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and too; eso 2 we call them slaves. Well, then, if we do not now make our cornplaints, we are in this dilemuna eitler we dare not complain, or we dare : if the former we are slaves ; if the later, we are the bases of hypocrites. Who will believe in the re. I to of our sorrow and indignation at the C, n entions in Portugal What Portugue-e or Spania, d or Swede will be sool •uough to give c. , it to aty of our noisy professions of regard for the interests of our allies : No one. Not a man of the three notions. We must do some iii:'s ; or, whatever we may think of ourselves, they will kok upon us as a people pretty fairly represented by the coovcution-making generals. To this we may make up our minds. The world will hear none of our excuses. They will not be able to hear the piteous stories of those who have places and pensions and contracts and jobs, who have sons to push forward, who have manifold, dependents for whom to provide. Of all these the world will hear nothing. The world knows that we have made a great, a loud, a furious clamour against the Conventions in Portugal; that world has been told that we are a people perfectly free ; and, if we do not act as well as make a mob-like noise, the world will have the good sense and

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with Spain took place, and when we attack

ed and siezed their richly-laden shops, before a declaration of war had been made. In the next place, to who in do we send him Why, the Gazette tells us, that “the king has “ been pleased to nominate and appoint the “ right hon. John Hookham Frere to be his “ majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister “ plenipotentiary to his catholic majesty Ferdinand the W11th, and has been pleased to ‘ direct him to reside in that character at the seat of the central and supreme Junta in “ Spain.” So. We do acknowledge, then, – that a man may be legally unkinged, and that another may be put up in his stead Thus is the doctrine of cashiering kings, whieh gave so much offence, some years ago; and the promulgation of which caused so many persous to be punished in England,

openly recognised by a solemn act of the government of England. Ferdinand and Charles are both alive ; they are both out of Spain ; they are both in France; both have abdicated the thu one in favour of the Buonaparte dynasty. Now, why do we prefer Ferdinatid to Charles Why simply for this reason, because the people, or some of them, say that they wish to have the former, while none of then, say that they wish to have the latter. It is pretended, that Ferdi. nand's right to the throne is foulsded upon the abdication which Charles made in his favour; but, Charles, the moment he was out of the hands of Ferdinand and his partizans, protested against that abdication, and declared that it was extorted from him with the knife at his throat. Upon that abdication, therefore, we can build no right for Ferdinand, without, by the same act, destroying the superstructure; for, if Ferdinand, by the abdication of Charles in his favour, became rightful sovereign of Spain, Joseph Buonaparte became the rightful sovereign of Spain in virtue of the abdication of Ferdinand. Both abdications I believe to have been extorted ; but, while we have a protest of the abdicating party against the former, we have none against the latter. Were he at liberty, we should, l dare say, have it ; but, we are not quite sure of that, while we are in actual possession of the protest of poor old Charles. It is clear, therefore, that, in point of hereditary right, Charles is king of Spain ; and that, in acknowledging the latter to be king, we have acknowledged a right in the people of Spain to cashie, their kings. But, the most interesting point is this : why do we choose to send an envoy to any king of Spain From the first I have feared, I have expressed iny fears, that the contest, as far as we were concerned, would be another contest for a king ; and, who can say how far the leading men in Spain may, by our interference, have been induced to make it a wer for a choice of kings, instead of a war of freedom against despotism 2 It was not, observe, until after our agents went to Spain, that there was much talk about Perdinand. Until then a reform of abuses was the main object which the people appeared to have in view ; and the public will recollect, that they spoke of their “ late infamous government,”, uncoupled with any exceptions whatever. It must be acknowledged, that an English minister is to consider, how, in this war, the exertions of England are to be made most effectually to contribute towards the permanent safety and greatness of England, provided no wrong be done to any

ally. If, therefore, it appeared, that to make war for Ferdinand was the most likely way of succeeding in this object, it was right to make war for him. Hot, I do not think, that this did appear "l'o me it has always appeared, that, for Spain to frustrate the views of Napoleon, to baffle and to mortify and to humble him, and to give an encouraging example to the rest of Europe, the war should have been a war of freedom against despotism. Between Joseph and Ferdinand many people will see but little difference; and many more will ask, what government could have been worse than that which the Spaniards themselves have declared to have been infamous It seems to me, therefore, that the English ministry ought to have wished that the names of Ferdinand and Charles should be totally left out of the contest.—It is not to be believed, that the people will fight and endure for the sake of either of their kings. They must perceive, that the result of the contest is of comparatively little importance to them; and, the monent they do so view the thing, there is an end to their exertions. -But, so think not Lloyds' and Whitehall. They are for a war for a king. Good luck to them ; but, they will be kind enough to excuse mé, if I feel a little less anxious for the fate of the man, who surrendered the sword of Francis I. to “His Serene Highness, the Grand Duke " of Berg,” than I felt for the fate of so mally millions of men, who appeared to me to be fighting for that freedom, which a set of degenerate despots had so long withheld from them. There has appeared, and will be inserted below if I have room, a Paper, entitled an Exposition of Facts, (relating to the usurpation of the crown of Soain by Napoleon) from the pen of DoN Proro Cevatios, who, it must be conlessed, has been most advantageously situated for the purpose, having been Secretary of State for foreign affairs, to the three kings, Charles, Ferdinand, and Joseph, and who is now in high favour, it would *m, with the Junta and with our people. Mr Pedro tells a tough story. Much too tough to be examined in the time that I have, at present, to spare for the purpose; but, I must say, even now, that there wants a good deal to convince me, that it is that “true and artless tale," that the London newspaper editors appear to think it. “A " man cannot serve two masters," says the Gospel; but, Don Pedro has served three. Bother me not, ye whining calumniators, with your insinuations that I dislike this man

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because he has exposed Buonaparte; insin ate or say or swear what you will, you shall never make me affect to believe what appears to me to be incredible, merely bec:) use it comes from a man who attacks Buonaparte. Falsehood is falsehood, if spoken of the devil himself. Don Pedro not only served three masters, but was confided in by all the three. He gives us an account of some conversations between him and Napoleon, and the Courier (I believe it is) observes, that we cannot have a better proof of his integrity, than the fact, tirat Napoleon reproached him for having too much of that qualsy. May be so ; but, we really are, as yet, destitute of any proof of that fact ; unless we take Mr. Cevallos's assertions for proofs, as the country folks in the House used to do with those of Pitt. Of one fact, however, we are quite certain, and that is, that Mr. Cevallos was chosen by this same Napoleon to be a confidential

servant of king Joseph ; and, I ask the reader,

whether he believes, that this choice would have been made, if Napoleon had found the person chosen to be so firmly attached to his honour and to the welfare of Spain —Mr. Cevallos will have very much to answer me; but, for the present I shall content myself with a question or two. 1st. Was he carried by force to Bayonne 2d. If he was not, how came he to repair thither at the request of Napoleon, after having been so intimately acquainted with all the previous machinations and detestable perfidies of Napoleon 3d. How came he, who was the confidential minister of Ferdinand, to suffer that king to go to Bayonne without using his utmost endeavours to prevent it 4th. How came Ferdinand to give up the sword of Francis I. to the “Grand Duke of Berg " And, 5th, how came Mr. Cevallos himself to write and publish paper upon paper, addressed to the people of Spain, assuring them that all their jealousies of the French were groundless, for that the views of the Emperor were of the most friendly and affectionate sort : and this, too, at a time, when the “machinations” were going on, and when he was intimately acquainted with those snachinations 2 When Mr. Cevallos, or any one for him, has answered these questions, I have some more ready to put to him. But, whatever may have been the conduct of Buonaparte; however wicked and perfidious that may have been. I think, that it is evident enough, that Mr. Cevallos has all along had a desire to be upon the strongest side; that he deserted Joseph, because he

was persuaded that he was become the weakest: and that the whole story, some - falsehood some touth, was written for the purpose of making his peace with the Spaniards and of again getting possession of power and enoument. Now, reader, divest yourself, for a moment, of the desire to hear Buouaparte accused of infatuous acts, and say, whether this be not, to all appearance, the real truth ; and, if that should be your opinion, you will not, I am persuaded, think that there is virtue enough in this Exposition to make it “a lever “ where with to raise the world against the Corsican Usurper; ” but will, perhaps, think with me, that the principles of political freedom, laid down as the basis of the cause in Spain, is the only lever, by which that nation, and, by their example, the rest of Europe, can be raised effectually to oppose a military despot. Aye, the truth is; the truth that speaks, with “voice “’trumpet-tongue," though those in power will not hear it, is, that to raise the world against the despotism of Napoleon, you must show the world, you must give the world to see and feel, something better than the despotism of Napoleon. Botley, 12ih Oct. 1808.

CoNvisor to N or Pontu GAL. Sir ;—st is impossible not to be satisfied, - for the most part, with the clear, candid, and able manner in which you have examined the Articles of the Convention of Łisbon, and stated your opinion on the several circumstances connected with it, as far as they are hitherto authenticated; and, although - you are very successful in applying the light to the flaws and hollow parts of several of the excuses urged in palliation of the act, you, nevertheless, do not appear to advance reasons sufficient to support your assertion, - “... that the people had a right to expect an unconditional surrendel.” After detailing the difficulties surmotuted, and advantages obtained at the battle of Vimiera, you say : : “When we are told all this, and were in-“ formed that immediately after this bril“ liant success, our army was augmented to “ nearly double what it had before been, * we naturally expected, that, by the next “ arrival seeing that the enemy could re* ceive no supplies by land or sea, we should “ beinformed of his surrender at discretion.” Now, I cannot see how this could naturally be expected by the next arrival. It was clear from the Igodom Gazette, announcing - ** {ot 'reagh, at Vimiera, that

bled to retire un

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concentrate his forces. Nay, the newspapers for several succeeding days contained invectives against Burrard for not permitting Wellesley to pursue and destroy the French army. And it is not necessary hete to inquire whether any, or what advantage, was to be obtained by the pursuit, or, if any favourable moment was neglected, to whom the crime of such neglect attaches. It is sufficient to the consideration of the present question, that the possibility of Junot's safe arrival in his strong hold was placed beyond all doubt on the 3d September, and re-echoed throughout the kingdom in the interval between the 3d and 17th September. You state, that Junot's army, after the battle, might be 10 000, and the English 30,000, or thereabouts, which is, perhaps, nearly correct The same scraps also, from which we ascertain that the cheek-scratched Ducks D'Abrantes retreated with 10,000 men, inform us that nearly 3,000 men were left in these strong places, and that 7,000 Portuguese soldiers were in the French service, men who never attempted to prevent Junot's returning to his entrenchments. There were besides 5,000 Russian soldiers, unoffending . neutrals certainly, men, who would not engage in active hostility, as some of the papers, have asserted; poor harmless creatures, who only confined 5000 Spanish soldiers on boar their ships! These, collectively, compose very formidable force ; and allowing f every exaggeration, there appears no reaso to doubt, but there were 20,000 men on whose active services Junot could rely. And I am even now entitled to ask, knowing th resolute and Tartar-like character of the Duke, and considering that his inninense. plunder was a most powerful motive to obstimate resistance, whether his situation was so deplorable and despair-creating, as to jus tify the public in expecting his surrender discretion by the next arrival; an arrival, recollect, which was looked for a week b fore the 17th September : I shall, however, examine the reasons adduced by you in support of this general opinion. You ask, “ since when did these places become so very strong? Junot found no difficulty in getting into them when he entered Portugal with the same army, which Wellesley told us he had beaten hollow, only a sew days before you made the Convention; nay, he marched into them, or ru-o ther over them. They have been quick then, it seems, in growing into places of such adamantine materials.” It is almost unnecessary to observe, that this is no procf. that the position was not strong when the Euglish army appeared before it; nay, it is

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no proof that it was not strong when Junot entered it at first ; and with you rests the Onus probandi. I do not purpose to enter into a detailed account of the circumtances under which Junot entered, and took pos session of Lisbon ; nor do I intend so quote the Prince .tegent's Manifesto, and a variety of other documents to prove how he could have been resisted ; and I am not aware of any reason why it may not be admitted, though contrary to the fact, that there was not, at the time Junot entered Portugal, one parapet in the whole kingdom, from behind wuich resistance could have been made with greater a vantage than in the open field, if resistance had been determined on. There cio, indeed, be no analogy between the sitiation of the French and English armies at the times they respectively entered the country. But since when did these places become so very strong There is no reason to be a stonished ; Junot has been in Portugal long enough, and has not wanted means, without supernatural aid or the interposition of a necromancer, to erect fortifications, from which to dislodge him by the next arrival would require all the skill of English of. ficers, and all the intrepidity of British soldiers. But, Sir, every account since Junot's arrival most fully concurred in representing him as particularly sedulous in repairing the old, and erecting new fortifications, and that he had rendered his position almost impregnable ; and I never saw any statement, which tended in the slightest degree to invalidate their claim to general belief; and, certainly, there were not a few individuals who, previous to Sir Arthur's landing, entertained very alarog apprehensions as to the result of the attack, if such had been found tinavoidable. You then ask, “Was Junot's army to be fed by ravens 2" I cannot immediately find the passaxe, but something to this effect. If you were as successful in proving that Junot was

not supplied with, nor had any means of .

procuring provisions for his army, as you are in exposing the hollow and groundless reasons entertained by our generals as to the impracticability of obtaining a supply for the English army, I should determine not to trouble you with these observations, although the question, as it respects the public, would still remain the stone. The newspapers, however, furnished us with various accounts of Junot's having collected a large quantity of provisions; and there was no great reason to believe, that a French army would starve

while there were between 2 and 300,000

Portuguese inhabitants in Lisbon, people whom we went to assist, not to distress, to

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defend, and not to assail. This was a most perplexing situation for our army, and Junot would take especial care to increase the difficulty to his utmost . Now, had the beforementioned statements of the inlinense strength of Junot's position, and his abundant supply of provisions been disproved instead of meeting with a confirmation, in the unqualified assertion, “that Junot could easily have consumed time in a protracted defence,” it would avail nothing to your argument. And unless you convince us that every individual of the public, who naturally expected an unconditional surrender was, in forming such opinion, convinced that Junct had no formidable entrenchments to fly to, and no supply of provisions, it will not assist you, if you can even prove that Sir Arthur could have marched into Lisbon with no more obstruction than one of your readers into Mr. Bagshaw's shop, and would have been as cordially and politely welcomed. You proceed—“Well, then,” say you, “if “ it be true that Sir Arthur Wellesley, with ‘‘ only 0000 men, beat the whole of the “ French force, in spite of all their advantages, have we not a right to expect, nay, “ had we not a right to claim and to de“mand, at the hands of the commander in “ Portugal, when he had 30,000 men, the ‘‘ capture or the total destruction of the French army in Portugal, and if any nation had any right to expect any thing, this nation had a right to expect a result such as here described ”— It is true policy in a general to whom the defence of a strong place is entrusted, and who has at his disposal a force amore than necessary for its

defence, to narch out and attack the army

advancing to the siege, if the circumstances, under which he is to nake the attack, are such as to justify him in expecting a favourable result ; arid in the event of his sustaining a repulse, retreat to his position is se. cure. On the contrary, it would evince a great want of skill in the general, -who would march out when his force was scarcely sufficient to garrison the place, where success was not certain. Junot, in his plan of attack on the 21:t, and in his resistance at Roleia, appears to have been perfectly satisfied that he should succeed. It fortunately was not the case, but his retreat was not prevented. What was the effect The English army was enabled to blockade him, and

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the field, had successfully defended a fortified place; but those of more recent occurrence, will perhaps be more convincing. We have not yet ceased to deplore the fate and admire the courage of the Spaniards, defeated at Rio Seco, and our tongues still vibrate with the praises of the undisciplined defenders of Valencia, Geroná, and Saragossa ; places certainly not more formidable than the forts and entrenchments of Portugal. Now, I do not mean to insinuate that our troops could not reduce Junot ; but their amounting to 30,000 would not prevent less bloodshed. Do you believe, that if Lisle, Maestricht, or Brissac, were pro

rly garrisoned and commanded, that the to. army would experience less loss, if they were ten times the number of the blockaded garrison 2 We also know, that in the battle of the 17th, when our army forced the passes of Roleia, only 6000 men could be brought to bear ; and it is probable, that if Loison and Laborde had effected their junction before the attack was made, we should have experienced a very alarming loss... I think no one will deny, that the public had the means of satisfactorily ascertaining that Junot effected his retreat after the battle of the 21st; that the places to which he retired were strong by nature and art; that he had a plentiful supply of provisions, and that his force after his defeat was still formidable; and the probability of reducing him not much greater than when the forces first sailed, recollecting, that at that time it was generally reported and believed, that Sir Arthur Wellesley would land at Peniche, and immediately invest the place. Impressed with the belief of these facts, I really cannot see how the public could anticipate the result, such as they did anticipate, and as you have related, till the public will declare that conditions might not be granted which would be

preferable to the eertainty of great loss in,

the attack of these places, and the chance of failure; till it can be proved that it was the public conviction, that our army would have been able to continue the blockade without much difficulty, that their services were not wanted in any other quarter; till, in short, it can be proved, that the public was certain that there were no secret motives, and those very strong ones, to influence the determination of our commanders to agree to a conditional surrender. So far, I think, you will allow unconditional surrender could not reasonably be expected by the public, and that our commanders were, so far, prematurely disgraced; but I most perfectly concur with the now

general opinion, that except in the most dis. tressing circumstances, nothing can justify our commanders for having acceded to the present Convention ; it is, I fear, a Convention which has affixed to the British army and nation a stigma so indelible, that no event, however favourable, can wholly remove it, or provent its suggesting the most agonizing reflections. We are, however, well aware, that great public calamities and individual tuisfortunes, have not unfrequent. ly given rise to, or been accompanied by circumstances which, in the progress of time, have very materially contributed to diminish the pernicious effects apprehendel at their occurrence; and it is some conso. lation, that the people have not suffere: their reputation to be sullied without a mur. mur; that the same page of history which records this infamous and insulting com. tion, will also relate the virtuous indignation felt by a people jealous of their honour; will rouse the lethargic, and animate the torpid of succeeding ages, by a glowing de. scription of the patriotism which prevailed in every rank; will detail the people's re. hement and unceasing cries for vengeance on those who dared to degrade their charac. ter, and debase their dignity. And although it is highly probable, that the immediate consequences of this Convention will to highly disastrous, it is not impossible tha it may produce some beneficial effects. " will shew the world the feelings and chi: racter of Englishmen; it will powerful instruct our military commanders, that the honour of a nation is not to be surrendered with impunity. Since the commencement of the French revolution, no treachers however base, no infamy however atrocious (and unfortunately many equally, nay, mor: iniquitous than the Convention of Lisbon may be enumerated), ever produced in the countries where they happened complaints so general and unqualified as in the present instance. The consideration of these circumstances will afford more than a transient gleam amidst the immense gloom; will prove more serviceable than a solitary spar, when threatening waves surround. I fee confident that I have been considerably too prolix and tedious, that many of my re. marks are totally unnecessary, and other not sufficiently elucidated; but as I have not time to condense and arrange them, I shall leave them to your candid and unpre: judiced consideration. I cannot, however, conclude without expressing my regret, this any circumstances should exist which could prevent our having, what we certainly very : much wanted, and which you have energo

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