Imágenes de página
PDF
ePub

Has there appeared one with the name of either the writer or the receiver? No: and the man, who, in the letter before me, takes upon him to argue upon the pretended facts contained in those letters; takes upon him to assert that their authors are all persons of high honour; even this man has the prudence not to favour either me or the public with his name. Is it after this fashion that I proceed? Have I dealt in such nameless, unowned, bastard-like documents? No: I have taken the official papers, have reasoned from their contents, and have, as premises, resorted to no facts, which are not universally admitted to be true.

By way of conclusion, I will point out a light, in which this pretended protest did not before strike me, and in which it does not appear to have stricken even the editor of the Times news-paper, who has displayed so much acuteness and literary powers of every kind, in the course of this interesting discussion.The statement of the friends of Wellesley, which statement is, in substance, repeated by my correspondent, is this:

Obedience is the soul of an army; a commander of an army must be as absolute as the Grand Turk; Sir Arthur Wellesley has been brought up in the school of obedience; he knew how great an injury it must be to the service, if he publickly protested against the convention; and, therefore, he confined his opposition to a protest privately made to the commander in chief. This is what they have said in his defence, over and over again, in various forms of words. Now, then, without asking whether the Wellesleys were remarkable for their obedience to the East India Directors, let us put the sincerity of this defence to the test. He protested privately, lest, by a public protest, he should create a division in the army, and thereby do great injury to the service. Now, ye canting hypocrites, if such were the fact and such the motive, how came you in possession of the knowledge of this protest? You are his close friends, perchatice, and so he wrote home, unlocking his bosom to you, easing his agonized heart by communicating to you the proof of his innocence? No. This will not do; this will not serve your turn; for, you have told us before, that the facts relating to this protest have been communicated by the of fuers of the army. So that, taking the whole of your own statement as true; admitting all that you assert, Wellesley, who was convinced that the making of a public protest would be greatly injurious to the service, made a private protest to the commander-in-chief, and then, made an underhand

communication of that protest to the officers of the army. Attempt no shuffle, I beseech you. Let your friend be where he is. You have already besmeared him from head to foot; and, if your efforts at whitewashing are continued much longer, he will come out of your hands as black as a crow.

SPAIN. Upon the affairs of this now most interesting part of the world there is a letter, written by Major Cartwright, and published in the last number of the Register, to which I beg leave to refer the reader. He will there see how the people of Spain for merly thought and with what spirit they acted, in matters relating to domestic freedom. It is surprizing how strong a resemblance there is between what they sought to establish, in the reign of Charles V, and what was established in England a century later. I sincerely wish, that Major Cart wright, who with the experience of threescore, writes with the clearness and the vigour of the prime of life, and whose reasoning and eloquence come recommended by unquestionable disinterestedness and integrity, may succeed in his zealous and unwearied endeavours to rouse the feelings and direct the judgment of the present patriots of Spain.--I am not, nor can any rational man be, without some very serious apprehensions as to the

result of the contest that is now about to begin; but, if a provisional government, capable of calling out and directing the force. of the country, be speedily organized, I shall have great hopes of final success, notwithstanding any reverses that may, at the out-set, be experienced by the Spaniards.. For, we seldom have heard of a whole people being subaned, if they were animated with one soul, and if that soul was bent upon obtaining freedom The thing to be most feared is, that this all-powerful motive may not universally prevail; that the nobles, or the priests, or both, may look beyond the immediate object of the struggle, and may be grudging in their offers to the people, aud also in point of confidence in their intercourse with them. If this should unhappily be the case; if the people should be treated with coolness, disgust will speedily succeed, the cause will soon fall to ruin, and those attacks, which in the other case, would have called forth the latent fire of patriotism, ta lent, and valour, will at once, extinguish every motive of resistance. It is quite shocking to think of an ancient nation consisting of so many millions of people being mad over to, and taken possession of by, a man who was, but yesterday, a person unknown in the world; but, he comes backed with

[ocr errors]

terrible power, and to resist that power there must be a motive, and an adequate motive too.In speaking of the operations of the war, the Fabian example of the Americans has been cited. But, we should bear in mind the vast difference in the circumstances. The nature of the two countries is, in the first place, very different. America was assailed by an enemy, who had all his troops, his horses, and his artillery, to send across the sea, a distance of, at least, a thousand leagues, and, it sometimes happened, that five or six months elapsed between the embarkation and the landing. Besides, the enemy whom America had to resist was of a very different character. We used no fire; we sacked no towns; we did not carry the torch in one hand and the sword in the other. Our generals were not Massenas and Junots. A standing toast at our head-quarters used to

be,

[ocr errors]

a long war and a merciful one." The Launeses do not give such toasts No: the Spaniards will want men very different from the Washingtons and the Lees. They will have to fight day after day and every day, and to withstand that terror, which the destructive progress of an army, accustomed to pillage and to all sorts of cruelty, cannot fail to inspire in the minds of the weaker part of the nation. We must not, therefore, conclude, that the Spaniards will succeed, because the Americans did. If, indeed, we could prevail upon Buonaparte to send against them such generals as we sent to America (and we might be able, perhaps, to point out some such for the service), the Spanish cause would be safe; but, as things are, it must be confessed, that the struggle is an object of the utmost anxiety; and, it beboves us to think betimes of what our measures ought to be, if the result should seat a Buonaparte upon the throne.

I

like not, I must confess, the seeming hank ering after FERDINAND VII. The Spaniards bave declared the late government to have been an infamous one. What sense is there, then, in their talk about a man, in whose person they must intend if they intend to do any thing with him) to restore that government? I do not understand this. He has abdicated the throne; he has given up his claims to the sovereignty of Spain, in terms as explicit as a man can possibly use. There appears to be something like infatuation in carrying on a bloody war for him, or in making his restoration any part of the objects of such a war. This is, with me, a chilling circumstance. It takes Fargely from the ardour I should feel in the Spanish cause; for, after all, it is the good of the world in general and of Spain and of

England in particular that one ought to have at heart. I observe, that, in several of our writers, a hatred of Napoleon is the predominant feeling; and, what is the worst of it, the far greater part of them do not discover hatred of him in his character of des pot, but in his character of conqueror. Now, it is, I presume, in the former cha racter, that he is the most decidedly enti tled to our hatred; but, then, the difficulty is, that there are other despots, whom we profess not to hate at all. We ourselves have been great conquerors in our day. There are the Nabob Viziers, the Nizams, the Sultauns, and a long list of sovereigns of one sort and another, whom we have conquered, whose territories we have invaded, and whose subjects we have taken to our selves, not forgetting some small portion of their property; and we have seen, that, instead of curses upon the head of the divers conquerors, we have heaped thanks, praises unbounded, and pensions and titles not a few. Come, come, then; let us not be so unjust as to hate and execrate this man in his character of conqueror. In his character of despot, with all my soul; in his character of despot-maker; in his character of ally of Russia of the rabble of rascals upon the Rhine; in this character I agree to him as much as any man living.If we hate him as a despot, we cannot wish to see a despotism, of any sort re-established in Spain. The name of the man who is to be at the head of the despotism, if a des potism it is to be, is of no consequence to the Spaniards, nor is of but very little conse quence to us. People have often carried on bloody wars for a choice of despots; but, then, each despot was present and active himself. In short, it is absurd to suppose, that, at this day, any nation will undergo fire and sword for the sake of n absent per son, whose former government they have called infamous; and, if this absurdity should be attempted to be persevered in, I think, it is very clear, that the Spaniards will be subdued.This, it seems to me, is the point, upon which the fate of Spain will turn. Uncommon, unheard-of, exer tions are required; new courage, new ta lents, new genius, are demanded. To call these forth powerful motives must exist, and these motives must make their way, at once, to the hearts of even the lowest or ders of the people. A choice of despots; a mere choice of persons to whom the peo ple are to be slaves, appears to me to be no motive at all; and hence I conclude, that, if the leaders in Spain persevere in professing to make war for the restoration of their former

despot, they will be defeated, and that Joseph Napoleon, though the son of a green-grocer, will stand at the head of their new family sovereigns. God forbid that this should be the case; but, if the struggle be made for no better purpose, the failure of the Spaniards will be a subject of regret with those only, whose fears of the conqueror have deprived them of the power of reflection. Botley, 6th October, 1809.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL. SIR;-Ought the firing of the Park and Tower guns to be considered as a signal of joy or of grief, Mr. Cobbett ? -Ought they ever to be fired, or can they be so, without an express order from the ministers? And when the public do hear these guns, are they bound to conclude that ministers see cause for rejoicing; that they are thus informed of the arrival of some glorious news; and that the firing of the guns is the means by which the ministers intend to convey to the people their own joy and exultation at the happy tidings they have received?Is nine o'clock at night an unusual hour for these guns to be fired?And if unusual, is it reasonable for the people to expect news unusually good and glorious?In such a case is it natural to be unusually anxious, and impatient for the Gazette? -The next question I would beg leave to ask you, Mr. Cobbett, is this Who is Sir Hew Dalrymple? This is a question I have in vain asked of all I am acquainted with, and I fear it is a question which will puzzle all the big wigs in this kingdom. There is no doubt, however, but that Junot and Kellermann could answer it. Sir Hew's name became immortal (to mention no one else at present) on the memorable 30th of Aug. last; a day which never can be forgotten. Who can wish to know more of Sir Hew? Read his Convention. Is that not enough? Is it the Commander-inChief, or the ministers who appoint, or ought to appoint the general, who is to act in the important situation of commander of 30,000 men; and to have the sole and entire disposal of so large and fine an army as the British forces in Portugal ?Are those who do appoint in such a case responsible, entirely, or in any degree, for the conduct of him whom they have appointed? If they are not responsible for his acts, who is? and to whom are the people to look for redress?-In selecting a general fit for a duty of so high, so important, and so honourable a nature, in the execution of which, the interests of the country at large, and the bouour of Great Britain, are so intimately

connected, should very great circumspection, much consideration, and infinite care and anxiety be shewn?-If that be so, and when a commander-in-chief of such an army is appointed, ought not his character to be perfectly well known, and his name quite familiar to the public? Should they not also be familiar with his former glory and exploits, with his talents, his vigour, his enterprise, and his prudence? Above all, ought not the army to be, (that is the soldiers) very well acquainted with him? Onght they not to have a confidence in him? Ought they not to feel that he is able to command them? Was there ever an occasion, when all these things should have been more particularly attended to than in selecting a general to command our brave troops in Portugal? Was it not upon the success of the first blow we were to strike in this glorious contest, that almost every thing depended? If it failed, and failed through dishonour and baseness, what could we expect? Had we a right any longer to look for trust or confidence on the Continent? Could the brave people in whose canse we were fighting look upon our military assistance, but with mistrust and apprehension? In effect, they might say Timeo Danaös et dona ferentes."now come, Mr Cobbett, to a very important part of the subject, and one which, at the present moment, occupies no small share of public attention; I mean the question with respect to Sir Hew and Sir Arthur, which I think will resolve itself into this: either that Sir Arthur is com pletely innocent, or infinitely more guilty than Sir Hew Dalrymple. Let us inquire the truth.- -Was the actual command taken from Sir Arthur the instant that the battle of Vimeira had terminated? And if 80,

Nor by whom was it taken? Certainly NOT Sir Hew, for his own dispatch declares the contrary, and begins thus: "[ "have the honour to inform your lordship, "that I landed in Portugal, and took the "command of the army, on Monday the "22d of Aug. the next day after the battle "of Vimeira." Now, then, we have the fact that Sir Hew only landed on the 22d. Who therefore had the command of our army, our victorious army, from the actual termination of hostilities on the 21st till the arrival at Cintra of Sir Hew on the 22d ? And what was done during that period? Upon the answer to these questions the whole will turn, Till we hear the contrary, we are bound to believe that Sir Arthur retained the command, I will, therefore ask, what was Sir Arthur doing? How was his

[ocr errors]

army employed, during that most important interval? His friends say, that he was burning to push on. Was he so? That pre. cious interval then, was so employed? Did he, then, after his splendid victory, and without losing an instant, give orders for the troops following up their well carried success, by immediate pursuit? Did he prove that he was burning to push on?" Did he instantly march towards Lisbon in order to cut off the retreat of the vanquished Junot (I beg his grace's pardon, I mean le Duc D'Abrantes) and in order to prevent the possibility of his concentrating his force in strong positions? Was, or was not, all or any of these things done? Was that very precious interval in any way made use of?

-I have not asserted that Sir Arthur did have the command during this period, but as we know that Sir Hew had not, it remains to be shewn whether epon this occasion the culprit was Sir Arthur, or Sir Harry, On the head of one or the other of these two, will fall the whole consequences resulting from the inactivity, or want of decision and promptness which then took place, which must have prevented our gallant army from intercepting the French from Lisbon, and from following up the decisive blow which had been struck. The not having done which, and the not having intercepted the French from Lisbon, are allowed to be the only reasons why any Convention became necessary, (or rather was thought necessary) he therefore, (be he who he may) the man who produced this state of things, whose scandalous conduct rendered such a humiliating alternative necessary, is far more guilty than the man who merely ratified the damned agreement. -Whilst I am always for permitting fully "Palmam qui meruit ferat," at the same time I am equally desirous that Culpam qui meruit ferat. And grieved as I should be to blast the fresh laurels on the victorious brow of Sir Arthur, still, justice, and the injured honour of this country, require, that the culprit, be he who he may, should be openly dragged forth to public view and to public investigation. We have already seen that there must have been most criminal conduct somewhere between the 21st and the 220, that Sir Hew is completely out of that scrape, and that it is entirely between Sir Harry and Sir Arthor. Now let us suppose that Sir Harry, notwithstanding his generosity on the field of battle, did however supersede Sir Arthur the moment that the French began to retreat; and let us suppose that Sir Arthur's advice was rejected then, on the following day, the 22d, Sir Hew arrives, and takes the com

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

mand from Sir Harry, and then, as his dispatch says, a few hours after my arri"val, General Kellermann came in with a flag of truce, &c. and immediately after, "The inclosed contains the several articles. "at first agreed upon and signed by Si "Arthur Wellesley and General Keller. "mann."-Pray how were these articles agreed upon and signed by Sir Arthur, whom we have supposed to have had no command since the termination of the battle of Vimeira? Are we to suppose, that Sir Hew requested Sir Arthur, as being conversant with the then state of affairs, to enter into some terms of agreement; and are we to suppose that he was left entirely to his own judgment and discretion? Or, are we to suppose that on being so requested, he strongly urged to Sir Hew, the fatal consequences to be dreaded from any suspension of hostilities, that he implored him to listen to nothing short of unconditional surrender, and that he did every thing in his power to prevent any Convention from being acceded to ?— That Sir Hew then commanded him to sign that which his heart revolted at? Are we to suppose this?-And are we then to suppose that tamely and tacitly, with much gentle resignation, the gallant Sir Arthur obeyed the detested order?Now which of these two, is the most probable case? The former which supposes him to be only requested, and left to act according to his own judge ment; or the latter in which he is harshly commanded and left without a particle of discretionary power? Is it not on this, that

the whole merit or demerit of his conduct as to the signature rests? But I will now ask you, Mr. Cobbett, whether you would consider the request of a conimander-inchief as tantamount to a command? Next, whether a command even, should always, and without exception, be implicitly and tacitly obeyed? Should the command of a superior in no instance be departed from? Is there no latitude in any case allowed? And supposing all these to be answered by decla ring that nothing but passive and implicit obedience, can be tolerated by the military law, I would ask you, are there no situations in which it would be both honourable and even noble to disobey an express command? And if it might be honourable and even noble in some situations to disobey a command, might there not also be circumstances under which it would be both criminal and base to obey an express command? Indeed, your last Register has already declared your opinion on this subject. If any one insisted on this meek, humble, non-resisting obe. d:euce, as being indispensable according to.

the military law, I would beg to know where such womanish obedience could stop. For instance: when Kellermaun was fairly about it, stipulating on the one hand, and getting every stipulation as quickly agreed to on the other-no matter how framed or how worded-why did it not occur to him, to stipulate that the duke his master, with the whole of the French army, artillery, &c. should be immediately conveyed in English trans, orts to the cast of Ireland, (a frigate or 74 being provided for his gace) and there be disembarked with all their baggage, plunder, &c. &c. and be supplied with sixty rounds per man and gun? Why did this not occur to him? Of course it would have been agreed to, and by the convenient non-resisting rule of obedience, the victorious Sir Arthur would, good pliant soul, have put his hand, when so required, to such a stipulation!!! Having so done, he might then have resumed his situation as commanderin-chief in Ireland with great éclat-and with "No Popery" as his watch-word, have had the infinite satisfaction of again encountering his Portuguese antagonists on British ground. Indeed he might, in that case, possibly, have beheld, the imperial flag, of "his imperial and royal majesty Napoleon 1. waving over the turrets of Dublin castle! And his grace of Abrantes might have then himself become an emperor, a catholic emperor. Strange that all this did not occur to Kellermann; whose fertile and comprehensive mind seems to have been always " in "utrumque paratus."Since writing the bove, a most unfortunate letter of Sir Arthur's has made its appearance before the public, in which (mirabile dictu!) he even Congratulates the Portuguese on the Convenion, in which he sees 6. NOTHING REMARKABLE"!!! Gracious God! Can the conqueror of Vimeira think so? As to the conduct of ministers on this occasion, I think we have yet no reason to doubt, that they will act with the same vigour and promptitude, which, happily for this country, has already marked their career. It is but doing them justice to say, that as a whole (however much I may object to certain component parts) they have done more, and with more spirit, in their short reign, than any administration, which I can recollect, to have done in the same period. The hiring of the guns ought to be accounted fo:!I cannot entirely dismiss this subject without taking notice of what you have written, Mr. Cobbett, respecting it. And although that damned Convention in Portugal, which can never cease to be thought of with curses and secrations by every Englishman, and all

that is any way connected with it, fires me with indignation, and chills me with horror at the bare recollection, still, notwithstanding this, I have been able to read your excellent account of the ignominous transactions in that quarter with some degree of pleasure and satisfaction; a melancholy pleasure indeed and a mournful satisfaction! Your plain, but nervous language; your unbiassed, but manly conclusions; your just, but ardent colouring, give to the whole of your statement a tone and character, which cannot fail, even to the remotest times, to make every true Briton's heart bleed within him when he peruses it—whilst at those honest bursts of indignation which it here and there exhibits, he will be roused to madness, will feel his whole soul on fire, and will call down curses and vengeance on those who were the authors of his poor country's disgrace and ignominy. To have all the circumstances which preceded this fatal Convention (at which name "horresco referrens") faifly detailed, and recorded in clear and unambiguous language, was fit, was necessary. Every one who has read your last week's Register, will, if they do you justice, readily admit, that few could have executed this so well, and none, I am sure, better.- I am always, Sir,-P. C.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.

SIR, Amidst the burst of general and violent indignation, which is so universally felt by the whole nation, at the termination of the campaign in Portugal, and in which you so largely participate; permit me to point out some circumstances, which have been either designedly or inadvertently overlooked. All the public writers have poured out the most virulent invectives against every part of the Conventions, without once adverting to the very important advantages which have been gained. This is not just. I am not, Mr. Cobbett, about to defend the conventions; I think with you that they are highly disgraceful, to those in particular who concluded them, and, aiso, to the nation at large, as far as it can be considered as a party to them. But, let us not shut our eyes to the services which have been performed; let not a blind and inconsiderate passion, hurry us on to deprive ourselves. of the consolation of thinking, at least, that something really essential has been effected, We certainly had a just right to expect the absolute surrender of the French army. The general atrocity which has marked the conduct of the French in every part of Europe, and in Portugal in particular, together with the victories of Sir Arthur Wellesley, do-

« AnteriorContinuar »