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told, this deposition. But, just so we were told in the case of Mr. Madison. “No “peace! No peace! No peace with JAMEs “ MADison 1" was the cry of this faction. Down with him! Send Duke Wellington! Kill! kill! kill! Keep killing; keep bombarding; keep burning; keep on till James Madison be deposed; ’till that “rebel and traitor;” 'till that “mischievous ex“ ample of the success of democratic re“bellion be destroyed.” They said our work was but half done, ’till this was accomplished; and, they have become almost mad since their scheme was defeated. Well, then, Englishmen, can you believe, that these same men; that this same wicked faction, wish to put down Napoleon for the love of freedom o Was it for the love of freedom that they wished to depose Mr. Madison 2 Can you believe, that it is from the fear of our safety being put in danger by Napoleon 2 Was it from the fear of our safety being endangered by Mr. Madison that they wished to depose him : Do you think, that they were afraid, that Mr. Madison would over-run Europe with his armies? Alas! do you not see what is their real fear? Do you not see, that it is liberty; that it is free government; that it is the rights of mankind, which they wish to see deposed? Some patriot said: “where liberty is, there is my country.” If this faction were to speak out honestly, they would say: “where liberty is, there is our Hell.”
DEcLARATION of THE ALLIES.
The Powers who have signed the Treaty of Paris, assembled at the Congress at Wienna, being informed of the escape of NApoleon Bon APARTE, and of his entrance into France with an armed force, owe it to their own dignity and the interest of social order, to make a solemn declaration of the sentiments which this event has excited in them. By thus breaking the convention which has established him in the island of Elba, Bonaparte destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended—by appearing again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe, that there can be neither peace nor truce with o he Por: consequently - Bonaparte has
and social relations; and that as an ene
my and disturber of the tranquillity of the world he has rendered himself liable to
public vengeance. They declare at the
same time, that firmly resolved to main
tain entire the Treaty of Paris of the
30th May, 1814, and the dispositions sanctioned by that Treaty, and those which
they have resolved on, or shall hereafter
resolve on, to complete and to consolidate it, they will employ all their means, and will unite all their efforts; that the general peace, the object of the wishes of Eu
rope, and the constant purpose of their labours, may not again be troubled; and to guarantee against every attempt which shall threaten to replunge the world into the disorders and miseries of revolutions. And although entirely persuaded that all France, rallying round its legitimate Sovereign, will immediately annihilate this last attempt of a criminal and impotent delirium ; all the Sovereigns of Europe animated by the same sentiments, and guided by the same principles, declare that if, contrary to all calculations, there should result from this event any real danger, they will be ready to give to the King of France,
and to the French nation, or to any other
Government that shall be attacked, as
soon as they shall be called upon, all the
assistance requisite to restore public tran
quillity, and to make a common cause
against all those who should undertake
to compromise it. The present Declara
tion inserted in the Register of the Con
gress assembled at Vienna, on the 13th
March, 1815, shall be made public. Done
and attested by the Plenipotentiaries of the
High Powers who signed, the Treaty of Paris, Vienna, 13th March, 1815.
Austria–Prince Metternich, Baron Wis-
Staeckelberg, Count Nesselrode.
ANSWER OF THE FRENCII GOVERNMENT.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRESIDENTS of THE councIL of STATE, APR11, 2.
In consequence of the remit which has been made to it, the Committee, composed of Presidents of Sections of the Council of State, has examined the Declaration of the 13th of March, the report of the Minister of General Police, and the documents thereto subjoined. The Declaration is in a form so unusual, conceived in terms so strange, expresses ideas so anti-social, that the Committee was ready to consider it as one of those forgeries by which despicable men seek to mislead the people, and produce a change in public opinion. But the verification of legal minutes drawn up at Metz and of the examinations of couriers, has left no ground for doubt that the transmission of this declaration was made by the Members of the French Legation at Vienna, and it must, therefore, be regarded as adopted and signed by them. It was in this first point of view that the Committee thought it their duty to examine, in the first instance, this production, which is without precedent in the annals of diplomacy, and in which Frenchmen, men invested with a public character the most respectable, begin by a sort of placing without the law, or, to speak more preeisely, by an incitement to the assassination of the Emperor Napoleon. We say with the Minister of Police that this Declaration is the work of the French Plenipotentiaries; because those of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England, could not have signed a deed which the Sovereigns and the nations té which they belong will hasten to disavow. For in the first place these Plenipotentiaries, most of whom co-operated in the treaty of Paris, know that Napoleon was there recognised as retaining the title of Emperor, and as Sovereign of the isle of Elba : they would have desigmated him by these titles, nor would have departed, either in substance or form, from the respectful notice which they impose. They would have felt that, according to the law of nations, the Prince least powerful from the extent or population of his States, enjoys, in regard to his political and civil character, the rights belonging to every Sovereign Prince equally with the most powerful Monarch; and Napoleon, recognized under the title of Emperor,
and as a Sovereign Prince by all the Powers, was no more than any one triable by the Congress of Vienna. An oblivion of those principles, which it is impossible to ascribe to Plenipotentiaries who weigh the rights of nations with deliberation and prudence, has in it nothing astonishing when it is displayed by some French ministers, whose consciences reproach them with more than one act of treason, in whom fear has produced rage, and whom remorse deprives of reason. Such persons might have risked the fabrication, the publication of a document like the pretended declaration of the 13th of March, in the hope of stopping the progress of Napoleon, and misleading the French people as to the true principles of foreign powers. But such men are not qualified, like the latter, to judge of the merit of a nation which they have misconceived, betrayed, delivered up to the arms of foreigners, That nation, brave and generous, revolts against every thing bearing the character of baseness and oppression; its affections become enthusiastic when their object is threatened or attacked by a great injustice; and the assassination to which the declaration of the 13th of March incites, will find an arm for its execution neither among the 25 millions of Frenchmen, the majority of whom followed, guarded, protected Napoleon from the Mediterranean to the capital, nor among the 18 millions of Italians, the 6 millions of Belgians and Rhenish, nor the numerous nations of Germany, who, at this solemn crisis, have not pronounced his name but with respectful recollections; nor amidst the indignant English nation, whose honourable sentiments disavow the language which has been audaciously put into the mouths of Sovereigns. The nations of Europe are enlightened; they judge the rights of the Allied Princes, and those of the Bourbons. They know that the convention of Fontainbleau was a treaty among Sovereigns; its violation, the entrance of Napoleon on the French territory, like every infraction of a diplomatic act, like every hostile invasion, could only lead to an ordinary war, the result of which can only be, in respect of persons, that of being conqueror or conquered, free, or a prisoner of war; in respect of possessions, that of being either preserved or lost, increased or diminished; and that every thought, every threat, every attempt against the life of a Prince at war with
another, is a thing unheard of in the history of nations and the cabinets of Europe. In the violence, the rage, the oblivion of principles which characterise the Declaration of the 13th of March, we recognise the envoys of the same Prince, the
organs of the same Councils, which, by the Ordinance of the 9th of March, also placed Napoleon without the law, also invited against him the poniards of assassins, and promised a reward to the bringer of his head. What, however, did Napoleon do? He did honour by his confidence to the men of all nations, insulted by the infamous mission to which it was wished to invite them; he shewed himself moderate, generous, the protector even of those who had devoted him to death. When he spoke to General Excelmans, marching towards the column which closely followed Louis Stanislas Xavier; to Count D'Erlon, who had to receive him at Lille; to General Clausel, who went to Bordeaux, where was the Duchess D’Angouleme; to General Grouchy, dispatched to put a period to the civil dissensions excited by the Duke D'Angouleme—everywhere, in short, orders were given by the Emperor that persons should be protected and sheltered from every attack, every danger, every violence, while on the French territory, and when they quitted it. Nations and posterity will judge on which side, at this great conjuncture, has been respect for
the rights of the people and of sovereigns,
for the laws of war, the principles of civilization, the maxims of laws, civil and religious. They will decide between Napoleon and the IIouse of Bourbon. If, after having examined the pretended Teclaration of the Congress under this first view, it is discussed in its relations to diplomatic conventions, and to the treaty of Fontainbleau of the 11th of April, 1814, ratified by the French government, it will be found that its violation is only imputable to the very persons who reproach Napoleon therewith. The treaty of Fontainbleau has been violated by the Allied Powers, and the House of Bourbon, in what regards the Emperor Napoleon and his family, in what regards the interests and the rights of the French nation.
First—The Empress Maria-Louisa and her son ought to have obtained passports, and an escort to repair to the Emperor; and far from executing this promise, they separated violently the
wife from the husband, the son from the father, and that during distressing circumstances, when the firmest soul has need of looking for consolation and support to the bosom of its family, aud domestic affectious. Secondly—The safety of Napoleon, of his imperial family, and of their attendants, was guaranteed (14th article of treaty), by all the Powers; and bands of assassins have been organised in France under the eyes of the French Government, and even by its orders, as wiłł soon be proved by the solemu process against the Sieur Demontbreuil, for the purpose of attacking the Emperor and his brothers and their wives: in default of the success which was expected from this first branch of the plot, a commotion had been planned at Orgon, on the Emperor's road, to attempt an attack on his life by the hands of some brigands: they sent as governor to Corsica an assassin of George's, the Sieur Brulart, raised purposely to the rank of Marshal-de-Camp, known in Britany, in Anjou, in Normandy, in La Vendee, in all Englaud, by the blood which he had shed, that he might prepare and make sure the crime : and in fact several isolated assassins attempted, in the Isle of Elba, to gain by the murder of Napoleon the guilty and disgraceful salary which was promised to them. Thirdly–The Duchies of Parma and Placentin were given in full property to MariaLouisa for herself, herson, and her descendants; and after long refusals to put her in possession, they gave the fiuish to their injustice by an ab. solute spoliation, under the delusive pretext of a change without valuation, without proportion, without sovereignty, without consent: and documents existing in the Foreign-office, which have been submitted to us, prove that it was on the solicitations, at the instance, and by the intrigues of the Prince of Benevent, that Maria Louisa and her son have been plundered.
Fourthly—There should have been given to the Prince Eugene, adopted son of the Emperor, who has done honour to France, which gave him birth, and who has conquered the affection of Italy, which adopted him, a suitable establishment out of France, and he has obtained nothing. Fifthly—The Emperor had (art. 9, of the treaty) stipulated in favour of the heroes of the army, for the preservation of their endowments on the Monte Napoleone : he had reserved on the extraordinary domains, and on the funds of the civil list, means of recompensing his servants, of paying the soldiers who attached themselves
to his destiny: all was carried away and kept back by the Ministers of the 13ourbons. An agent for the French Military, M. Bresson, went in vain to Vienna, to claim for them the most sacred of properties—the price of their courage and blood. Sirthly–The preservation of the goods, moveable and immoveable, of the family of the Emperor, is stipulated by the same treaty (art. 6): and they have been plundered of one and of the other; that is to say, by main force in France, by commissioned brigauds; in Italy, by the violeuce of the military chiefs; in the two countries, by sequestrations, and by seizures soemnly decreed Seventhly--The Emperor Napoleon was to have received 2,000,000, and his family 2,500,000 francs per annum, according to the arrangement established in the 6th article of the treaty: and the French Government has constantly refused to fulfil this engagement, and Napoleon would soon have been reduced to dismiss his faithful guard for want of means to secure their pay, if he had not found in the grateful recollections of the bankers, and merchants of Genoa and of Italy, the honourable resource of a loan of 12 millions which was offered to him. Eightlily—In short, it was not without a reason that they wished by all means to separate from Napoleon those companions of his glory, models of devotedness and constancy, the unshaken guarantees of his safety and of his life, The island of Elba was secured to him in full property (art. 3, of the treaty) and the resolution to spoil him of it, which was desired by the Bourbons, and solicited by their agents, had been taken at the Congress.
And if Providence had not in its justice provided for him, Europe would have seen an attack made on the person on the liberty of Napoleon, banished for the future to the mercy of his enemies, far from his family, . separated from his servants, either to Saint Lucia, or St. Helena, which was intended for his prison. And when the Allied Powers, yielding to the imprudent wishes, to the cruel importunities of the house of Bourbon, had condescended to violate the solemn contract, on the faith of which Napoleon had released the French nation from its oaths: when himself and the members of his family saw themselves threatened, attacked in their persons, in their property, in their affections, in the rights stipulated in their favour, as Princes, even in those rights secured by the laws to simple citizens, what
could Napoleon do? Ought he, after having endured so many affronts, supported so many injuries, to have consented to the complete violation of the engagements made with him, and resigning himself personally to the lot which was prepared for him, abandon once more his wife, his son, his family, his faithful servants to their frightful destiny 2 Such a resolution appears above human strength; and yet Napoleon would have taken it, if peace and the happiness of France had been the price of this new sacrifice. He would have devoted himself again for the French people, of whom, as he wishes to declare to Europe, he makes it his glory to hold every thing, to whom he wishes to ascribe every thing, to whom alone he wishes to answer for all his actio;', and to devote his life. It was for France alone, and to avert from it the misfortune of civil war, that he abdicated the crown in 1814. He restored to the French people the rights which he held of them : he left it free to choose for itself a new monarch, and to establish its liberty and its happiness on institutions which might protect both. He hoped for the nation the preservation of all which he had acquired by 25 years of combats and of glory, the exercise of its sovereignty in the choice of a dynasty, and in the stipulation of the conditions on which it would be called upon to reign. He expected from the new government respect for the glory of the armies, the rights of the brave, the guarantee of all the new interests, of those interests which had arisen and been maintained for a quarter of a century, resulting from all the laws political and civil, observed, revered during this period, because they were identified with the manners, the habits, the wants of the nation. Far from that, all idea of the sovereignty of the people was discarded. The principle on which all legislation, political and civil, since the Revolution, had rested, was equally discarded. France has been treated by the Bourbons like a revolted country, re-conquered by the arms of its ancient masters, and subjected anew to a feudal dominion. Louis Stanislas Xavier did not recognise the treaty, which alone made the Throne of France vacant, and the abdication which alone permitted him to ascend it. He pretended to have reigned 19 years, thus insulting both the governments which had been established in this period, and the people who had consecrated them by its suffrages, and the army which had defended them, and even the Sovereigns who had recognized them in their numerous treaties. A charter digested by the Senate, all imperfect as it was, was thrown into oblivion. There was imposed on France a pretended constitutional law, as easy to elude as to revoke, and in the form of simple royal decrecs, without consulting the nation, without hearing even those bodies, become illegal—phantoms of the national representation. And as the Bourbons passed ordinances without light, and promiscd without guarantee, they eluded without good faith, and exccuted without fidelity. The violation of the pretended Charter was restrained only by the timidity of their government; the extent of the abuses of power was only confined by its weakness. The dislocation of the army, the dispersion of its officers, the exile of many of them, the degradation of the soldiers, the suppression of their endowments, their deprivation of pay and halfpay, the reduction of the salaries of legionaries, their being stripped of their honours, the pre-eminence of the decorations of the feudal monarchy, the contempt of citizens, designated anew by the Third Estate, the prepared and already commenced spoliation of the purchasers of national property, the actual depreciation of that which they were obliged to sell, the return of feudality in its titles, its privileges, its lucrative rights, the re-establishment of ultramontane principles, the abolition of the liberties of the Gallican church, the annihilation of the Concordat, the restoration of tithes, the intolerance arising from an exclusive religion, the domination of a handful of nobles over a people accustomed to equality,+such was what the Bourbons either did or wished to do for France. It was under such circumstances that the Emperor Napoleon quitted the isle of Elba; such were the motives of the determination which he took, and not the consideration of his personal interests, so weak with him, compared with the interests of the nation to which he has consecrated his existence. He did not bring war into the bosom of France; on the contrary, he extinguished the war which the proprietors of mational property, forming four-fifths of French landholders, would have been compelled to make on their spoilers; the war which
the citizens, oppressed, degraded, humiliated by nobles, would have been compelled to declare against their oppressors; the war which Protestants, Jews, men of various religions, would have been compelled to sustain against their persecutors. He came to deliver France, and was received as a deliverer. He arrived almost alone; he traversed 220 leagues without opposition, without combats, and resumed without resistance, amidst the capital and the acclamations of an immense majority of the citizens, the throne deserted by the Bourbons, who, in the army, in their household, among the national guards, were unable to arm an individual to attempt to maintain them there. And yet, replaced at the head of the nation, which had already chosen him thrice, which has just designated him a fourth time by the reception it gave him in his rapid and triumphant march and arrival,—of that nation by which and for the interest of which he means to reign, what is the wish of Napoleon 2 That which the French people wish—the independence of France, internal peace, peace with all nations, the execution of the treaty of Paris of the 30th of May, 1814. What is there then changéd in the state of Europe and in the hope of repose it had promised itself? What voice is raised to demand that succour which, according to the declaration, should be only given when claimed? There has been nothing changed,—should the Allied Powers return, as wo are bound to expect they will, to just and moderate sentiments, if they admit that the existence of France in a respectable and independent situation, as far removod from conquering as from being conquered, from dominating as from being enslaved, is necessary to the balance of great kingdoms, and to the security of small states. There has been nothing changed,—if respecting the rights of a great nation which wishes to respect the rights of all others, which, proud and generous, has been lowered, but never debased, it be left to resume a monarch, and to give itself a constitution and laws suited to its manners, its interests, its habits, and its new wants. There is nothing changed, —if not attempting to compel France to resume a dynasty which it no longer wishes, feudal chains which it has broken, and to submit to seignorial and ecclesiastical claims from which it has been liberated, it is not wished to impose upon