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of action on the Pyrenees; that it does ac- der of the French at discretion, and that * - - hear upon this subject, that it was perfectly 19 stoul..te moreover that no inquiry o genteel and well-bred to treat Junot and his

tually give the French a large and well appointed disposable force which they would not otherwise have possessed;—these considerations are to be regarded as trifling when compared to the main object.—“ We have got Portugal, though not all belonging to it: we have got rid of the French there ; no matter what becomes of them—charity begins at home – and if these same French should march over the Pyrenees and help to beat the Spanish Patriots, why we are very sorry for it, but cur business was to get them out of Portugal: and as to the few little advantages which the French obtained in the course of the negociation and in wording the Conventions, besides that they also are very subordinate considerations, is it our fault that Kellermann was the best negociator of the two Sir Arthur is a soldier, not a statesman ; he has shewn that he could fight and beat the French too ; is he to be blamed because he cannot wicki the pen as well as the sword, or because Kellermann, who is probably some dull plodding German as his name indicates, and never fought a successful battle in his life, should get and keep the whip hand of him in the course of a long, intricate, and most difficult negociation : "---This, I make no doubt, is the sort of reasoning with which we shall be hereafter edified. But it will not, I dare say, Sir, have escaped your observation, that your correspondent C. has, in your last number, brought forward some “ secret motives, and those very strong ones, to influence the determination of our tommanners to agree to a conditional stor, ender.” This Mr. C. must surely be one of Sir Arthur's indiscreet injudicious friends, or he never would even have hinted at secret notives in a case, from which, of all ot".ers, secrecy seems most necessary to be banished. What, in the name of heaven, could be the secret inotives in such a case, unless they consisted in the very convenient, though not very honourable, preference given to the sort of service that was to follow the Conventions, over that which must have been undertaken to force Junot and his army to unconditional surrender As to C.'s quibbling about your expression of “ meat arrival,” it may, together with his other miserable shifts and subterfuges, be safely left to the corrective energy of your own pen, which has very properly characterized him and the cause in which he is embarked. The whose nation will bear you festimony that it did expect (and not without reason), that the next advices of any importance from the army would announce the surren

the vessel that brought those advices would also bring two or three of the principal French generals by way of a satople of what ours had been able to achieve—This, I can at least vouch, was the general sentment throughout the metropolis, and it should seem that the counties were to the full as sanguine.—But, since we are on the subject of “secret motives,” I will suggest for your consideration one which I think more likely than any other to have influenced the determination of our commanders; one which must not only have embarrassed them greatly at the time of framing the Conventions, but which will, if they are good courtiers as I take them to be, embar. rass them still more when they come to unfold their motives to the people of England. —Did you never hear, Mr. Cobbett, of such a thing as an IssTRUction to a commander drawn up with studied ambiguity, or so encumbered with a multitude of expletives— with paragraph within paragraph—parenthe. sis within parenthesis — hypothesis bril; upon hypothesis—and the whole so interlarded with ifs and luts that it might be construed any and every way save into a direct, clear, and positive meaning 2 And did you never hear, Sir, that Lord Castlereagh was famous for giving such Instructions 2 There is no act o any description for which a saving clause may not be fou: in such a dispatch ; and there is no clause in it by which any one act can be positives justified. Yet it is such a dispatch under whose influence I am told our commanders acted; and if my information be correct, as I have no doubt it is, their embarrassment, as to what defence they shall set up, will be most naturally accounted for.—But, Sir, let us now look a little farther forward into the consequences of this business; let ts sec whether it be not possible to extract some eventual good out of the evil that we thus grievously lament. I quite agree with you, that to lose our time in fruitless whining and complaints is to act in a manner very unbecoming men and good citizens. We are, if we do our duty, to see if some practical good may not hereafter result from the confidence of the nation having been thus shamefully abosed.— We know from the language of the throne that an inquiry is to take place. Whatever may be the sentence pronounced in a military view, it must be obvious to every body that the source of the evil is not altogether of a military natore, and that it is one which a n:litary court of inquiry is not very likely to notice or to animadvert upon with much

harshness.--What I allude to, Sir, is the practice that has obtained of late years of military and naval commanders negociating and binding their country to stipulations which are altogether beyond the competency of their functions. It is a question in my mind how far the country is, in honour and good faith, obliged to abide by conditions thus subscribed to. I am very much of opinion that the country is under no such obligetion; for if you carry the same principle but a little farther, it would be a necessary consequence that if Lord Cathcart, or Gen. Whitelocke, or Sir H. Dalrymple, or any ether of your Convention-making generals had, besides giving up the advantages they respectively possessed, chosen to surrender Portsmouth, or Chatham lines, we must equally have been bound to admit an enemy's garrison into them. The Duke of York's stipulating for the surrender of 8,000 French prisoners who were well and securely lodged in our prison-ships and barracks does come as near as possible to such a supposition. But if this be a question open for the disSussions of the learned in the law of nations, I imagine that it is not a matter of doubt whether it would be better to restrict

2ur generals in future from committing

their country by similar engagement.--Some discretionary power is no doubt necessary to the command of an army : but then that power should be as much as possible of a military nature. The extreme of an evil is in some cases its best cure ; and it will now be felt that there is a point beyond which a general may not transgress the limits of his command.--To apply this observation to the Conventions, I would ask, what could be so entirely extra-military, so :xclusively a political consideration as the acknowledgement contained in the first article of Sir A. Wellesley's armistice, of his imperial and royal majesty Napoleon I. It is no matter whether the said Napoleon would or would not, at some future day, have been acknowledged by us in that capacity; it could never belong to a general commanding an army on a foreign station to determine the time or mode of so doing.— If I am told that it is an unmeaning couplimentary article, and that Buonaparte is not the more an emperor because Sir A. Wellesley chose to call him so, I have only to reply, then why do not you upon the same plea get rid of the Conventious altogether 2 -Again, what could be more an un-military and political concern than the inquiry into the conduct of the Portuguese during the French occupation of their country

this sort should be made, was absolutely to say to ourally the Prince Regent, “You shall be no longer master of your country We have done yout he favour of driving out the French for you, but you have no business to inquire how they came there, or by whom they have been aided or abetted. You shall be nominal sovereign of Portugal, but we will carry on the police for you."— In short, it is as completely dethroñing the Prince Regent as if we had sent him word that he should not return to Europe now that he has a comfortable home at the Bra. zils.-You, Sir, have asked a very pertinent question : “What would the French covernment have done had its generals made such a Convention as ours have made : " In the first place, Buonaparte, who knows how to choose his men, would l'arily imave employed a general capable of such a transaction ; or if, from favouritism or any family consideration, –for these do sometimes prevail at St. Cloud also,-he did send such a person to command an army; he would have. placed a proper check upon him in the second in command, or in the chief of the staff. If, however, after all, such an act had been conmitted, I have very little doubt that he would have instantly disgraced all the parties concerned in it. The warning he has given Dupont of what is to be his fate sufficientiy indicates what would have been his conduct in the case you have contemplated.— I think then, Sir, that some practical good may arise out of the Conventions; because I think that they will serve as a warning to ministers what Instructions they give generals; and as a

| warning to generals not to exceed the pow

ers intrusted to them. They must, I think, be productive of a new system in these respects; for even if Lord Castlereagh should, for the misfortune of the country, continue to direct the war department, he must still see that he will, in the end, run too great a risk should he always give obscure unintelligible instructions, and should his generals,

for want of a better guide, always blunder

over their business in the way we have so often witHessed.—The inquiry that will take place about the Portugal Conventions will set these matters in their proper light, and it will also, I trust, expose to public reprobation that other part of our intercourse with foreign powers, which, under the specious name of concilia,ion, moderation, &c. would sacrifice the dignity and often the best interests of the county to a mistaken notion of personal feeling and propriety.—I expect to

army in the manner we have done after having beat them in the field: that it was the bias of a great and generous mind, soaring above little narrow and vulgar national prejudices, to shew that as we were great so we could be merciful , and that it might conciliate the good-will of other countries—of France and of Russia, for instance—to let them see that when victorious we could set bounds to our triumphs, and not carry our resentment to extremes. You may believe me, Sir, it is not with this amiable part of the British character that the nations of the world want to be made acquainted. They give us full credit for disinterestedness, moderation, and generosity ; they know that we would never strike or insult a fallen enemy; but they are not so certain of our acting with that vigour that would convince both fiends and foes that we are not to be insulted with impunity; that we are resolved to obtain satisfaction proportioned to the injuries that we receive ; that our exertions will not slacken until the just object of our undertakings be accomplished; and that, at any rate, we are not to be gulled by the artifices of the first intriguer with whom we may happen to have to deal. This is what the people of the continent want to see ; they feel that instead of our being Machiavelists, as Buonapate calls us, all the Machiavelism is on

his side, and that we have too often carried

on our concerns with other powers with an awkwardness, and a want of systern bordering upon silliness.-They think that we make immense efforts to produce very trifling comparative benefits. The nation gives with profusion money and men; the government is at times aetive in employing them ; our soldiers and sailors fight most valiantly ; and yet, in the end, what does it all avail us * —We either fail in our object as at the Helder, or obtain it but partially as in the case of Portugal. What can this be owing to but to a defect or to a total want of system We see things through too small a medium, or we do not look far enough into the consequences of them. Hence it follows, that when we are successful, what with surprise and joy, we are so confused that we know not what to do next. —The actions of the 17th and 21st August, do infinite honour to the bravery of our troops, and we certainly were not behind-hand in bestowing a full measure of applause upon their commanders ; but it is clear to me that those actions will be noticed in history, more for the inadequate effects which they produced than for any credit that may be due to the personsengaged in them. It really seems as if a British gencral, going on the command of an ex

pedition, had no other thought in his head : than how he should land his army; when

that is done he must take time to look about

him ; and if unmolested by the enemy he

sits quietly down upon the shore to consume

the provisions brought for him in a fleet of victuallers. It is then fortunate if he does not think it necessary to send home for fresh instructions before he proceeds any farther. At length up comes the enemy—You ob. served, no doubt, at the time, that on the 21st August our army was the attacked not the attacking party; and I have been informed, from very credible authority, that our general knew so little of his opponent's movements, that the troops were three times put unde arms and as often dismissed in the night the 20th; and that it was only at six o'cloci in the morning, wien Junot's main body w seen within a very short distance of our that we discovered what his intentions real were.—If it had not been for Junot's adop ing the spirited resolution of marching out Li-bon to give us battle, he might, accord to our mode of proceeding, of which it having three different commanders-in-chido in the course of 36 hours is no immaterio o trait, have puzzled them all three so as haps to be at this moment in possession that capital. As it was, we were forced fight, and our soldiers fought as they alw: have done. But was it enough to beat t enemy in an encounter which in the sev years' war would have been considered as more than a sharp affair of advanced guar Where would Buonaparte now be, it, as the battle of Auerstadt, he bad sat him quietly down before the town, concluded armistice, and enjoyed for ten days tickling compliments which one of the ki of Prussia's generals might have paid him the bravery of his troops, or the distingus ed conduct of any part of them 2–Wh. is probable that the Prussians would have covered from their panic; collected th scattered corps; and taken up some positi in which to arrest the conqueror's march: all events they would not have been dev ed piecemeal, or compelled to surrender discretion, before they could reach any te ble position. But Buonaparte's business to take all possible advantage of his victe and to reach Berlin by the shortest ro Ours was to reach Lisbon. He marched distance in a shorter time than the Pruss Joe let the French escape and never stir

from our ground. He then exemplified to principle which we altogether neglect, zł the neglect of which is, in my opinion,

cause of much of our distress —With

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successful, he cries : “ Nothing is done hilst any thing remains to be done ; " and stantly his troops march on to farther connest and take rest only when their enemy utterly annihilated. We, on the contrary, ways take time to surfeit ourselves with joy ld congratulations; the enemy is always :tive, and after a due portion of expectation nd conjecture the public is astonished with he information that our first success not aving been followed up, it has been either junterbalanced by some success of the enely, or tarnished by some want of proper certion on our own part.—You, Sir, were

mongst those who approved of our proceed-.

gs last year towards Denmark. It was at‘mpted by men of high political consideraon in this country, to maintain that those roceedings alienated from us the affections f the continent. Sir, it was no such thing. he politicians on the continent, many even ho did not wish well to this country, were nanimous in exclaiming : “At last the Enlish are roused from their lethargy; at last ley assume the tone and attitude that bepmes them ; we shall now see, at least in \e north of Europe, something like a counrpoise to Buonaparte's overbearing anybion." They admired the wisdom of our lan, and would have admired the energy f the execution, if they had not seen s in the month of September drawing n our horns, and hiding ourselves within ur shells as if afraid of the cold of October nd November. They then thought that we ad put ourselves to a great expence, made n amazing uproar in Europe, and subjected lur moral character as a nation, at least to ome sort of imputation, without obtaining iny object adequate to so much risk.--If the Conventions, and the inquiry that is to be intituted concerning them, should lead to a correction of this most capital defect in our system of foreign policy, I shall think that the disgrace, which they have otherwise brought upon us, is not without its counter*ling advantage.—I am, yours, &c.—AN *GLisH MAN.—Oct. 18, 1803. Exposition of the practices AND MACHINATIONS w HICH LED TO THE USU RPATION OF THE CROWN of si' A IN, AND THE MEAN's A Do PTED BY THE EMPERo R OF THE FR EN CH To CAR RY IT IN To f X*ouTuos : BY DON PEDRO cew ALLos, FIRST seck ETARY of st ATE AND Dis*ATCHEs To HIs catholic MAJ f sty, **RDIN AND vii. (Continued from p. 640.) While these occupied the right bank of * Ebro, and appeared to have for their "lot the maintaining the communication

with Portugal, I entertained the hope that he would not abandon the sentiments of esteem and friendship which he had always manifested towards me. But when I perceived that his troops advanced towards my capital, I felt the urgency there was for collecting my army round my person, to present myself before my august ally in a manner worthy of the king of Spain. I should have removed all his doubts, and have secured my best interests. I gave orders to my troops to leave Portugal and Madrid, and I united them in various parts of my monarchy, not to abandon my subjects, but honourably to support the glory of my throne. Besides, my extensive experience convinced me that the emperol of the French might very well entertain wishes conforma. ble to his particular interest, and to the policy of the vast system of the Continent, . but which might be inconsistent with the interests of my house. What was, in such circumstances, your conduct 2 You introduced disorder into my palace, and infused a spirit of mutiny into my body guard, against my person. Your father was your prisoner; my prime minister, whom I had appointed and adopted into my family, covered with blood, was driven from one danger to another. You dishonoured my grey hairs— you despoiled me of the crown, possessed with glory by my ancestors, which they had preserved without a stain. You seated yourself upon my throne, and placed yourself at the disposa' of the people of Madrid, and of foreign troops, who were then entering the capital.—The conspiracy of the Escurial had already accomplished its purposes. The acts of my administration were brought into public contempt. Old, and oppressed by infirmity, I was not able to surmount this new misfortune. I resorted to the emperor of the French, not as a king at the head of my troops, surrounded by the pomp of royalty ; but as an unhappy and abandoned prince. I have found refuge and protection in the midst of his camp. I owe to him my own life, that of the queen and that of the prime minister. I have arrived at last at Bayonne, and you have so conducted this negociation, that every thing depends upon the mediation and protection of this great prince. -The idea of resorting to popular agitation would tend to the run of Spain, and expose yourself, my kingdom, my subjects, and my family, to the most horrible catastrophes. My heart has been fully unfolded to the emperor; he knows all the injuries I have received, and the violence that has been done to me; he has declared to me, that you sha, never be acknowledged as king, and that the enemy of his father can never acquire the confidence of foreign states. He has, in addition to this, shewn me letters written with your own hand. which clearly shew your aversion to France, —Things being thus situated, my rights are clear, and my duties are much more so. It is incumbent on me to prevent the shedding of the blood of my subjects, to do nothing at the conclosion of my career, which shall carry fire and sword into every part of Spain, and reduce it to the most horrible misery. Certainly, if faithful to your primary obligations, and to the feelings of nature, you had rejected those perfidious counsels, and placed yourself constantly at thy side, for the defence of your father, you had waitei the regular course of nature, which would bave clevated you in a few years to the rank of royalty I should have been able to conciliate the policy and interests of Spain, with that of all. For six months, no doubt, matters have been in a critical situation; but notwithstanding such difficulties, I should have obtained the support of my subjects; I should have availed myself of the weak means which yet remained to me, of the moral aid which I should have acquired, meeting always my ally with suitable dignity, to whom I never gave cause of complaint ; and an arrangement would have been made which would have accommodated the interests of my subjects to those of my family. But in tearing from my head the crown, you have not preserved it for yourself; you have taken from it all that is august and sacred in the eyes of mankind.— Your behaviour with respect to ine, your intercepted letters, have put a brazen barrier between yourself and the throue of Spain, and it is neither your own interest nor that of the country that you should reign in it. Avoid lighting a fire which will unavoidably cause your complete rain, and the degradation of Spain.—I am king by the right given me by my forefathers: my abdication was the result of force and violence; I have nothing to receive from you ; nor can I consent to the convocation of the cortes, an additional absurdity, suggested by the inexperienced persons who attend you.-I have reiguel for the happiness of my subjects, an I do not wish to bequeath them civil war, mutiny, popular juntas, and revolution. Every thing should be done for the people, and nothing by the people : to forget this maxim, were to become the accoin plice of all the crimes that must follow

its neglect. I have sacrifice i the whole of my life to my people; and in the advance: age to which I have arrived, I shall do no. thing in opposition to their religion, the: tranquility, and their hoppiness. I have reigned for them; I will constantly occo; myself for their sakes ; I will forget all my sacrifices; and when at last I shall be coi. vinced that the religion of Spain, the into grity of her provinces, her topolo, her privileges are preserved, I shall desceni, to the tomb, forgiving those who have em. bittered the last years of my life. —Date: from the imperial palace of Bayonne, call the Government Palace, M y 2, 1803. No. IX. Letter written by King Ferdina JTI. to his august Father, in answer the preceding. My honoured Father and Lord ; –I r ceived the letter that your majesty cond scended to write to me, dated yesterday, a I will endeavour to answer all the part lars with that moderation and respect whi is due to your majesty.—Your majes speaks, in the first place, with respect the alteration in your political conduct wards France, after the peace of Basle; an in truth, I believe there is no individual Spain who has complained of it; rather were unanimous in praising your majesty fi your confidence in, and fidelity to the psi ciples you had adopted. Mine, in partic lar, were entirely similar to your own; a I have given irrefragabio proofs of it fr the moment when your majesty ablicat the throne in nay favour.—Had the affair the Escurial, which your majesty states, 0. ginated in the hatred with which my wi inspired me against France, your ministe my beloved mother, and your royal se been examined with all the legal forms, would have evidently proved the contr Notwithstanding I had not the least in fluence, and no liberty beyond the shew it,-guarded, as I was, by donestics wh you put round me, yet the eleven counse lors chosen by your majesty were unani mously of opinion, that there was no groun for the accusation, and that the suppose criminals were innocent.—Your majos talks of the distrust created by the entrap of so many foreign troops into Spain; an that if your majesty recalled from Portug" your troops, and united those that were Malrid, at Aranjuez, and its neighbourhood. it was not to abandon your subjects, but to support the glory of the throne. (io be continued.)

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