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then, let that Lord explain to an abused and most grossly insulted nation, how, for what reasons, from what motives, he came. to cause the Armistice, the only document signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, to be published to the people of England in the French language only, while all the other documents were puolished in the English language only. From the first, this was a great point with rue; because, until this distinction appeared, there was no reason, that I could perceive, of suspecting the ministers of a disposition to do any thing that was wrong, or unfair. From this distinction, I did begin to suspect unfair intentions, Yet, until now, there might be a doubt; because, until now, we were not quite certain, that all the documents came home in the same language. Now we are certain as to that fact; and, here can be, I think, but very little difference of opinion as to the motive, whence all be other documents were translated for pub.. ication, while that one, that one which alone bore the name of Sir Arthur Wellesey, was published in French.- --The next hing, towards which the public should, in my opinion, direct their attention, is the tatement of Sir Hew Dalrymple, accommanied with documents to prove, that, after ■ few days' consideration, the Portuguese spressed their pleasure at, and, their gratide for, the Convention; though, at first, hey had loudly condemned it; whence it is meant, that we should draw an inference avourable to that measure, which has, in his country, been so decidedly and so geneally condemued. But, Sir Hew Dalryınple,

fore he prevails upon me to adopt this inerence, must show me, that this change of nguage proceeded from some new lights, bich the Portuguese had received upon the =bject; he must let me see the grounds of eir change of opinion; he must convince e that their reasoning was correct; and, Dove all things, he must convince me, that e persons, who had, at first, expressed pinions hostile to the Convention, were ot under the smallest apprehension, that a ntinuation of that hostility might be atnded with disagreeable consequences to emselves. I remember an English House Commons, who, on one day, by an alost unanimous vote, did, upon a motion the minister (Mr. Addington) decide in atmative relating to a certain tax; and o, when, on the morrow, the same miter, proposed to negative that same prosition, did, without any division, or opsition at all, give their vote in the said gative. We, who were not born yester, know too much of the means, by which

approving letters and addresses are some. times, and particularly in cases of emergency, obtained, to lay much stress upon such documents; and, we know, that, in the present case, there existed, as to the disapprobation, no undue influence at all; and that the Portuguese, whether right or wrong in their opinions, had no temptation, when they first heard of the Convention, to say what they did not think.—We now come to the wonderfully magnified numbers of the French army. It has been stated, it appears, before the Court of Inquiry, that the number embarked amounted to twenty-five thousand men. It is not averred, that these were all soldiers; that they were all persons bearing arms, or capable of bearing arms; but, as the public must have observed, and with no small degree of surprize and indignation, all the generals, and others, who have been called upon to state their opinions as to the expediency of the Convention, have reasoned upon this fact, relating to numbers, as if all the persons embarked were actually so many capable of being brought into the field of battle. Now, if this were so, is it probable, that Junot would, in the first instance, have met Sir Arthur Wellesley with no greater a force than fourteen thousand men? Is this probable? And, then, when he actually argociated, he had, if this new edition of numbers could be believed, more fighting men than our army consisted of, even after the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard. Nay, when Sir John Moore arrived, and he did not arrive till after the Armistice was signed, our whole army, even then, amounted to only one-sixth more than that of the "Duc "d'Abrantes" is now made to amount to, he having all the fortresses and strong holds and positions, not only at his command, but in his possession. I appeal to the sense and judgment of the reader, whether Junot would have dared to make an offer of evacuation under such circumstances? So much as to the reason of the case; but, Sir Arthur Wellesley, in his dispatch, told us, that he defeated the WHOLE of the

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French force, commanded by the Deke "of Abrantes in person ;" and, indeed, that the whole, or very nearly the whole, of the effective force was that day in the field, there can be very little doubt. It is barefaced hypocricy to affect to believe, that Junot, who had so much time for preparation; who had the choice of time as well as of place; whom it so evidently behoved to have driven our first-advancing battalions into the sea; who had received a check on the

day before; and who had all his means at. - his back and completely at his command: it is barefaced hypocricy to affect to believe, :that such a Commander, so situated, would march to the attack of superior numbers leaving nearly half of his efficient force in a state of inactivity. Besides, the reader will not fail to bear in mind, that, when the news of the Convention first reached England, it was asserted, by the friends of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that if he had not been prevented from following up his victory of the 21st, the WHOLE French army must inevitably have been destroy" ed." Now, either this was a falsehood;

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it was, from beginning to end, a lie, invented for the purpose of raising Sir Arthur Wellesley in the public estimation, at the expence of Sir Harry Burrard's reputa tion; either this was a foul and malignant lie; or, it is not true that Junot ever had, after the landing of any part of our army, twenty-five thousand effective men under his command. It is curious to observe, how this French army is raised, or lowered, as the purposes demand. They were nothing, when the purpose was to persuade the public, that Sir Harry Burrard was guilty of the crime of preventing Sir Arthur Wellesley from putting an end to them, "de

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stroying the whole of them," after the manner of Captain Bobadil; but, now, when the purpose is to defend the Convention, it being no longer to be denied, that Sir Arthur Wellesley had a principal share in making that instrument; now, the French army was very numerous, nearly twice as strong as the army with which Sir Arthur beat them. It is; it is, say what they will, the old story of the Buckram Men revived.

question; but, I have not yet heard it put by
any of the great captains, now sitting in the
Court at Chelsea. The truth is, that our ge
nerals appear to have eyes wonderfully adapt
ed to the discovering of difficulties and ob-
structions. We have often been amused
with descriptions of the miserable state of
the French armies; the shoe-less, hat-less,
shirt-less state of the "wretched conscripts,
"whom Napoleon leads to battle in chains"
But, somehow or other, these wretches de
fight and get on. They feed on the air, per
haps; but, certain it is, that they live; ther
find something to eat and to drink. Alas
Buonaparte has generals, who can shift, for
a while at least, without port wine and fee-
ther-beds; and he has, of course, soldiers
who follow their example. To hear the
miserable excuses of a scarcity of provisions,
want of horses and carriages, want of can-
non, and the like, is truly deplorable, at 1
time when we have just been witnessing the
campaigns in Austria, Moravia, and Poland;
campaigns, at one half of the battles of
which, in the midst of winter, Frenchmen
bred up under a southern climate, fought up
to their knees in ice and snow, at the end
of a march, which had left them scarcely a
shoe to their foot, and in which hardship
the officers had shared with the men.
this is to be our manner of making wat
if to go into the field of battle, we mus
have our English luxuries, let us, in the
name of common sense, give up the thing
at once; withdraw from the contest; stay
at home in ale-houses and barracks; keep
guard over the prisoners taken by the sk...
and valour of the navy; and no longer ex-
pose ourselves to the scorn and derision of
the world.These are the points, which,
as far as the proceedings have hitherto gone
and been published, have chiefly attracted
my attention. Out of the circumstances of
Sir Arthur Wellesley's command, however,
there arises a question or two, which are
worthy of great attention. Whether th
officer received the usual sum given to com
manders of expeditions for their out-fit, to-

lowance of a lieutenant general command

The reader will see, that, at Chelsea, there is great stress laid upon the state of the army's provisions. Provisions, we are told, were not to be got on shore, in Portugal, and those, which we had on board, it was difficult to land. I have asked this question before, but I will ask again : how did the "Duc d'Abrantes; " how did Wellesley's Tartar Duke; how did he ob-gether with the staff-pay and enormous alFain provisions? He had, they now tell us, wenty-five thousand men; he had longing in chief, including bat and forage mohad them there; he had had no communication with the sea; he had even the Russian fleet to feed, besides his own army. How did he, who had all the people for enemies; how did he obtain his supplies of provisions, in this sad barren country, and wot only enough for the time being, but enough to horde up stores for the long lingerng siege, which our heroes apprehended; I am in tribulation for an answer to this

ney, which last alone would, I imagine, amount to, at least, five hundred pounds? There is, too, it has been publicly stated. another general, employed upon the staff of the same army; I mean the brother of Lond Castlereagh, who, along with the pay ard einoluments of a major general, bat and fo rage money, &c. &c. receives pay, agreea bly to the report laid before the House of Commons, as an under secretary of state,

made up as to any point whatever. It is
impossible to shake it. The present pro-
ceedings have only strengthened the opinions
already formed. There is no man, who
looks with even the smallest degree of in-
terest to the proceedings at Chelsea; and,
if no other mode of Inquiry be instituted,
fresh applications to the throne will certainly
be made.
SPAIN.-

-There appears to be some rea son to fear, that Napoleon is in but too fair a way of finally accomplishing his accursed purposes, with regard to the Spaniards. I was, but a few weeks ago, reproached by a correspondent for having, at first, expressed my fears, that the Spaniards would be sub dued I wish, with all my heart, that this ground of reproach, if it be one, may hold good to the end. I would much rather be regarded as a fool for the rest of my life, than that tyranny, in any shape, should, in a nation like Spain, triumph for a single day.The Morning Chronicle has an are ticle complaining of the conduct of the GENERAL JUNTA in Spain; and, though one does not like to begin to blame, at a moment when the blamed party appears to be experiencing a reverse of fortune, it must be acknowledged, that, as far as we can judge at this distance from the scene, and with means of information so imperfect, there is, as the Chronicle observes, but too much reason to look back with regret to the Junta of Seville. The General Junta may be composed of wise and good men ; but, it does not breathe the spirit of the Junta of Seville. It does, perhaps, contain more of rank than the Junta just named: but more rank and title will, I should think, do, in such circumstances, little, or nothing.

to the amount of two thousand pounds a year. Will the House of Commons make inquiry into these matters? Will they ascertain, whether Sir Arthur Wellesley, whether the man who signed the Convention of Cintra; whether this man was, at that time, and had been, for months before, receiving pay, at the rate of six thousand pounds a year, as chief secretary of state in Ireland Will they inquire into these interesting mafters? Are these things right? Will any sycophant, however base he may be, say that these things ought to be tolerated? To be "loyal" must a man hold his tongue upon matters of this sort? Is it to shew one's love of the country and of the constitution, to wink at these crying abuses? And, lastly, does the existence of such abuses tend to strengthen, or to overthrow, our excellent form of kingly government?There is one general remark to add upon the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry; and that is this: that all the persons, hitherto examined, are, more or less; parties concerned. They should, consistently with reason, be called upon for nothing but official returns, or other documents; not, at least, in the present stage of the business. What are their opinions to us? They will hardly say, that they think they have done wrong. They will hardly give such evidence as is calculated to throw blame upon themselves. We are proceeding as if upon an implied acknowledgement, that an English army can never, in any possible case, do amiss. But, the fact is, that whole armies have frequently done amiss. Whole battalions, at least, have been disgraced, and, in some cases, have had their colours, and the facings of their coats, taken from them. I do not say, that the army in Portugal, or any corps of it, is under a shade; -The General Junta appear to have dibut, I do say, that we have nothing to do, rected their attention chiefly to the keeping in the way of evidence, with the opinions of of the people quiet; to the maintaining of any of the generals employed upon that ser-order and tranquillity;" to the represvice. It is impossible, that such an Inquiry can prove satisfactory to any man, who really wishes for satisfaction. There may be men, who will feign that they are satisfied, that all is well, though they hear of the "Duc d'Abrantes having again taken possession of his Dukedom; but, the nation at large never will, and never can, and never ought to be satisfied, with any thing short of a fair, open, legal, and rigorous investigation into the causes, which have produced such disastrous effects. Parliament will, indeed, have full power to take the matter; up; and, if all other modes of legal investigation are refused us by the ministers, we shall look to that with great anxiety. The miud of the nation never was more decidedly

sing of all violences, proceeding from popular commotion. But, with their leave, this is not the way to oppose Buonaparte and his daring legions. The object of the Juuta is, doubtless, to nip, in time, the bud of insurrection; lest, in, the end, the people, proceeding from one step to another, overturn the whole system of the government, in church as well as in state, as was the case in France. But, the question is, is Buonaparte to be resisted by any means other than those of a general insurrection; a general lettingloose of the people? I think, that he is not; and that the nobles of Spain have to choose, whether they will see king Jo. seph upon the throne, or see the people left to act as they please. There wanted, in

Spain, a renovation of character; an entirely new spirit excited; new talents called forth from obscurity. Therefore, if the nobles have assembled in a Junta, and are endeavouring to keep the people quiet; to preserve" order and tranquillity," they, in my view of the matter, are taking precisely the wrong course. It is, in that case, little more than the old government, administered by deputy, under which, it is my decided opinion, that, sooner or later, Spain must fall.

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It is not cautiousness that is now wanted in Spain. It is vigour; it is activity; it is great daring; it is enthusiasm. Anger, resentment, revenge; every feeling that leads to violence. These are wanted in Spain. With these Buonaparte may be resisted; but, without them, it seems to me that he cannot.- -There is one decree, or edict, of this General Junta, which, if it be authentic, it is impossible not to forebode great evil. I men that, whereby they attempt to put a stop to what they call the licentiousness of the press." If the press assault only Buonaparte and his friends, it is evident. that it cannot be too unshackled. Why attempt to check it, unless it be feared, that it will produce what is thought to be mischief, in Spain ? And, if, so soon, the Junta itself be afraid of the press, the reader will easily suppose, that much of a change is not in contemplation, a fact which, the moment it is discovered by the people, will admonish them not to be very lavish of their blood. I must confess, that this little circumstance, this decree, for which the Junta will be, I dare say, greatly applauded by many, has, in my mind, excited very serious fears for the Spanish cause; because, if authentic, it argues a distrust of the people, and an opinion, on the part of the Junta, that the country is to be defended by the old ordinary means; than which, I am convinced, the result will prove nothing in the world to be more erroneous.- As to the check, or the

defeat, for such I fear it is, that General Blake has received, I think nothing at all of it. How many such defeats did the French experience, at the out-set of their revolutionary war? They rose more powerful after each defeat. It is true, that there is some little difference between the assailants of the Spaniards and those of the revolutionary French. Yet, this I do not value, if the Spaniards have a spirit like that of the French; if they are animated by motives like those by which the French were animated. I cannot help think ing, that it was very unwise in us to send an envoy to the king of Spain. This was, in fact. one way of pointing out to the people

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of Spain the object, which we thought they should have in view, and for the effecting of which we would give our aid. I am afraid, that this tended to damp the rising spirit of the people. There are persons, I know, who, rather than see the French resisted by a patriotic insurrection, would see Joseph Buonaparte in safe possession of the throne, This is a fact, which has been all along evident enough, and which was, long ago, dwelt upon by me. But, such persons must be very unwise, very short-sighted; for, in the end, all the evils, which they may apprehend from the success of a patriotic insurrection, must come, and come swifter too, through another channel.- -As to our armies, in Spain, they really appear to be in a rather unsatisfactory state," at preThey are, however, under experienced commanders; and, let what will be their fate, they will have done their best to assist the cause. It is impossible, that either ministers or commanders can foresee every thing something must be left to luck; and, therefore, if the expedition should fail, under Generals MOORE and BAIRD, I should not, from the bare circumstance of failure, be disposed to blame the ministers.—In the two Morning Chronicles of Tuesday and Wednesday last, there appeared some very spirited and able articles upon the conduct of the ministers, with regard to the war in Spain and Portugal. They are well worth reading; but, I do not agree with the writer, that it was so easy a matter to know precisely what ought to be done, at the time when the expeditions were first sent out. Let the ministers have all the blame that is their due, but no more. It is the fashion, because it accords so well with party motives, never to blame the commanders, but always to blame the ministers. This is not only unjust in itself, but it has a very mischievous tendency, as to the conduct of those commanders, who, be that conduct what it may, are sure to meet with, at least, an indirect defence, from one party or the other. It is not so in the French service, where the commander is looked to, and nobody but the commander. There is nobody found to accuse the war-minister of Bot sending him to the right point, or of not supplying him with horses or provisions. The fact is, we have nothing but the parade of military service. We have no really military notions; for, if we had, we never should endure complaints against the minis try for having "exposed a general to diffi culty and danger," the existence of which are always implied when men talk of war. -That ten thousand English troops

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should, at a moment like this, be, as the Morning Post states, necessary to curb "the refractory disposition of certain class"es of the Portuguese," is, indeed, matter for serious reflection; for, in the first place, the refractory" must, if this necessity do really exist, be the most powerful part of the nation; otherwise, they might be "curbed" by the part, who are not refractory. Then, what is the mark of this refractoriness? it a disposition favourable to the French? Is it a spirit of hostility to the Prince Regent or the old government? Or is it a dislike to the English authority? One or the other of these, I think, it must be. If the latter, it is quite evident that to withdraw our troops and our authority is the only effectual way of removing the necessity of keeping troops locked up in Portugal; and, if either of the former, it would, I think, puzzle the Morning Post to assign any probable good that will arise from keeping them there. To cherish, or defend, a people against their will, is a most difficult as well as a most ungrateful task. It is a task, which, from the nature of things, can never be attended with success.

Is it not a strange thing, that, amongst all the numerous nations, who have been subdued and plundered by the French, there has never yet appeared one, that has demonstrated any great degree of anxiety for the return of their former rulers? Some few have fought a little to keep the French out; but, when once in, there is scarcely any people that have discovered any very strong wish to get them out again. Who would not have supposed, that the people of Portagal, for instance, would have been half mad with joy at their "deliverance?" Who would not have expected to see them vie with each other in eagerness to obtain a return of the ancient order of things? Who would have imagined it likely to be neces sary for us to keep ten thousand men in the country, "to curb the refractory disposition "of certain classes" of a people, just delivered from the grasp of the French, and restored to the rule of the representatives of their "beloved sovereign"? I should like to hear the sapient editor of the Morning Post explain this political phenomenon; for it is a matter of vast importance with all those who study the science of government. AMERICAN STATES The election of the new President and Vice President, which has taken place before now, will, it is thought, terminate in favour of the Jefferson party, and in the election of MR. MADISON to the office of president. If so, the embargo will, probably, continue; but, the violations of it, the almost open defiance of

it; will not be less than they now are. We were told, that the Americans could starve the West India Islands. Those Islands were, perhaps, never much better supplied from America than they now are, and have been ever since the embargo was laid. The town of Halifax, in Nova Scotia, is become a grand depository for American produce, whence it is shipped to the West Indies. And, in fact, all that Mr. Jefferson and his bitter set have done, with a view of injuring England, has had no other effect than that of injuring his foolish constituents.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.The effect of the American Embargo puts one in mind of the alarm of the "Barley-Growers," who are now selling at from 50 to 60 shillings a quarter that corn, which they were afraid would sink below 37 shillings a quarter; and who, upon seeing the ports in the Baltic and in America closed against us, were seized with a dread, that we should be starved in consequence of being able to convert into bread 300,000. quarters a year of that corn of our own growth, which we formerly employed in making spirituous liquors! I defy all the world, the readers of the Morning Post not excepted, to produce me an instance of folly equal to this. Mr. Wakefield denied me the privilege of judging upon such a subject, because I was not a practical farmer. Just as if it was necessary for a man to be a good hand at ploughing and sowing, in order to be certain that 300,000 quarters of bread corn would add to the food of the nation. It was a question of such plain common sense, that, to come to a right decision, their required neither experience nor reason. Barley must now be dear till next harvest; so that, at any rate, there is one year for the BarleyGrowers, free of that mischief, which they really did, or affected to, anticipate.

** A letter from LORD ANSON to the Freeholders of Staffordshire is inserted, because it is right that my readers, who have seen the letter of A. B. should see, that that nobleman had it not in his power to be present at the county meeting.

The Income of the DUKE OF YORK I do not state this week, because my intention is to publish, along with it, the whole of the act of parliament, granting him the estate in Surrey, and which is too long to be inserted, except in a double number.

MAJOR HOGAN does not answer my request. I have a letter before me, saying, that, next week, "the publisher of Major Hogan's Appeal will send me a letter upon

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