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invasion by a million of men in arms, not though millions of money are emIoyed, in all probability, to excite dissensions in her cities and provinces. Have you ever seen the matter in this light before? Is it not time, then, for you to begin to think? Such is the state, to which you have been reduced by the “great statesman now no more” and his successors of both factions. Such is the price that you have paid for your support of those men and their measures. Such is the fruit of those wars, which you were told were to secure you in the enjoyment of your property;
wars, which ended in placing the Bour
bons, for eleven months, upon the throne of France; in restoring the Pope, the Jesuits, and the Inquisition, and in erecting Holland and Hanover into kingdoms; wars, the success of which you have joined in celebrating ! But, now; if such have been the effects of war upon your property; if, in fact, you, who had estates in the funds in 1792, have lost more than the half of those estates, what are you ALL to expect as the consequences, to you, of another war I shall lay out of account all the possible dangers from a stoppage of the sinking fund, or any other measure, to which necessity might drive the minister for the time being; I shall suppose that no danger can ever arise to you from internal commotions, produced by the pressure of war; but, I must assume, and I think, you will allow the assumption to be correct, that the thing will, at least, go on as it has done ; and, of course, that your estates in the funds will daily grow of less and less value, in proportion as the mass of debt is augmented. You are quite sure, that war will augment this mass ; and, yet, you raise not your voices against war, but on the contrary, appear to be disappointed, that blood has not yet been drawn. The certainty that your estates will continue to melt away as they have melted, is, one would think, quite sufficient to make you deprecate the renewal of war. Having lost 50 guineas out of every 90 guineas that you possessed in 1792, in the first restoration of the Bourbons, one would think, that you would dread a second “success” of the kind as you would dread the hour of death. The late wars lasted 20 years, exclusive of the peace of
Amiens. Another 16 years of war, at the same rate, would take away the remaining 40 guineas. So that, even in case
of a second “ success,” you would be
without a penny. But, it is not thus, that the thing would travel. The stone that rolls down a hill, even if the surface be smooth, goes swifter and swifter as it approaches the bottom ; and, if it meet with rubs in its way, its bounds add to its velocity, till, at last, it comes, at a single jump, like a ball from the cannon's mouth. So it will be, because, so, from the nature of things, it must be with funded property, if we now enter on a war of any considerable duration. . . To be satisfied of the truth of this, you have only to look at what has taken place in other countries, where there have been funding systems, and at the increasing
force of the Debt in England. Since the
funding system began, we have had seven wars. The debt created by each war is as follows:
1st War, which ended in 1697 fol,000,000
2nd War, which began in 1702 33,000,000 3rd War, Ditto 1739 48,000,000 4th War, Ditto 1756 72,000,000 5th War, Ditto 1775 108,000,000 6th War, Ditto 1993. 297,000,000 7th War, Ditto 1803 413,000,000
- of 992,000,000 There are perhaps, 30 or 40 millions of floating Debt, besides the amount of the arrears of the last war; so that, about eight years of war would, in all human probability, bring the Debt to 1600 millions, at which point it would render the funds possessed in 1792 worth nothing at all. But, the thing would hardly proceed; it would hardly get along, at any rate, to this length. . An addition of three or four hundred millions, is, probably, as much as it would bear, before the whole thing would be blown up; for,by that time, the price of the guinea would be so high, and the alarm would become so great, on your part, that you would sell your stock at any price, tisí, at last, there would be nobody to purchase. Is not this the natural march of your property? Is there any one of you, who will set his face against the facts, which I have stated : If wars have gone on adding to the Debt in the above manner: why should not the same take place again?
If the value of your estates has fallen in U 2 -
the proportion of from 90 to 40, during the creation of 700 millions of Debt, will not another 5 or 600 millions take away the whole of your estates? If you cannot find any answer to these statements; if they be true, and you are obliged to acknowledge them to be true, why should you shut your eyes to your danger? Is it the part of wise men; is it the part of men of common sense, to act thus 2 The calamity of which I have been speaking, I mean your total ruin, is to be prevented; but, it is to be prevented solely by peace and economy; that is, by getting rid of all the heavy expences, except that of the National Debt. If all the other expences were reduced to the standard of 1792; if the Army, the Navy, the Civil List, were brought down to the state of that year, the interest of the Debt might still be paid, and that, too, without a Corn, 3ill. It is, therefore, for peace and economy that you ought to petition, instead of joining in the cry of war, and in the abuse of ‘hose who have endeavoured, and are stil, endeavouring, to prevent that calamity, a great one to us all, but to you a thousand times greater than to any other class of the community. WM. Cobb ETT. Botley, 16th May, 1815.
LETTER VIII. To THE EARL of LIVERPool.
On the Naval Force of the United States - of America.
My Lord, From the beginning, and before the beginning, of the late war with America, I thought it my duty to warn you, that, one of the consequences of that war would be the creating of a great Naval Force in that country. I endeavoured to describe to you the immense means of America for such a purpose. Her fine rivers, bays, and harbours; her excellent ship-builders, her hemp, iron, pitch, and timber, all of her own produce; and, above all, her matchless seamen. Of the truth of this account you and your colleagues must, by this time, be pretty well convinced; but, I cannot help quoting, and addressing to you, a paragraph from the Times newspaper of the 16th instant, in the following words:–“ Extract of a let“ter from Philadelphia, dated the 17th “ of March:—“Congress have at length * determined to have a nary—a Bill has
‘passed the Legislature, appointing a “Navy Board. Commodores Hull, Bain‘bridge, and Rodgers, it is expected, will “be appointed Admirals, and put in com‘mission. A very powerful force, under “ the command of Commodore Bainbridge, * is now fitting out for Algiers: it will con“sist of two new 74-gun ships, five fri‘gates, and ten sloops of war. If I am ‘ not mistaken, the Algerines will rue the ‘ day when they provoked the vengeance ‘ of our tars. The Guerriere, under the ‘command of Morgan, sailed from this ‘port yesterday for New York, where she “is to be joined by the Constellation and ‘Java frigates, from the Chesapeake, and “ the United States and Macedonian from * Long Island Sound: these frigates, with “six sloops of war, form the first division * against Algiers, and it is said that 2,000 < of Brown's rifle veterans will go with the 4 squadron. The whole nation is decided * for a navy: the Pennsylvania, a 74-gun 4 ship, will be launched at this place in the « month of May. “ timber are daily brought down the Dela“ware and Sohuyllkill for ship building. • It is no more extraordinary than true, “with what dispatch they build ships of ‘ war in this country. . The Peacock, of * 18 guns, was built at Newbury Port in * 18 working days The Wasp was built ‘ at New York in 20 days' The Superior, * Commodore Chauncy's flag-ship, of 64 ‘ guns, on Lake Ontario, took up only 39 * days from the laying of her keel until ‘she had all her guns on board, and was ‘ready for a cruize. It is said Congress ‘ intend to have the frames of the Lake ‘ squadron removed to the Atlantic.”— Now, what does your Lordship think of this? Do you think, that it indicates any thing of that desire, of which you were pleased to speak some time ago, on the part of the American people to put themselves under the protection of his Majesty's government 2. Or, do you now begin to think with me, that it indicates the speedy appearance of an American Fleet of 20 ships of the line and as many frigates on the Ocean : Really, my Lord, this is of far greater consequence to us, and to the
Large quantities of government.” It will, and it must, make a figure in the world. It must act a great part. Four years will swell it to a respectable size. Before the end of that time, if we have war with France, I predict, that we shall see an American fleet of great force, carrying its “bits of striped bunting” across the Atlantic. It is for you, my Lord, who are a states. man and a prime minister, and for your bright colleague, who has recently returned from Vienna; it is for you, and not for me, to say precisely what will be the consequences of this very important change in the naval power of the world; but, as it is a Yankey subject, H will venture to guess, that the friendship of Jonathan will soon begin to be courted by every nation who has either ships or commerce; and, that, even already, some of them has their eye upon alliances to be formed with him, in order to deprive us of the power of exercising a mastership on the high seas. At present the main use that I would make of the above information, is, to urge it on you as a reason for remaining at peace with France. I do not want to See an American newspaper to know what the people in that country will think of the threatened war in Europe. I know they will not have patience to read one single article in the Times newspaper without throwing it down, and crying out for more ships to be built and manned. The war ended in a way to provoke and at the same time to encourage them. The past, the future, resentment, glory; every thing will concur in favouring wishes for a new contest; and, though they build ships very quickly in peace, they would do it more quickly in war. Some will say, that, seeing this danger, we ought, without delay, to fall upon Napoleon, and to destroy him, conquer France, and burn or capture all her fleet, before the Americans have time to build a large fleet. Yes, if you could be sure of doing all this in the course of this summer. But, if you should fail. Failure is possible. It is sufficient for us to know, that it is possible. We may, indeed, do all that is wished; but, we may be obliged to come to a peace without doing any part of it; nay, we may, as in the war of 1793, draw the French armies out of France to over-run our allies. Louis le Desiré ascribes the former successes of Napoleon to Providence, who permitted him, for
awhile, to make conquests. But, as Providence has permitted him to come back to France, and even to put out the Bourbons, why may not Providence permit him, in case France is attacked, first to defend her, and then to sally forth in pursuit of her assailants? • If this should be the case, I think we may rely upon seeing the American Admirals in our seas; and, therefore, this should come in as an item in our estimates of the consequences of war, if now made against France. With a stout American fleet at sea, our West India Colonies, and the Azores, belonging to our ally, Portugal, would be in any thing but a satisfactory state. In short, it would require fifty ships of the line and fifty frigates to defend them all. The Slave Trade would soon be at an end, and the whole face of the naval and commercial world would be changed. The fleets of France would revive. Example, emulation, have powerful effects. I beg you to think well, and in time, of these things. I beg you to take your eyes, for a little, from Hanover and Belgium, and to cast them on the other side of the Atlantic, where you will see what is much more dangerous to England than is the army of Napoleon, numerous and brave as that army may be. I am, &c. Botley, 17th Muy, 1815. P. S. On looking over a file of American papers, which have just reached me, I find the following official letter from the Secretary of the Navy, to the Committee of ways and means of the House of Representatives. It clearly shews, that “the encouragement and gradual increase “of the navy (as observed by the National “Intelligencer) is now a national senti“ment:”— Navy Department, Feb. 28th, 1815. SIR-In compliance with your request, I have the honour to transmit an estimate of the expences of the navy, reduced to the demands of an establishment, accommodated to all the effects of the peace with Great Britain, but at the same time to provide for the protection of our commerce against the actual hostility of the Dey of Algiers. An act that proposes the reduction of any part of the naval force, is naturally accompanied with a grateful recollection of the service which that force has rendered to the nation. In the first movements of
the late war, the achievements of the navy excited admiration and confidence throughout the United States, shedding a lasting splendour upon the American arms. tory has invariably been the result of our naval combats with an equal force; and even when the surrender to a superior force has proved, unavoidable, it must be acknowledged by the world, that those who have gained the ship, have not always gained the glory of the battle. Co-operating with their brave and patriotic brethren of the army, the officers and crews of the American vessels of war have greatly contributed to the honourable restoration of peace ; and whateyer may be the general policy of reducing the naval establishment, it must be universally a favourite object to secure for those meritorious citizens a participation in the blessings which they have conferred upon their country. Permit me, Sir, to take this op
manders of proper rank for our squadrons, but as the means of bestowing professional distinction and reward upon the distinguished veterans of the navy. It has been seen and lamented, that for want of this grade of command, the gallantry of a subordinate officer could be rewarded by promotion, while his gallant superior officer must remain stationary. The protection of commerce against the hostilities of the Dey of Algiers will require that a strong squadron should be stationed, as soon as practicable, in the Mediterranean. The Algerine naval force is believed to consist of four frigates, four corvettes, four sloops of war, and twenty gun-boats; but these vessels will be covered and aided by the powerful batteries which defend the harbour of Algiers. To secure success in our operations, therefore, and to command the gemeral respect of the Barbary powers, it is proposed, that the American squadron shall consist of two seventy-fours, six frigates, three sloops of war, and six or eight small armed Yessels; and an estimate of the expence of the expedition accompanies this communication. If, however, congress should not contemplate a maritime war against Algiers, and
should not be disposed to increase the naval establishment, a different course must be pursued. The three seventyfours (of which two may be soon completed for sea, at a small additional expence) should be perfected in their guns and equipments, and laid up in ordinary so as to be really for service upon the first emergency.—Four frigates should always be manned and ready for sea; and should be deemed to be in actual service, together with four sloops of war, four small armed vessels (to be principally employed as dispatch vessels) and two gun-boats in each principal port. The slotilla may be discharged, and the gun-boats (with the exception provided for) and the barges may be generally laid up or sold, as the president may deem most expedient. The ships and vessels on the lakes, or on the . stocks for the lake service, may also be laid up, or sold, as the president shall direct. But it is respectfully suggested that . no greater reduction of our naval establishment ought at this time to take place. The destinies of the nation appear to be intimately connected with her maritime power and prosperity—and as the creation, of a navy is not a work to be quickly performed, it seems necessary not only to cherish our existing resources, but to . AUGMENT THEM G R AD UALLY AND STEADILY. The purchase of timber, the casting of guns, and the collection of all other. materials for building and equipping vessels of war, at safe and convenient places, are objects of the greatest importance ; and the actual construction of at least one seventy-four and two frigates, is recommended upon principles of economy as well as policy. Smaller vessels of war can be built as the occasions occur, but these require time and care. Contracts for a supply of two hundred heavy cannon to be delivered at New York, Boston, or Portsmouth (which afford at all times an outlett to the ocean) might be advantageously formed. To these general views, I beg leave to add that an appropriation, for the purchase of the vessels captured by Commodore Macdonough on Lake Champlain is necessary; and, as the estimated value cannot be now ascertained, the appropriation may be made for such sum as shall be settled and agreed upon, with the approbation of the president. I have the honour to be, very respectfully, &c.
B. W. CRow NINSHIELD.
The following documents will show, that the people of this public spirited town have wished to assemble, in a peaceable and orderly manner, under their Magistrates, to petition against the renewal of the war, which wish has been opposed by the Mayår. These doeuments, which I insert with all the names attached to them as a mark of my respect for the town of Nottingham, will speak for themselves; but, I cannot refrain from making a remark or two.—The Mayor refuses to eall a Meeting, on account, as he says, of “ the unsettled state of the public mind.” Why, what is that to the purpose 2 The people's meeting, discussing the great subject of peace or war, and proposing a petition, is, one would suppose, the best possible way of settling the public mind. What! Then this Gentlemen would, I suppose, never have another clection; for, then, it is notorious, that the public mind is unsettled ; unless, indeed, he would have, as in the rotten Boroughs, all the matter snugly settled before-hand— He will suffer the people to sneak into the Town-Hall to sign a petition. That is, he will suffer them to sign that which mot a fiftieth part of them can have an opportunity of reading. If the petition had been proposed at a public meeting, not only would it have been read aloud to the people; not only would they have heard what it was that they were about to sign, but, they would have been made acquainted with all the facts and arguments for and against it: they would have been in possession of the reasons for doing that which they were about to do.—What, then, can have been the true cause of this refusal? We shall probably be informed of it hereafter.
their fellow townsmen and to shemselves, to publish the Requisition to the Mayor, and also the Correspondence which has ensued thereon; so that the Public may be thorougly enabled to form a correct opinion of the conduct of the parties concerned in this matter. The inhabitants of the town and its vicinity are respectfully informed, that this business is not abandoned, but will be pursued by the Committee, with ail the ardour and ability of which they are possessed ; and in a mode which they conceive, under existing circumstances, best calculated to produce . the desired effect. By or DER of THE CoMMITTEE. Nottingham. May 5th, 1315. “To Jo HN Ashwori, Esq. MAYor. “SIR.—We the undersigned housekeepers of the town and county of the town of Nottingham, most respectfully solicit you to call a PUBLIC MEETING of the inhabitants thereof, at the first convenient opportunity, to take into consideration the propriety and necessity of PETITIONING HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT, and also the CoMMons House of PARLIAMENT, against involving this country, unnecessarily, in a War with France, because that nation, in imitation of our immortal forefathers, has thought right to choose a Government consistent with its own will.” Richard Alliott Samuel Doubleday .
John Bryan Robert Smith
Nathaniel Nead, Jum.
W. Blackwell Henry Leaver . Richard Sibert J. Norweb William Daft John Blackner John Roberts John Sands Thomas Yates Charles Heald Robert Webster George White Henry Cross E. Milligan John Woodward Samuel Holland William Page Isaac Meats Joseph Thorpe William Baldock William Mason James Edwards Xharles Clarke B. Hind James Saxby Edmund Hart