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been gained, because no one can fail to perceive, that a retreat before 25 thousand men must have been more difficult, than a re

treat before 17 thousand. But, though . such a determination, on the part of Sir Harry Burrard, night have been

wise previous to the battle of the 21st of August, it does not follow, that, supposing the French force to have been thus inferior to ours, his decision was wise after that battle ; because then all the advantages to be hoped for from greatly superior numbers were given up. So much for the reasoning upon supposition. But, I think, there can be no doubt in the public mind, that, at the utmost, the French force did not exceed 14 or 15 thousand men ; and that ot this fact our officers were well assured. How does i) is tell, then, for the Convention ? What becomes of all the paltry excuses for suffering the French to go off with their plunder, and with all the honours of war, and to be carried home, and set down (ready to march against the Spaniards) at our expence The cause of this disgraceful event appears to me to be the design of Wellesley to have to himself all the honour that was to be achieved, and the desire of Sir Harry Burrard to thwart him in that design. Wellesley hastened to the combat before Sir Harry landed, and against Sir Harry's expressed opinion, who wanted the former to wait for the arrival of Sir John Moore. On the 22d. Wellesley was no longer commander-in-chief. Any honour gained by capturing the French must have been claimed tood enjoyed by another ; Wellesley's name would have apppeared neither at the held nor the tail of the official papers relating to the event ; aad, which was of still inore importance, in this view of the matter, his “Victory of Wi“ mier , " would have sunk into comparative insignificance. If not to a cause of this sort ; to a jealousy somewhere or other ; to what can we ascribe a Convention, such as that of Cintra, inade with an enemy, whose whole force, commanded by “the Duke of Abrantes in person,” had been obliged to retreat, at least, before one half of the army which we had ready to act on the day when that Convention was signed “Oh,” say they, “ but, after the 21st the opportunity was lost.” What opportunity? If hat opportunity, my good Nabobites ? Why, the opportunity of “. annihilating the whole of the French army.” This is what you said at first ; but, you had not then thought of the 13 thousand men in Buckram. At the utmost, it was only the army in Kendal Green that

could have been annihilated by continuing the pursuit of the 21st of August. Besides, does it not appear from the evidence, that, at most, supposing the pursuit to have been attended with all the success, which its most strenuous advocates contend for, there was only a part of the French army, amounting to about 4 or 5 thousand men, that there was the smallest chance of intercepting on their retreat towards their “ strong holds :". What becomes, ther, of the pretence, that, after the 21st of August, “ the opportunity was lost o' The object of this pretence is evident enough. Sir Hew, it is clear, is no more than a participator with Sir Arthur, whom he was to consult, whom he did consult, and with whose concurrence he acted. It is, therefore, necessary to make it out, that the fault lay elsewhere ; and the only way that can be found out of doing this, and of combining all the purposes together, is to throw the blame upon him who prevented a pursuit on the 21st ; but, unfortunately for this scheme, it roust be shown, by those who have invented it, that the army in the forts was the same, or very nearly the same army, that retreated before our troops the day before; and this does not suit any of the persons concerned in making the Convention; of course, it does not suit Sir Arthur Wellesley, who is in this dilemma : either the French had 27 or 25 thorisand men, or they had 14 or 15 thousand. it the for ver, Sir Harry Burrard was right in wishing to wait for Sir John Moore, and also in preventing a continuation of the pursuit on the 21st of August : if the laster, then the Convention, in making which Sir Archer Wellesley had his full share, is deprived of one of the principal facts, which have been stated in its justification. —This clutter about the “fatal effects “ of preventing the gallant Sir Arthur “ from pushing forward on the 21st" is: ruse de guerre, against which the people should be upon their guard. Granted that he would have pushed on ; granted that he would have succeeded ; granted that he would have cut off and captured the 4 or 5 thousand men, whom he and his friends saw he could have captured. What then : What would that have done towards driving out of the forts, the 27 or 25 thousand men, which they are now said to have contained Evidently nothing. Junot would have been able to march out, the very next day, with a force greatly superior to outs, and consisting chiefly of fresh troops. And, if we take away this force of Buckram men, away goes Sir Arthur's chief argo ment in favour of the Convention. It is, therefore, the Convention to which our attention is still to be directed. We ought not to suffer our minds to be led astray by any of these pretences of “ a lost opportutunity." Let it, for argument sake, be granted, that Sir Harry Burrard acted unwisely ; let it be granted, that, if he had acted upon the suggestion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, 5 thousand Frenchmen would have been captured on the 21st ; still, according to the latter's own first account, there would have been but a force, one half, at most, as great as ours to subdue. The whole question is, after all, a mere question of numbers. If the French had, as we were first told, only the 14 thousand men, who were eugaged in the battle of the 21st, then nothing in the world can justify the Convention of Cintra; and, if they had 27, or even 25 thousand men, previous to that battie, the getting them out of Portugal, except upon the condition of retaining their plunder and securing indemnity to their partisans, was a very meritorious and honourable service, and there is no blame attaches to any of the generals ; though one cannot very well excuse Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose greediness for fame would save ied him to continue his pursuit of the 21st, while “ the Duke d'Abrantes " could have come out upon him with 13 thousand fresh troops. –As to the settling of this important question, no proof has been produced, or attempted to be produced, that the French had 27 or 25 thousand soldiers that could possibly have been brought into the field ; and, as I have before asked, is it probable ; nay, is it possi! {e, that Junot, who knew that our army was daily receiving large reinforcements, would have met our 17 thousand men, with only 14 thousand, if he had had 27 or 25 thousand men capable of being brought into the field 2 There is not, I think, one man in the whole world, who is impudent enough to say, that he believes the affirmative of this proposition. It cannot be believed. Of course, the public must still see, as the world will always see, that about 12 or 13 thousand Frenchmen, allowing for the losses of the battle of the 21st of August, obtained from, or rather dictated to, 30 thousand Englishmen the terms of the Convention of Cintra. Whitewash, plaister, disguise the matter howsoever we may ; confuse, confound, bewilder, as long as we please; to this plaiu nut-shell statement, the world, who has no interest in becoming our dupes, will still return ; and this the enemy does, and will continue to, throw in ou teetin. “ Thirteen thousand Frenchmen


“ dictated to thirty thousand Englishmen, “ the terms of the Convention of Cintra, “ which terms caused a firing of cannon, “ and an illumination in London, under the “ direction of those who administered the “ government.”

SPAIN. If the French bulletins and accounts be true, Buonaparte was at Madrid on the 4th instant, and, of course, his brother has, before now, been crowned in that city. Madrid is not Spain ; and, upon the supposition, that a complete change of the government be intended by those wino are at the head of affairs in Spain, the country, I hope, will let the invading despot see, that his conquest is hardly yet begun. He will issue proclamations, as the Duka of Brunswick did ; but, with men resolved to love free, or die, hostile proclamations are nothing. A correspondent, whose letter I insert below, complains of my lukewarmm ess " as to the reverses in Spain, and says he expected from me something more patriotic.” Now, I have no recollection of what I have said, or thought, upon this subject; if I have, upon any occasion, shown myself waiting in warmth towards the cause of the Spanish people, whom s regarded as engaged in a most perious conflict against a despot, to whom their for aler despot had transferred them. For their own flakes I heartily wished them success,and also, for the sake of other nations, who, in more than one way, might be induced to follow their example, as far as that example might be found to apply to their several situations. The resistance of the Spaniards to the declared will of their late masters, and to the threats and violence of their new ones, excited in my mind more pleasure, as far as I know, than I had ever felt at any political event. But, what had this to do with a war for that very Ferdinand, by whom they

had been abandoned, and by whom they had

been, in terms the most earnest, exhorted to submit to the sovereign sway of Joseph Napoleon —My correspondent, in complaining, that I am “ continually looking “ at the abuses of the old government,” asks me, if I am “ not assured that those abuses “ would be corrected " I answer, that, so far from being assured of this, I see no reason to believe the fact, in the case of a successful war in behalf of the old government; and, if I had had no doubts upon the subject before, the proclamation of the Central Junta, for restraining what is there called “ the licentiousness of the press," would have excited such doubts ; because, for reasons which I have, of late, amply stated, I can see no good motive for restrain

ing the press, nor, indeed, any motive at all, other than that of preventing the promulgation of truth ; and, of that person, or that government, that desires to prevent such promulgation, I want very little else to enable me to judge of the character.— “ But,” says my correspondent, “if the “ abuses were not to be corrected, is this a “ time to chill the blood of patriotism *" What is patriotism, Sir 2 Is it love of country 2 If so, let me ask you, whether by r storing the old government of Spain, with all its abuses, good would be doue to either Spain or England 2 I think not ; and, really, you must excuse me, if, in my turn, I express my “ surprise and indignation " to hear an Englishman say that, from which I may fairly inser, that he would gladly see the blood of his countrymen flow, for the preservation, or restoration, of the Inquisition. I am as well aware as my correspondent can be, of the “tremendous power “ of Buonaparte; " but I have never seen, and I do not now see, the means of checking the progress of that power, in the old system of Spain, or of any other nation. I wished to see a new system brought to bear against him in Spain. That wish has not yet been gratified; and I am not to blame if I cannot see any good likely to arise from a perseverance in the old system. When the people of Spain first took up arms, they talked of “ the “ abuses and corruptions of the late infa“ mous government;" and they uttered unreserved imprecations on the “ traitors at “ Bayonne.” They then drove the French before them. language; and they do not now, that we hear, frequently drive the French before them. I do not say, however, that the one has proceeded solely from the other; for, I always expected the Spaniards to be beaten at first , but, if I had thus far sees, the Spaniards successful, I should still have been fully persuaded, that, unless they made a eomplete revolution, they would have been finally subdued. The Spanish cause was good till it was taken up by those, who never did, and never will, approve of any thing which is not bad at bottom. Who, but such people as those, to whom I allude, - would, when the Spaniards discovered such an excellent disposition, have set so systematically at work, to harness them in the cause of royalty Who, when they saw the Spanish kings go off without any resistance on their own part, or on the part of the people, would, by toasts or otherwise, have given that people to understand, that they would do weii to fight for a king, and soft's #

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They have now changed their

for a king, too, who was in the hands, completely in the power, of the despct, whose armies were about to be sent against them : Who, but such people, would not have considered, that there were, and that there must be, a numerous party in Spain opposed to Ferdinand, and that the war, if carried on for him, must be carried on by a party or faction ? It is the common trick of partisans, to regard and describe their own party as the whole community ; but who, except the people I am now speaking of, would not have known, that it was next to impossible, if not quite impossible, that the whole of the Spanish people should approve of the act by which Ferdinand had supplanted his father, though the latter was a half-ideot, and though his favourites were notoriously the most

corrupt and rascally men in the nation ? What was there in the conduct or character of this Ferdinand,

that could be expected to produce such a singular feeling in his favour 2 We have often spoken of his conduct since the affair of Aranjuez ; and, we have, since the war has been carried on for him, made, through Mr. Pedro Cevallos, the discovery, that this famous king had actually given his consent to marry “a Princess of France; ” that is to say, one of the female relations of Buonaparte, or of his wife. And, this is the king, for whom we are making war. This is the “beloved Ferdinand VII.” This is the object, for which the whole people of Spain, eleven or twelve millions of people, are to risk their property and their lives. Time was when whole nations suffered themselves to be half butchered in such a cause ; but, that time is passed, and who con regret it Who but the basest of mankind can possibly regret it? A corresponder t has lately reminded me, that, at the outstt of the insurrection in Spain, I express'. my hope, that the people would be left to choose a government for themselves ; and, that, as they have chosen Ferdinand Płł., I should be content. Prove to me that they have. The Central Junta have, I know and lament; but, without inquiring into their motives, I know that we have no proof, that the people have made any such choice. I always bear in mind the toast at the Turtle Feast. That toast had a great deal of meaning. It was said at the time, and now we see the verification of the saying. PoRTUGAL is, too, in an “unsatisfacto“ry state,” if we are to believe that which is given as i. telligence coming from that utfortunate kingdom. Divided into parties and factions, tiere can be no such thing as :


969) union of operatic n in any enterprize, whether of offence, or of defence. If we had carried freedom to the shores of Portugal, why should there not have been, by this time, fifty thousand Fortuguese, well armed and equipped, and tolerably disciplined, ready to march against the French in Spain : Instead of which an English army is necessary to keep “the refractory Portuguese in or. der.” The Nabobs' Gazette tells us, that it is only the lower classes who are discon“tented.” Very true Only those who have no share of the good things. Very true, I dare say. I'll engage that the Alcades and the Bishops, who eat the beef, and the Capuchins who sup the broth, are, as they always have been, for “ social order and regular “government;" and, if the fighting part was performed by them, things might go pretty smoothly on ; but, alas ! this part fills upon those who have none of the good things; and, in times like the present, they are very apt to aspire to a share of them; they are very apt to think it reasonable, that a share of the eatables and drinkables should, at last, come to their mouths. Yes, after all, it is not witchcraft, but downright hunger and thirst and nakedness, that work for Buonaparte. They are saying, it appears, plenty of masses in Portugal, and the Coufier is very angry with them for seeming disposed there to rest their exertions. But, the Courier forgets, sure, that it is much easier to say mass than to fight or to pay taxes; and, I think, the editor of that paper would not venture to bet very great odds, that the same persons, who now say masses for the expulsion of the French, will not, a few months hence, say mass: s upon their return. And, are these they laterials wherewith to work in resisting Buonaparte Is it to be hoped ; is it within the scope of possibility, that he should not, whenever he chooses, become the master of such a people We may fret at their conduct; the Courier may abuse them ; but, that will not dispose them to risk their lives in battle. For exposing themselves to such danger they must have some motive, and some powerful motive too ; and, unless that motive be given them, the Courier may keep its breath for a more useful purpose than that of abusing them and their masses. It is very true, that the possession of Spain and Portugal will make Napoleon more formidable to us; much more formidable : but, as was, Sometime ago said with regard to Austria, the Spaniards and Portuguese may be foolish

*hough not to perceive any great harm in

ot. In short, we may rest assured, that * mass of the Portuguese will like those

DECEMBER 24, 1808.-The Declaration.

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[970 best, who afford them the best chance of enjoying the good things of this world, without any regard to the circumstances of names or of nation. THE DEcLARATIon, dated the 4th instant, and just published, respecting the overtures of France and Russia, from ERFURTH, is, in my opinion, the most insignificant state-paper, that I have seen, for some time.—it was certainly right to make known to the world, that no negociations were going on. The reasons given for this are quite sufficient, and very well and concisely stated ; but, it is impossible, I think, for any man of a just naind, to approve of the partiality, which is shown towards the Emperor of Russia, who in abetting Buonaparte, with respect to Spain, is, of the two, most worthy of censure. Nor do I, for my part, approve of the charge against Napoleon of having “deposed and imprisoned friendly sovereigns.” The kings of Spain went to Bayonne without any force ; without compulsion of any sort; and, there they aldicated their rights to the Spanish throne. They might be induced to do so from personal fear, and their journey to Bayonne might be attributable to the sane cause ; but, I can see no use in calling it a deposing of them, when the fact certainly is involved in some doubt, or, at least, admits of dispute. The reply “ of France " to the king's proposition to consult his allies and also “the go“ vernment of Spain, acting in the name “ of His Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand “ VII;" this reply is deeply resented. It is said to have “ displayed, with less than “ ordinary reserve, the arrogance and injuttice of the government of France ;" and, in substance, though not altogether in manner, the reply of the Emperor of Russia is described as being equally offensive. Two of the ministerial newspapers have informed us, that, in his reply, Napoleon observed, “ that it would not be more un, easonal le on his part to propose almitting THE CATHOLICS OF “ IRELAND, as a party to any negociction, than that we should propose admitting the Spanish Insurgents.” If this

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be true, as the Morning Post and the

Courier give it us, there is, indeed, no longer any ground to wonder at the asperity cf the Declaration ; for, of any thing fuller of gravel than this observation it would be difficult to forum an idea. One almost fancies one hears it grate under the teeth of “ No Popery.” It cuts, not like razors and knives, but like bits of glass and flint stones; it pricks, not like pins and needles, but like splinters and fish-hooks; it draws no blood, but leaves an aching festering wound; and a wound, too, which is, somehow or other, shy cf showing itself to the doctor. Mr. Canning seems to have been put into so much agony by this observation as not to know very well what he was about; for, the latter part of the Declaration is, whether as to manner or matter, any thing, I think, but what it ought to be. There is a pitiful hankering still after the Emperor of Russia; there are blunt attemps at severity ; there is a roundness of assertion that nothing short of proved facts could have justified; and, as to the phraseology, it may, perhaps, be thought a compliment to it, to say, that it is equally “ unparallelled" with the usurpation of the throne of Spain by the Buonapartes.— When parliament meets, we shall, I suppose, have all these negociation papers before ns; and, my opinion is, that it was to soften the effect of Buonaparte's sarcastic observation, about the Catholics of Ireland, that the newspapers were enabled to let it leak out beforehand. There is, to be sure, a gross fallacy in the reasoning of that obscivation ; but, gross as it is, it is a fallacy, which many will not perceive, and which will be affected not to be perceived by many more. " And, whose fault is it, that we are exposed to the probable, or, at least, possible, effect of such a dangerous fallacy That question may be useless ; but, certainly it is not useless to ask, whether ail possible speed ought not now to be used, in order to remove the ground, whereon it rests Frequently have Napoleon's newspapers sympathised with the Irish Catholics; but, this is the first time that he has openly sad officially given us to understand, that they are an object of his imperial attention and solicitude. There is no doubt, however, that hey long have been such, and that, if he succeed in his present enterprize; if he get safe possession of Spain and Portugal, the Irish Catholics will be the next, or nearly the next people, to whom he will directly, and with very little reserve, address hinself. This must be evident to every man of common sense ; and, it being evident, the question is, whether our government will, while there is jet time, adopt the means, and the only possible means, of preventing him som obtaining a fair chance of final success; or whether, we are doomed to keep blundering on to the end of the chapter, under the influence of despicable bigotry and more despicable intrigue. That Buonaparte will, as Jong as he has life, never rest until he has

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ing this kingdom no one can doubt. The motives which existed at the rupture of the peace of Amiens, still exist in all their former force; they have received strength from time, and especially from recent events. Our fleet is, indeed, a mighty bulwark; but, as has been a thousand times observed, there are modes of attack against which a fleet cannot be brought to bear. Experieree has proved, that our fleet cannot, at all times, prevent the landing of French troops in Ireland. Now is, therefore, the time to erect, in that country, an impenetrable barrier against the enemy. The means are completely in our hands. They will cost us nothing. Only a single act of parliament does the business. How many millions. What freights of treasure, what streams of bicod, might be spared, by an act of parliament passed in time !

DUKE of York's IN coxse. In my last statement, upon this subject, there was, I am informed, an important omission. At page ()01 of this volume.' I stated the seve

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ment, and contains about 300 folio pages, does not, however, contain the places and pensions upon the Irish establishment, except in part, but contents, itself with refering to another Report, which was laid tofore parliament some years ago, and which, of course, very few of the present members cver saw, or ever will see as long as they live. I will endeavour to find out this Report, and when I have so done, I will state the fact, relating to this additional pension. In the meanwhile, I beg the reader to look again at the whole of the article begining at page -97 of this volume. - Botley, Dec. 22, 180s.

SPAIN. Sif,-Accustomed to approve and admire your writings on most subjects, I cannot bit read with a mixture of surprize and indignation your very lukewarm remarks on the late reverses in Spain. It seems with you a matter of doubt whether we ought to


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