ing to Prince Leopold a throne so precarious and tottering as that of Belgium, can_never be sufficiently reprobated. It was a piece of positive injustice to Holland; because, while we declined to guarantee to the King of the Netherlands his revolted Belgian subjects, we had no sort of difficulty in guaranteeing his revolted subjects against the King of the Netherlands. We guaranteed the revolutionary, but declined to guarantee the legitimate throne: we supported the revolted Belgians, but refused to do any thing in favour of the dispossessed Dutch. And this is called non-intervention, and holding the balance even between the aristocratic and democratic divisions of the world! What we should have done in these circumstances, is perfectly obvious. We had refused, and rightly refused, to aid the King of the Netherlands in his quarrel with his Belgian subjects; and on the same principle we should have refused to aid the Belgian revolutionists in their quarrel with the King of the Netherlands. "A clear stage and no favour" should have been our principle. We should have said to Leopold-" Go, if you choose, to Belgium; make what you can of the throne of the barricades; but do not expect us to aid you against our ancient ally, or give that succour to menaced democracy which we have so recently refused to endangered royalty." This would really have been non-intervention; this would have been acting justly; this would have kept England free from embarrassments; and this would, long ere this, have extinguished the flame which threatens to involve the world in its conflagration. No mortal now doubts that if the Dutch had been let alone, they would, last autumn, have easily crushed the Belgian insurrection, and restored freedom, order, and happiness to the beautiful but agonized and withering provinces of Flanders.What paralysed them in the midst of success, and stayed the uplifted arm of lawful authority? The army of Gerard and the fleet of Codrington; the power of France and the dread of England; the arms of a revolutionary monarch, and the fleets of an innovating administration. We looked, and looked anxiously, to see what Lord Grey said on this subject, and how he attempted to justify so gross an instance of revolutionary interference. He evaded the difficulty; he absolutely said nothing on this the vital point in the whole Belgian question. He said that Belgium and Holland had been four months separated, and it was evident they could not be again united. "It was evident!"-This is an easy way of defending a proposition which is utterly indefensible, and avoiding an objection which is altogether insurmountable. Is the separation of every country evident, because for four months it has been in a state of revolt? Has Earl Grey forgot that six long years of warfare, and the destruction of five great armaments had taken place in Greece, before the Allied Powers ventured on the doubtful measure of defending the Christians of the Morea from Egyptian extermination? Has he forgot that France recovered its dominion in La Vendée, after four bloody campaigns, and the extermination of a million of men? If "four months" is the period assigned for recovering dominion, under pain of having a revolutionary sovereign guaranteed on the throne of the revolted province-why was not this measure of justice dealt out to the Imperial Autocrat during his nine months' campaign against Poland ? Why was army after army allowed to be precipitated on that heroic land, at the very time that not a soldier was allowed to advance from Holland into Belgium? Let us take care that this principle is not applied against ourselves, and a revolutionary monarch installed on the throne of Ireland, because "four months have elapsed," and the British authority is not re-established in that island. Truly, when we recollect the long and faithful alliance of Holland with Great Britain, and attend to the conduct of this country towards her monarch in the period of his misfortunes, we are not surprised that the Dutch captains have resolved to blow up their vessels rather than strike to the flag of England. It is evident, therefore, that our conduct towards Holland has been utterly inexcusable; that we have, under the specious name of preserving the peace of Europe, and by the 1 aid of mistifying protocols, veiled an act of downright spoliation; and, with the words of freedom and liberty in our mouths, engaged in a system of revolutionary aggression and despotic partition. History will class this flagrant oppression towards the King of the Netherlands, with the strangulation of Venice and the partition of Poland, and declare that the rise of tempestuous democracy in England has been attended with an instance of national vacillation, and an exertion of despotic ambition, unparalleled in the long period of its tranquillity and freedom. III.-The fatal step of interfering between the King of the Netherlands and his rebellious subjects, and guaranteeing to the latter the revolutionary throne which they had erected on the foundation of the barricades, explains at once the otherwise inexplicable act of abandoning the barrier of Wellington and Marlborough against France. It was no doubt an object to establish a revolutionary monarch in Belgium; but it was a still greater object to preserve the good-will of Francethe great focus and centre of republican propagandism. But the elevation of a Prince, with British feelings and a British connexion, to the throne of Belgium, necessarily gave umbrage to French ambition, and might possibly threaten the ultimate acquisition of the Low Countries by that ambitious power. Something, therefore, required to be done to calm the effervescence of the Palais Royalsomething to heal the wounded pride of the heroes of the barricadessomething to give an earnest that the march of Dumourier to Brussels might again be renewed; and Antwerp again become the pivot of invasion and aggression on this country. To accomplish these objects, the barrier fortresses were sacrificed; the fruit of the battle of Waterloo abandoned; and Belgium for ever rendered a revolutionary power, by throwing down the gates between it and republican France. truth does the Constitutionnel declare, that this single act has "inverted the relative position of Flanders to France and the Allied Powers; instead of being the advanced post of Europe against France, it has become the advanced post of France against Europe." With We again repeat that we do not accuse Ministers of an intention to sacrifice the interests of Great Britain in this unparalleled proceeding. What we say is, that their understandings have become so warped by opposition to their political opponents, that they are incapable of perceiving the consequences of their actions; and that they they have wound up their political existence so completely with the cause of revolution abroad and innovation at home, that they are unable to extricate themselves from the perilous torrent.We have no doubt that Talleyrand clearly perceives the consequences of all these measures, and we honour him as a true patriot for doing what he has done. It was as much his duty to urge, by diplomatic art, and the specious guise of a new era in human affairs, the demolition of the fortresses, as it was Wellington's duty by military force to compel their formation. What we reprobate is the fumes of democracy and the spirit of faction which blind and infatuate the human mind, and make men adopt measures for the furtherance of particular interests, or the support of long cherished ideas, fraught with lasting disaster, beneficial only to their enemies, and which their own judgment, if applied impartially to the subject, would be the first to condemn. Let not the illusion be cherished, that because Leopold once was intimately connected, and long has resided in this country, therefore by placing him on the throne, we establish British influence in that important kingdom, and can afford to destroy the fortresses from the ascendency we have acquired over the government. It is not past recollections, but future expectations or present necessities, which govern mankind. By placing Leopold on the throne of Belgium, with the French armies within three days' march of Brussels, and an open road unguarded by fortresses between them, we necessarily threw him into the arms of that power. Whether he forgets the Princess Charlotte in the arms of a Princess of France or not, certain it is, that he will abandon English interest in the necessity of maintaining French connexion. What can the fleets or the money of England do to protect his open and unfortified frontiers from Marshal Soult, at the IV. But this is not all; new, and to this country equally galling consequences, have resulted from this separation of Holland from Belgium, which we actually produced, by preventing their reunion when the Dutch monarch was on the point of effecting it. This involves the question of the Russian Dutch Loan, the most palpable and evident, though by no means the most serious, error committed by the innovating admi nistration. To understand this subject, it is only necessary to recollect, that in 1815, on occasion of the establishment of the kingdom of the Netherlands, a loan of 50,000,000 of gilders, or L.5,000,000 sterling, due by Russia to Holland, was undertaken by the King of the Netherlands and Great Britain. The purpose of this engagement was to secure the powerful aid of Russia in upholding the new kingdom of the Netherlands and the barrier fortresses against France, and accordingly a part of the consideration which she gave for the bond, was discharged in the large force which she retained in the Ne- As this was the object of the treaty, "It is hereby understood and agreed between the high contracting parties, that the said payments on the part of their majesties the King of the Netherlands and the King of Great Britain, shall cease and determine, should the possession and sovereignty (which God forbid) of the Belgic provinces, at any time, pass, or be severed from the dominions of his majesty the King of the Netherlands, previous to the complete liquidation of the same." Nothing could be more express than this clause. It declares the obligation of England at an end, if Flanders should ever be separated from Holland. When the separation took place, therefore, not only with our full knowledge, but by our active interference; when we had guaranteed to Leopold his revolutionary throne, and sent our fleet, in conjunction with the armies of France, for his defence, the condition suspensive of the obligation had occurred. The Dutch government accordingly viewed the matter in that light; for as soon as the separation took place, they ceased to make any farther payments on account of the loan. It is clear England was entitled to have done the same. But this would probably have embroiled Ministers with Russia; or the discussion of the subject in Parliament might have led to awkward disclosures during the transports of new-born Reform. To avoid these evils, Government neither laid the difficulty before Parliament, nor stopped payment of the dividends on the bonds, in terms of the conditions, but went on paying them, as if the contemplated separation had never taken place, and the Netherlands had still formed a compact and united barrier against France. And this was done, when so far from having done any thing to prevent the separation of the Netherlands, been," as the Times expresses it, " from the very first, the most strenuous advocates for the settlement " we had 1 of the Belgium question, on the footing of a complete divorce."* Indeed, Government themselves are so far from attempting to disguise, that they glory in the share we had in effecting the separation of Holland and Belgium. "What has England done?" says the Solicitor-General, on the debate on this question. "Had she not interfered? She had assisted to accomplish the separation. England had been accessory to the separation, and it was not in good faith to say that a separation which had been in a manner CAUSED BY HERSELF, should have been taken advantage of to avoid the payment." It is needless to say any thing on the legal question, as to whether the condition suspensive of the bond had occurred. The greatest lega authorities of England, Lord Eldon, Sir E. Sugden, Sir James Scarlett, are unanimous that it had. There is an end therefore of the legal question. But it is said that, though free in law, we were bound in honour and equity; and we at once admit that a debt of honour must be paid. But why is it said by Lord Brougham that it was a debt which England was bound in honour to discharge? Because Russia had done nothing to produce the separation of Holland and Belgium, and therefore could not be fairly implicated in the consequences of a proceeding to which she had not been accessory. But observe what this argument implies as to the objects of the bond. It admits that the object of the undertaking by England was to interest Russia in the preservation of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, and yet we were avowedly the parties who broke it up. We first undertake a debt of L.5,000,000, in order to secure the consolidation of a kingdom; we then become "the most strenuous advocates" for, and chief instruments in effecting, its dislocation; and then we go on paying the debt which was contracted to perpetuate and ensure its consolidation, in the face of a condition which provided for its cessation on that event. This appears to us to be by far the strongest view of the question of the * Times, Feb. 4, 1832. Russian Dutch Loan which can be urged. It drives Ministers into a dilemma from which it is impossible to escape. If they were right in forwarding, by every means in their power, the separation of Holland and Belgium, they were clearly wrong in continuing payment of the public money on account of the loan; if they were right in continuing the payment of the loan, they were as clearly wrong in the previous measures which led to the separation. But first to urge on the separation, and hinder the reunion, and then continue the payment which their own act had caused to cease being obligatory, is a concatenation of absurdity rarely paralleled in the annals of diplomacy. According to Lord Brougham's arguments, we should be bound to continue the payment though the Netherlands were united to France by voluntary union; "because," says he, "it was external conquest, not internal dislocation, which was the suspen sive condition." That is, we should be bound to continue a conditional payment, intended to prevent an event, when the very event meant to be guarded against has occurred. Nothing more decisive to shew the absurdity of the proceeding can be imagined. We do not so much blame Ministers for continuing the payments that should have been done by Parliamentary authority, as for other parts of the transaction; the omission of that which could be supplied by a bill of indemnity, is a matter of comparatively little importance. What we charge them with is, the enormous error of having promoted, by such decisive means as they did, the sepаration of Holland and Belgium, in the face of the clear interests of England, and in the knowledge of the heavy burdens which they now hold out as irremovable, which the nation had undertaken, in order to secure their union. That is the fatal error; the error which is now irremediable, which has lost to Great Britain the whole fruit of the battle of Waterloo, and complicated its foreign diplomacy in a way which no human wisdom will be able to unravel. + Debate, Thursday, 26th Jan. 1832. The Ministerial Journals, more candid than their superiors, have revealed the real reason of this extraordinary proceeding. They say it was necessary to keep Russia quiet -that a refusal to pay the dividends would have embroiled us with that power, and that therefore it was expedient to continue the payment, in order to prevent that great power from openly espousing the cause of Holland. In other words, this voluntary and gratuitous undertaking of the bond, after it had ceased to be obligatory, was a bribe to Russia to wink at our forcibly preventing the King of the Netherlands from regaining his authority over Belgium, and for preserving a revolutionary throne in that kingdom, to the imminent hazard of European independence; that is, for the pleasure of establishing the throne of the barricades in the Netherlands, and opening the gates of that country to France, we are, besides throwing down the barrier fortresses, to pay five millions sterling. One would hardly imagine, from these proceedings, that England has seven hundred millions of debt, and has an income of L.700,000 a-year less than her ordinary expenditure. It is urged for Ministers, that if we had not interfered to arrest the King of Holland when about to vanquish the Belgians, the inevitable consequence would have been, that the newly-erected kingdom would have been subdued, and that instantly France would have poured in her armies, and the peace of Europe would have been destroyed. We have no doubt that the French would have done this, knowing, as they did, that a Reforming Administration, who had adopted their visionary ideas of freedom, was at the head of affairs in this country. But would they have done it, if Pitt or Wellington had been at the helm? Would they have ventured to beard Europe in arms, if England had been at its proper place in the van of independence and freedom, instead of sinking into the second line behind the throne of the barricades? It was the alliance with England-the knowledge that we had guaranteed the throne of Belgium to Leopold as well as them, which rendered the French so valiant. Had we acted otherwise, they would never have stirred from Valenciennes. The Austrians bearded them in Italy-the boasts of democracy came to nothing, and the march of revolution was speedily checked to the south of the Alps. The original sin of our Belgian interference has been that insane system of conceding to the populace, which lighted Bristol with the fires of conflagration, and promises, ere long, to involve the world in its flames. No revolutionary danger was ever yet averted by concession to the demands of democracy, any more than any mob was dispersed by flying from its approach. We have seen what the system of concession led to at Bristol; and the conduct of Government, in regard to Belgium, appears to have been founded on the same principles-" Concede every thing to the Belgian and Parisian mobs avoid every thing which can irritate them-dismantle the fortresses, to keep them in good humour." These are the principles on which we have acted. The sending the 14th Dragoons out of the burning city, is not without a parallel in sending the fortresses out of the burning conti nent. What we should have done in this crisis is sufficiently plain. We should really have followed out the system of non-interference: we should have done nothing either to restore Charles to the throne of France, or the King of the Netherlands to that of Belgium; but we should have done as little to prevent them from endeavouring to regain them. We should have allowed the Belgians to choose what Sovereign they liked, or adopt what form of government they preferred, on the condition only, that Belgium was to be part of the Germanic Confederation, and its fortresses intrusted to the surveillance of the Allied Powers, and that they were to fight it out, without foreign aid, with their ancient Sovereign. We were enti tled to demand this, because their fortresses, though locally situated in Belgium, were, in fact, the common property of the Allied Powers, and the barrier, not of Belgium, but of Europe. Had we done this, we would have preserved our good faith inviolate to our ancient allies; we would |