thought in apt language, but without the tendency to run into the path of debate or exposition, which ap peared in the acts of some of his colleagues of the Tribunal of Arbitration.

In comparing Mr. Stampfli, with his deep-brown complexion, his piercing dark eyes, his jet black hair, his quick but suppressed manner, and the Viscount of Itajubá, with his fair complexion and his air of gentleness and affability, one, having no previous knowledge of their respective origins, would certainly attribute that of the former to tropical and passion. ate America, and that of the latter to temperate and calm-blooded Europe.

SIR ALEXANDER COCKBURN.

On the extremes of the Board, Mr. Adams to the right and Sir Alexander Cockburn to the left, sat the American and British members of the Tribunal.

Sir Alexander Cockburn represents a family of some distinction, the Cockburns of Langton. His father was British Minister in Colombia, and one of his uncles was that Admiral Sir George Cockburn, whose service in American waters during our last war with Great Britain has left some unpleasant traces or memories in the United States. His mother seems to have been a French lady, being described by Burke as "Yolande, dau. of Viscomte de Vignier of St. Domingo." He was born in 1802, called to the bar in 1829, became distinguished as a barrister, eutered Parliament, and, after passing through the routine offices of Solicitor and Attorney General, was

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made Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas in 1856, and of the Queen's Bench in 1859, which place he still fills.

He presided for sixteen years in the common-law courts of England without being raised to the peerage. It is unnecessary to speculate on the reasons for this unusual, if not unprecedented fact.

Iis political career dates from his zealous defense of Lord Palmerston in the affair of the notorious David Pacifico. This person was an adventurer of doubtful nationality and of bad character, in whose behalf the navy of Great Britain, under Lord Palmerston's direction, seized the Piræus, captured Greek merchant-vessels, and threatened Athens. The ground of claim was alleged destruction of property by a mob. Pacifico claimed, according to the official statement of the case by the British Government, £4916 on account of furniture and other personal effects, which he originally stated at only 5000 francs, and £26,618 168. 8d. on account of papers. It is very doubtful whether the claim was a proper subject of interna tional reclamation. But, after a three months' block ade, Grecce submitted to pay £5000, of which £4720 was either falsehood or consequential damages; and afterward, on examination of the case in Lisbon, a commission awarded the petty sum of £150 in full satisfaction of the pretended loss of £26,618, induced perhaps by political reasons rather than by conviction of any rights of Pacifico.

The conduct of Lord Palmerston and the British Government in this affair nearly involved Great Brit

ain in a war with France and Russia. The French Embassador retired from London to Paris for the purpose of personal communication on the subject with his Government. Count Nesselrode on behalf of Russia remonstrated in a dispatch, which the Loudon Times characterized as reproachful, irrefutable, and just, and as profoundly affecting the peace of Europe and the dignity of Great Britain. The united voice of Europe and America has condemned the conduct of Great Britain in this affair. The House of Lords closed an historic debate by a vote of censure of the Government. In the Commons, the last words of Sir Robert Peel were raised in protest against this outrage on the rights of other nations; the morn ing dawned on a protracted session of the House before he recorded his vote of condemnation; in the afternoon of the same day he met with the accident which closed his honorable life. Mr. Gladstone in the same debate said that the claim was "on the very face of it an outrageous fraud and falsehood;" that "it was mere falsehood and imposture," and that " a greater iniquity had rarely been transacted under the face of the sun."

Sir Alexander Cockburn was then without parlia mentary distinction or political advancement. With the devotion of a Dalgetty, he placed his lance at the service of a chief, regardless of the merits of the cause. He was soon rewarded for his services by appointment to the office of Solicitor-General, from which he was promoted step by step, with unexam. pled celerity, to his present position.

Since he became the head of the Queen's Bench he has occasionally appeared in the field of letters on questions connected with municipal or public law, but not in a way to invite respect at home, or attention beyond the limits of Great Britain.

A few years ago he published a monogram on the subject of nationality, in which he reproduced in an abridged form [but quite incorrectly, as the remarks of a most competent judge, Mr. Beach Lawrence, on droit d'aubaine, tend to show] the matter contained in the report of a commission appointed by the Gov ernment to inquire into and report upon the laws of naturalization and allegiance in England.

Again, when it was proposed to arraign Nelson and Brand as criminals in England for acts committed in Jamaica under proclamation of martial law, Sir Alex ander Cockburn delivered a voluminous charge to the grand jury, which he afterward published with additions and notes, notwithstanding the partiality and the urgency of which, the grand jury refused to find a bill; and it must be confessed that, as a charge, it was pas sionate, vague, declamatory, and confused; and as an exposition of law, it is valueless when compared with the treatises of Mr. Finlason, in England, and of Mr. Whiting, in America, on the same subject.

This charge, and some proceedings by which it was followed, provoked much criticism. Mr. Gathorne Hardy, for instance, called attention to the fact that the Chief Justice "vacillated," that he "went from one side to another," so as to render it doubtful what his opinions really were; and Mr.

Hardy, as well as Mr. Mill, who spoke on the other side of the general question, said that the charge was "not law," and was "without legal authority." Mr. Finlason, a most competent authority, said that, “ although the charge dealt so largely in denunciation," it was "utterly indeterminate and indecisive;" that "it avowed a state of entire doubt;" that, though "there was much denunciation of law laid down [by others], there was no positive declaration of law laid down by the Chief Justice." The same writer also points out grave mistakes of history as well as errors of law in this charge. Thus, the Chief Justice as sumes, as a cardinal thought, that martial law and military law are one and the same thing: a mistake, which implies extraordinary confusion of mind, for getfulness of his own official opinions in the inci dents of the rebellion in Ceylon, and ignorance of the most commonplace events of English history, for instance, as detailed in Hallam and Macaulay.

I allude to these criticisms for the reason that, as will appear in the sequel, the same singular intellect. ual traits and moral characteristics of the Chief Jus tice, which became conspicuous at Geneva, had shown themselves on the Queen's Bench, and had attracted the notice of his fellow-countrymen.

I refer to this charge for another cause. It is diffi cult for many reasons to measure the exact personal value of ordinary legal opinions delivered, in the course of adjudication, by any judge of the Queen's Bench. All such difficulties cease when he goes out of his way to deliver a demonstrative charge to a