanche in 1866, of compensation for the approaching completion of German unity. Sir, I know of no compensation but one, which can be worthy of the head of a Government of France, whatever may be his name, or origin, or title--whether he calls himself King, President, or Emperor-and that is to die fighting sword in hand, to prevent it.' France in drawing the sword to keep her, perforce, divided. And the very doubt of victory exasperated the feverish impatience which expected the combat. Prevost-Paradol wrote, two years back, in his France Nouvelle': 'Proceeding on the hypothesis of a war with The Prussia-shall we vanquish Prussia? mere fact that such a question can be asked, shows too clearly the change which has been accomplished within these two years in the relative position of France and Germany.' Prevost-Paradol stated, at that time with truth: It would be unjust to the unfortunate Ruler of France, whose declaration of war against Prussia rekindled into so fierce a blaze from their embers of 1813-14 all those national animosities which still smouldered in the German heart*-to forget that politi- 'It is not that the Prussian Government has cians claiming the title of Moderate on all any desire to provoke, or the French Governother questions, and exercising such influ- ment to make war. Quite the contrary; it is ence as that of Thiers in the legislative notorious at the present time that, from diffebody and Prevost-Paradol in the press, had rent reasons, the chiefs of those two states are been declaring war, as far as words went, the will of men, the force of things leads disincerely disposed for peace. But, in spite of these four years on the whole German na-rectly to war. The reason is very simple; it is tion, if it should dare to complete its union under Prussian leadership or in Prussian alliance. It was casus belli enough that an united German nation should presume to form itself beside an united French nation; and it could only be a question of time, prudence, and preparation, when the Rhine should be crossed to crush such insolent pretensions with the armed force of France. The writer before us, indeed, shows the shrinking of humanity from the horrors of the coming conflict, and the presentiment of genius of the doubtful prospect of success. But in his view the mere fact that Germany * 'I found in Rhenish Germany,' said Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in 1854 to a young relative, Baron Hubert de Tocqueville, the same feelings which you find prevalent at Vienna with regard to the French-feelings often of alarm, almost always of hatred. How should it be otherwise? We turned the world upside down, disturbed the peace of all nations, and stirred society to its very foundations-all in the name of ideas, sentiments, and doctrines, we have ourselves miserably surrendered since. How can we wonder at the opinion now entertained of us in Europe?' And again in 1858-All you tell me of Germany agrees with what I thought and with what I knew of it. I returned from Germany three years ago, convinced that our neigh bours across the Rhine are our irreconcileable enemies, and that, whatever might be the desire of their Governments to ally themselves with us, the people would always draw off their chiefs to other alliances. It was the long, exhausting, and, above all, insolent oppression exercised by the First Empire over Germany that united it as one man against us, and lighted up passions which still survive, and will long survive the causes which gave birth to them in the hearts of the entire German populations.'-Correspondance Inédite, pp. 325-481. all but impossible that Prussia, notwithstanding her prudence, should not make some further step towards the absorption of Germany. And it is impossible that the French Government, notwithstanding its patience, should stand by and see that step made without drawing the sword.' Even on the hypothesis of French victory over Prussia, Prevost-Paradol admitted the probability that the movement towards German unity, stimulated even by defeat, would soon resume its course, and the result would be retarded, rather than finally averted, by a successful effort of the valiant arm of France.' Then to what purpose any such effort to arrest forcibly the operation of those general causes which, in his own opinion, whatever might be the immediate issue of an armed struggle, would continue to operate for the ultimate achievement of German unity? The vehement repugnance with which Frenchmen of all parties since 1866 have regarded German progress towards that achievement, doubtless was quite sincere.. But to entitle that repugnance to express itself sword in hand, Frenchmen should have abstained from aspirations, the continually-recurring avowal of which convinced Germans of all parties of the necessity of closing their ranks and completing their union. France should have shown herself a safe neighbour to the German Confederation of 1815, to have entitled her to quarrel with the German Confederation of 1866 for the mere fact of its existence. The Prussian best hopes of national and international peace and progress. Prevost-Paradol's political imagination was too nimble for the slow march of facts, like that of many highly-endowed Frenchmen; and when such an imagination, bodying forth the forms of things unknown, and events unborn, translates itself into action, it is very apt to precipitate the worst evils it prematurely anticipates. Le Français est une machine nerveuse,' said the First Napoleon, with his keen unsympathising insight into the weak points of the national character. The Frenchman takes umbrage, or takes fright, like a high-mettled charger, at whatever unexpectedly crosses his path, or affronts his amour propre. 'For a nation that has known greatness and glory,' says M. PrevostParadol, there is no alternative between maintaining its old prestige or sinking into complete impotence.' Let this be granted the French people and Government that what they have in this war asserted the right to resist sword in hand in Germany is precisely the same process of consolidation under one head of the disjecta membra of dominion which was completed ages ago in France, and to which France owes all her national greatness. And for France, of all nations, to pretend to arrest that process on the ground of the treaties of 1815, might be endurable, if all her efforts since 1848, and even since 1830, had not been directed to throw contempt on those treaties, and nullify their provisions at every possible opportunity. From the date of the severance of Belgium from Holland to that of the 'revendication of Savoy and Nice, all French parties have been ready to abet all infringements on the treaties of 1815 which favoured French interests. The French fixed idea of reclaiming the Rhine frontier, which the wars of the Revolution had put in their pos--it may still be affirmed that the old pressession for the first time, was cherished as regardlessly of the treaties of 1815 as the German fixed idea of national unity, which she is now realising. So wise a man as Tocqueville talked fifteen years ago, in his Correspondence, of the great chimera of German unity as taking a much firmer hold on the German imagination than the desire for real liberty in each of the countries of which Germany is composed. The two fixed ideas of the two nations have come at last, as they could not but come at last, in collision, and the French idea of reconquest may be likened to brilliant and brittle Sèvres china dashing itself, like the jar in the fable, against Berlin iron. tige of nations is the last thing they lose, if they forbear from exposing it to over-rude tests. The old prestige of the Spain of Charles V. survived a succession of Philips. The old prestige of the Venetian power and polity long outlived its real vigour.. The old prestige of France assuredly would have been in no immediate peril from the pacific and therefore protracted process of German unification, which French impatience has precipitated by the red-heat of warfare fusing Fatherland instantaneously into one. Prevost-Paradol's passionate demand-What can become of France, with a new military power of fifty-one millions of men at her doors?' is best answered by another question-What wisdom was there It is a question which, from time to time, on the part of France in calling, by her armed the course of events forces on attention attack, that new power which might long have how is it that all the wisdom of France remained dormant, into sudden self-consciousproves unequal to control her unwisdom? ness, and compelling it to energetic action? At the recent crisis of her fate, as at all What was to become of France with an former crises, there has been enough in United Germany at her doors depended France of what Guizot somewhere calls the mainly on what degree of genial heat France vigueur rationnelle of political disquisition herself retained-of what internal and exterto set up all Europe in wise saws and modern nal development France remained capable. instances. There is enough, for instance, in If her internal power of growth and expansion Prevost-Paradol's France Nouvelle,' tho- was decaying-and her all but stationary roughly to lay bare the main cause of what population at home, and failure to colonise he calls 'nos échecs depuis 1789,' which may even so near a dependence as Algeria, must be be briefly indicated as the 'perfervidum Gal- admitted to be shrewd symptoms of national lorum ingenium,' ever overshooting the mark senescence and debility-the causes of decline of the practically attainable, and ever too could only be aggravated by more arming impatient of any powers confronting its will and more fighting. Foremost amongst those -however legitimately existing-to come causes, in Prevost-Paradol's opinion in to any terms of compromise with them. which opinion he stood by no means single Intolerance, to the pitch of internecine con- amongst serious French writers-is the slow flict, of whatever thwarts it at home or rate of progress of French population of late abroad, is the constantly-recurring character times compared with that of her more proof public action in France. Upon that rockgressive continental or insular rivals. have split, for the last eighty years, all her must consider as absolutely chimerical,' he - We says, 'every project and hope of preserving | Paradol therefore turned his views to Algeria, for France her relative rank in the world, if which, though it has been a French territhose hopes and projects do not take this torial possession these forty years, seems maxim as their point départ-that the num- little nearer becoming a French colony than ber of Frenchmen must be made to increase at the date of conquest. A hundred and with sufficient rapidity to maintain a certain twelve thousand Europeans, imperfectly equilibrium of our numerical force with guarded by seventy-six thousand soldiers, in that of the other great nations of the world.' the midst of two millions and a half of Assuredly the wars of the Second Empire, Arabs ever ready to take advantage of the like those of the First, have run directly coun- slightest negligence to rise in revolt against ter to every project and hope of preserving us-voilà l'Algérie. Pointing to the rapid for France her relative rank in the world' by progress of the young colony of Queensland, preserving unexhausted her flower of man- Prevost-Paradol asked sorrowfully what hood, and function of officina gentium. To would it have been in the hands of France? that function England and Germany have succeeded the former in the direct work of planting new colonies, the latter in furnishing immense contingents to the invading forces best befitting these ages, which seek new hemispheres, not to contend with rivals, but to conquer the wilderness. 'Forty millions of French,' said PrevostParadol, concentrated on our own territory, are by no means sufficient to form a counterpoise to fifty-one millions of Germans, whom Prussia may perhaps be able to unite on our frontier, and the increased population which Russia may be able to boast of at no distant period. 'What Englishman would ever have been tempted to emigrate thither? What else would have been seen there but a camp, a café, a theatre, a prison? May the day soon come,' he exclaimed, 'when our countrymen, finding themselves cramped for room in French Africa [Frenchmen have hitherto formed an inconsiderable portion of its scanty European population], will overflow over Morocco and Tunis, and at length lay the foundation of that Mediterranean empire, which will not only supply a satisfaction for our national pride, but which, in the future state of the world, will certainly become the last refuge of our national greatness.' After all, has not every nation its bee in 'But how insignificant becomes this French its bonnet?-and may it not modestly be figure of forty millions if we take the census of all the populations of English tongue who asked, whether the British buzzer has not will cover the globe, when the United States of perhaps buzzed as idly in its time as any of America-when the Anglo-Saxon States of its neighbours? Amongst the titles of the Oceania-shall have reached full development! chapters remaining unwritten of Arbuthnot's How shall we assure ourselves of a proportion-History of John Bull,' we find the followate increase of population, indispensable, if it is hoped that the French name is still to count for something in the world?' ing-Chap. iv.: Of the methods by which John endeavoured to preserve peace among his neighbours; how he kept a pair of steelThis question also may be replied to by yards to weigh them, and by diet, purging, another-How could the youth of France vomiting, and bleeding, tried to bring them be driven by hundreds of thousands into to equal bulk and strength.' Of the schemes the life of camps, yet retained for the life to preserve the European balance of power of cottages and the functions of fathers of which busied John Bull three centuries, it families? How could the wealth of France may be observed that his apprehensions and be lavished by thousands of millions on his armaments were almost always directed military adventures, yet husbanded for against objects of traditional jealousy and home-culture or for peaceful colonization? enmity which had become antiquated, and Prevost-Paradol conceived a correspond- long after the real sources of danger should ing increase of territory to be not less in- have been sought (if such must needs be dispensable than the desired increase of sought) elsewhere. Thus James I. lost population to preserve the relative impor- credit for seeking to be friends with Spain, tance of France in the scale of nations. after Spain was no longer dangerous as an He perceived, however, with the good sense enemy; and Cromwell gained credit for the which struggled with his uneasy patriotism, spirited' foreign policy which sent a that France can no longer hope to found British auxiliary force to Dunkirk to help colonies at a distance from her central seat France to substitute a really formidable of empire. In the first place, the Aó: Tov rising power for the safer neighbourhood of OT is a demand now difficult to answer: a sinking power in the Spanish Low Counthe earth's surface is for the most part pre- tries. In John Bull's slowly transferred apoccupied in the next place, Frenchmen in prehension, the French next succeeded the the present age seem to have lost the spi- Spaniards in the traditional character of rit of distant colonial adventure. Prevost-natural enemies,' which they have only of เ |