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g33] his condission, n thing about his address was kt own at the Horse Guards.--Another pomphleteer asks, why apply at a newspaper office, when the name of a bookseller appeared But the sect is, that no bookseller's name appeared to the first advertisement, which was published in August. Now, Sir, as to the facility of tr. c 1 g the notes, I rather think your friend has been too sanguine. To satisfy you of that, I need only refer to the case of Lord Melville, where a committee of the House of Commons, invested with powers, to send for persons, papers, and records, found it extremely difficult to trace any of the notes, and were entirely unable to trace some — Then, Sir, if, with the means which that committee possessed, obstacles arose, how can it be so considently stated, that it is in the power of any individual, or even of the directors of the Bank of Fngland, to trace the notes, alluded to in Major Hogan's Appeal.—It must be obvious, that any individual may refuse to answer the applica on of the person or persons endeavouring to trace such notes, and the probability of a refusal to answer, where the answer might betray a party, making an improper application of such notes, is so stroi.g., that I always heard with surprise, have the confident language of those, who talked so much about the facility of tracing these notes.-After ail, Mr. Cobbett, let us argue this matter as we may, it must resolve itself into a question of faith, and then you are to consider, whether you will attach credit to the words of Major slogan, recommended as he is, to your respect, by some of the first military characters in the country, or wie her you will attend to the mere doubts, surmises, and conjectures, of sycophants in office, and anonymoos ibeilers.-Here let me conclude, Sir, with the rope. tion of your own words, that “ the affair “ of the Bäik notes has 1:0 connection with “ Major Hogan's case, which closes before “ this aflair occurs "-- But the motives which urge that meritorious officer's assailauts, to dwell so much upon this affair, are quite obvious. The case of Alejor Hogai, is found impregnable, because the grounds of his complaint are undeniable, and therefore, it is thought expedient, by his for 3, to fix the public attention as much as possible, upon the business of the Bank notes, because it ailords some opportunity for cayilling. | THE PUBLISHER of Major - - Hoc As's APPEAL. December 6, 1503.
POLITICAL REGISTER.—31.jor Cariwight on the Affairs of Spain.
[944 MAJo R CARTw Rig ot, os THE AFFAIRs or SPAIN. Sir, The Proclamation from Aranjuez, bearing date the 26th of October, and published in the “ Titues " of the 3d of this instant, fully justifies the conclusions drawn in my letter, inserted in your Register of the 29th of October, touching the patriot: views of the supreme junta; but if virtue herself be too slow in her movements, consequences the most fatal may ensue. As the salvation of Spain depended on the people being made politically free, and being armed, these were points on which there ought not to have been a moment's hesitation. The very first resolution of the supreme junta, and while the oath of fidelity was warn upon their lips, ought to have been, that a national cortes, equally representing the people, and annually elected by all who contribute to the taxes, should as soon as possible be assembled ; and that all the able-bodied of the whole community should be instantly trained for war, and furnished with arms as expeditiously as they could be procured ; and to these objects the whole energies of the junta ought, in the first instance, to have been directed. These being the principles I have uniformly inculcated, they cannot, now that disasters have been experienced, be called afterthoughts; and I could appeal to a Spanish nobleman, for having, in a letter dated so far back as the 21st of joine, expressed an
anxiety for so cing “ the English force with
“ the best of the Spanish in the service of “ their country, in the Pyrenees.”—What lavic Ueen in both counties the causes of delay, and will toy be the fatai consequences, are objects worth, investigation ; because a know ledge of ti.cm might be highly instructive. No time, however, ought to be lost in atteo; ting to retrieve past errors; and, tio on time incoism and constancy of the Spanish character, much may be hoped for. If the mind of Spain be not subdued, the farther the enemy leads his columns into the country, the sooner perlaps he may be destroyed. I say perhaps ; for, knowing very little of actual circumstances, I cannot judge what is likely to be the event. We have, however, seen the confidence with which Botone parte has undertaken the conquest of the Peninsula, at a time when the whole people were apparently hostile, and when every hand that had a weapon would be raised against him. If, under such circumstances, we should see that Peninsula actually subdued, the event must give birth to two reflecticas, on which we cannot ponder with too much or too serious attention. First, that all the combinations of political and military powers, applica!!e to invasion and offensive war, have, in the Frerich government, attained a degree of perfection far exceeding even those of Rome, and consequently whatever was before experienced among mankind ; and that, for resisting the attacks of such an invader, nothing is to be depended on short of the best combinations of political and military power which are applicalse to defence. Secondly, that that national disease, of which inveterate despotism and habitual slavery are the indications, so ureaks down and destroys the constitution, the energies, and the very means and capacities, of a state, that the mere dissolution of its detestable government is by no means a restoration of health and vigour. According to circumstances, its recovery must be a work of time of greater or less duration; as ge. nius a.d virale have more or less the ascendaut; and as the tree spirit of itberty shall be n:ore or less aroused and cherished. it was at an early period of the struggle, and in my first public letter on Spanish affairs, written on the 15th, and inserted in your Register of July, the 23d, that I used this language —“ If she fail in the attempt, “ it can only be, because she reformed and “ armed too late; AND IF sile FALL, we * KNow W Hose H A R N Ess, FoR T H E FINAL “ con FLICT, MUST BE N Ext Buck LED on.” After just remarking, in coufirmation of my second reflection, that eight months have now elapsed since the worn-out government of Spain was annihilated ; and four months since the French power in the country was in effect broken by the capture of Dupont's army; which ought to have led to an early contest in the very passes of the Pyrennees, we in England ought not to lose a moment in effecting those reforms in our own government which, by equally restoring to health and vigour both the civil and military branches of our constitution, shall once more give us those best combinations of political and military power which are applicalle to defence. An attorney-general may think it a right season for proposing a statute, abridging the rights of liberty and adding to the severities of law ; a court of King's Bench may think it a right season for acting upon most questionable precedents, in committing, for of fences in Middlesex, the convicted persons to distant gaols, thereby grievously and calamitously adding to the evils of legal impr:sonment, and causing to the parties a heavy expence, although fine made no part of the sentence ; ministers may think it a season
for mocking the nation with a species of tribunal which has all the qualities of a packed jury, and no one attribute of a court of justice or equity; and the great rival parties in the state may still think it a season, for factiously contending with each other for power; but ought not all parties, and all descriptions of men, rather to consider how long it may be, before we ourselves may have to contes d with that invader, under whose prowess many are of opinion Spain and Portugal must sink 2 - Should such an event take place, it would need not the spirit of prophecy to foretel, that nought but reforms, civil and military, completely restoring to us those best combinations which are applicable to defence, could save the throne, or government of our country. But when those combinations are at the same time the very essence of our constitution, which, in the strictest sense, is a constitution of liberty and arms, were it not the first duty of king, ministers, parliament, and people, to restore whatever is in decay, and with one heart and one soul build up again the dilapidated parts of our constitution, and rear again the fallen parts of our liberties, yet, as mere matter of the most vulgar prudence, it should seem advisable, not to neglect these things until the Iberian peninsula may become French, until the marine of France may doulose our own, and until the armies of France may be in Ireland or in England. But Mr. Miles, in his letter to the Prince of Wales, p. 73, tells us of “ a project of “ suspending the constitution,” which project he attributes to one of whom he says, “ the natural despotism of his temper is “ well known, and it has lost nothing of “ its stern and inflexible ferocity by a resi‘‘ deance in Asia, where it has been most ‘ wofully felt.” The reason which the person alluded to is said to have given for his advice, is this, ‘ that the power of Buo‘ naparte can only be effectually resisted by ‘ a power as despotic as his own.' But there are some objections to this conclusion. First, in the most effective combinations of political and military power, for offence and for defence, they are radical differences of . principle. Secondly, neither of the hunbled emperors, nor the king of Prussia, were at all deficient in despolic power. And, thirdly, if despotism is to be our defence against despotism, we may as well submit at once to that of Buonaparte himself, as that of the adviser, or any other. Nay, it would be more creditable as well as more beneficial : more creditable, because there is less discredit in submitting to a mighty con
queror, than to any traitorous usurper of contemptible pretensions; and more bencficial, as we should not only be spared the havoc and bloodshed of a contest, but, when once slaves, should at least be governed with transcendant ability. As I am not, however, likely ever to become a convert to the preachers of despotism, so I must myself continue a preacher of Reform. I have remarked, that in the combinations for invasion and for defence, there is a radical difference. But this requires explanation and qualification. In the present state of society, standing, regular, and highly disciplined armies, are best for invasion and conquest; but it is only in despotic states that such armies can arrive at the magnitude necessary for subduing extensive and potent states ; for so long as any nation retains its liberty, its standing army must necessarily be limited in its numbers for the security of that liberty. A free nation, therefore, in these days of civilization, is,
happily, unqualified for the conquest of
other powerful nations. In the rude and ferocious ages prior to civilization it was otherwise; for then the nations most free were most warlike ; and countries were not conquered by standing armies, disciphne, and military science, but by whole nations of free men pouring into a territory more fruitful than their own, and exterminating or subduing nations less free, fierce, and hardy than themselves. My position: therefore remain unshaken, that in our own age despotism, with its unlimited standing aroies, are the machinery for invasion ; while liberty and the universal arms-bearing of the people, are the means of defence; always recollecting, that the more universal that arms-bearing of the people, the greater may be with safety the regular army of the country in question. Nor, Sir, is reform, radical reform, only necessary to our political liberty, and to the preservation of our property from taxation at the will and pleasure of a minister, sor corrupting parliamentary supporters, and for enlisting an immense army of civil mercenaries for the support of his power, to be paid out of the pockets of the betrayed and injured people; but it is necessary
for restoring discipline and vigour to every
department of the state; that our affairs abroad as well as at home may not be conducted with imbecility, and our national efforts end in disappointment, and cover us with disgrace. In “A Short English Tale,” written in answer to Major Hogan, it is
chief, in not always selecting proper men for command, that parliamentary influent must be yielded to. Here, is the bane of our affairs! Here is the canker-worm prey. il;g on the vitals of the state This, Sir, is “ the accursed thing” we must “ take “ away," or in the day of trial “we can. “ not stand before our enemies."— I rentain, Sir, &c. — J. CARTw Right.— Enfield, Dec. 12th, 1808. OFFICIAL PAPERS. ENGLAND AND FRAN ce.—King of Eng. !and's Declaration against France. Dated JP'estminster, HDec. 15, 1808. The overtures made to his majesty by the governments of Russia and of France have not led to negociation : and the intercourse to which those overtures gave rise being terminated, his majesty thinks it right thus promptly and publicly to make known its termination.— The continued ap: pearance of a negotiation, when peace his been found to be utterly unattainable, could be advantageous only to the enemy-lt might enable France to sow distrust andjeilousy in the councils of those who are com: bined to resist her oppressions: and if, among the nations which groan under the tyranny of French alliance, or among those which maintain against France a doubtso and precarious independence, there should be any which even now are balancing be: tween the certain ruin of a prolonged inactivity, and the contingent dangers of an effort to save themselves from that ruin ; 10 nations so situated the delusive prospect of a peace between Great Britain, and France could not fail to be peculiarly injurious. Their preparations might be relaxed by to vain hope of returning tranquillity; or their purpose shaken by the apprehension of be: ing left to contend alone —That such wo, in fact, the main object of France in the proposals transmitted to his majesty from Erfurth, his majesty entertained a strong persuasion.—But at a moment when results so awful from their importance, and so to: mendous from their uncertainty, might to depending upon the decision of peace o war, the king felt it due to himself to ascertain, beyond the possibility of doubt, to views and intentions of his enemies-l was difficult for his majesty to believe, tho. the emperor of Russia had devoted himsel; so blindly and fatally to the violence on" ambition of the power with which his im: perial majesty had unfortunately become Allied, as to be prepared openly to * the usurpation of the Spanish monarchy: assumed by France, to depose and imprison
made an apology for the commandeis-in- and to acknowledge and maintain the right
friendly sovereigns, and forcibly to transfer
to herself the allegiance of independent nations. When therefore it was proposed to his majesty to enter into negociation for a general peace, in concert with his majesty's allies, and to treat either on the basis of the Uti Possidetis (heretofore the subject of so much controversy), or on any other basis, consistent with justice, honour, and equality, his majesty determined to meet this seeming fairness and moderation, with fairness and moderation, on his majesty's part, real and sincere.—The king professed his readiness to enter into such negotiation in concurrence with his allies ; and undertook forth with to communicate to them the proposals which his majesty had received. But as his majesty was not connected with Spain by a formal treaty of alliance, his majesty thought it necessary to declare, that the engagements which he had contracted, in the face of the world, with that nation, were considered by his majesty as no less sacred, and no less binding upon his majesty, than the most solemn treaties; and to express his majesty's just confidence that the government of Spain, acting in the name of his catholic majesty Ferdinand VII, was understood to be a party of the negotiation.— The reply returned by France to this proposition of his majesty casts off at once the thin disguise, which had been assumed for a momentary purpose; and displays, with less than ordinary reserve, the arrogance and injustice of that government. The universal Spanish nation is described by the degrading appellation of “the Spanish “ Insurgents; " and the demand for the admission of the government of Spain as a party to any negotiation, is rejected as inadmissible and insulting —With astonishment as well as with grief his majesty has received from the emperor of Russia a reply, similar in effect, although less indecorous in tone and manner. The empefor of Russia also stigmatizes as “insur“ rection,” the glorious efforts of the Spanish people in behalf of their legitimate sovereign, and in defence of the independence of their country; thus giving the sanction of his imperial majesty's authority to an usurpation which has no parallel in the history of the world.—The king would readily have embraced an opportunity of negotiation, which might have afforded any hope or prospect of a peace, compatible with Justice and with honour. His majesty deeply laments an issue, by which the suf. ferings of Europe are aggravated and prolonged. But neittier the honour of his
majesty, nor the generosity of the British nation, would admit his majesty's consenting to commence a negotiation, by the abandonment of a brave and loyal people, who are contending for the preservation of all that is dear to man ; and whose exertions in a cause so unquestionably just, his majesty has solemnly pledged himself to sustail1.
SPAN 1sh Revolution.—First Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Vittoria, Nov. 9, 1808. (Continued from p 928.) The marshal duke of Dantzic advanced against them, and broke through their centre. The 58th and 32d regiments distinguished themselves upon this occasion.—Had these events occurred in the plains, not a man of the enemy would have escaped; but the mountains of St. Andero and Bilboa are almost impassable. The duke of Dantzic pursued the fee during the whole of the day in the passes of Walmaseda –In these various affairs, the enemy have lost, in killed and wounded, from 3500 to 4000 men.—The duke of Dantzic particularly praises the generals of division Laval and Sebastiani, the Dutch general Chassey, colonel Lacoste, of the 27th regiment of light infantry, colonel Baco, of the 63d regiment of the line, and the colonels of the regiments of Baden and Nassau, upon whom his majesty has conferred rewards.—The army is abundantly supplied with provisions, and the weather is very fine.—Our columns are marching forward, and combining their movements. It is supposed that the headquarters will nove forward to-night from Vittoria. Second Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 12. The duke of Dantzic entered Valmaseda, in pursuit of the foe.— On the 8th, general Sebastiani discovered the rear-guard of the insurgents posted upon a high hill to the right of Valinaseda : he immediately advanced against them, defeated them, and took about 100 of them prisoners —In the meantime, the city of Burgos was occupied by the army of Estremadura, consisting of three divisions. The advanced guard was coinposed of Walloons and Spanish guards; and the students of the universities of Salamanca and Leon, divided into several battalions, and some regiments of the line, with other Corps raised since the insurrection of Badajos, made the whole of the army amount to little short of 20,000 men. The command of the cavalry of the army was given to marshal, the duke of Istria; and the emperor confided the command of the second corps to marshal the duke of Dalmatia. On the
thirty pieces of artiliery. This was the sigmal for advancing at the pas de charge ; the infantry of the division of Moutou attacked them, supported by the artillery. The Walloons and Spanish guards were de
feated at the first outset. The duke of 1stlia, at the head of his cavalry, attacked them in flank. The enemy were completely routed; 3000 of them being left dead on the field. We took twelve pair of colours, twenty-five pieces of cannon, and 3000 prisoners. The remainder were completely dispersed. Our troops entered the city of Burgos internixed with the enemy, and the cavalry pia; sued them in all directions.— This army of Estremadura, which had come from Madrid by forced narches, whose first enterprise was the assassination of their unfortunate general count Torres, and which was completely equipped with English arms,
been a title of lion our.—'I he castle of Burgos has beeu occupied, and was found in
good condition ; it contained considerable quantities of Iiour, wine, and grain.-On the 11th the emperor reviewed the division of gen, Bonnet, and immediately detached it towards the ei: trai:ce of the posses of St. Aude: 0.--The position of the army, this day, is as follows.--The marshal doe of losiona is in close pursuit of the remains of the air, of Gallicia, who are fiying in the directiva or Villa cayo and Reynoso, towai is which points the doke of Dalmatia is also roarcling. They can have no other resourse than that of dispersing in use mout,tains, with the loss of artillery, veggage, aid every thing that constitutes an army. Third Busselin of the French -írny of Spain, dated Burgos, Yav. 13.
The army of Galicia, which fied from Bilboa, is pursued by the marshai duke of 3eliuto, in the direction of £spinosa; by the marshal duke of Danzic, in the direction
of Viisarcayo ; and at Reynosa is surrounded by the marshal duke of Dalmatia. Impor. tant events must take place in that quarter. -General Milbaut, with bis division of ca. valry, has entered Palencia, and has sent of detachments towards the outlets of Reynosa, in pursuit of the park of artillery of the ar. toy of Gallicia.-The young students of Sã. lasmanca, who thought to accomplish the conquest of France, the fanatical peasauts, who already dreamed of plundering Bayonne and Bourdeaux, and imagined themselves led on by all the saints, being misled by the trea. cherous monks, are dispossessed of their foolish fancies. Their despair and dismay are at their height. They deplore the mis. fortunes of which they are become the prey, the lies wi.ich they have been made to Lelieve, and the struggle, without an object, in which they are involved.—The whole plain of Castille is already overspread by our cavalry. The zeal and ardour of our troops enable them to perform journies of fourteen or fifteen miles a day. Our piquets are on the Duero. The whole coast of St. Andero and Blboa completely swept of the enemy. -The unfortunate city of Burgos, a prey to all the miseries of a town taken by storm, trembies with dismay. Priests, monks, inilabitants, fled upon the first news of the battle ; terified lest the soldiers of the army of Estiemadura should attempt to defend the uselves in the houses, which resolution
they probably inade known beforehand ; '
first plundered by these, and afterwards by our soldiers, who entered the houses, in or
der to dive out their enemies, and found
t!ere no inhabitants.--Such men as M. Von Steine, who from want of troops of the line, which out eagles could not oppose, form to themselves the exalted idea of raising the people in a mass, have become witness of the misfortunes which they have brought upon theoselves, and of the small obstacks which such as siliaries can oppose to regular troops –At itingos and in its neighbourhood, wo, to the value of thirty millions has been food, which his majesty has caused to be sequestrated. All of it that belongs to the novos, and to titose persons that have formed a part of the insurrection, shall be declared for eited, and shall be first set apart for the indemnification of the French, for the losses which they have sustained; for in the city of \ladrid, Frenchmen, who had been **ted these even for forty years, have been roceed of every thing, and the Spaniards who were true to their king have been declared emigrants. The property of Azania, a snost virtuous and intelligent minister; ot Midssoredo, a loost experienced seaman; c.